

Christian Psychology:  
The Soul And  
The Body In Their  
Correlation And  
Contrast  
(1875)



Emanuel Swedenborg  
T. M. Gorman



# CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY:

THE SOUL AND THE BODY IN THEIR  
CORRELATION AND CONTRAST.

BEING

A NEW TRANSLATION OF SWEDENBORG'S TRACTATE

DE COMMERCIO ANIMÆ ET CORPORIS, &c., LONDINI, 1769.

WITH

Preface and Illustrative Notes.

BY

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Et formavit JEHOVAN DEUS hominem, pulverem ex humo, et inspiravit  
in nares ejus spiraculum vitarum, et factus homo in animam viventem.

Gen. ii. 7.

LONDON:

LONGMANS, GREEN, READER AND DYER,  
PATERNOSTER ROW.

1875.

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**CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY.**



### Ad Clerum.

NOVUM non potest intrare, ubi falsa prius ingenerata sunt, nisi haec eradicentur, quod fiet apud Clerum, et sic apud Laicum.— *Vera Christ. Relig.* § 784.



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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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THE small work, a new version of which is here presented to the reader, may be regarded, from a general point of view, as a highly condensed, yet sufficiently lucid, summary of the primary truths which the other voluminous writings of the author were specially designed to teach and illustrate. Its contents are, for the most part, of a strictly philosophical character, although it evidently contains several distinct indications of having been written with a definite theological aim. It sets forth in plain and simple terms, and in a spirit and style of transparent sincerity and candour, a statement of the author's peculiar position and claims, both as a philosopher and as a theologian. It was his own intimate and sacred conviction, that he had been entrusted with a Mission, of a most extraordinary and unprecedented character, to the moribund Christian Church of the benighted eighteenth century.

Owing to its brevity and clearness, as well as to the vast range of thought implied in a study of the high and noble subject of which it treats, the little Tractate referred to seemed, on the whole, to be well adapted to serve as a general introduction to the methodical study of

a body of writings in which, it is believed, will be found a complete system of reasoned and demonstrated truths, in the closely allied spheres of philosophy and theology. It may, perhaps, be said without offence, that up to the present time little if anything is accurately known, even among the more studious portion of the reading public, respecting the new and wonderful forms of truth herein brought to light.

The extensive and varied results of rigidly consecutive thought, on subjects so profound and so far removed from common apprehension, cannot be expected to possess any real and living interest for that large, and, in the present day, probably increasing class of readers who 'never exercise their judgment on what comes before them, in the way of determining whether it be conclusive and holds.'\*

Not only in essence but even in form, the author's works are such as to repel all readers who are not sedulously intent on attaining to clearer and higher aspects of truth. They will be found replete with analyses of transcendant sublimity, and disquisitions of exquisite subtlety and beauty, on the most exalted and sacred of all themes of human contemplation. They treat of the being, essence, and attributes of the one supreme Author and Upholder of the universe; of man as created and made in the image and likeness of God;

\* Bishop Butler, *Preface to Sermons*.



of the eternal and immutable laws of the Divine economy and government from age to age; of the intimately conjoined and correspondent worlds of mind and matter, with their amazing variety of causes, forces, and phenomena. In breadth and depth of mental grasp, in comprehensiveness of plan, and in the consistent and continuous development of first principles and truths, these remarkable writings may be said to stand apart, and to be without parallel, in the history of human speculation.

There is too much reason to apprehend, that many for whom the investigation of subjects so truly akin to the highest and noblest faculties of the mind, possesses a special and peculiar attraction, have been hitherto deterred, by the influence of prevailing misconceptions and prejudices, from forming an acquaintance *at first hand* with writings which will be found, on examination, to be well worthy of the most careful study, in these days of increasing scepticisms, religious indifference, and worldliness.\*

\* An unhappy instance of the grave injustice often inflicted upon great and good men, with what deserves to be called culpable heedlessness, by the too common practice of procuring information on certain subjects at *second hand*, is afforded by a recently published *Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology*, edited by the Rev. J. H. Blunt. The account of the 'system' of Swedenborg with which the readers of that work have been furnished, is pervaded by errors and misrepresentations so strangely absurd, that were it not

To those who from mere curiosity, if from no higher and worthier motive, may wish to obtain, to a certain extent, trustworthy information on a subject of the very first importance in its own domain, it is hoped that the present imperfect endeavour may furnish some small amount of help. An attempt has been made to point out, in a general way, a few of the more obvious relations, and even affinities, which appear to exist between the clearly established conclusions of modern research, in various departments of human

for the sacredness of the subjects involved, they could excite no other feeling than that of ridicule. How such statements came to be made, can only be imagined, apart from the supposition of unworthy motives, by charitably believing that the writer of the article had never read a line of the author with whose 'system' he undertook to make his readers superficially acquainted. It becomes a duty, then, to remind the reader that the misleading compilation in question, is allowed to appear in a publication (in other respects of much merit and value), the professed object of which is expressly declared in the following terms:— 'The writers of all the Essays have endeavoured to make them sufficiently exhaustive to render it unnecessary for the majority of readers to go further for information,' &c. And as to the principles according to which the work was to have been conducted, the Editor and his coadjutors declare that they 'have carefully avoided any party bias.' To what cause, then, is it allowable to attribute the extraordinary disregard of accuracy evinced by this writer! Instead of facts, easily obtained by direct reference to the original sources, he has preferred to give his reader a travesty of the subject in question so absurd as to excite a strong impression, that his object was to create merriment, rather than afford instruction. This is certainly not the part of a sincere and conscientious compiler, especially when the subject involved happens to be, as in the present case, of paramount importance to the interests of Revealed Religion.

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inquiry, and the complete system of rational truth taught by this pre-eminently Christian philosopher.

The brochure on the *Commerce between the soul and the body*, modestly styled by its author a 'brief lucubration,' would appear to have been intended as a reply to certain pressing inquiries made by the once celebrated Kant. The special point, on which information was so eagerly desired, had reference to a remarkable occurrence alleged to have taken place between the Queen of Sweden and Swedenborg, the reality of which, according to the united testimony of the most competent and truthful witnesses, could not be called in question. The alleged extraordinary incident was only one of several of a similar kind which went to prove conclusively the Swedish Assessor's power of communicating with the unseen world. In the words of Kant himself, after a careful scrutiny of the facts, this evidence 'was sufficient to set the assertion respecting Swedenborg's extraordinary gift beyond all possibility of doubt.'

The reply, if indeed it be such, here given to the inquiries of the Königsberg metaphysician, is a plain, artless, and lucid statement of the author's views touching a problem well known to the ancients and still keenly discussed in certain modern schools of philosophy in which the serious and conscientious study of philosophical truth still finds a place. Our author,

moreover, claims to be heard on such subjects, from a vantage-ground peculiar to himself. He brings into one view within the compass of a few quarto pages, the primary truths on which the entire question rests ; and in doing so, presents a sketch in miniature, so to say, of the chief features by which his voluminous writings are characterised.

The outline is drawn with the utmost clearness and precision. It was printed for the author in London, in the year 1769, when he had attained the mature age of eighty-one. It was not published. In his last great work, *The True Christian Religion* (§ 608), it is referred to as a *Codicillum*. A translation appeared in the year 1770, from the pen of the Rev. Thomas Hartley, Rector of Winwick in Northamptonshire, who was Swedenborg's intimate and attached friend. This eminently pious and exemplary Anglican priest, in a spirit of modesty and diffidence, which those who have most deeply studied the subject will be best able to appreciate, thus refers to the little work in the preface to his own rather paraphrastical translation :—

‘ As our highly distinguished author, who is also eminent in the school of human literature, writes to men of understanding ; so his humble translator follows his steps in this address to the honourable and learned universities of this realm ; as the hand of a mean messenger may be allowed to bear a rich present to his

superiors ; for by that name I must call everything that comes from our author's pen.

' And as this little lucubration, though printed, was never published, so it might never have come to their knowledge but for this translation, which I offer to the public chiefly to introduce the knowledge of his other Latin works, which, though long ago printed, remain yet as a treasure hid in a field ; but I have found it, and having enriched myself thereby, am desirous that others may partake of the benefit. And should any of the worthies in these our celebrated seminaries of learning and philosophy be led by this our information to dig in the same mine, and then, like scribes instructed to the kingdom of heaven, draw out of their treasure things new and old for the benefit of their brethren, I shall rejoice to be found even as an under-servant to men of superior talents so profitably employed.' \*

More than a century has passed away since these simple earnest words were written. They evince a high degree of moral courage, if the time and the circumstances be duly taken into account. No response of any kind seems to have followed the warm and homely appeal of this courageous pioneer of the New Light, who thus proved himself to be far in advance of the current notions and prejudices of his age, and a faithful watchman on the walls of Zion.

\* *A Theosophic Lucubration on the Nature of Infux*, p. xxiii.



In the mean while changes, full of significance for the future, have taken place in the two great national seats of learning, in the country at large, in its habits and manners, in its very spirit and life. The entire Christian world has also silently and rapidly undergone a mighty and marvellous transformation. During the period of a single century, in the respective spheres of social, political, and religious life, *all things have been made new*,\* in a certain very real sense, and to a degree never before witnessed in the history of the world.

Amid the varieties and fluctuations of public opinion, which have arisen on almost every subject during the past eventful century, it was not to be expected that the voluminous pages of our author's indefatigable pen should receive much attention. They were the productions of one who was looked upon by all but a very few, as the mystic *par excellence*, a dreamer, a fanatic, a madman, or an impostor. Nothing was, apparently, more likely, than their being allowed speedily to pass into utter oblivion. Far otherwise, however, has been their fortune. Possessing, as they do, an inherent intellectual and spiritual power, it was impossible wholly to suppress them. In the face of almost every kind of obstacle they have succeeded in

\* Rev. xxi. 5.



securing some share of public attention. Men of intelligence, candour, and real breadth of mind are beginning to mention them with some degree of respect. The reckless and scornful mode of speaking both of them and their author, once in vogue, is now confined chiefly to the ignorant, the uncharitable, or the dishonest. The tide of fanatical opposition is on the turn. The works of learned scholars, brilliant wits, famous philosophers, and popular poets of the last century, have had their full share of public esteem and applause. They seem, with a few notable exceptions, on the eve of being forgotten. Not so the vast labours of the Swedish philosopher and theologian. The true character and purpose of his mission is slowly but surely emerging into clearer light. The actual results of his gigantic researches into almost every department of human inquiry are gradually unfolding themselves, in a more distinct and intelligible form to the public eye. *Veritas initio premitur, sed nunquam opprimitur.\**

In an age of intense mental activity, and restless inquiry, like the present, it is not a little remarkable that no serious and systematic attempt should have been made to submit the contents of the following, or any other of Swedenborg's works, to a careful and minute

\* Christian Wolf, Preface to *Cosmologia*.

examination, or to illustrate his peculiar and characteristic teachings, by a comparison with the speculations of the more eminent philosophers of ancient or modern times. And yet, something of this kind was manifestly needed to smooth the way of the ordinary reader, and aid him in the endeavour to form a just and adequate notion of the real meaning and value of principles and doctrines which, on first view, appear so strange and remote from ordinary modes of thought. One chief aim of the present undertaking is to show, that not a few of the highest and most clearly established results of recent scientific investigations, are essentially in accord with conclusions, which by a profound analysis of *facts*, Swedenborg had clearly established, previous to the middle of the last century ; a period in which (to use the words of Lord Bacon) 'the inquisition by induction was wonderful hard.'

The intrinsic value of the following brief essay, on the now generally discarded subject of *The Commerce between the Soul and the Body*, is much greater than might appear on a first hasty perusal. Brief though it be it, nevertheless, covers a wide and wonderful field of speculation. When carefully studied it will be found to evince a just and adequate estimate of the most difficult questions in ancient philosophy and in modern science. A clear conception of its true character and aim, therefore, cannot be attained without the aid of

certain prerequisite knowledges. At least a general acquaintance is presupposed on the part of the reader, with the best thoughts of the most eminent thinkers of past ages, as well as with the chief results reached by experimental science during the first half of the last century. The whole subject will be found, after due investigation, to be raised far above the sphere of a criticism, much too common in the present day, which lacks intelligence, sagacity, and those sentiments of veneration and awe, with which every honest and sober-minded inquirer feels conscientiously bound to approach the investigation of truth, in its more exalted and sacred forms. The problem in question is one which is beset with difficulties on all sides. It is, indeed, generally supposed to defy solution. It is dogmatically declared to be an inscrutable mystery, both by Christians and non-Christians, who, however widely they may differ in other respects, present a remarkable unanimity in the attempt to prescribe limits to philosophical research. Both alike display an utter want of faith in 'the untried capacities of the human mind.'

Happily, however, speculations concerning the essence and quality of the human soul, and its mysterious relations to a future and eternal state of being, still possess a deep and living interest for a considerable number of earnest-minded men, belonging to widely different schools of intellectual and religious thought. They continue to be investigated with a daily increas-

ing ardour. Notwithstanding several appearances to the contrary, the interest taken in researches which stand in a most intimate relation to the true welfare and highest destiny of man, as a spiritual being, keeps pace with the rapid progress of human knowledge. As the field of observation and thought widens, the desire to know becomes more eager and intense. The faculty of true philosophic insight, even in these days of increasing devotion to the study of the physical sciences, appears to be in no danger of becoming extinct. Facts and principles within the domain of natural knowledge, which border upon the region of the supernatural proper, still possess a paramount interest for the highest order of minds. More especially is this the case, at present, in all that relates to what may be called empirical Psychology. The last result of analysis, whether from the side of science or metaphysic, always conducts the inquirer to the confines of that mysterious border-ground which lies between what, in strictness of speech, is to be regarded as the spiritual and the corporeal in man. As in the past, from the very dawn of philosophy, so now, attempts of various kinds are being made to throw light upon what has always been considered the darkest of enigmas. The old yet always new problem of the soul, its origin, essence, and destiny, still presents itself for investigation, but under wholly new aspects.

One chief purpose of the present work is to direct

attention to writings which profess to give a complete solution of the problem of the reciprocal connection existing between the soul and the body. The bare announcement of the fact will, doubtless, be sufficient to excite, in the mind of some readers, the strongest prejudices against any further consideration of the subject. In others, the mere suggestion of such a notion is likely, perhaps, to provoke ridicule and scorn. In reference to such predispositions it may be observed that they are totally opposed to a true philosophic spirit, and incompatible with a fair and honest examination of any subject. In reply to criticisms coming from such sources, it will be enough to say, in the words of one of the most cautious and rigid of reasoners,\* 'it is self-evident that the objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous.'

It would, indeed, be too much to expect that the principles which constitute the basis of the solution here offered, are likely to be understood, much less meet with acceptance, in the condensed form in which they are presented in the following exposition. At least some general acquaintance with the author's previous extensive philosophical researches, is necessary to obtain a clear notion of the real question in issue. Such knowledge, however, implies the careful examination of a mass of writings, in which the most arduous problems of science and philosophy have been subjected to an

\* Bishop Butler, *Analogy*.



analysis, to which for breadth and depth of intuition no parallel can be found in any age. These writings present in a clear light, for the first time in the history of human speculation, all the facts and principles essential to the construction of a Psychology, which shall be at once truly rational and pre-eminently Christian. This result, which justly deserves to be characterised as stupendous, has been accomplished, not by divination, nor by mystical contemplation, nor by an imaginary inspiration, but by the laborious process of carefully collecting the choicest experiences of sixty centuries ; by unwearied industry and intense mental labour, in co-ordinating and subordinating these various experiences ; and by deducing from them first principles, according to the rules of a rigidly inductive method, in other words, by the legitimate exercise of the rational faculty.\*

The principles of a complete Psychology have at length been discovered. The most shifting and shadowy of all human subjects of investigation has been brought

\* As an example of the strange mistakes made on the above-mentioned point, even by the more enlightened and moderate of Swedenborg's critics, see Morell's *History of Philosophy*, (vol. ii., pp. 259, 260), where the foundation of our author's philosophy and theology is confidently declared to be a 'direct intuition, granted by special revelation.' Whereas the true state of the case is :—(1), that the philosophy in question is the reasoned result of a vast induction from known and unquestionable facts in the domain of experience ; and (2), that the theology is a complete system of Christian doctrine, consisting of pure spiritual truths which, although supernaturally revealed, have nevertheless been so delivered, that they can be *rationaly* comprehended by the intellect of man, when duly enlightened by education and culture.



within definite and intelligible limits. The steady and continuous pursuit of this truly noble science has thus been rendered comparatively easy, in all future time, for those who are disposed and prepared to engage in it, with an honest determination to seek for the truth, and accept it thankfully, under whatever unexpected form it may present itself. The term *comparatively* is here used advisedly; for, especially in the case of Psychological science, does the ancient maxim hold good, *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ*.

It has thus come to pass, that in the very age in which a gross and reckless form of materialistic science, began to wage open war, with new and hitherto unheard of weapons, against the very existence of the supernatural, the domain of Christian philosophy was immensely widened, and its fences rendered secure against the assaults of the enemy, for all future time. After midnight, the dawn.

It is now possible to demonstrate to the unsophisticated reason, that clear and definite boundary lines between the various human sciences and cognitions, have at length been drawn, by the steady and powerful hand of the greatest master in philosophy the world has ever seen. Within the limits of these lines the rational faculty has free and boundless play. Beyond them lies the dismal and unhallowed region of mere phantasms and shadows, where the bewildered imagination, amid the Egyptian gloom which envelopes

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the aimless and hopeless 'philosophy of the unknown,'

'Finds no end, in wandering mazes lost.'

It is unfortunate that the reputation of Swedenborg as a mystical Theologian, a dreamy ecstatic, or a mad-man, according to the various modes of estimating his character, has almost wholly concealed his astonishing labours as a philosopher. In the following pages an attempt has been made to direct the reader's attention, in some measure, to the character and extent of these labours, and to signalize some of their principal results, more especially in relation to the subject of Psychology.

Our author's writings exhibit throughout, to an amazing degree, that stamp of unity which is so characteristic of truly original minds. In the hands of a candid and intelligent reader they will be found to be their own best interpreter. They everywhere exhibit one pure and exalted aim—the acquisition of genuine truth, and its diffusion among men, as being a most powerful means of promoting their highest happiness.

As a Christian philosopher, he studied most deeply, and most thoroughly understood, the actual character of the age in which he lived. He clearly saw not only its downward tendencies, in all matters, social, civil,

intellectual, and religious, but he also clearly discerned, that amid its varied and complex movements, it carried within its bosom, in the course of Divine Providence, the germs of a new order of things. In one of his works, while engaged in describing an analytical method, by means of which he hoped to discover truths then deeply hidden under a veil of hypotheses; and while rejoicing in the prospect of the rich store of experience which had been gathered together in the lapse of centuries, sufficient, as he says, 'to build a palace,' he significantly observes:—'Nor do I think we ought to wait any longer, lest haply experimental-knowledge should be overtaken by age, night, and oblivion; and the arts and sciences be carried to the tomb; for unless I mistake the signs of the times, the world's destinies are tending thitherwards.'\*

Elsewhere he remarks:—'We have advanced so far that at the present day (1740) we have skill enough to exalt the sensations of the ear and eye far above themselves, or above their natural acumen, by artificial instruments; it now remains for us correspondingly to exalt the mind, or the rational hearing and sight. But the only way to accomplish this is by the philosophy we have pointed out. This philosophy, however, must be deduced from a perpetual intuition of causes, in causes and effects; a work truly requiring an immense exercise of the rational faculty, and a profound abstraction from

\* Prologue to *Animal Kingdom*, § 14.

those things that, as superinduced, affect the lower faculties.' \*

Again he says:—'I do not undertake this work for the sake of honour or emolument; both of which I shun rather than seek, because they disquiet the mind, and because I am content with my lot: but for the sake of the truth, which alone is immortal, and *has its portion in the most perfect order of nature*; hence, in the series only of the ends of the universe from the first to the last, which is the glory of God; which end He promotes: thus I know Who it is that must reward me.' †

Passages like these, which might be quoted in abundance, show the spirit in which Swedenborg entered upon the investigation of the most arduous problems the human mind has ever attempted to solve. No radical inconsistencies have as yet been discovered in the bulky and elaborate productions of his fertile pen; no instance of essential divergence from those few first principles with which his philosophical labours seem to have formally commenced, and which he gave to the world, in his forty-sixth year, in a small but golden treatise, entitled *Prodromus Philosophiæ ratiocinantis de Infinito, et Causa Finali Creationis: deque Mechanismo operationis Animæ et Corporis.*‡

\* *Economy of Animal Kingdom*, Part ii. § 207.

† *Ibid.* § 218.

‡ *Dresdae et Lipsiæ, sumptibus Friderici Hekelii, Bibliopol. Regii.*  
MDCCXXXIV.

Everywhere throughout his philosophical writings, as they successively appear, there is evidence of growth and development, of progress and actual elevation of thought; but no interruption or break in the orderly series of his rational researches has ever been proved to exist. The record of his speculations presents a close, continuous, coherent, and self-consistent evolution of philosophical principles, altogether unique in the history of human thought. How is such a phenomenon to be psychologically accounted for? There is one, and only one satisfactory theory on the subject, which any rational mind, adequately acquainted with the facts, can by possibility adopt. It is this. Our author most solemnly avers, that from his earliest youth, (unknown to himself at the time,) his mind had been subjected to a gradual process of preparation for a sacred office to which, in the full maturity and highest vigour of his mental powers, he received a special Divine call. If this theory be rejected, Swedenborg becomes the most inexplicable of psychological puzzles. If it be admitted, every difficulty disappears.

A system of Philosophy given to the world under circumstances so singular, must be expected to present to the general reader numerous difficulties of no ordinary character. The above-mentioned essay on the Infinite, for example, is a unique attempt to unloose what the author aptly names the *nodus Philosophiæ*. To the mass of readers it must appear unintelligible. The

momentous topics of which it treats, are presented under forms which cannot but appear strange, and even unmeaning, on a first perusal.

The coldness and indifference hitherto shown towards this and other wonderful productions of our author's pen, is thus easily explained. They are too profound in their subject-matter, they discuss questions too recondite, too exalted, too far removed from the sphere of ordinary investigation, to fall in with the general taste and humour, even in its loftier and more contemplative moods. It is by the disclosure of such new and unusual forms of thought on subjects of the deepest interest, and yet confessedly amongst the most obscure, that the genuine *philosophic spirit* is put upon its trial. Whatever is far removed from common modes of conception, however true it may be in itself, usually excites doubt and perplexity, if not open hostility, in the minds of those who are wholly possessed by their own pre-conceived notions. They instinctively resist any violence done to their favourite and long-cherished convictions. New forms of truth demand not only close and continuous 'review and attention,' but also unusual freedom from prejudice, and, above all things, a transparent candour. Conditions so essential to the fair and honest examination of any new and difficult subject, are found in combination only in a comparatively small number of minds. To require from the great majority of readers



the cultivation and employment of these purer and higher forms of mental activity, would be, in the homely and expressive language of Bishop Butler, 'to put them quite out of their way.'

Nearly a century has elapsed since Swedenborg passed into the eternal world. During this period the indifference or hostility at first shown towards his name and writings have been slowly but surely giving place to intelligent curiosity, and a certain qualified respect and admiration.\* Much, however, remains to be done in this direction. A dense mass of unreasoning prejudice must be removed, before anything like an adequate and just estimate of the man and his mission can find its way into otherwise intelligent and cultivated minds. That his vast intellectual efforts have received scanty consideration at the hands of the philosophers—especially those of the extreme naturalistic type—is disappointing, though not surprising. But it

\* The gradual but manifest change, on this subject, which has taken place of late years among the representatives of the more enlightened public opinion, recalls the following remark of an eloquent and sagacious philosophical critic:—'When an inveterate prejudice is destroyed by extirpating the casual associations on which it was grafted, how powerful is the new impulse given to the intellectual faculties of man! Yet how slow and silent the process by which the effect is accomplished! Were it not for a certain class of authors, who, from time to time, heave the log into the deep, we should hardly believe that the reason of the species is progressive.'—DUGALD STEWART, *Preface to Prelim. Dissert. to Encyc. Brit.* p. 11.

is painful to be obliged to confess that his most bitter and unscrupulous enemies have ever been the partisans of the various theological schools.

An impartial examination of the more or less unfriendly reviews and notices of our author that have appeared during the last ten years (to go no farther back) would reveal an amount and variety of error, misrepresentation, and even wilful perversion of the plainest facts, that could not fail to excite feelings of astonishment and indignation in any fair and honest mind. The attitude assumed by such of the clergy as have thought the name or writings of Swedenborg worth their notice, does no credit, to say the least, either to their sense of justice or to their philosophic insight. Their reckless hostility serves to show, in a striking manner, to what an extent men of great natural parts and varied learning, can sometimes allow their better judgment to be warped by the subtle power of prejudice.

A few examples will suffice to place this point in a clear light.

Some years ago a 'voice'\* emanated from the Vicar of Frome-Selwood on what he denominates

\* *The Church's Broken Unity*. On Methodism and the Swedenborgians, (London, Hayes.) The errors and misrepresentations of fact contained in the part treating of 'Swedenborgianism' have been ably and thoroughly exposed in a small work entitled *Swedenborg's Writings and Catholic Teaching*, by the Rev. Augustus Clissold, M.A. (Second Ed. Longmans.)

'Swedenborgianism.' With the latter, whatever it may mean, these pages are in no way concerned. Their specific purpose is to place before their readers Swedenborg himself; and, as far as possible, to make him his own expositor. It is but the merest justice, however, to remark here, that, with respect to the principles of Church Order, Polity, and Unity, the deepest wrong is done to Swedenborg by confounding him, as is almost universally done, with the small sect founded in the year 1787, under most unhappy auspices, by a certain Robert Hindmarsh, of Clerkenwell Close, Printer-Extraordinary to the then Prince of Wales, a layman, and formerly a member of Mr. Wesley's Communion.\*

As to the Vicar of Frome's diatribe, it may suffice to observe that it labours under *one* radical defect. It displays, throughout, an entire want of acquaintance with what Swedenborg has actually taught. The original sources do not seem in any case to have been

\* In its origin and progress, this small sect presents several features without a parallel in the curious annals of Nonconformist eccentricity and wilful waywardness. In reality, it is one of the most cruel of calumnies to identify the reverent, conservative, and truly Catholic Churchmanship of Swedenborg, with a movement marked throughout by proceedings so utterly at variance with the laws and life of that Holy City, whose light is the Lamb (Rev. xxi. 23.) It is fortunate that the founder of the new community can be judged with complete impartiality 'out of his own mouth.' See Hindmarsh's *History of the Rise and Progress of what he falsely and arrogantly styles 'The New Jerusalem Church.'* (London, 1861.) See, also, *A Remembrancer and Recorder, &c.* By Thomas Robinson (Manchester, 1864).

consulted. Thus the process of proof against Swedenborg's 'orthodoxy' is pervaded by a fatal flaw—the fallacy known as *Mutatio Elenchi*. The real point in question is altogether ignored, namely, *the actual teachings* of Swedenborg, whether right or wrong. For these, the strange and absurd misconceptions of the Vicar of Frome have been substituted. Thus his readers are made the dupes of his fallacies.

The 'voice,' therefore, in the present case, is a 'cry' without meaning.\* It is a false alarm. A careful and more conscientious re-consideration of the whole question, will doubtless convince him that he has been more frightened than hurt, by the apparition of the New Theology, the true character and purport of which he has entirely failed to comprehend. It is but just to observe, however, that the Essay in question is only to a slight extent disfigured by the coarse and offensive common-places, so frequently to be found in religious polemics. It also stands in marked contrast to most of

\* It may be a relief, and prove as 'the entrance of light' into the Vicar's mind, to state the fact that in no place has Swedenborg concluded that 'the first eleven chapters of Genesis are nothing but an allegory.' (*Church's Broken Unity*, pp. 222, 223.) This may be the language of untrained and unauthorised 'Swedenborgian' expositors, but it is not that of the Swedish theologian. Nowhere has he so much as hinted a doubt respecting *the true historical basis* underlying these Divinely inspired and accurately preserved Records of the primeval Church; but he proves, incontestably, *from the text itself*, that this portion of the Holy Word is written in a style peculiar to the most ancient inhabitants of this earth.

the hostile notices of Swedenborg that have hitherto appeared, inasmuch as it handles a solemn and sacred subject, in that spirit of kindly courtesy, gravity, sincerity, and reverence, which are imperatively required at the hands of a Christian critic.

Owing to several causes, which cannot here be specifically characterized, a total misapprehension prevails, even amongst the more thoughtful and educated clergy, on the subject of the New Dispensation, of which Swedenborg claims to be the Divinely prepared and commissioned herald. In his theological writings, the terms *New Church* and *Old Church* are of constant occurrence. Chiefly owing to their novelty and deep spiritual significance, they have been ignorantly, and in some cases perversely, wrested from the meaning they were originally intended to convey. Nothing can be more certain than the fact, that as used by Swedenborg, they invariably mean, respectively, a *new state* and an *old state*\* of Church principles and life in Churchmen. They expressly refer to a new or renewed state of Church doctrine and life *in all* 'who profess and call themselves Christians;' a state to be brought about, gradually, and in a peaceful and orderly course and manner, through the medium of the *Ministri docentes*, that is, the Clergy duly appointed, under

\* On the theological use of the term, *state of the Church*, see *Theophilus Anglicanus*, p. 257. (Ninth Ed.)



public and lawful authority, by Episcopal consecration, to their Sacred Office. This, and no other, is the position expressly taken by Swedenborg as a Churchman, throughout his entire theological works.

Not a single passage can be found in his voluminous pages, in which the remotest allusion is made to the duty or necessity of separating from the external Communion of the Church, unless by ignorantly or dishonestly distorting the meaning of his words to a sense he manifestly never intended. On the contrary he repeatedly teaches, in plain and most carefully chosen language, that the principle of separation, on merely doctrinal grounds, involves the fundamental heresy and falsity, that *truth* is the essential principle of the Church.\* Whereas he demonstrates that *goodness* is the essential principle of the Church.† He elsewhere expressly denies that matters of *doctrine* constitute the Church, and as expressly asserts that the *sole* ground of Church life and membership is love and charity.‡

But, to place this point beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil in any unprejudiced mind, Swedenborg has defined, with the utmost distinctness, what that NEW CHURCH really is, the commencement of which it was part of his sacred mission to announce to the Church

\* See *Arcana Coelestia*, § 4925.

† See *Ibid.* § 5536.

‡ *Ibid.* § 809.



of his own day. 'What,' he exclaims, 'is a Church without faith; and what is faith without charity: and so, what is the Church without the marriage of faith and charity. This marriage is the very Church itself. It is also the New Church which is *now* (anno 1769) being raised up by the Lord.\* It is in this sense, and no other, that the *New Jerusalem* is the Lord's Kingdom in heaven and on earth.†

It is to be noted, however, that the question of the lawfulness or expediency of originating a fresh schism in the Church, is not here under discussion, as being altogether irrelevant to the special subject of these pages. The purpose of the foregoing remarks is to forewarn the general reader that the notion of a separate sect finds no favour, much less sanction, in Swedenborg's theological writings. To employ them as a pretext for such a proceeding is to gravely misrepresent them. Like all enlightened Church Reformers, Swedenborg has evinced his moderation and practical wisdom in his desire 'to see a Reformation of the Church *within* the Church, and proceeding *from* the Church,'‡ and a consequent realization, in the future, of 'that *renewed state* of the Christian Church which all prophecy leads us to look forward to.'§ The true character and quality of this

\* *Summaria Expositio*, § 68.

† *Arcana Coelestia*, § 935, 1066, 2853.

‡ Bishop of Lincoln, in Preface to the Rev. A. R. Pennington's *Life of Erasmus*, p. vii.

§ The Prophetical Character and Inspiration of the Apocalypse con-

state, it was one of Swedenborg's special functions, to reveal to the Church, for the first time, in clear rational light.

The following observations of the Archbishop of Canterbury, indicating the duties devolving on the Anglican Clergy in the present day, may serve to illustrate the point under consideration. They are in essential accord with the teachings of Swedenborg, although the coincidence of view is, of course, undesigned. His Grace is reported to have said, that 'What they (the Clergy) had to do was to make inroads against ungodliness. He felt confident that they had no reason to be afraid of the influence of the Old Church to which they belonged. . . . Whenever he was present at any great gathering he saw *new schools* rising in all directions in connection with it; he saw *old churches*, one after another, being restored; and he felt convinced that these signs of a material revival were but the outward signs of a *spiritual revival*, and an increased energy and zeal among both the Clergy and laity of the Church of England.'\*

These words of hope and encouragement convey a fairly accurate general notion of the true sense in which Swedenborg uses the terms *old state of the Church* and *new state of the Church*, in other words, *Old Church* and *New Church*.

considered. By G. Pearson, M.D. Quoted in the Rev. A. Clissold's *Athanasius, Sabellius, and Swedenborg*, p. 178.

\* *The Times*, Dec. 19th, 1873.

In connexion with the injurious misconception of Swedenborg's teaching on a point of the greatest importance, above referred to, it becomes necessary, in the interests of truth, justice, and even our common humanity, to direct attention to the merciless calumnies in which certain hostile critics of Swedenborg have allowed themselves to indulge. The unwary reader needs to be put upon his guard against placing the least reliance on these scandalous and malicious productions. They abound in the most reckless misstatements of fact, and the most cruel aspersions against the intellectual and even the moral character of a man distinguished, throughout a long life, for public probity and the faithful discharge of duty, in positions of the highest honour and trust; and beloved by his countrymen of all ranks for his honesty, sincerity, piety, and spotless purity of life.

It is not easy to characterise, in measured language, the iniquitous attempts that have been made from time to time, in certain reviews, to defame and blacken the reputation and name of one who, in consequence of the vast and varied services he has actually rendered to the cause of intellectual and spiritual truth, is justly entitled to the highest regard and honour of all honest men.

Certain misguided persons have had recourse to the meanest and most malignant subterfuges, in the vain

endeavour to fasten upon the object of their contempt or hatred, the offensive and slanderous epithets of visionary, enthusiast, madman, heretic, spiritist, and even impostor. So true is it that

Be thou as pure as ice and as chaste as snow,  
Thou shalt not escape calumny.

Among those who have most shamefully distinguished themselves, in these most unchristian and unmanly attempts, may be mentioned Dr. Maudesley and Dr. (now Cardinal) Manning. Among the calumniators of Swedenborg, these two persons may be regarded as fitly representing the 'schools of thought' to which they respectively belong.

Dr. Maudesley ranks among the most daringly unscrupulous and pertinacious of those who, blinded by self-conceit and regardless of facts, have most grossly and maliciously slandered the great name of Swedenborg. To those who possess any real acquaintance with the subject, his 'criticisms' present a tissue of foul misrepresentations, arising in part from his having, in his eagerness to speak evil of one whose teachings he did not like, allowed himself to become the dupe of a wicked forgery, the so-called 'Book of Dreams,' fraudulently attributed to Swedenborg.\*

\* The full title of this bestial fabrication is *Swedenborg's Drömmar, 1744, jemte andra hans anteckningar. Efter original-handskrifter meddelade af G. E. Klemming, Stockholm, 1859.* Among those who were soonest and most easily befooled by this gross and palpable fraud

This flippant, and (regarded from a strictly Christian point of view) sometimes profane writer has, in the present instance, perpetrated a most discreditable blunder. His easy credulity, when he wished to believe, has become the occasion of furnishing a most instructive example of the folly of trusting too implicitly the opinions of 'Experts.' Did not the common sense of mankind act, generally, as a countercheck to such hap-hazard modes of judging in grave and difficult cases, the class to which Dr. Maudesley belongs, would soon become a dangerous and intolerable social nuisance.

So much, then, for the hallucinations respecting Swedenborg, of which certain apostles of mere Naturalism, and 'Specialists' in matters of Lunacy, are the unhappy victims.

A few words must suffice to show how intimately allied in spirit and purpose, it is possible for two libellers of an illustrious Christian philosopher to be, who, in other respects, stand before the world so far apart.

was the author of a so-called 'Life of Swedenborg,' which in common justice must be pronounced to be a farrago of egregious folly and vanity, literary blunders, garbled quotations, and coarse calumnies, deserving of the hearty execration of all who cherish the least regard for common honesty and candour, in literary matters. This is obviously not the place to expose in detail the stupid and disgusting exhibition of ignorant and malignant mendacity in question. It will suffice to have thus called attention to the subject, apparently for the first time; and to have indicated to the reader the true character of the so-called 'Dream-book.'

Dr. (now Cardinal) Manning, by the violence and malignity of the language he has deliberately employed, has made himself a fitting representative of Swedenborg's most bitter and unscrupulous enemies, among religious zealots. This astute and ardent champion of the most recent of the many modern evolutions of Papal fanaticism, and who so lately

To his own new deity sacrificed  
And was himself the victim and the priest,

has had the hardihood to write thus concerning one of the most gifted of human beings :—

‘There have been claimants to supernatural power, who have appealed to their miracles in proof of their mission, and who have taught otherwise than the Church. They are impostors ; and their wonderful works are either mere deceptions, or they are done through the co-öperation of the enemy of God and of the human race. These remarks apply to such pretenders to Divine communications as Montanus, Mahomet, Swedenborg, the Jansenists, and modern spiritists.’ \*

Considering the principles, spirit, and motives of the ‘faction’ to which this writer has so ardently attached himself in the Church of his choice, the epithet he here deliberately employs to characterise Swedenborg, conveys a slander of the deepest dye. The charge of

\* *Essays on Religion and Literature*, p. 310.



religious imposture, involves the most odious and awful form of human guilt. And yet this most horrible charge is unblushingly preferred by a victim of modern Vatican spiritual sorcery, in manifest violation of truth and charity, against one who in reality, ranks among the most upright, pure-minded, and marvellously gifted of human beings, and who was specially endowed with 'a spirit divinely touched to fine issues.'

It ill becomes Cardinal Manning, under any circumstances, to make use of the term 'impostor,' seeing that he has blindly delivered himself over, soul and body, to the service of a religious system, undeniably based on known and confessed forgeries and imposture.\*

In the case of Swedenborg, the Cardinal's language transgresses the limits of all decent and honourable controversy. His violence stands in striking contrast to the moderation and justice of other enlightened members of the great religious Communion of his adoption.† Impelled by a fierce spirit of proselytism, blinded by the false glare of his own perverse imaginings, and led by fallacies which have their origin in one of the most malignant forms of religious prejudice, this wily propagandist and champion of 'Vaticanism,' or the new form of Christian Gentilism, may plume himself on having obtained a

\* See *Janus*, Chap. III. a. iv. Forgeries (and *passim*). Cf. also *The Present State of Christendom*, by the Rev. A. Cliasold, pp. 20, 44, 45, 63-67.

† Vid. *Eman. Swedenborg, seine Visionen und sein Verhältniss zur Kirche*. Görres., Strasburg, 1827.

complete victory over the absent object of his false and slanderous aspersions. But Swedenborg, also, has something to say concerning religious imposture. Like another Abel, in presence of another Cain, 'he being dead yet speaketh.'\* The irresistible retorsion of his own deadly malice, upon this would-be moral assassin, shall be given in Swedenborg's own clear and vigorous language. Like his own honest Dalecarlian countrymen, to use the words of one who knows them well, 'he wrote as he thought, and his words remain.' In his exposition of the Divine Commandment, *Thou shalt not steal*, he says:—

'They who teach what is false and heretical, and persuade the vulgar that they are true and orthodox, and nevertheless read the Word, whence they have it in their power to make themselves acquainted with what is false and what is true; and they also who, by means of fallacies, confirm the falsities of religion and lead others astray; may be compared with impostors and impositions of every sort.' . . . †

Again: in treating of the *natural sense* of the command, *Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour*, he teaches that

(1.) 'By bearing false witness against the neighbour,

\* Hebrews xi. 4.

† *True Christian Religion*, § 320. Cf. § 309, his exposition of the command *Thou shalt not kill*, which is not reproduced here, as it might be thought unduly severe. The reader, however, may consult it with advantage.

is meant, in the *natural sense* nearest to the letter, to bear false witness either before a judge, or, in extrajudicial cases, before other persons, against any one, accused on a groundless charge; and to corroborate such evidence by the name of God, or by an appeal to anything else that is holy, or by himself and such things as pertain to his own name and fame. (2.) By this commandment, taken in a more extended sense, is meant falsehoods, and political hypocrisy of every kind, which have an evil end in view; as also traducing and defaming one's neighbour, whereby his honour, name, and fame, on which the character of the whole man depends, become utterly ruined.' . . \*

The following description of the Papacy, in its principles and practice, which recent events, with almost miraculous minuteness, have verified to the letter, well deserves the serious attention, not merely of Cardinal Manning and his credulous partisans, but especially of those conscientious Roman Catholics who have had the courage to stand fast by the more humane and Scriptural traditions of the old Gallican Church in its palmiest days; and who, like the good Père Gratry, regard with feelings of humiliation and horror, the recent insanities perpetrated at Rome under the deadly influence of the Curia:—

Quantum hallucinantur illi, qui in solo sensu Literaræ

\* *True Christian Religion*, § 321.

manent, nec exquirunt Sensum Internum ab aliis locis, ubi ille in VERBO explicatur,\* constare manifeste potest a tot haeresibus, quarum unaquaevis suum dogma ex literalis sensu Verbi confirmat; imprimis ex magna illa, quam vesanus et infernalis amor sui et mundi induxit, ex Domini verbis ad Petrum :—Ego tibi dico, quod tu sis Petrus, et super hac petra aedificabo meam Ecclesiam et portae inferni non praevallebunt ei : et dabo tibi claves regni coelorum, et quicquid ligaveris super terra, erit ligatum in coelis, et quicquid solveris super terra, erit solutum in coelis. (Matt. xvi. 15—19.)

Qui sensum Literae premunt, putant quod haec dicta sint de Petro, et quod illi tanta potestas data sit; tametsi norunt, quod Petrus fuerit homo admodum simplex, et quod ille nusquam talem potestatem exercuerit, et quod exercere illam contra Divinum sit; usque tamen, quia ex vesano et infernali amore sui et mundi, sibi arrogare volunt summam potestatem in terra et in coelo, et se deos facere, hoc secundum literam explicant, et acriter defendunt; cum tamen sensus internus eorum verborum est, quod ipsa FIDES in Dominum, quae solum est apud eos qui in amore in Dominum et in charitate erga proximum sunt, illam potestatem habeat, et usque non Fides, sed DOMINUS a Quo Fides. Per

\* These few words contain the rule of Scripture interpretation from which Swedenborg, in no single instance, has departed. It is almost needless to observe that his superficial or hostile critics universally entertain an entirely different opinion.

*Petram* ibi intelligitur illa Fides, ut ubivis alibi in Verbo. Super illa aedificatur Ecclesia, et contra illam portae inferni non praevalent: et illi Fidei sunt Claves regni coelorum. Claudat illa coelum, ne mala et falsa intrent, et aperit illa coelum pro bonis et veris. Hic est sensus internus horum verborum.\*

Lastly: Swedenborg was an unostentatious but a profound and far-seeing statesman. He well knew the danger to the safety of peoples and Commonwealths, the obstacles to human freedom and progress, that lay hidden under the mask of this pretended 'Power of the Keys.'

In a memorial presented to the Swedish Diet in the year 1761, which contains 'General views respecting the maintenance of the State and the preservation of its freedom,' Swedenborg, then in his seventy-third year, makes some observations which, in presence of the strange and unexpected events now taking place in the principal kingdoms of Europe, can hardly be denied to have in them a genuine prophetic ring. Alluding to the misfortunes and frightful consequences likely to arise in the North of Europe under a despotic government, he confines himself to the single all-important topic of *Papal darkness*.

'We know from experience,' says he, 'how the Babylonian harlot fascinated and bewitched the reigning princes of Saxony, Cassel and Zweibrücken, also the

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, Præf. ad Lib. Genes. c. xxii.

king of England, shortly before the House of Hanover was called to the British throne, and how it is still dallying with the Pretender. How in Prussia, likewise, it tampered with the present king, when Crown-Prince, through his own father: not to mention King Sigismund and Queen Christina, in Sweden. We are well aware, too, how this harlot is still going her rounds through the courts of Reformed Christendom. If, therefore, Sweden were an absolute monarchy, and this harlot, who understands so well how to dissemble, and adorn herself like a goddess, were to intrude herself into the cabinet of a future monarch, is there any reason why she should not as easily delude and infatuate him, as she did the above-mentioned kings and princes of Christendom? What opposition would there be, what means of self-protection, especially if the army, which is now upon a standing footing, were at the disposal of the monarch? What could bishops and priests, together with the peasantry, do, against force, against the determination of the sovereign, and against the crafty cunning of the Jesuits? Would not all heavenly light be dissipated? would not a night of barbarian darkness overwhelm the land? and, if they would not be martyrs, must not the people bow down the neck to Satan, and become worshippers of images, and idolators?

‘The dread of this and every other kind of slavery, which I need not here describe, must hang over us for



the future, should there take place any alteration in our excellent Constitution, or any suspension of our invaluable liberty. The only guarantee and counter-check against such calamities would be oath and conscience. Certainly if there were an oath, and the majority were sufficiently honest to respect it, civil and religious liberty, and all that is valuable, might, indeed, in every kingdom remain inviolate: but, on the other hand, we must bear in mind that the Papal chair can dissolve all oaths, and absolve every conscience, by virtue of the keys of St. Peter.\*

It is no small relief to be able to turn from the utterly corrupt religious system above described, 'the inevitable result' of the policy of which 'is to propagate, from generation to generation, lies, hypocrisy, and deceit, by wholesale;' a system cunningly devised to foster a profound hatred of free institutions and all that deserves the name of constitutional; a system which preserves unchanged its ancient animosity to 'the noble mother of European constitutions, the English Magna Charta,'† to what, with all its defects and shortcomings, must be called the greatest and most powerful branch of the Church Catholic, the Anglican Church spread over the world. In its fundamental

\* *Documents concerning the Life and Character of Em. Swedenborg*, &c., p. 176 (Ed. New York, 1847).

† *Janus*, pp. 17, 22.

principles, combined with its Apostolic Order, it is still the most powerful bulwark, existing in the present day, against the two arch-enemies of the true Christian Religion, superstition and infidelity. And it may not be without advantage to reproduce here a noble description of what it ought to be, as given in the words of one of the wisest and most upright of British statesmen, who was also a sincere Christian, Edmund Burke:—

‘I wish,’ he says, ‘to see the Established Church of England great and powerful ; I wish to see her foundations laid low and deep, that she may crush the giant powers of rebellious darkness ; I would have her head raised up to that heaven to which she conducts us. I would have her open wide her hospitable gates by a noble and liberal comprehension ; but I would have no breaches in her wall. I would have her cherish all those that are within, and pity all those who are without. I would have her a common blessing to the world, an example, if not an instructor, to those who have not the happiness to belong to her. I would have her give a lesson of peace and happiness to mankind that a vexed and wandering generation might be taught to seek for repose and toleration in the maternal bosom of Christian charity, and not in the harlot lap of infidelity and indifference.’


The holy desire, here expressed in such noble language,

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may fairly be taken as setting forth, in general terms, the primary end of the New Theology, to which the New Philosophy serves for a stepping-stone. This end is no other than the complete *renovation* of the Universal Church of God on earth; a *new state* of spiritual perception and life in each one of her true members, to be brought about by the gradual revival and spread of pure and undefiled religion, through the medium of a closer and more real conjunction, with her one Divine Source and Head, the Lord God and Saviour Jesus Christ.

KENSINGTON,

*Easter, 1875.*



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#### ERRATA.


- Page 193, last line in note, for "G," read "C."  
 225, line 13, for "borne," read "bound."  
 225, line 20, for "by the mad impieties," read "by a horror of the  
 mad impieties."  
 227, line 10 from bottom, for "atheist," read "alleged atheist."  
 283, line 12 from bottom, for "n'enest," read "n'en est."

# CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY:

ETC., ETC.

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## § 1.

HREE opinions, which are hypotheses, have hitherto been held and taught touching the commerce of the Soul and the Body, or in other words, the operation of the one *upon* the other, and also, of the one *jointly with* the other. These opinions are known, respectively, by the names of (α) Physical Influx; (β) Spiritual Influx; and (γ) Pre-established Harmony.<sup>1</sup>

(α) The first, or that of Physical Influx, comes from the appearances presented by the objects of sense, and from fallacies thence arising; for it seems as if the objects which impress the organs of vision flowed inwards into the faculty of thought,<sup>2</sup> and called it forth into

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note A.

<sup>2</sup> The faculty of thought (*cogitatio*) has been variously defined or described. The language of philosophers on the point, is vague, vacillating, and obscure. The definition of Descartes is as follows:—"Cogitationis nomine, intelligo illa omnia, quæ nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est."—(Descartes, *Principia*, P. I. art. 9.) It errs, fundamentally, in confounding two things which are essentially distinct, namely, *thought* and *feeling*. The definition given by Christian Wolf, which he takes to be the same as that of Descartes, is thus given:—"Cogitare dicimur quando nobis consilii sumus eorum quæ in nobis con-

act. In like manner, spoken words, which excite motion in the organs of hearing, appear to flow, as it

tingunt, et quæ nobis tanquam extra nos representantur. *Cogitatio igitur est actus animæ, quo sibi sui rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est.*"—(*Psych. Empir.* § 23.)

As a contrast to the foregoing, a few passages may here be quoted which throw an entirely new light on a subject which is in danger of being darkened to an unprecedented degree, in the present day, as may be evident from the attempts made by certain votaries of physical science to confound two operations of the mind so manifestly distinct as are these of *thought* and *imagination*.

Thought, according to our author, is a faculty of the mind enabling it "to consider attentively the things which it has received into the understanding, according to the order and nature of things." . . . "All must confess that thought is a higher or more sublime form of imagination." (See *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, Vol. II. Chap. iii.—*The Human Soul*, §§ 278, 279.)

In the following extract thought is traced to its origin :—

"Now if any one enter into the operations of his mind by somewhat of sublimer thought, (which we may do inasmuch as we possess a soul that is above the mind,) he will observe, not obscurely, that a certain inferior rational sight flows into every single word and into every single form of words. For we represent to ourselves articulate sounds under an image not unlike that which enters by way of the eye : wherefore this conception of words is called imagination, and is in the proximately superior degree above hearing ; just as the visual image is above sounds, or the æther above the air. Again, by farther reflection we observe, that into these images, or objects of the imagination, which are the same as the things pertaining to the memory, there flows, from a still higher source, a certain higher intellectual light, by which the things imagined or comprehended under a limited form are perceived in a manner still higher and more abstract. *This is the origin of thought*, which is a faculty of the intellectual mind (*mens*), so distinct from imagination, which is a faculty of the inferior or natural mind (*animus*), that the two can exist either conjointly or separately. By the faculty of thought we approach still nearer to the supreme intuitions of the soul, albeit only to those that are of a more general kind. In truth, neither the faculty of imagination itself nor that of thought can exist and subsist unless a certain light flows from the soul into the sphere of the soul's thoughts, that is to say, into the mind." (*Ibid.* § 309.)

"Thought is a certain species of discourse with a man's self ; for since



were, inwards into the mind, and to produce in it ideas. The same may be said of the remaining senses, smell, taste, and touch.

Since then, the respective organs of these senses are, first in order, the recipients of the various forms of contact which reach them in such abundance from the world without; and inasmuch as the mind appears to exercise thought and will according to the modes in which these organs are affected, therefore the ancient Philosophers and Schoolmen were induced to believe that an Influx or Influence was derived from these sensuous contacts into the Soul, and thus they came to adopt the hypothesis of Physical or Natural Influx.

( $\beta$ ) The second hypothesis, which is called Spiritual Influx (to express which some philosophers use the term *Occasional*), takes its rise from the principle and laws of ORDER,<sup>1</sup> inasmuch as the Soul is a spiritual substance,<sup>2</sup> and hence is purer in essence, prior in order

the operations of our minds are real activities or changes of state by variations of form, it follows that they also constitute a species of interior speech, &c." (*On the Worship and Love of God*, § 52, note p.)

"Thought is nothing else but internal sight." (*On the Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 404.)

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note B.

<sup>2</sup> With the above brief but clear and distinct definition of the soul, the speculative tenets of the most enlightened philosophers, whether Gentile or Christian, are virtually in complete accord, as is fully proved by the Cardinal de la Luzerne in his excellent *Dissertation sur la spiritualité de l'âme*. In exposing the errors and false assertions of contemporary materialism that eminently learned and lucid writer thus appeals to facts, against the adversaries of rational and Christian philosophy, in reference to this deep and difficult subject.

After fully exposing the absolute falsity of the general assertion, advanced by certain modern materialists, that the ancient philosophers

of existence, and interior in situation or place ; but the body is material, and therefore is grosser by nature,

regarded the human soul as a material substance, the Cardinal proceeds to show, by a series of instructive extracts, that this assertion becomes still more evidently false when applied to the Fathers of the Church. He confesses to knowing only two among ecclesiastical writers who can be accused of materialism—Tatian and Tertullian. "Tout le chœur de ces saints docteurs," according to this candid writer, "dépose de la manière la plus authentique, en faveur de la spiritualité de l'âme. Nous pouvons citer Saint Irénée, Origène, les Constitutions apostoliques, Arnobe, Eusèbe, Lactance, Saint Hilaire, Saint Basile, Saint Grégoire de Nysse, Saint Césaire, Saint Ambroise, Saint Jean-Chrysostôme, Saint Jérôme, Saint Augustin, Némésius, Théodoret, Claudien Mammet, Saint Grégoire le Grand." (*Dissertations, &c.*, tom. v. p. 207.)

From this array of ancient Christian testimonies to the doctrine that the soul is a spiritual substance, it may suffice to select that of St. Augustine, the most enlightened of all the Fathers of the Church. The following passage shows a striking similarity of thought to that contained in the text. It presents a good example, not only of the philosophical acumen, but also of the general resemblance, to be frequently met with, between the sagacious suggestions of the Bishop of Hippo and the clearly established principles of the Swedish Christian philosopher :—

"Certum igitur est esse spiritalem naturam in nobis, ubi corporalem rerum formantur similitudines, sive cum aliquod corpus sensu corporis tangimus, et continuò formatur ejus similitudo in spiritu, memoria recon-ditur : sive cum absentia corpora jam nota cogitamus, ut ex eis formetur quidam spiritalis aspectus, quæ jam erant in spiritu et antequam ea cogitaremus.

"Hæc certè natura spiritalis est, in qua non corpora, sed corporum similitudines exprimuntur. Non enim omnino ipsa corpora in anima sunt, cum ea cogitamus ; sed eorum similitudines. Quia verò spiritus omnis omni est corpore sine dubitatione præstantior, sequitur ut non loci quidem positione, sed nature dignitate, præstantior sit natura spiritalis (etiam illa, ubi rerum corporalem exprimuntur imagines) isto quoque corporeo cælo, quod est oculis conspicuum, unde luminaria et sidera effulgent, excellentius utique omnibus corporeis elementis, aicut oculorum sensus excellit in corpore.

"Unde hic existit quiddam mirabile, ut cum prior sit corpore spiritus, et posterior corporalis imago quàm corpus : tamen quia illud, quod tempore posterius est, fit in eo quod naturâ prius est, præstantior sit imago corporis in spiritu, quàm ipsum corpus in substantia sua. Melior enim est

posterior in order of existence, and exterior in situation or place. It is, moreover, in accordance with the re-

imaginatio, sive imago, corporis in animo, quàm ipsa species corporis, in quantum hæc in meliore natura, id est, in substantia vitali, sicuti animus est. Ideo perfectò major est notitia corporis, quàm ipsum corpus quod eâ notitiâ notum est. Illa enim vita quædam est in anima cognoscentis : corpus autem non est vita. Et vita quælibet quolibet corpore major est, non mole, sed vi." (*Aug. Phil.* apud Collect. Fab., pp. 479, 480.)

The rigorously analytical method of our author, as well as the gradual and orderly manner in which he passed from the region of pure philosophy, to that of pure theology, will become evident by a study of the various phases in which the doctrine of the soul is presented throughout his entire writings. There is no hastily adopted hypothesis to discard, no error contrary to philosophy or religion to renounce. There is no retrogression. There is simply profound and comprehensive analysis, and steady progressive development from the first gleams of light to the perfect day of heavenly truth. His first attitude towards this most arduous of problems is that of hope and courage. "Inasmuch," he observes, "as the sciences are diving continually deeper into the mysteries of nature, and as continually detecting a resemblance between the substances of the subtil and grosser worlds, it seems just to believe that they may one day attain to knowledge on even this abstruse subject. And why not at the present day, &c.?" (*On The Infinite*, p. 110.) "The soul is the last and subtlest part of the body. . . . It is the part where there is a centre to which all the subtlest vibrations can refer themselves : in which there is nothing of elemental existence, but an essence the most active : without which none of the momentaneous intuition, distinctness, or vitality of the rational power, could possibly exist." (*Ibid.* p. 145.) "We have no reason to despair of arriving at a knowledge of the soul, especially if it be no longer regarded as an object of supreme ignorance, and as operating by absolutely unknown laws." (*Ibid.* p. 147.) "The veriest formative force and substance is the soul." (*Ec. An. Kingdom*, vol. i. p. 245.) "It is a faculty distinct from the intellectual mind, prior and superior to, and more universal and more perfect than, the latter." . . . "Consequently a notion of it can hardly be procured while we live in the body." (*Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 258, 259.) "The spirituous fluid itself is the eminently organic substance of its soul ; just as the eye is the organ of sight, &c." . . . "Now if the above-mentioned fluid be a super-eminent organ or sensorium, it seems that its faculty of operating is properly speaking the soul ; just as the faculty of thinking is the mind ; and the affection of the whole brain is the natural mind (*animus*)." (*Ibid.* p. 289.) "The soul is the only essence

quirements of order that what is of a higher degree of purity should flow into what is grosser, the prior into the posterior, the interior into the exterior, thus what is *spiritual* into what is *material*, and not contrariwise. It follows, therefore, that the mind, in so far as it is a subject of thought, flows into the sense of sight, according to the state induced upon the eyes owing to the presence of external objects; and this state, the same thinking mind orders and arranges at pleasure. In like manner the mind regarded as possessing the power of perception, flows into the sense of hearing, according to the state induced upon the organs of that sense, arising from spoken language.

(γ) The third view, which is known as Pre-established Harmony, has its origin in the appearances and fallacies of the rational faculty, inasmuch as the mind, in the very exercise of its energies, acts *together with* and *at the same time as* the body. It is, nevertheless, a fact that every operation is, in the first place, successive, and afterwards simultaneous. Successive operation is Influx; and simultaneous operation is Harmony: just as when the mind thinks and then speaks, or when it wills and thereupon acts. It is therefore, a fallacy of the rational faculty to establish, as a principle,

in which our body lives, so that our *being* and *life* is of one soul; and all other things which are supposed to live, belong to nature, because they are acted upon. Wherefore the soul is a substance so real, that by it and from it we proximately exist and subsist, and without it we are not bodies, but stocks, &c." (*On the Worship and Love of God*, § 33, note x.) "The soul is the intimate and supreme principle of man." (*True Christian Religion*, § 8.)

what is *simultaneous*, to the exclusion of what is *successive*.<sup>1</sup>

Now over and above these three opinions touching the mutual relation and intercourse between the soul and the body, a fourth is not possible; for it is plain that either the soul must act on the body, or the body on the soul, or else both must act at one and the same time without intermission.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note C.

<sup>2</sup> It is of the greatest moment, in a problem of this kind, to determine, if possible, the maximum of conceivable hypotheses. Wolf, notwithstanding his characteristic love of system, thus declines to give an opinion on the subject:—"An plura istis tribus systemata dari possint, nec ne, in præsentem non disquirimus." (*Psych. Rat.* § 553., note.)

Cudworth, indeed, attempted to frame what has been called by some a fourth hypothesis, that of a Plastic Medium. It is, in effect, nothing more than the *anima Mundi* of Plato, or the substantial forms of the Peripatetics, in the garb of a new terminology. On this opinion Rothenflue, who strangely attributes it to Leclerc, makes the following observations:—

"Datur et quartum systema, scilicet *mediatoris plastici*, a Joanne Leclerc Batavo excogitatum, qui, ut commercium animæ cum corpore explicaret, finxit in nobis esse principium quoddam vivens, nec omnino spirituale, nec omnino materiale, cujus ministerium sit, ad animæ imperium movere corpus, et occasione motuum corporis de iis animam admonere, ipsi sensationes gratas vel ingratas imprimendo. Principium hoc vocavit *mediatorem plasticum*. Ast systema hoc non solum gratis assertum est; cum inter compositum et simplex medium dari non possit; sed insuper etiam inutile est, atque in eadem incurrit difficultates, propter quas solvendas assumptum est. Si enim mediator ille est compositus ac proin materialis, quomodo agit in animam? Si vero simplex, quomodo agit in corpus?" (*Vide Instit. Phil. Theoret.*, tom. ii. p. 165.)

Helmholtz, who seems averse to making a new hypothesis, unhappily gives the weight of his great scientific authority in favour of Physical Influx, or what he terms *l'Opinion empiristique*. (*Optique Physiologique*, p. 578.)



## § 2.

Forasmuch as Spiritual Influx takes its rise from the principle of order and its laws, as previously stated, therefore this opinion has been admitted and accepted by the wise in the learned world as being preferable to the other two hypotheses.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever has its source in Order is Truth; and Truth, owing to its inherent light, renders itself manifest even in the obscurity and shade of human reason, which is the region of hypotheses. There are, moreover, three circumstances which serve to envelop the hypothesis of Spiritual Influx in obscurity:—

- i. Ignorance as to what the Soul really is.
- ii. Ignorance as to what the Spiritual is.
- iii. Ignorance touching the quality<sup>2</sup> or mode of Influx.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note D.

<sup>2</sup> The logical term *quale* is of constant occurrence in our author's writings. It is always employed in one definite sense and for a specific purpose. A clear notion of its meaning is, therefore, essential to a correct understanding of those passages in which this significant predicable occurs. The following remark of Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 705, note) may serve to indicate what is meant by it:—"The natural order of the four questions (that may be proposed with regard to any thing), and as they are commonly enounced, is:—*An sit—Quid sit—Quale sit—Cur sit.*" Again, he observes (*ibid.* p. 878), "One affection is distinguished from another as it is, or as it is not, such and such; or, in other words, as it has or has not, this or that *quality* (suchness)."

"Both ancient and modern philosophers," says Swedenborg (*Economy of A. K.*, vol. ii. § 231), subscribe to the axiom, that every thing derives from its form its peculiar and distinctive character or quality." By thus connecting *form* and *quality*, the latter term ceases to be a mere metaphysical abstraction, and finds its true place in the sphere of reality both natural and spiritual, as the following extracts clearly evince:—

"A being is not a being unless it exists. The reason is, that prior to



Wherefore it behoves that these three principal points be made clear and evident before the Reason is capable of seeing the actual truth itself; for hypothetical truth is not the real and veritable truth. It is but a guess about truth. It is as if a picture on a wall were seen at night, by the light of the stars, to which the mind imparts a different form according to its fancy. The

this it is not in a *form*: and what is not in a form has no *quality*; and that which has no quality is nothing." (*Angelic Wisdom*, *etc.* § 15.)

"Every unit has its existence from various things, for a unit which is not constituted of things various in character is not anything. It does not possess form, and therefore it has no *quality*. But when a unit exists from things that are various, and when these varied constituents are in a perfect form, in which each joins itself to another as a friend, harmoniously combining in the series, then the unit has a *perfect quality*." (*Heaven and Hell*, § 56.)

"It is according to order that what is first should proceed to its ultimate, in general and in particular, that the variety of all things may exist, and by means of varieties, every sort of quality. For quality is rendered perfect by differences which have relation to things more or less opposite. Who cannot see that truth receives its quality from the existence of the false, similarly good from the existence of evil; just as in like manner light receives its quality owing to the existence of darkness, and heat because there is such a thing as cold? What would colour be if there were white only, and not black? Under any other conditions, the quality of the intermediate colours is no otherwise than imperfect. What would the senses be apart from relation? And what is relation unless it has respect to opposites? Is not the sight of the eye rendered dim by looking at white only, and does it not acquire new vigour by looking at a colour which inwardly acquires a something derived from what is black, such as is the colour of green? Does not the ear grow deaf when a single tone keeps continually pressing on its organs, and is it not aroused and enlivened by melodious sounds which are varied by (musical) relations?" (*True Christian Religion*, § 763.)

"Each good has its opposite evil, and each truth its opposite falsity. This may be known from the fact that there is nothing in existence without a relation to its opposite; and that from its opposite it is known what kind of a thing it is (*quale*), and in what degree it is; also, that thence come all perception and sensation." (*Heaven and Hell*, § 541.)

case is otherwise when, in the morning, the light of the sun shines full upon it, and reveals not only its general features, but also its several parts in detail, and places them clearly and distinctly in view. Even so, out of that dim shadow of truth, in which the hypothesis in question lies obscured, the plain and naked truth emerges when once the following points are thoroughly comprehended :—

i. What that is which is called spiritual, and how it stands related to what is natural.

ii. What the human soul is, and what is its quality or manner of being.

iii. What is the mode or quality of that Influx which first passes *into the soul* ; then, by means of the soul *into the mind* ; and, lastly, proceeds from the mind, as being endowed with perception and thought, *into the body*.

It is, however, impossible to communicate a knowledge of such subjects except through the instrumentality of one who has been endowed with the gift of being in fellowship with angels in the spiritual world, and *at the same time* with men in the natural world. Now whereas this privilege has been granted to me, I have been enabled to describe what is the essence, and what the quality or mode of both worlds. This has been already done in a small work on the subject of CONJUGIAL LOVE, in the spiritual Record therein contained, which treats of the spiritual order of being, §§ 326—329 ; and of the human soul, § 315 ; also of influx, § 380 ; and still more in detail, §§ 415—422.

Who does not, or at least may not, know that the goodness which has its source in love, and the truth which pertains to faith, flow from God into man ; and that, moreover, they flow into his soul, are sensibly perceived in his mind, and also flow forth from thought into words, and from will into acts ?

That this is the source of Spiritual Influx, and that hence it has its origin and derivation, will be shown in the following order :—

I. There are two worlds ; a Spiritual World in which spirits and angels dwell, and a Natural World, the habitation of men.

II. The spiritual world has derived its existence, and continues at every moment to subsist, from its own proper Sun : in like manner, the natural world, from its own proper Sun.

III. The Sun of the spiritual world is *pure love* from JEHOVAH GOD, who is in the midst of it.

IV. From that Sun go forth heat and light. The heat proceeding from it is, in its essence, Love ; and the light which thence appears is, in its essence, Wisdom.

V. That heat as well as that light flow into man ; the heat into his will, where it produces the Goodness which has its origin in Love, and the light into his understanding, giving rise to the Truth which is derived from Wisdom.

VI. These two, namely, heat and light, or, in other words, love and wisdom, flow conjointly from God into the Soul of man; and by means of the Soul into his Mind—into its affections and thoughts; and from these into his bodily senses—into speech and actions.

VII. The sun of the natural world is *pure fire*; and by means of this sun the world of Nature, in the beginning, was brought into existence, and still continues to exist.

VIII. Thence it follows, that whatever proceeds from this sun, when considered in itself, *is dead*.

IX. What is spiritual clothes itself with what is natural, as a man clothes himself with a garment.

X. Things spiritual, when thus clothed in man, render it possible for him to live as a rational and moral creature—in other words, as a natural man, but after a spiritual manner.

XI. The *reception* of that influx is such as is the state of love and wisdom in the man himself.

XII. The understanding in man is such that it can be raised into the light, that is to say, into the wisdom, in which the angels of heaven are, *according to the degree of culture and development of the rational faculty*. His will also can be elevated into heat, in other words, into love of a like kind, *according to the deeds of his life*. It is to be observed, however, that

the love which pertains to his will, is not thus elevated, except in so far as man *wills and does* what the wisdom, which belongs to his understanding, *teaches* him to do.

XIII. The case is absolutely different with the brute creation.

XIV. There are three Degrees, or grades of being, in the spiritual world, also three Degrees, in the natural world, according to which all influx takes place.

XV. In the first of these degrees are Ends, in the second Causes, and in the third Effects.

XVI. From the foregoing it is plain what the quality of Spiritual Influx is, when traced from its origin to its effects.

Each of the above propositions shall now be made the subject of some brief illustrations.

### I.

*There are two worlds; a Spiritual World, in which spirits and angels dwell, and a Natural World, the habitation of men.*

### § 3.

That there is a spiritual world in which are spirits and angels, distinct from the natural world which is the abode of men, is a truth which up to the present time has lain deeply concealed from mankind, even in



Christendom.<sup>1</sup> The cause of this is that no angel has ever come down and taught it orally, nor has any man ascended to that world and seen that it is so. Lest,

<sup>1</sup> The author refers here, exclusively, to that open vision of the spiritual world which he avers had been vouchsafed to him, in fulfilment of the Divine counsels, also with special reference to the close of the Christian Dispensation, and the actual state of the Church in these latter times. On such mysterious themes there has been no lack of speculation among theologians. Much of it, indeed, is fanciful and, in some cases, false and pernicious, such as the fantastical visions of certain Roman Catholic so-called saints. On the other hand, there are not wanting instances of noble efforts to rise into the serene region of intellectual light, far above the dull level of mere superstitious unreasoning belief in the realities which transcend 'the visible diurnal sphere.' Eminent in this kind are those of St. Augustine. That great pioneer in the direction of a 'Divine dialectick,' thus ably and eloquently exposes the falsity of materialism, and the enormity implied in denying that Truth Incarnate is an object of perception:—

"... Si, ut alia omittam, ipsa aeternitas semper manet, nec aliqua imaginaria figmenta requirit, quibus in mentem quasi vehiculis veniat, nec tamen venire posset nisi ejus meminissemus, potest esse quarundam rerum sine ulla imaginatione memoria. . . . Justitiam et sapientiam, et quicquid ejusmodi est, non aliter imaginamur, aliter contuemur. Sed hæc invisibilia simplici mentis atque rationis intentione intellecta conspicimus sine ullis formis et molibus corporalibus, sine ullis lineamentis figurisque membrorum, sine ullis localibus finibus, sine spatiis infinitis. Ipsumque lumen quo cuncta ista discernimus, in quo nobis satis apparet, quid credamus incognitum, quid cognitum teneamus, quam formam sensu corporis recordemur, quam cogitatione fingamus, quid corporis sensus attingat, quid imagnetur animus simile corpori, quid certum et omnium corporum dissimile intelligentia contempletur. Hoc ergo lumen ubi hæc cuncta dijudicantur, non utique sicut hujus solis et cujusque corporei luminis fulgor per localia spatia circumquaque diffunditur, mentemque nostram quasi visibili candore illustrat. . . . Sed invisibiliter et ineffabiliter, et tamen intelligibiliter, lucet." (St. Aug. *Epist.* LXXII., LXXXV.)

In contrast with these lofty and pregnant thoughts, and as showing the depths of darkness into which modern metaphysic has plunged this whole subject, consult the *Bampton Lectures* of the late Dean Mansel, *passim*; also one of the most recent attempts to resuscitate the decaying *Traditionism* of the Middle Ages, *La Philosophie Scholastique*, by the Père Kleutgen, T. IV. c. iij. De la Création. (Trans. of the Père C. Sierp.)



therefore, owing to ignorance of the existence of such a world, and to a wavering and unsettled faith respecting heaven and hell resulting from this ignorance, mankind should grow infatuated to such a degree as to become atheists<sup>1</sup> of that type which refers all things to nature

<sup>1</sup> "Who are more persuaded that they have their eyes open, and that, as God, they know what is good and evil, than they who love themselves and are learned in worldly matters? And yet, who is more blind than one who belongs to this class? If such persons only ponder the matter with some degree of attention, it will appear that they do not know, much less do they believe in, the possible existence of spirit. What the life spiritual and celestial really is they are totally ignorant. Nor do they acknowledge that there is such a thing as life eternal; for they believe that they are to die like the brutes. In no way whatever do they acknowledge the Lord. On the contrary they worship themselves and nature. Those who are disposed to speak with caution on this point, say that there is a certain Supreme Being of whose essence they know nothing, and that He rules over all.

"These are their principles, which, in many and various ways they confirm in themselves, by means of reasonings taken from the senses and from matters of science. If they dared they would do the same openly in the face of the whole world. Such persons, although they are willing to be acknowledged as gods, that is to say, as the wisest of beings, yet if they were asked whether they knew of anything that did not belong to their own proper life, they would reply that such a thing would be a mere non-entity; and that should they be deprived of what was properly their own, they would be simply nothing. Were they asked what is meant by living from the Lord, they would consider such things to be phantasies. Were they questioned as to whether they knew what conscience is, their reply would be that it is nothing but a certain imaginary entity which might perchance prove of service to the common people in the way of keeping them under restraint. If one inquired as to whether they knew anything of perception, they would do nothing but laugh, and call it enthusiasm of some kind or other.

"Such is their wisdom. Such are the open eyes they have, and such gods are they. From principles of this kind, which they deem to be clearer than the daylight, they take their commencement, on such principles they proceed, and thus they reason on the mysteries of faith. What thence could result but an abyss of thick darkness? These, beyond all others, are the serpents that seduce the world." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 206.)

as their source, it has pleased THE LORD to open the sight of my spirit, and to cause it to ascend up into heaven, and also to go down into hell, and to display to its view the distinctive character of each.

It was thence made evident to me

(1.) That there are two worlds, distinct from each other; one, in which all things are spiritual, and for that reason called the *Spiritual World*; and, another, in which all things are natural, and therefore named the *Natural World*.

(2.) That spirits and angels live in their own proper world; and men, in a world proper to them.

(3.) That every man takes his departure, through the gate of death, from his own world into that other, wherein he lives for ever.

It is necessary first of all to have a clear and definite conception of both these worlds, to the end that INFLUX, which is the special subject of these pages, may be unfolded from its own first principle. For the spiritual world flows into the natural world, and endows with activity each of its minutest parts, in men as well as in the brute creatures; and it is also the

"All those persons are evil who deny that the world was created by God, and who consequently deny that there is a God: for such persons are atheistic naturalists. The reason why they are evil is, because all good, which is not only naturally but also spiritually good, is from God. Therefore they who deny a God are not willing, and hence they are not able, to receive any good from any other source than that which is proper to themselves. What is proper to man is the lust of his flesh; and whatsoever proceeds from this is spiritually evil, howsoever it may naturally appear to be good." (*True Christian Religion*, § 382.)

efficient cause of the principle of vegetation in trees and plants.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *anima vegetativa*, or efficient cause of all vegetable existence and growth, is stated by our author to be spiritual, as well as the soul of animals; but he remarks, that in the world this fact is unknown.

"By the vegetative soul is meant the endeavour and struggle to produce a vegetable in regular progression, even to the formation of seeds, and thereby to multiply itself to infinity, and to propagate itself to eternity. For there is, as it were, an idea of the Infinite and the Eternal in every vegetable. For one seed, during a certain number of years, may be multiplied so as to fill the entire earth, and also propagated from seed to seeds without end. This together with the marvellous progression in the process of growth from the root into the shoot, next into the stem, then into branches, leaves, flowers, fruits, and at length into new seeds—all this is not natural. It is spiritual.

"In like manner, vegetables in many respects present a resemblance to such things as belong to the Animal Kingdom: as that they exist from seed; that in this seed there is, as it were, a prolific principle; that they produce a shoot which is, as it were, an infant; a stem, as it were a body; branches as arms; a top as a head; the various barks as so many skins; and leaves, as lungs; that they grow in the course of years, and then break forth into blossom as maidens before marriage, and after this bloom unfold *uteri* or *ova*, and bear fruit as offspring, in which lie stored up new seeds; and from these, as in the Animal Kingdom, exist proliferations or fructifications of the same species or race. These, in addition to many other things which have been observed by those who are skilled in the Botanical Art, and who have established a parallelism between these two Kingdoms, are so many indications of the fact, that the endeavour and struggle towards such things is not from the natural, but from the spiritual world." (*Apocalypse Explained*, § 1203.)

"The first generating or plastic force, innate in the very seeds of vegetable fetuses, may be likened to a soul; for from this, and in the similitude of it, are formed their bodies with their members and joints, while the stems are continued with their branches, leaves, little tubes, and several particulars, which resemble animal fetuses. These also, in like manner, pass through their several stages. In their infancy they flower, then they grow to maturity, next they verge to old age, and at length decay; not to mention innumerable other particulars. But such births are the first and ultimate powers of nature herself, excited from the conjunction of her most active forms constituting the æther, together with the forces of the sluggish earth, through the mediation of the sun's rays; and from this

## II.

*The spiritual world has derived its existence, and continues at every moment to subsist, from its own proper Sun: in like manner, the natural world from its own proper Sun.*

## § 4.

There is one sun proper to the spiritual world, and another to the natural world. The reason is this. Those two worlds are absolutely distinct: and, besides, a world, as such, derives its origin from A SUN. In truth, a world in which every thing is spiritual, cannot possibly take its rise from a sun out of which every thing that emanates is natural: for were this the case there would be such a thing as Physical Influx, which, nevertheless, is contrary to the principle of order.

That the world has derived its existence from the sun, and not the sun from the world, is clear from a study of the effect in connexion with its cause. For the world, both in whole and in part, subsists by means of the sun. Moreover, subsistence is the plain proof of

origin, in their first principles and in their last, as well as in those intermediate, they derive the image of primitive and most perfect nature, and in a certain type bear a resemblance to the superior essences, or the living essences themselves. But what the quality of this seminal force is, cannot be known except from the pure and simple forms of a prior nature, both those which have reference to active powers, and those which have reference to passive powers, and also, from comprehending in what way the solar rays operate so as to join these powers together. (*On the Worship and Love of God*, § 29, Note m.)

existence. Hence the well-known maxim, *Subsistence is perpetual existence*.<sup>1</sup> From all this it is evident that if the sun were withdrawn, the world which depends upon it would fall into its original chaos,<sup>2</sup> and this again into nothing.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note B.

<sup>2</sup> This term is always used by the author in a sense which he has elsewhere clearly defined. It is, therefore, not to be taken as a mere form of speech, to conceal ignorance, but as expressing a strictly philosophical determination. This "chaos, or solar crust" is described at length in *THE PRINCIPLES* (vol. ii. p. 253, &c., chap. iv.), "Of the universal solar and planetary chaos, and its separation into planets and satellites." It may here be observed that the speculations contained in this great Book of Principles well deserve to be called stupendous. They, unhappily, still await a candid and adequate examination by competent physicists and philosophers.

The following extract will perhaps suffice to convey a general idea of the author's views on the subject of a primeval chaos :—

"Merely from the light of reason the ancient philosophers held that there was a certain universal chaos both of the sun and planets, in which were comprehended simultaneously all things which could conduce to the perfection of our system ; thus, that both Tartarus and the sun, the day and the night, soft bodies and hard, lay primordially buried together ; in fine, all the seeds and elements of the things subsequently produced ; . . . .

"These philosophers . . . . were shrewd enough to guess the pre-existence of a chaos ; although they were ignorant of the series by which the various things were brought into existence. The philosopher naturally embraces the opinion which seems to him to be the most agreeable to reason, the most resembling visible nature, and which presents the least difficulties ; for he is anxious, of course, that in future ages his system should not fall to pieces in consequence of inherent contrarieties. The mind, therefore, naturally chooses the least difficult path, which it pursues like a traveller in the dark, who gropes his way in the direction in which he meets with the fewest obstacles ; and so follows the path without seeing it ; he touches the various objects that come in his way, although he knows nothing of what he is touching, and arrives at the end of his journey, although he cannot tell how. In the same way were the ancient philosophers led to presume the existence of a chaos common to the sun and



There is in the spiritual world a sun which is different from that in the natural world. To the truth of this I am able to bear solemn witness, inasmuch as *I have seen that sun*.<sup>1</sup> Its appearance is fiery like that of our own sun, of almost equal apparent size, at such a distance from the angels as ours is from men: still, however, it neither rises nor sets, but stands fixed and unmovable at a mean height, between the zenith and the horizon. Thence it comes to pass that the angels rejoice in perpetual light and never-ceasing spring.

The man who trusts to the faculty of reason, and who, at the same time, knows nothing touching the sun of the spiritual world, may easily fall into error in the idea he entertains as to the creation of the universe. When he reflects profoundly on this creation he perceives no otherwise than that it has come from nature; and since he supposes that the original source of nature is the sun, he cannot but conclude that the creation is derived from the sun as its creator.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it is

planets; although in what manner it existed, of what kind it was, and by what means it came to be such, they were altogether ignorant.

"This at least we may conclude from the Ancient Philosophy (a conclusion highly agreeable to reason), that on the one hand there existed, pripevally, a universal chaos both of the sun and planets; and, on the other hand, that any other hypothesis whatever is less consistent with reason." (*Principia*, part iii. c. iv.)

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note F.

<sup>2</sup> A certain class of writers seems to be busy and earnest in sowing the seeds of a new form of sun-worship, or at least what seems to be an exceedingly close approximation to it.

"To worship the sun of this world," says Swedenborg, "is also to acknowledge Nature to be the Creative Power, and one's own proper pru-



impossible for any one to have a perception of Spiritual Influx unless he also know, for a fact, its real origin ;

dence to be the efficient cause of all that one does ; and this involves the denial of God, and also the denial of Divine Providence."

With the above may be compared the following apparently unqualified and highly dogmatic statement of a recent writer. The reader will draw his own conclusion :—

"It is now an admitted doctrine that the nervous power is generated from the action of the nutriment supplied to the body, and is therefore of the class of forces having a common origin, and capable of being mutually converted—including mechanical momentum, heat, electricity, magnetism, and chemical decomposition. The power that *animates* the human frame, and *keeps alive* the currents of the brain, has its origin in the *grand primal source of reviving power, the Sun* ; his influence exerted on vegetation builds up the structures whose destruction and decay within the animal system give forth all the energy concerned in maintaining the animal processes. What is called vitality is not a peculiar force, but a collocation of the forces of inorganic matter in such a way as to keep up a living structure." (Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, p 51.)

As 'heaven is high above the earth,' so far removed from folly and blindness such as this, is the language of genuine science. "The sun," says Sir John Herschel, "is the almoner of the Almighty, the delegated dispenser to us of light and warmth, as well as the centre of attraction ; and as such, the immediate source of all our comforts, and indeed of the very possibility of our existence on earth." (*Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, p. 62.)

A well-known writer, amongst the first in his own special field of inquiry, has directed public attention to this novel scientific epidemic, which, under the colour of an 'advance' in science is, in fact, a retrogression to idolatry and barbarism. He thus remarks upon the new movement :—

"Living matter is first called by a name (also) given to non-living matter ; then it is asserted that this (matter) does so and so, which it has never been proved to do ; this is next stated to be a fact of the profoundest significance ; and by such devices the public is taught to believe in the creative and directing power of the non-living. Arguments of another kind have already led many to accept as an article of faith the dogma that it is force alone which forms, and builds, and designs, and makes ; and that the only source of the countless living things which people this earth is the sun — 'the God of this new world.'" (Dr. L. Beale, *Protoplasm*, p. 77.)

The following weighty words of an honest and intrepid thinker, written

*for all influx comes from a sun.* Spiritual influx is from a spiritual sun, and natural influx from one that is

before French Revolutions came into vogue, may not unfitly be reproduced in illustration of the text. They are well worthy of being deeply pondered, at the present time, for their wise counsel and salutary warning in what nearly concerns the public conscience and the morality of the masses :—

“Let that principle of some of the philosophers, that ‘all is matter, and that there is nothing else,’ be received for certain and indubitable, and, it will be easy to be seen, *by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days*, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any one (with Polemo) take the world, or (with the Stoics) the æther, or the sun, or (with Anaximenes) the air to be God, and what a divinity, religion, and worship we must needs have ! Nothing can be so dangerous as principles thus taken up without questioning or examination ; especially if they be *such as concern morality, which influences men’s lives, and gives a bias to all their actions*. Who might not justly expect another kind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure ? And in Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity ? And he who, with Plato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations *than those who look not beyond this spot of earth*, and those perishing things which are to be had in it. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a principle, that ‘right and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not by nature,’ will have *other measures of moral rectitude and pravity* than those who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent to all human constitutions.” (Locke, *Human Und.*, B. IV. c. xii. s. 4.)

“Most people in the world speak from appearance, and say that the sun by heat and light produces what is seen in plains, fields, gardens, and woods ; also that the sun by his heat brings forth worms from eggs, and causes the beasts of the earth and the fowls of heaven to be prolific ; yea that it even vivifies man.

“Those who speak thus, only from appearance, may do so without ascribing these things to nature, for they do not reflect on the subject ; just as in the case of those who speak of the sun as rising and setting, and causing days and years, and being now in this or that degree of altitude. Such persons, in like manner, speak from appearance, and may do so, and yet not attribute such things to the sun ; for they do not think of the sun as stationary, and of the earth’s revolution.

“On the other hand, those who confirm themselves in thinking that the sun by heat and light produces those things that appear on the earth, at length ascribe all things to nature, even the creation of the universe,

natural. The internal sight of man, which is that of his mind, is the recipient of influx from the spiritual sun. On the other hand, the external sight, which is proper to the body, is the recipient of influx from the natural sun: and these two modes of vision, when in action, are joined together mutually in the same manner as the soul is with the body.

From the preceding statements it is plain into what blindness, darkness, and folly, all those may fall who know nothing of the spiritual world and the sun that is there. They may fall into *blindness*; inasmuch as the

and become naturalists, and at last atheists. It is true they can afterwards say that God created Nature, and endowed her with the power of producing such things. This they say from the fear of losing their reputation. But still, by the term God the Creator they mean Nature—some, what is inmost in Nature. And in this case they make light of the Divine teachings of the Church." (*Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 349.)

"Some, indeed, are to be excused for ascribing certain visible effects to nature; because they have had no knowledge concerning the Sun of the spiritual world, where the Lord is, and respecting the influx thence. Nor have they known anything of that world and its state, yea more, nor of its presence with man; and consequently they could think no otherwise than that the spiritual principle was a something more purely natural; and thus that the angels were either in the æther or in the stars: also that the devil was either the evil belonging to man, or if he did exist, that he was either in the air or in the depths; besides, that the souls of men after death were either in the inmost part of the earth, or in some *Ubi* or *Pu* (*πού*) till the day of judgment; and other like notions which fancy evolved, owing to ignorance of the spiritual world and its Sun. This is why they are to be pardoned who are in the belief that nature produces the things which are seen, owing to some principle implanted from creation. Nevertheless those who have made themselves atheists by confirmations in favour of nature, are not to be excused, inasmuch as they had it in their power to confirm themselves in favour of the Deity. Ignorance, indeed, excuses, but does not take away the false principle that has been confirmed; for this falsity becomes coherent with evil, and the evil with hell." (*Conjugal Love*, § 422.)

mind, when it depends on the sight of the eye alone, becomes, in the exercise of reason, like a bat, which at night flies here and there at random, and presently against some linen clothes hung out to dry;—into *darkness*, inasmuch as the sight of the mind, while the sight of the eye flows into it *from within*, is deprived of all spiritual light, and becomes like that of the owl;—into *folly*, because notwithstanding that the man still thinks, he yet thinks from natural things concerning spiritual things, and not in the reverse order; and thus it is that he thinks in a state of blindness, folly, and infatuation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Speaking in the name of philosophy, Boëthius, as he is wont, beautifully describes the state of those minds that are blinded by their own disordered affections :—"Nequeunt oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae veritatis attollere, similesque sunt avibus quarum intuitum nox illuminat, dies coecat." Aristotle's comparison is frequently borrowed without acknowledgment, and the original passage is seldom quoted. It seems worth while to place it before the reader, not merely on its own account, but also as showing how carefully the ancients distinguished between *anima* and *mens*. This is a distinction of the first consequence in a Rational Psychology, well-nigh obliterated among the moderns, but rigidly observed throughout Swedenborg's entire writings. The words of the Gentile philosopher are :—

ὥστερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὁρμάτα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. (Aristot. *Met.* Lib. i. Min. § 9.)

The similitudes in the text would seem, however, to involve much more than what is commonly intended by mere comparisons. They are correspondences. That is, they answer, in the order of natural things, to certain spiritual realities. A few references to the *Arcana Coelestia* will serve to indicate what is meant. *Moles* and *bats* (Ia. ii. 20) are there taken to signify "those who are in darkness, that is, in falsities, and the evils to which they give rise." (§ 8932). In the same work it is also stated that for man "to bow himself down to the *moles* and the *bats* is to worship such things as are in thick darkness and in the shade of

## III.

*The sun of the spiritual world is pure love from  
JEHOVAH GOD, who is in the midst of it.*

## § 5.

What is spiritual can proceed from no other source than love, and love from no other source than Jehovah God, who is Love itself. Wherefore the sun of the spiritual world, whence all things spiritual stream forth as from their fountain head, is pure love proceeding from JEHOVAH GOD. *That sun itself is not God ; but*

night, and to do this is to worship things external, apart from anything internal." (Cf. *Ibid.* § 10,582.)

"Everything relating to science in man is natural, because it is in his natural man. This is the case even in what is matter of science concerning things spiritual and heavenly. The reason is that man sees those things in and from what is natural. What he does not see from the natural order he does not comprehend. But the regenerate man, who is called spiritual, and the unregenerate man, who is merely natural, see these things in different ways. With the former, things of science receive illustration from the light of heaven ; but with the latter, from the light which flows in by means of spirits who are in what is false and evil. And this light is, indeed, from the light of heaven, but in them it becomes darkened, like the light of evening or night. For such spirits, and consequently such men, are like the owls, which see clearly at night and obscurely by day ; that is, they see the false clearly, and the true obscurely. They, accordingly, see clearly the things of the world, but obscurely, if at all, the things of heaven." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 4967.)

"Gross and dense falsities are described (in the Word) by *owls and ravens* : by owls, because they live in the shades of the night ; by ravens, because they are of a black colour. As in Isaiah, 'The owl also and the raven shall dwell in it' (c. xxxiv. 11) ; where the subject treated of is the Jewish Church, in that it contained nothing but falsities. These are also described by the owl and the raven." (*Ibid.* § 866.)



is from God. It is that sphere which is nearest to Him, surrounding Him, and proceeding from Him.<sup>1</sup>

By means of that sun the universe was created by JEHOVAH GOD. The term universe is here taken to mean all worlds in their totality, which are as many in number as are the stars in the expanse of our heaven.

Creation took place by means of that sun, which is pure love; thus it was effected by JEHOVAH GOD, because Love is the very and inmost being of Life, and Wisdom is the very existing form of that Life thence originating; and, moreover, from Love by means of Wisdom all things were created.<sup>2</sup> This is what is meant by the following passage in the Gospel according to St. John:—*The Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was not any thing made that was made . . . and the world was made by Him.* (i. 3, 10.) The Word there mentioned is the Divine Truth; thus it is also the Divine Wisdom. It is also on this account that the Word, in verse 9, is called *the Light which lighteth every man*, in like manner as Divine Wisdom enlightens by means of Divine Truth.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note G.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix, Note H.

<sup>3</sup> It is a principle which pervades the author's theological system that Jehovah God, and our Lord—who is called God and also the Word, in the above passage of Holy Scripture—are essentially one and the same Divine Being. Apart from a full and explicit acknowledgment of this primary doctrine, a true Christian Theology is shown to be impossible. In the present day, in a greater degree, perhaps, than at any previous period in the history of the Church, is this fundamental doctrine opposed. Its very exist-



Those who deduce the origin of mundane systems from any other source than that of Divine Love operating by means of Divine Wisdom, are the victims of hallucinations after the manner of those who see

ence in Christendom is menaced by the most vehement opposition on all sides; by Judaism, Arianism, Socinianism, Calvinism, Materialism, and Atheism. Its denial involves the destruction of the Church, the unique basis of which was and ever must be the worship of Jehovah in a human form, that is, of the God-Man. The words above cited from Holy Scripture manifestly teach the identity of *Jehovah* and the *Word*, as the Creator of the world, and the light of every man coming into it.

Deity is one, although spoken of in Revelation under various appellations. "Owing to a secret cause," says our author, "the Lord is called in the Word, at one time, *Jehovah* only; at another, *Jehovah God*; at another, *Jehovah*, and afterwards *God*; at another, the *Lord Jehovah*; at another, the *God of Israel*; at another, *God* only, as in the first chapter of Genesis, where also, although *God* only is mentioned, it is said in the plural, *Let us make man in our own image*. Nor is He named *Jehovah God* until the subsequent chapter which treats of the celestial man. He is called *Jehovah* because He alone is, or because He alone LIVES; thus He is so called from *Essence*. He is called *God* because He is able to do all things; thus He is so called from *Power*." (*Arcana Cælestia*, § 800.)

"That in ancient times men worshipped Jehovah under a Humanity which was Divine, is manifestly clear from the angels who were seen by Abraham in a human form, then afterwards by Lot, as also by Joshua, Gideon, and Manoah, which angels were called Jehovah, and moreover were worshipped as the God of the universe. At the present day if Jehovah were to appear in the Church as a Man, men would be offended, and would think that He could in no wise be the Creator and Lord of the universe, inasmuch as He appeared as a man. And, besides, they would have no other idea concerning Him than such as they entertain concerning a common man. In this they believe themselves wiser than the ancients, not knowing that in thinking thus they are altogether destitute of wisdom. For when the idea of their thought is poured forth upon an *Ens universale* which is altogether incomprehensible, the idea falls upon no being, and is utterly dissipated. And then in its place comes the idea of *nature*, to which all and everything is attributed. Thence arises the worship of nature so general at the present day in the world, especially in the Christian world." (*Arcana Cælestia*, § 6876.)

spectres as men, and who take their own fancies to be genuine lights of the intellect, and the visionary products of the reason to be real representations. For, of a truth, the created universe is a coherent work derived and fashioned from Divine Love by means of Divine Wisdom. This thou wouldest see wert thou able thoroughly to explore its universal bond of union, in regular order from first to last.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "There is a connection, communion, and mutual relation of all things in the world and in nature, beginning from the first substance and force ; one science meets and enlarges another, and each successive discovery throws new light upon the preceding."

"There is a connection between all things in the world, and a mutual dependence on their first principles, since there is nothing which is not a series, or in a series. This transcendental truth is manifested only by contemplation of the various objects in the world ; and is consequently not acknowledged except by a rational view of the facts presented by general experience. Nevertheless, that the truth is such, both reason and experience abundantly testify." (*Ec. An. King.*, vol. i. p. 6 ; ii. p. 10.)

"This alone I perceive most clearly, that the order of nature exists for the sake of ends, which flow through universal nature to return to the first end ; and that the worshippers of nature are insane." (*Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 243.)

"Most stupendous is the order and connection of all things in the world and its three kingdoms. All things flow from an end, through ends, to an end. There is a most universal providence in the veriest particulars, to recount the arguments in proof of which, would be to impose an impossibility on the most untiring tongue by reason of the infinite evidences with which creation overflows. To be lost in silent astonishment, therefore, at this display of Divine Wisdom, is more becoming our nature, than to overburden ourselves with proofs of its existence. In all the heavens there is nothing, throughout the whole earth there is nothing, that does not exhibit, in most palpable signs, the presence of a superintending Deity ; so that he who sees nothing in all these evidences, is blinder than a mole, and viler than a brute." (*Ibid.* vol. i. pp. 276, 277.)

"We can, with sufficient clearness, contemplate the idea of a certain kind of creation represented in our own very minds themselves. For our minds, in the first place, represent to themselves ends, or purposes, which are their first and last goals, and to which they direct their course. Presently

After the same manner that God is one, so also the Spiritual Sun is one: for extension of space cannot be predicated of spiritual things, which are derivations from that Sun. Add to this that Essence and Existence, separate and apart from space, are everywhere in spaces *yet without possessing the attribute of space*. Thus it is that the Divine Love extends from the first principle of the universe to all the ends of the same.

The Divine Being fills all things, and by this outgoing of his fulness preserves all things in the state in which they were at first created. Reason sees this truth, as it were, afar off: but it may see it near at hand in proportion as it acquires a thorough knowledge of the following principles:—(1) What the mode or quality of Love is, in itself; (2) in what its conjunction with Wisdom consists in order that *ends* may be perceived; (3) what constitutes its influx into Wisdom that *causes* may be presented to view; (4) in what

they plan and endeavour, by certain means or causes, which being subordinate to each other may promote ends by effects, so that uses may come into existence. By this method there are formed, as it were, ova, which being animated by the mind, and conceived through the love of the end, and presently also cherished and hatched, produce vital offsprings conformable to the preconceived idea. And in these it appears that the ends themselves and the uses were altogether different, in their first origin, from the causes and the means; and are present in the mind, howsoever the mediations or series of causes mutually succeed each other; which mediations themselves, before their birth, have an existence together, and in one complex whole, in the same mind. If then, such series and operations can have a place in minds that are obscure and in the greatest degree finite, what must the case be in a mind Divine and Infinite! ” (*Worship and Love of God*, § 28, Note t.)

manner it operates by Wisdom that *effects* may be produced.

#### IV.

*From that Sun go forth heat and light. The heat proceeding from it is, in its essence, Love; and the light which thence appears is, in its essence, Wisdom.*

#### § 6.

It is well known that in THE WORD, and hence in the ordinary discourse of preachers, Divine love is expressed by the term *fire*. They are wont to pray, for example, that heavenly fire might fill their hearts, and enkindle within them holy desires to engage in the worship of God. This is owing to the fact that *fire* corresponds to *love*, and thence comes to signify *love*. Therefore it is that JEHOVAH GOD appeared as fire in the bush before Moses; in like manner upon Mount Sinai in the sight of the children of Israel. On this account also the command was given that fire should be kept burning continually upon the altar, and that the lamps of the candlestick in the Tabernacle should be lighted every morning. All this was done because *fire* signified *love*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Reference is here made to the science of correspondences between things natural and spiritual, which was well known to the ancients both within and without the Church. First destroyed among the Israelites, it remained lost for ages, and is now restored to the Church in these palmy days of the natural sciences. For a general account of it see the author's treatise *On Heaven and Hell* (§§ 87-115). On its pre-eminence over all other sciences

That heat arises from that (spiritual) fire is abundantly clear from the effects produced by the feeling of

see *Arcana Cælestia* (§ 4280). A knowledge of it will enable the reader to estimate at its true value the following inconsiderate strictures, recently made by a popular exponent of physical facts, on what he is pleased to call *the credulous prattle of the ancients about miracles*. "Transferring thought," says the writer, "from our little sand-grain of an earth to the immeasurable heavens, where countless worlds, with their freights of life, probably revolve unseen, the very suns which warm them being barely seen by us across abysmal space; reflecting that beyond these sparks of solar fire suns innumerable may lie, whose light can never stir the optic nerve at all; and bringing this conception face to face with the idea that the Builder and Sustainer of it all should contract himself (*sic*) to a burning bush, or behave in other familiar ways ascribed to him—it is easy to understand how astounding the incongruity must appear to a scientific man." But the incongruity exists in the errant imagination of the mere man of science. To the enlarged and well-ordered mind of the Christian philosopher, this *Divine manifestation* made to the inner vision of Moses at the 'mountain of God' presents no incongruity. He does not confound—as the above writer has done without thought and without knowledge—the gaze of the Seer (by Divine permission) on spiritual realities, with the gross material idea of a *physical contraction*. Thrice unhappy man of science, whose 'conception' of this lower world is such as to turn into 'sheer darkness' that faint glimpse of the all-glorious eternal I AM, mercifully vouchsafed to man through the apparently humble medium of the bush which burned with fire, and yet was not consumed. The man of science, as such, can know nothing of these most loving and truly astounding records of Theophaneia. (See *Arcana Cælestia*, §§ 9359, 9972.) A key to such 'science' difficulties will be found in the following extracts, if sought for by a clear and candid mind:—

"When the Lord appears, he appears according to man's quality, inasmuch as man receives what is Divine no otherwise than according to his quality. Wherefore also when the Lord appeared on Mount Sinai, he appeared to the people as fire burning even to the heart of heaven, and as darkness, clouds, and thick darkness. (Deut. iv. 11; v. 22, 23; also Exod. xix. 18.) He would have appeared altogether otherwise, if the people who stood beholding at the nether part of the Mount had not been such as they were." (*Arcana Cælestia*, § 6832.)

Those persons who have a material and earthly idea of truth, and not at the same time a spiritual and a heavenly one, are described as not knowing what the heavenly kingdom is, nor what the glory there is, nor what



love; as, for example, a man is excited, grows warm, and becomes inflamed with passion, just as the state of love in him is raised to a feeling of jealousy or to burning rage. The heat of the blood—in other words, the vital heat of human beings, and in general of animals, is from no other source than from the love which constitutes their life. *Infernal fire* is nothing else but a state of love which is in opposition to heavenly love.<sup>1</sup>

love is; yea more, nor what faith is, nor, in general, what goodness is; for they form their judgment from things corporeal and pertaining to earth. . . . "When they think about God, they think materially, and, therefore, either deny God, or take nature to be God; or they worship idols, or dead men. . . . In such an obscure and false principle of faith are they who believe the Word as to the sense of its letter alone, apart from doctrine formed from it by one who is enlightened. They who read the Word without doctrine are like persons who walk in the dark without a lamp. Such are all merely sensual men." (*Ibid.* § 10,582).

"With the unregenerate man there exists neither the understanding of what is true, nor the will of what is good; but these appear only as if they existed; and they are moreover so called in common discourse. There may, however, exist within him truths rational and scientific; but then they are not living. There may also exist certain kinds of good which pertain to the will, like those which are to be found among the Gentiles, yea, among the lower animals; but they are only analogues." (*Ibid.* § 671.)

<sup>1</sup> "What is meant by the everlasting fire and also the gnashing of teeth spoken of in The Word concerning those who are in hell, is scarcely as yet known to any. This is owing to the fact that persons have thought after a material manner, of the things contained in The Word, not being acquainted with its spiritual sense. Wherefore by *Fire* some have understood material fire, some torture in general, some remorse of conscience, some a form of speech adapted to strike with terror, in consequence of the evils committed. Also, by gnashing of teeth, some have understood the thing itself, some a state of horror like that felt when such violent contact of the teeth makes itself heard. . . . Spiritual heat in man, is the heat of his life; for . . . in its essence it is love. This is the heat



It may now be seen whence it comes to pass that Divine Love appears to the angels as a Sun in their

which is understood by fire in The Word ; love to the Lord and love towards the neighbour, by heavenly fire ; and love of self, and love of the world, by infernal fire." See *Heaven and Hell* (§§ 566, 568) ; and in the Third Part, which specially treats of this dismal and terrible subject. The unhappy lot which, in the other life, awaits the wicked, is there set forth in detail, in the light of principles, a rejection of which would involve, by just consequence, a denial of the basis on which all Revealed Religion rests.

This dread subject is all the more deserving of the most serious and conscientious investigation, inasmuch as the utmost laxity of thought begins to prevail respecting it, among earnest, sober-minded, sincere Christians. Even ministers of religion, perplexed with its various difficulties, feel forced to deny what is plainly a doctrine of revealed Truth,—the *eternity of the state* of the wicked in the other life. Some even go so far as to advocate the notion of the annihilation of the unhappy in the other world—a notion at once unscriptural and pernicious. On this subject, which no pious mind can contemplate without being moved with feelings of the deepest awe and holy fear, our author's teachings are clear, definite, reasonable, and in strict accord with the express statements of Holy Scripture. Here, at least, the trumpet of truth gives no uncertain sound. It is shown that the vital fire in man does not derive its origin from the elementary fire of our world ; and that by the fire of hell, so frequently mentioned in the Divine Word, is always meant the fire of love in the various modes of its being, thus the fire which pertains to a man's life. This fire originally proceeds from the Lord as a Sun. On finding an entrance into the minds of those who are in states which are *contrary* to it, it is then turned into the fire of various lusts, such as revenge, hatred, and cruelty. *It is this fire which torments those who are in hell.* For when a loose rein is given to their lusts, they rush upon and torture each other in ways direful and inexpressible. . . . They who have no belief in things spiritual, *especially the worshippers of nature*, can in no case be induced to believe that the heat which has its abode in living creatures is from any other origin than that from which the heat of this world proceeds. For they cannot know, much less can they acknowledge, that there is a heavenly fire proceeding from the Lord as a Sun, and that this fire is pure love. Hence it is that neither are they able to attain to the knowledge of innumerable things which are in the Word, nor can they acquire any acquaintance with the innumerable things which are in man, who is an organ made capable of receiving that heavenly fire. (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 6882.)

world, of an igneous character like our own sun, as stated above; and that angels experience the sense of heat according to the mode in which they receive love from JEHOVAH GOD, through the medium of that Sun.

It follows as a consequence from this that the light in that world is, in its essence, wisdom; for love and wisdom are inseparable, just as are *being* and *existing*. By means of wisdom, indeed, and according to wisdom, love exists.

The like to this has place in our own world, in that heat, in spring-time, makes itself one with light, and causes buds and at length fruits to appear. Every one, moreover, is aware of the fact that spiritual heat, or ardour, is love, and spiritual light is wisdom. Man, indeed, is in a state of warmth in the degree that he loves, and his understanding is in light in proportion as he is wise. *That spiritual light I have very frequently seen.* It exceeds, beyond measure, natural light in brightness and effulgence; for it may be described as being brightness itself and veritable effulgence in itself. It appears as resplendent and dazzling snow of such a kind as the garments of the Lord appeared when He was transfigured. (St. Mark, ix. 3. St. Luke, ix. 29.) Now inasmuch as Light is Wisdom, therefore the Lord calls Himself *the Light which lighteth every man* (St. John, i. 9); and elsewhere it is written that He is *Light itself* (St. John, iii. 19, viii. 12, xii. 35, 36, 46), that is to say, He is Divine Truth itself, which is THE WORD; therefore He is Wisdom itself.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The first and primary principle of the Church is to know and

There obtains a belief that the dim and shadowy light of nature, which is also rational, comes from the light of

acknowledge its God ; for without this knowledge and acknowledgment there is no such thing as conjunction with God. In like manner, in the Church, there is no conjunction without an acknowledgment of the Lord. This the Lord teaches in St. John, iii. 36, viii. 24.

"Those who have been born within the Church ought to acknowledge the Lord, His Divinity, and His Humanity, and also to believe on Him and to love Him ; for from Him comes all salvation. This the Lord teaches in St. John, iii. 36, vi. 40, xi. 25, 26.

"Wherefore, those who are within the Church, and do not acknowledge the Lord, and his Deity, cannot be conjoined to God ; and, consequently, can have no lot with the angels in heaven. For no one can be conjoined to God but by and in the Lord. That no one can be conjoined to God but by the Lord, the Lord teaches in St. John, i. 18, xi. 27, xiv. 6, xiv. 7—11, x. 30, 38, and in St. Matt. xi. 27. (See *New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrine*, §§ 296, 282, 283.)

"The idea of the common people in Christendom concerning God is like that which they have respecting man, because God is called a PERSON in the Athanasian Doctrine of the Trinity ; but those who are wise above the common order of men openly declare that God is invisible. This arises from their being unable to comprehend how God as MAN, could have created heaven and earth, and also have filled the universe with His presence, and several things besides, which cannot possibly fall within the sphere of the understanding, as long as the fact remains unknown that the Deity is not in space. Those, on the other hand, who approach the Lord alone think of his Divine Humanity, and so think of God, as being a Man.

"How nearly it concerns men to have a just idea of God may be evident from the circumstance that the idea of God is the inmost constituent of thought in all men who have any religion ; for all that pertains to religion and worship has reference to God. And inasmuch as God is universally and individually in all things connected with religion and worship, it follows that unless there be a just idea of God no communication with the heavens is possible. Hence it is that every single nation in the spiritual world has there its allotted place according to its idea of God, as a Man : for in this, and in no other, is there an idea of the Lord. That the state of a man's life after death is according to the idea of God which he has positively determined within himself, is manifestly clear from its opposite—that the denial of God constitutes hell, as does also the denial of the Lord's Deity within Christendom." (*Angelic Wisdom*, &c., §§ 12, 13.)

The adoration, in spirit and in truth, of the Word made Flesh, God with

this our world. It proceeds, however, from the light of the sun which is in the spiritual world. The reason is that there is an inflowing of the sight of the mind into the sight of the eye<sup>1</sup>; thus also various forms of spiritual light flow in, and not *vice versâ*: for were the order reversed, influx would be physical and not spiritual.

us, is the very life of the Church. How different the worship of her Divine Lord was in the Primitive Church, as compared with the Arianism, Socinianism, and Deism which, in various guises, at present prevail in Christendom, may be gathered from the following testimony of her most illustrious Doctor :—

“Superior illa lux, qua mens humana illustratur, Deus est. . . . Quid aliud lux Dei, nisi veritas Dei? Aut quid veritas Dei, nisi lux Dei? Neque enim et Christus sic dicitur lux, quomodo dicitur lapis, sed illud propriè, hoc figurativè.

“Noster sol justitiæ veritas Christus; non iste sol qui adoratur à Paganis et Manichæis, et videtur à peccatoribus: sed ille alius cujus veritate natura humana illustratur, ad quem gaudent Angeli. Filius Dei virtus et sapientia Dei est, qua illustratur omnis quisque veritate sapiens efficitur.

“O veritas lumen cordis mei, non tenebræ loquantur mihi: ô lumen veridicum tibi admoveo cor meum; ne me vana doceat, discute tenebras ejus. . . .

“Emitte lucem tuam et veritatem tuam. Ipse Christus est lux tua, et veritas tua. HÆC NOMINA DUO, RES UNA. Et, hoc utrumque unus Christus. Ego, inquit, sum lux mundi. Ego sum via, veritas, et vita. Ipse lux, ipse veritas. . . . Sapientia Dei, Verbum Dei, Dominus Jesus Christus ubique præsens est, quia ubique est veritas, ubique est sapientia.” (St. August. *Philosophia*, pp. 211—217.)

The ‘power and pressure’ of the time are in potent opposition to this most essential of all Church doctrines. Against this “the kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together.” . . . . But “He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord (ADONAI, that is to say, God MESSIAH) shall have them in derision.” (*Ps.* ii. 2, 4.)

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note L

## V.

*That heat as well as that light flow into man ; the heat into his will, where it produces the Goodness which has its origin in Love, and the light into his understanding, producing there the Truth which is derived from Wisdom.*

## § 7.

It is well known that all things without exception may be traced to THE GOOD and THE TRUE,<sup>1</sup> and that there does not exist a single being in which there is not something that has relation to these two principles. Hence it is that in man there are two receptacles of life—one the receptacle of goodness, which is called the Will ; the other, the receptacle of truth, called the Understanding. Now since goodness has its origin in love, and truth in wisdom, it follows that the will is the receptacle of love, and the understanding that of wisdom.

The reason that goodness has its origin in love is that what man loves he wills, and when he carries out this will into work and deed, he calls it *good*. In like manner, the reason that truth originates in wisdom is this : all wisdom is made up of truths. Yea more, the good which a wise man thinks is *truth*. This truth also

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note K.



becomes *good* when he wills it and reduces it to practice.<sup>1</sup>

He who does not, with all necessary care, accurately distinguish between these two receptacles of life, namely, the will and the understanding, and does not thereby form for himself a clear notion concerning them, strives in vain to acquire a correct and adequate knowledge of Spiritual Influx. For there is an influx into the will, and there is an influx into the understanding. Into the will of man there is an influx of the good which originates in love, and into his understanding there is an influx of the truth which pertains to wisdom. Both

<sup>1</sup> "To act from truth and not from good, is to act solely from the intellect ; for truths have reference to the intellect and good to the will : and to act from the intellect and not from the will is to act from that which stands without and serves. For the intellect was given to man that he might receive truths, and introduce them into the will that they may become good : for truths are called good when they become of the will." (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 8988.)

"The genuine doctrine of the Church is the doctrine of good, thus the doctrine of life, which is of love to the Lord and of charity towards the neighbour ; but still it is also a doctrine of truth, for doctrine teaches life, love, and charity, and so far as it teaches these it is truth. For when a man knows and understands what good is, what life is, what love is, and what charity is, he then knows and understands those things as truths, for he knows and understands the quality of good, how he is to live, also what is meant by love and charity, and the quality of the man who is in the life thereof. And so long as these things are matters of science and of the understanding, they are nothing but truths, and thence doctrines : but as soon as they pass from science and from the understanding into the will, and thence into act, they are then no longer truths but good ; for man interiorly wills nothing but what he loves, and what he loves this to him is good. From these considerations it may appear, that all the doctrine of the Church is a doctrine of truth, and that the truth of doctrine becomes good—even the good of love and charity—when from the state of doctrine it passes into that of life." (*Apocalypse Explained*, § 724.)



are from JEHOVAH GOD. They proceed *immediately* from Him by means of the Sun in the midst of which He is ; and *mediately* by way of the angelic heaven.<sup>1</sup>

These two receptacles, the will and the understanding, are as distinct from each other as are heat and light : for the will receives the heat of heaven which, in its essence, is love ; and the understanding receives the light of heaven which, in its essence, is wisdom, as above stated.

There is one kind of influx from the human mind into speech, and another into actions. The influx into speech arises from the will, by means of the understanding. On the other hand, the influx into actions takes place from the understanding by means of the will. Those who are acquainted merely with that form of influx which passes into the understanding, and not at the same time with that which proceeds into the will, and who, nevertheless, reason and deduce conclusions from the former kind alone, are like persons that have but one eye, who see only those objects that are on one side, and not at the same time those on the other. They are also like maimed persons, who labour in an awkward and perplexed manner with only one hand. They are, moreover, like persons who walk on one foot, with a limping gait, by the aid of a staff.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note L.

<sup>2</sup> Sir W. Hamilton, in a summary of the Cartesian doctrine of Perception and Ideas (*Reid's Works*, Note N, p. 961), thus sanctions, without reserve, the terminology introduced by the French philosopher, which confounds two things so manifestly distinct as *thought* and *will* :—

“ For *Consciousness*, Descartes says *Thought* ; but as he includes under

It has been made sufficiently plain, from these brief considerations, that spiritual heat flows into the will of

this term thought, properly so called, feeling, and desire, that is, all the energies and affections of which we are conscious, and nothing more, the conversion is both legitimate and convenient. *Principia*, p. i. § 9. It is needless to say that by Consciousness I mean, here as elsewhere, the fundamental form of all our mental modifications, and not that determination of consciousness, by which, through an act of will, we can attend with greater intensity to the laws under which our mind acts, or is affected, than to the external object of the energy or passion. Consciousness properly is conversant equally with the objective and with the subjective. The different faculties and affections are only modified consciousness."

The 'conversion' here alleged, on such high authority, to be 'both legitimate and convenient,' is, in truth, a radical error which runs through modern psychology in general, vitiating it in every part. It is as if a physicist were to include all the phenomena of heat and light under the single term illumination. The same mistake has been made by another eminent thinker :—

"Sous ce mot (*la pensée*)," says the Cardinal de la Luzerne, "je comprends toutes les opérations intellectuelles ; la perception, le jugement, le raisonnement, la sensation, la volition, le souvenir, la prévision, &c. Nous disons que ces diverses sortes de pensées sont produites par une substance spirituelle, c'est-à-dire parfaitement simple, que nous appelons *esprit* ou *âme*." (*Dissert. sur la Spirit. de l'Âme*, tom. v. p. 199.)

It forms a fundamental fallacy in the writings of Mill, both father and son, who have added to the confusion, and fallen to the lowest level of speculative thought, by employing the term 'Feeling' in its corporeal sense, as an equivalent for 'Consciousness.' The distinction between *will* and *thought* is essential to any true and intelligible account of the mind and its operations, because all that constitutes man has reference to these two principles. (See *Apocalypse Explained*, § 790.) The necessity of this distinction and the consequences resulting from omitting to take it, did not escape the comprehensive mind of our author. "Every man of sound learning," he observes, "knows that there are two faculties or parts in the mind, the *will* and the *understanding*. Few, however, know how to make a just distinction between them, to investigate their properties one by one, and then join them together again. Those who cannot do this are unable to obtain for themselves any other than a most obscure notion of the mind. . . . The properties of both, in a summary, are the following :—

- i. Love itself, and those things which pertain to love, reside in the will ;

man producing there the good which has its source in love; and that spiritual light flows into his understanding revealing there the truth which pertains to wisdom.

and science, intelligence, and wisdom, have their abode in the understanding. The will also breathes its love into these latter, and effects in them favour and assent. Hence it is that such as are the love and the intelligence thence derived, such is the man.

ii. From this also it follows that everything good, and also everything evil, belongs to the will; for whatever proceeds from love is called good, even though it be evil. The enjoyment, indeed, which makes the very life of love has this effect. The will, by means of this enjoyment, enters the understanding and produces consent.

iii. The will, accordingly, is the *being* or *essence* of man's life; but the understanding is the actual *existing* or *existence* thence arising. And inasmuch as essence is nothing unless it be in a certain form, so the will is nothing unless it be in the understanding. The will, consequently, forms itself in the understanding, and thus passing into the light becomes manifest.

iv. Love in the will is the end or purpose; and in the understanding it goes in quest of and finds causes, by which it may advance itself to the effect. And inasmuch as the end is the thing proposed to be done, being that at which the end aims, the thing proposed also belongs to the will, and through the medium of the aim or intention, enters into the understanding and incites it to reflect upon and weigh well the means, and form a conclusion with respect to such things as tend to produce effects. Everything proper to man is inherent in the will, and what is proper to him is evil by his first birth, and becomes good owing to a second birth. The first birth is from his parents, but the second is from the Lord. From these few facts it may be seen, that there is one property which belongs to the will, and another to the understanding. . . . (*True Christian Religion*, § 658.)

## VI.

*These two, namely heat and light, or in other words, love and wisdom, flow conjointly from God into the soul of man; and by means of the soul into his mind—into its affections and thoughts; and from these into his bodily senses—into speech and actions.*

## § 8.

Up to the present time, a doctrine of spiritual influx passing from the soul into the body has been taught by men of highly cultivated genius. No attempt, however, has yet been made to investigate the subject of an influx *into the soul itself*, and by means of the soul, into the body. It is, nevertheless, well known that all the good originating in love, and all the truth pertaining to faith, flow forth from God into man, and that they do not in the least owe their origin to man himself. Those things, moreover, which thus flow forth from God, are influent *proximately* into the human soul, and by the way of the soul into the rational mind, and by means of the latter into those things which constitute man's body.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is obvious that the subject of Divine Influx is here presented in an aspect which has never been even imagined by any previous investigator. In his philosophical writings the author regards the whole question as transcending the sphere of mere rational speculation, as in the following passage from the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (vol. ii. pp. 246, 247) :—

“For the mind, which is within nature, there is no path open beyond

Were any one to attempt to investigate the subject of spiritual influx in any other order than this, he would

and above nature ; consequently none by which its philosophy can penetrate into the sanctuary of theology. No human faculty of perception can possibly understand of itself its own essence and nature ; much less the essence and nature of anything higher than itself. Thus no sensitive organ can understand what perception is : no organ of perception can understand what intelligence is : nor can intelligence, so far as it is merely natural, understand what wisdom is. The higher power must judge of the lower. Therefore the lower exists as it is by means of the higher. Let us therefore, on no account venture beyond bounds, nor rashly trespass upon sacred things with our reasoning powers. All that is lawful to do is to kiss the threshold, that we may know that there is a Deity, the sole Author and Builder of the universe, and of all things in the universe, who is to be revered, to be adored, to be loved ; and that the providence of our reason is respectively nothing, while the providence of His wisdom is all in all. But what His Divine Nature is, how He is to be worshipped, in what way He is to be approached, by what means He is to be enjoyed,—this it has pleased Him, immortal glory be unto Him, to reveal in His holy Testaments and Oracles. Only supplicate His pardon, use the appointed means, weary Him with prayers, speak from the soul, not from a heart covetous of the world, and surer than certainty He will open to you the sanctuaries of His gracious favour."

Compare (*Ibid.* pp. 236, 237), where it is said that to know how life and wisdom, from the Deity, flow into substances capable of receiving them transcends infinitely the sphere of the human mind. It can only be represented in the way of comparison with light. The Deity is the Sun of life and wisdom. The physical sun is within nature, the moral Sun is above nature. The one is within the field of philosophy, the other is among the sacred mysteries of theology. Between these two are boundaries which human faculties cannot pass.

The feebleness shown by minds of the deepest penetration, in their speculations on this question, may be seen, for example, in the *Méditations Chrétienne* of Malebranche (VI\*\*\*), or in the following from a recent writer of the same school :—

"Or, il est de toute évidence que nous ne pouvons percevoir l'Infini que par la perception de l'Infini lui-même, puisqu'il est contradictoire que quelque chose de fini soit l'objet de la perception de l'Infini. On ne peut donc s'empêcher de conclure, de ce raisonnement fort simple, qu'il est impossible de connaître Dieu sans Dieu, ou sans que Dieu soit objectivement présent à l'esprit. Il est donc évident, dès lors, que, lorsque nous per-



be like a person who should choke up the spring of a well, and still continue to seek there a constant supply of water; or like one who ascribes the origin of a tree to its root and not to its seed; or, lastly, like one who strives to trace to their source the determinations of a first principle, independently of the principle itself.

The soul, in truth, is not life in itself. On the contrary, it is a recipient of life from God, who is Life in Himself.<sup>1</sup> All influx, moreover, has its source in life; it is, therefore, from God. This is the meaning of the following words:—JEHOVAH GOD *breathed into man's nostrils the soul of lives, and man was made into a living soul.* (Gen. ii. 7.) To breathe into the nostrils the soul of lives signifies to endow with the faculty of perceiving the Good and the True. Moreover the Lord also says concerning Himself:—*Even as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself.* (St. John v. 26.) To have life in Himself is to be God: and the life of the soul is the life which flows in from God.

cevons Dieu, l'objet direct et immédiat de notre concept est Dieu lui-même, et que, comme le dit si énergiquement saint Augustin, nous devons tenir d'un côté, que ce qui connaît Dieu est uni à Dieu, et de l'autre, que l'âme raisonnable connaît Dieu : *Deo junctum est quod intelligit Deum, intelligit autem rationalis anima Deum.* (*De Util. Cred.*, cap. xv.)

“C'est en raisonnant de la sorte que Gerdil, c'est-à-dire la plus grande autorité philosophique des temps modernes, en est venu, lui aussi, à conclure que l'objet immédiat de notre connaissance de l'Infini est Dieu lui-même.” (*Réponse aux Lettres d'un Sensualiste contre L'Ontologisme*, par l'Abbé Fabre, Paris, 1864, p. 3.) On the correlative questions of ‘the action of God on created beings,’ and on ‘the union of the mind with God,’ Cf. *Ibid.* (pp. 152–155.)

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note M.



Now since all influx takes its origin from *life*, and since this life comes into operation by means of its own proper receptacles; and inasmuch as the inmost or primary of these receptacles in man is his soul, it follows that in order to have a correct and adequate perception of influx, the starting-point of our inquiry must be *from God*, and not from any intermediate position. If a commencement were to be made from some middle ground, the doctrine of influx would be, so to speak, like a carriage without wheels, or a ship without sails.<sup>1</sup> Now since this is the case, it was necessary, in what has gone

<sup>1</sup> The system of Descartes is here evidently pointed at. It took its rise, not from God, but from a metaphysical abstraction called 'consciousness.' It resulted in a complete divorce between philosophy and theology. It adopted doubt and denial as its rule and method. It introduced a psychology which denied the possibility of arriving at any *real* knowledge concerning either natural or spiritual things. "The modern scepticism," says Dr. Reid, is the natural issue of the new system; and although it did not bring forth this monster [Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature'] until the year 1739, it may be said to have carried it in its womb from the beginning." (*Reid's Works*, Hamilton's Ed., p. 206.)

The state of philosophy, and especially of psychology, at the present day affords ample proof and illustration of the principle stated in the text. Take, for instance, the effects of the Kantian metaphysic. The speculations of this consummate sophist have poisoned the philosophy of Protestant Europe. Kant undertook, says an eminent thinker, "a regular survey of consciousness. . . . The result of his examination was the abolition of the metaphysical sciences,—of rational psychology, ontology, speculative theology, &c., as founded on mere *petitiones principiorum* . . . His doctrine leads to absolute scepticism. Speculative reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of mere delusion." (Sir W. Hamilton's *Discussions*, pp. 15, 18.)

"Philosophy," says a writer in the *Dublin Review* (April, 1873, p. 283), "never recovered the shock Kant gave it by looking upon the human personality as a phenomenon *without a substance*. In less than a hundred years this philosophy has run its course, and its outcome has been chaos." The Kantian day-dreams ended in the chimeras of Hegelianism, a

before to treat of *the sun of the spiritual world, in the midst of which is JEHOVAH GOD* (§ 5), and of the *influx of love and wisdom*, and, consequently, of the *life proceeding from that Sun.* (§§ 6, 7.)

system which dares to identify Deity and Nothing. (See Hamilton, *loc. cit.* p. 21.)

The Père Gratry thus exposes the blasphemy and spiritual insanity of Hegelianism :—"Il y a pour lui (Hégl) deux raisons, dont l'une est la raison telle qu'elle nous donnée, et l'autre la raison telle que nous la faisons. L'une est la *raison vulgaire*, commune, le bon sens, le sens commun. L'autre est la *raison supérieure*, philosophique, telle que Hégl lui-même la développe. L'une est cette *raison vulgaire*, cette *saine raison*, comme il la nomme ironiquement, qui affirme simplement que *l'être est*, que le *néant n'est pas*; que le *tout est plus grand que la partie*, qu'on ne peut pas affirmer en même temps le *pour et le contre*, que le *fini et l'infini*, Dieu et le monde, le libre et le nécessaire, le bien et le mal, ne sont pas identiques. L'autre est cette *raison philosophique et supérieure*, qui s'élevant au-dessus de ces différences, '*ne voit dans ces contradictions que la vérité même par laquelle les deux termes sont à la fois posés et détruits.*' (*Œuvres de Hégl*, t. i. p. 271.) C'est le texte du maître . . ."

"Cela est donc parfaitement sérieux. On attaque aujourd'hui la raison, la raison même, ce que nous appelons la raison, ce qui est et sera toujours la raison.

"Je ne sais si l'on comprend bien ce qu'il y a de formidable dans ce phénomène vraiment nouveau. Comprend-on que nous avons ici les signes d'une décadence, d'une décomposition intellectuelle, qui n'a pas d'analogue dans l'histoire? Comprend-on que jamais la vérité n'avait été ainsi traitée parmi les hommes?

"Je sais bien que la Vérité incarnée, présente, vivante, a été insultée sur la terre: on l'a bafouée, on lui a craché au visage. Mais alors la Vérité même disait: Pardonnez-leur, car ils ne savent ce qu'ils font. La Vérité peut-elle le dire encore de ces nouveaux blasphémateurs? C'est sa manifestation nécessaire, intime à l'homme, sous forme d'évidence naturelle qu'on insulte et qu'on veut détruire? Où est la ressource?" (*La Sophistique Contemporaine*, pp. 146-148.)

The answer to this apparently despairing question is at hand. There is no other true source of help except in the principles of a Christian philosophy which may be seen to rest on the trinal basis of genuine spiritual, rational, and natural truth, and which takes its starting-point from God. These principles are to be found fully developed and thoroughly established only in our author's writings.

Life flows, by the way of the soul, from God into man; then by the soul into his mind, that is, into its affections and thoughts; and, again, out of these latter into the bodily senses, into the speech and actions. The reason of this is that these are the forms of influx which properly pertain to life; and they are stated according to that order in which they succeed each other. The mind, in fact, is subordinated to the soul, and the body, in its turn, to the mind. The mind, moreover, possesses two kinds of life, one of the will, the other, of the understanding. The life of its will is that goodness which comes from love, the derivative states of which are called affections; and the life of the understanding therein is that truth which is proper to wisdom, the derivative states of which are called thoughts. *By means of these affections and thoughts the mind lives.* Whereas, the life of the body consists of sense, speech, and actions. That all these have their origin in the soul, and proceed by way of the mind, follows as a consequence from the order in which they exist; and from this order they manifestly appear before the eyes of a wise man, and that without much investigation.

The human soul, in that it is a *spiritual substance* of a superior order, is a recipient of influx immediately from God. On the other hand, the human mind, as being a spiritual substance of an inferior order, is also a recipient of influx from God, but mediately by way of the spiritual world. The body, however, inasmuch as it is made up of substances derived from nature, which

are called *matter*, receives an influx from God, mediately by way of the natural world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The author's doctrine concerning the true character of the subordination which subsists between the substances of which man is composed, presents one of the most wonderful and beautiful results of his unique psychological analysis. In *Arcana Cœlestia* (§§ 4223, 4224), it is clearly shown that it is impossible to conceive of any function except from *forms*, that is, from *substances*. For substances are the forms from which functions exist. There can be no sight without an eye, from and by means of which sight exists. Function and organic form are inseparable. The one connotes the other.—There are organic forms, such as those of the internal sight, so pure as to be invisible to the eye whether it be naked or aided by art. The forms which belong to the intellect are inscrutable. Still, they are forms, that is, substances. For even the sight of the intellect is impossible except from *something*. The learned admit that, without a substance, which is a subject, there is no such thing as a mode, or modification, or quality which actively manifests itself.

The soul is that which is intimate and supreme in man. What pertains to faith flows in, indeed, through the medium of the hearing, and so is implanted in the mind, consequently, in a sphere beneath the soul.—Things substantial are the commencements of things material. Matter is but the gathering together of substances. (*True Christian Religion*, §§ 8, 280.) In the posthumous work, *Adversaria*, it is shown with admirable clearness that there are *four* faculties in man which mutually follow upon one another, in order, thus :—(a), The soul, (β) the superior or intellectual mind, (γ), the inferior mind or *animus*, and (δ) the sensations called external. These four are, it is said, all *real substances*. The subject is thoroughly investigated in the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, which preceded the present treatise nearly thirty years; and it is interesting to find the author there appealing, in corroboration of the above distinction, to the great philosophical light of the Primitive Christian Church :—“The existence of four different faculties has also, I find, the sanction of Augustin, a Father distinguished for his enlightened judgment. ‘When anything,’ says he, ‘is seen with the eyes, straightway an image of it is formed in the spirit, but the formation of this image is not discovered unless the eyes are taken off from the object, which through their medium we saw in the *animus*. And although the spirit be irrational, as in the case of brutes, nevertheless the eyes make their report to it. But if the *soul* be rational, then the image is announced to the *intellect*.’ (*De Trinitate*.) ‘So far does the *soul* operate, and it judges of the innumerable differences of tastes, smells,

That the goodness which arises from love, and the truth which proceeds from wisdom, flow forth from God into the soul of man, conjointly, or in other words, *united into one*, but that, nevertheless, in their progress they are separated by man, and are conjoined in the minds of those only who suffer themselves to be led of God, will be seen in what follows.

## VIL

*The sun of the natural world is pure fire; and by means of this sun the world of Nature, in the beginning, was brought into existence, and still continues to subsist.*

## § 9.

That Nature and the world proper to it—by which are meant the atmospheres and the earths named planets, among which is included the globe composed of land and water on which we dwell, together with all and everything which year by year clothe its surface with beauty—that Nature and its world, I say, subsist solely from the sun which forms their centre, and which by the rays of its light and the temperature of its heat

and forms, by tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. No one denies that the soul in beasts can do all these things: therefore it rises to the *third degrees*.’ (*De Animâ*.) See also *Deuteronomy*, vi. 5. We gather from these words of Augustin; that he separated the intellect or faculty of the mind from the animus, and the animus from sensation, which belongs to the body, and maintained that the soul presides over all; exactly according to our proposition.” (*Econ. An. Kingdom*, vol. ii. p. 265.)



is present in all places, everyone may know for a certain fact, by immediate personal inspection, by information derived from the senses, and also from what has been written concerning the manner in which it has been peopled.<sup>1</sup>

Now since it is from this source that the *perpetual subsistence* of the mundane system is derived, reason may also conclude, beyond a shadow of doubt, that to the same source it owes its *existence*. Because, according to the received maxim, for a thing to perpetually *subsist*, is the same as to perpetually *exist* in the way in which it has heretofore existed. It follows from all this, that the natural world was created by JEHOVAH GOD in a secondary and subordinate rank, through the instrumentality of this sun.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note N.

<sup>2</sup> The following passage from the Platonic Proclus, although written to illustrate a widely different subject, may serve in some degree to show that an idea strikingly similar to that contained in the text was dimly divined by the ancients. The translation is that given by the learned and amiable author of *Hermes* :—

“If, therefore, the cause of the universe be a cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing operate from its own proper essence, such cause is *primarily* what its effect is *secondarily*; and that which it is primarily it giveth to its effect secondarily. It is thus that fire both giveth warmth to something else, and is itself warm; that the soul giveth life and possesseth life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows, therefore, that the cause of the universe, operating after this manner, is that *primarily* which the world is *secondarily*.

“If, therefore, the world be the plenitude of forms of all sorts, these forms must also be primarily in the *cause of the world*; for it was the same cause which constituted the sun, and the moon, and man, and horse, and in general all the forms existing in the universe. These, therefore, exist primarily in the cause of the universe; *another sun besides the ap-*



Thus far it has been shown (1) that there are things spiritual and things natural, which are totally distinct

parent, another man, and so with respect to every form else. The forms, therefore, previous to the sensible and external forms, and which, according to this reasoning, are their active and efficient causes, are to be found pre-existing in that one and common cause of all the universe." (*Hermes*, p. 227. Ed. Oxon. 1841.)

Ever since the appearance of the 'Treatise of Human Nature,' the philosophy of Causation, speaking generally, has been in a state of chaos. In the Scottish sceptic and his victims we see the human mind loosed from its ancient moorings, by means of 'a philosophy unknown to the ancients,' and set adrift on the boundless sea of universal doubt. Not to mention recent writers, Sir W. Hamilton, in his *Discussions* (Appendix I., *Causality*), has, unwittingly, given ample demonstration of the 'learned ignorance' which prevails on this most fundamental of all questions in any true system of philosophy. Although intending quite another thing, he has clearly pointed out (*φωρὰντα ἀντιρροίαν*) the abyss of 'mental impotence' which lies in the 'interval' between the 'two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles' of thought, to the verge of which modern metaphysic inevitably leads its votaries, and into which some have already cast themselves headlong.

To deny that we have a perception of the causal nexus in the material world, as Hume and his followers do, is to destroy the rational basis on which philosophy and science rest. Hence the necessity for recurring to the ancient distinctions between efficient and proximate, principal and instrumental, causes, as indicated in the following extracts:—

"It is well known, that when we examine effects, and even causes, we do not abstract the principal cause from the instrumental, but represent the two together to our minds as a single cause. The instrument, indeed, is considered by itself, apart from the force of acting, although not apart from the power of acting; and when it is acted upon, it is as though it acted, and it is called the instrumental cause. In conversation we constantly attribute to the instrumental cause what should be attributed to the principal; for we speak according to the senses, which have not power to separate the one from the other." (*Economy of Animal Kingdom*, vol. ii. p. 232.)

"The variations of light and shade, as well as of heat and cold, on the earth, are from the sun: to wit, from the difference of his altitude in every year and every day, and also in the various regions of the earth. But these causes, which are proximate causes, and are in the natural world, were created after those things in the spiritual world, so as to be, by virtue of

from each other; (2) that the origin and support of spiritual things is derived from a Sun which is *pure*

their own prior causes, the efficient of the posterior causes which exist in the natural world. For nothing, which is at the same time in order, can possibly be in the natural world, which does not take its cause and rise from what is spiritual, that is, by means of what is spiritual, from what is Divine." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 8211.)

An instructive illustration of the foregoing observations has lately been furnished by a bold flight of fancy on the part of a noble worker in the rich field of physical facts. The speculation is one of 'imagination all compact.' The *proximate* natural cause is mistaken for the *efficient* spiritual and real cause. The *FIRST CAUSE* in the series seems altogether ignored. "Trees grow," says this brilliant and fascinating writer, "and so do men and horses; and here we have new power incessantly introduced upon the earth. But its source . . . is the Sun. For *he* it is *who* separates the carbon from the oxygen of the carbonic acid, and thus enables them to recombine. Whether they recombine in the furnace of the steam-engine or in the animal body, the *origin* of the power they produce is the *same*. In this case we are all 'souls of fire and children of the sun.'" Such is the dictum of modern science, without apparently the least *qualification*.

Swedenborg's comment on such 'strange darkness and ideal conclusions' would probably be—"that the source of error among the idolatrous vulgar is identical with its source among those philosophers who make an idol of Nature: the only difference being that which lies between the gross and the subtle, between the more or less plausible, between reason little developed and reason over developed." (*On the Infinite*, pp. 47, 48.)

"*What*," exclaims our author, "*would the ancients feel*, could they rise from their graves, and revisit the learned world, *when they heard that they had lost their cause!* . . . Would not their anger be kindled against our Schools, and would they not demand of us, by the laws of nature and reason, why we have thrown away their monads, to substitute a number of equally occult things." (*Posthumous Fragment on the Soul*, p. 135.)

With the new and spreading Heliomania of Physical Science, the passage from Proclus quoted above may be compared with advantage. The pure and lofty speculation of the Gentile Platonist will serve as a fixed point from which to measure the depth to which the human intellect in these days has suffered itself to sink, owing to a rejection of the ancient and true doctrine of causes so simply and lucidly set forth in the following statement:—

"The things which are in nature are nothing but *effects*. Their *causes*

love, in the midst of which is JEHOVAH GOD, the Creator and Upholder of the universe. On the other hand, that the origin and support of natural things is a sun which is *pure fire*; and that the latter sun has its origin from the former, and both from God, follows of its own accord, just as what is posterior follows from what is prior, and the prior from the Primal Origin of all.

That the sun of nature and its various mundane systems is pure fire, all its effects conspire to make evident; as, for example, the concentration of its rays into a focus by optical contrivances. From this concentration a fire is set free which burns with great energy, and also flame. The nature of the sun's heat is similar to that which proceeds from elementary fire. The degree of intensity of that heat is according to the angle

are in the spiritual world: and the causes of these causes, which are *ends*, are in the inner heaven. Nor can the effect subsist unless the cause be perpetually in it. For when the cause ceases the effect ceases. The effect, regarded in itself, is nothing but a cause—but the cause so clothed from without that it may serve, in a lower sphere, to enable the cause to act there as a cause. And as the case is with the effect in relation to the cause, so is it, in like manner, with the cause in respect to the end. The cause, unless it also exist from its own cause, which is the end, is not a cause. For a cause apart from an end is a cause which stands in no order, and where there is no order, nothing takes place. Hence it is now clear that the effect, regarded in itself, is a cause; and the cause, regarded in itself, is the end; and the end of what is good is in heaven, and proceeds from the Lord. The effect, therefore, is not an effect, unless the cause be in it, and perpetually in it; and the cause is not a cause, unless the end be in it, and perpetually in it; and the end is not an end of what is good, unless the Divinity which proceeds from the Lord be inherent in it. From this also it is clear, that all and each of the things in the world, just as they really have had their existence from the Deity, do also now exist from the Deity." (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 5711.)

of its incidence ; whence arise the varieties of climate and also the four seasons of the year, besides several other effects. From all this, reason, by means of the senses of its own body, may confirm the following truth, namely, that the sun of the natural world is nothing but *mere fire*, and also that it is fire in its very and absolute purity.<sup>1</sup>

Those who know nothing as to the origin of spiritual things from their own proper Sun, but who are acquainted merely with the origin of natural things from the sun proper to them, can scarcely do otherwise than confound spiritual and natural things together ; and by the fallacies of the senses, and the consequent fallacies of reason, come to the conclusion that spiritual things are no other than purely natural things, and that from the activity of the latter, excited by heat and light, the phenomena of wisdom and love emerge. Such thinkers, inasmuch as they do not see anything with their eyes, perceive anything with their nostrils, or breathe anything in their breasts, but *nature*, accordingly ascribe all things to nature—even *what is rational*. Thus it comes to pass that they imbibe naturalism just as a sponge does water. They may, however, be compared to charioteers who yoke abreast their four steeds, in the rear and not in the front of the chariot.

It is otherwise with those who make a distinction between spiritual and natural things, and conclude that the latter are derived from the former. Such persons also *per-*

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note Q.

ceive the actual inflowing of the soul into the body. They perceive that it is spiritual, and that the natural things pertaining to the body are subservient to the soul as vehicles and media, to the end that it may produce its proper effects in the natural world. Should you be induced to conclude otherwise you may be likened to a crab which proceeds on its way, aiding its progress by means of its tail, and retracting its eyes as it advances. So your rational vision may be compared with the sight of the eyes of Argus, situated in the back of his head, whilst those in front are buried in sleep. Men of this character also believe themselves to be, in some sort, Arguses, when they are engaged in reasoning: for they say "Who does not see that the origin of the universe is from Nature; and what in that case is God, but a something which inmosty pervades nature?" This and the like irrational assertions they boast of even more than wise men do of what is in accord with reason.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (vol. ii. p. 207) reference is made, in language which seems strikingly applicable, at the present time, to those who favour the external senses more than *the mind in the senses*; who hastily judge of everything that comes before them from their own partial information; who are smitten with the love of their own discoveries and imaginations, in which they contemplate their own image as a parent does his offspring; who, not unfrequently, look down with royal superciliousness upon all who pay no homage to their favourite theories, which they themselves adore to distraction. The writer then proceeds to characterise, in the following terms, the state of philosophical thought prevalent in his own day:—

"But there is no reason to disparage the living or to wrong the present age; for few, indeed, are there now who contend for any hypothesis or system as a matter of faith and love. The motives are various and innumerable that prevail upon men to profess with their lips that they believe what they do not believe. The mere enumeration of them would



## VIII.

*Thence it follows, that whatever proceeds from this sun, when considered in itself, is dead.*

## § 10.

What understanding, if it be elevated only a little above things of a sensuous character pertaining to the body, does not see that love, regarded in itself, is *living*, and that the appearance of its fire is *life*; and that, on the contrary, elementary fire viewed in itself is, respectively, dead: consequently that the Sun of the spiritual world, being *pure love*, is living, and that the sun of the natural world, being *pure fire*, is dead? Similarly it may be said, respectively, of all things that proceed, and have their existence, from these two suns.

There are two things by the operation of which all effects in the universe are produced, namely, *Life* and *Nature*. They also produce such effects as are in

occupy a large space in our pages. Who is there, if he be free to confess it, that does not regard the known as unknown, the true as probable, and the probable as false? Or who, if he has not sufficient time or talent for discussing the several arguments, does not tacitly, in his own mind, come to neither affirmation nor negation upon the subject? Indeed, we may form a judgment of the state of the human mind from this circumstance, that it is held as a maxim, *never to give credence or implicit assent to anything but actual demonstration*. And should any one set himself to work in furnishing the demonstration, the opinion then is, *they must next hear the other side*. For experience teaches that there is nothing that an orator may not establish as an aliquot part of many different series of reasonings, and a philosopher of many series of facts. Just as one syllable, word, or phrase may occur in a never-ending series of sentences and discourses, or one colour in an infinite number of pictures."

accordance with order, provided that life, *from an interior source*, be the actuating principle in nature. It is otherwise when nature, *from an inner sphere*, constrains life to act.<sup>1</sup> This latter mode of action has place in the minds of those who elevate nature, which in itself is dead, above and within life, and accordingly pay their vows solely and entirely to the pleasures of sense, and the evil desires of the flesh, and count for nothing the spiritual interests of the soul, and the truly rational things which are proper to the mind. These are the men who, owing to this inversion of order, are called *dead*. Such are all atheistic devotees of nature in the world, and all satanic spirits in hell. In THE WORD they are also declared to be dead, as in these words of David:—"They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and ate the sacrifices of *the dead*." (Ps. cvi. 28.) "The enemy hath persecuted my soul. . . . He hath made me to sit in darkness as the *dead* of the world." (Ps. cxliii. 3.) "To hear the groaning of the prisoner; and to open to *the children of death*." (Ps. cii. 20.) And again in the Revelation:—"I know thy works, that thou hast a name, that thou livest; but thou art *dead*. Be watchful, and strengthen the things that remain that are ready to *die*." (iii. 1, 2.) These are called *dead*, because spiritual death is condemnation; and condemnation is the lot of those who believe that Life is derived from Nature, and, by so doing, regard the light of nature as the light of life, whereby they conceal, suffo-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note P.

cate, and extinguish every idea concerning God, heaven, and life eternal.' Accordingly such men are like owls

<sup>1</sup> The above exposition presents a characteristic example of the method employed by the author to show how 'the things of the Spirit of God' are to be 'spiritually discerned' (1 Cor. ii. 14), and genuine doctrine derived from the *true* literal sense of Holy Scripture. Nor can it be said of this Watchman, this pre-eminently enlightened observer of the states and changes of the Church, that the trumpet of truth which he held gives an uncertain sound. As to the *doctrinal* meaning of the term *dead*, he elsewhere observes :—

"Man lives as a wild beast when the inner is separated from the outer man, so as not to act upon it except in a most general manner. For man is man in consequence of what he possesses by means of the inner man, from the Lord. On the other hand, man is a wild beast by virtue of what he possesses from the outer man. The latter, when separated from the inner man is, in itself, nothing but a wild beast. There is in him a like nature, like desires, like appetites, like phantasies, and like sensations. *The organic forms are also similar.* Nevertheless he can reason, and, as it seems to himself, with subtilty. This capability he has from the spiritual substance by means of which the life of the Lord flows into him : but this life is perverted in such an one, and becomes a life of evil. Hence he is called a *dead man*." (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 272.)

Again :—"The natural mind, which is a hell, is in total opposition to the spiritual mind, which is a heaven. When loves are opposite, then all that pertains to perception becomes opposite. For from love, which constitutes the very life of man, all things else flow, as rivers from their source. Those things which do not take their rise thence, separate themselves, in the natural mind, from those which do. Those things which are of the ruling love are in the midst, the rest are at the sides. The latter, if they be truths of the Church derived from the Word, are banished from the midst still more remotely to the sides, and at length are expelled altogether; and then the man, in other words, the natural mind, perceives evil as good, and sees the false as truth, and vice versa. It is owing to this that he comes to believe wickedness to be wisdom, thinks that madness is intelligence, takes cunning for prudence, and evil arts for cleverness. And then he also sets at nought the divine and heavenly things of the Church and worship, and makes the things of the body and the world of the greatest moment. He thus inverts the state of his life, so that what belongs to the head he makes belong to the sole of the foot, and tramples on it; and what belongs to the sole of the foot he makes belong to the head. In this way man, from being alive, becomes dead. He whose

which see light in darkness and darkness in light, or in other words, they see what is false as true, and evil as good: and because the delights which spring from evil are to them the delights of their heart, they are not unlike those birds and beasts which feed on the bodies of the dead as on rich dainties, and to whose sense the noisome stench of graves seems as the fragrance of balm. These are the men who do not see any other kind of influx than what is physical or natural. If, notwithstanding, they still affirm the existence of spiritual influx, this arises, not from any idea of the subject, but from deference to the authority of their teacher.

mind is a heaven is said to be alive, and he whose mind is a hell is called *dead*." (*Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 276.)

A doctrine concerning spiritual death such as this inspires with a new force and meaning the striking language of that beautiful Collect for Quinquagesima Sunday in the Prayer Book of the Anglican Church, which declares that without charity whosoever liveth is counted *dead* before the Lord. Nor will it, perhaps, be deemed out of place to produce here the following ardent apostrophe to the very recipient and organ of Divine life, by virtue of which man is man:—

"*Immortalis es, ô anima. Jamjam crede rationibus, crede veritati. Clamat et in te esse habitare, et immortalem esse, nec sibi suam sedem quacumque corporis morte posse subduci. Avertere ab umbra, revertere in te. Nullus est interitus tuus, nisi oblitam te esse quod interire non possis.*" (St. Augustine, Lib. II. *De Soliloq.* c. xix., apud *Collect. Fab.* p. 408.)

## IX.

*What is spiritual clothes itself with what is natural,  
as a man clothes himself with a garment.*

## § 11.

It is a well-known truth that in every operation there is an active and a passive principle, and also that from an active alone nothing comes into existence, nor yet any thing from what is solely passive. The case is similar with what is spiritual and natural. What is spiritual, because it is a *living force*, is active; and what is natural, inasmuch as it is a *dead force*, is passive.<sup>1</sup> It follows from this that every thing that has come into existence, from the beginning, in this our solar world, and continues afterwards to exist at every moment, is derived from what is spiritual by means of what is natural—and this too not only in the subjects of the animal kingdom, but also in those of the vegetable kingdom. A truth similar to this is also known, namely, that in every effect which is produced, there is a principal and an instrumental cause, and that when anything takes place, these two appear as one, albeit they are distinctly two. Wherefore, among the established rules of wisdom, this also is to be found, namely, *the principal cause and the instrumental cause make together one cause*: so also do the spiritual and natural orders. That in the production of effects these two

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note Q.



appear as one, is owing to the fact that the spiritual is contained within (*intra*) the natural as the fibre is inclosed within (*intra*) the muscle, and the blood within (*intra*) the arteries ; or as thought is inwardly in (*intus*, *in*) speech, and affection in (*in*) sounds, and also causes itself to be sensibly perceived by means of what is natural.<sup>1</sup>

From the foregoing considerations (but still, so to speak, as seen by a glance through a lattice,) it is plain that what is spiritual clothes itself with what is natural, as a man clothes himself with a garment.

The organic body, with which the soul invests itself, is here likened to a garment, because the body covers the soul as with a garment, and the soul also divests itself of this covering, and casts it off from itself as a slough, when, by death, it passes away from the sphere of the natural world into its own native spiritual world. The body also grows old as doth a garment. Not so,

<sup>1</sup> This peculiar use of the Latin prepositions *intra*, *intus in*, and *in*, seems to have been made designedly by the author with the view of expressing accurately the distinction between the ideas intended to be conveyed, respectively, by the terms 'natural,' 'thought,' and 'affection.' Compare the French *en l'âme*, *dans le corps*. Numerous instances, showing a carefully studied employment of language, might be adduced from his various works proving how thoroughly he was aware of the value of language as an instrument of thought, and how assiduously he had studied the peculiarities of the Latin idiom in relation to its power of expressing the more subtle and profound distinctions necessary to be taken in philosophy and theology. His terminology, while (according to his own express rule) keeping as closely as possible to that already in use, has at the same time, all the perfection of which the language employed by him seems capable. But see, especially, the posthumous work entitled *Clavis Hieroglyphica arcanorum naturalium et spiritualium per riam Representationum et Correspondentiarum*. (Lond. 1784.)

however, the soul, being a *spiritual substance* which has nothing in common with the changes incident to nature—changes which take place in progressive order from primordial commencements to final results, and come to a close on having completed a period.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The actual nature and quality of the resurrection-body is a question on which the most various and discordant opinions are entertained by philosophers and theologians of the highest repute. The view given above manifestly differs essentially from the commonly received notion. It is not, however, on this account to be supposed that it is contrary either to the teaching of Holy Scripture or to the principles of a true theology. The entire subject has of late years been too much neglected, or else shunned as too difficult and mysterious for human investigation. A general notion of the author's doctrine on the subject may be obtained from the following passages :—

“ . . . The mind of man is the man himself. For the primordial texture of the human form, or the human form itself with all and everything belonging to it, is derived from principles continued from the brain through the nerves. . . . This is the form into which man comes after death, which is also then called a spirit and an angel. It is in all perfection a man, but spiritual. His material form, which is added and superinduced in the world, is not a human form of itself, but from the above-mentioned spiritual form. Such material form is added and superinduced that man may perform uses in the natural world, and also that he may carry along with him, *from the purer substances of the world*, something fixed in its nature, and adapted to contain spiritual things, and thus continue and perpetuate his life.” (*On the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom*, § 388.)

With the above it may not be without interest and instruction to compare and contrast the speculations of the most profound thinker of the seventeenth century on the same subject. “It might be said . . . that in every man there is, so to speak, a certain ‘flower of substance,’ the nature of which may be illustrated from the principles of chemists.” (*A System of Theology*, by G. W. von Leibnitz, translated by Dr. Russell, London, 1850, p. 164.) The translator of this work adds in a note from the *Miscell. Leibnit.*, p. 411 :—“We shall put off the body, it is true, but not entirely; and we shall retain the most subtle part of its substance (quintessence), in the same way as chemists are able to sublimate a body or mass, the defecated part alone remaining.”

This mode of viewing the subject differs, it is true, from that taught by

Those who do not consider the body as a vesture of the soul, or as a covering which, in itself, is dead, and as

Swedenborg. At the best, it is the mere guess of a great genius, but it may, perhaps, serve to prepare the way in some minds for receiving the true doctrine as given in the text. Dr. Delitzsch, in his curious treatise on *Biblical Psychology*, has collected many singular speculations and fancies relating to this question, and quotes (p. 508) with approval Göschel's opinion (*Letzte Dinge*) that "The soul of the spirit, after its separation from its body, is not wholly without a body." But what is *spirit*, what is *soul*, and what, properly speaking, is *body*? To these questions no clear answer has hitherto been given. Nor is an answer possible without a truly rational science of embryology, at the base of which lies the following fundamental principle, dimly seen by Aristotle, fully established by Swedenborg, and corroborated by all *facts* yet made known in the wide fields of anatomy, physiology, and rational psychology:—

"Aliud est quod homo accipit a patre, et aliud quod a matre. A patre accipit homo omne quod internum est. Ipsa anima seu vita est ex patre. Sed a matre accipit omne quod externum est. Verbo, interior homo, seu ipse spiritus est a patre, sed exterior homo seu ipsum corpus est a matre. Quod quisque capere potest solum ex eo, quod ipsa anima implantetur a patre, que inchoat se induere corporeali forma in ovulo; quicquid dein adjicitur, tam in ovulo quam in utero, est matris; nam aliunde accrementum non habet. (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 1815.) Hence it is that "those things which are inmost in man belong to his soul; but those which are exterior pertain to the body. The inmost things of man are the good and the true from which the soul has its life; otherwise it would not be a soul. The things that are exterior derive thence their life, and are all in the similitude of a body, or, what amounts to the same thing, they are in the likeness of a veil or clothing." (*Ibid.*, § 2576.)

"The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body," says the Duke of Argyll, "sanctions and involves the notion that there is some deep connection between Spirit and Form which is essential, and which cannot be finally sundered even in the divorce of Death. The affections hold to this idea even more firmly than the intellect." (*Reign of Law*, p. 309, 1st Ed.) But the sound intellect also feels bound to admit the absolute necessity of this connection. "There cannot be such a thing," says Swedenborg, "as a soul without its body, or a body without its soul. . . . That a soul can exist without a body is an error which flows easily from fallacies. For the soul of every man is in a spiritual body after it has cast off the outward covering which it had carried about with it in the world. . . . A being is not a being unless it exists, inasmuch as prior to this it

a form adapted merely to the reception of living forces, flowing in by way of the soul from God, cannot do otherwise than conclude, from fallacies, that the soul lives by and from itself, and also the body by and from itself; and that between the life of the one and the other there is a *pre-established harmony*. They may even suppose that the life of the soul flows into the life of the body, or the life of the body into the life of the soul, and thus come to conceive of influx as being either *spiritual* or *natural*; when, nevertheless, it is a truth to which every created thing bears witness, that what is *posterior* in the order of things does not act from itself but from something *prior* to it, whence it has its origin; in like manner that neither does this prior act from itself, but from something still prior to it, and that thus there is nothing that does not act from a First, which acts from itself, consequently from God.

is not in a form: and if it be not in a form, it has no quality, and what has no quality is nothing." (*Divine Love and Wisdom*, §§ 14, 15.) The following passage contains the true doctrine of the resurrection-body:—

"Spirits themselves are forms, that is, they consist of continuous forms, in like manner as men, but of purer substances, which are not visible to the bodily sight, or that of the eye. But inasmuch as these forms or substances are not such as to be seen by the eye of the body, man at this day conceives no otherwise than that cognitions and thoughts are abstractions. Hence also comes the madness of this age of ours, in that they do not believe that they have a spirit within them which is to live after the death of the body; when, nevertheless, this spirit is a substance much more real than the substance of the material body. Yea more: if you are disposed to believe it, the spirit, after being set free from what is corporeal, is that *very purified body* which several say they are to have at the day of judgment, when they believe that they shall rise for the first time." (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 3726.)



Moreover, *there is but one sole and only Life*, and this life is not creatable. It is, however, in the highest degree capable of flowing into forms organically adapted to its reception. All and every thing in the created universe are forms of this kind.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The above universal truth is thus stated in a small work, published in London, in the year 1745, two years after the opening of the author's spiritual sight. The real scope and aim of this truly golden treatise seems, as yet, to be very imperfectly understood, even by some who profess to have made his works a special study:—

“That there are two Principles most distinct from each other, one natural, the other spiritual, is a conclusion which follows and is demonstrated by all the subsequent topics contained in this treatise; also, that what is natural derives its origin from the sun of the world, but what is spiritual takes its rise immediately from the fountain-head of Life itself, or from the Supreme Deity. I wish here merely to resume and continue the thread which was begun . . . where the *forms of Nature* were treated of; and, indeed, in the last place, of her supreme form, called the *Celestial*. Those forms, or the Atmospheres arising from them, as the active forces of nature, are all inanimate, as every thing is which derives its origin from the sun, which is the fount and source of natural things. But above this supreme form of Nature, or celestial form, there is a form perpetually celestial, or SPIRITUAL, in which is contained nothing but what is Infinite, copiously flowing forth from the irradiation of the Sun of Life itself, as do the other forms from the irradiation of the sun of the world. And this perpetually celestial form, since it flows immediately from the Infinite, or from God Himself, who alone is, it is therefore *LIVING IN ITSELF*. This it is which animates the souls of living things for the uses of their life. Not that it is a universal soul; but it is what animates those things that have been born and made for the reception of life. For every soul is a substance *per se*; and, after the manner in which natural Essences are roused into activity by their *auras*, so this is perpetually excited by its own *aura* to live its own life.” (*Worship and Love of God*, § 24, Note q.)

“I have been instructed by very much experience that there is but One sole and single source of Life, which is that of the Lord, and that this life flows in and causes man to live—yea, causes the wicked, as also the good, to live. To that life correspond Forms which are Substances, and these are so vivified by a continual Divine influx that they appear to themselves to live of themselves. The correspondence is that of the organs with the Life; but such as are the recipient organs, such is the life they live. The



Many believe that the soul is life, and thus suppose that man, because he lives from the soul, lives from his own life, and so lives from himself, consequently not by an influx of life from God. Such persons, however, cannot do otherwise than weave a kind of Gordian knot of fallacies, and in this entangle every judgment of their mind ; whence arises mere insanity in spiritual things. Or else they construct a labyrinth, out of which the mind is unable by any clew of reason to retrace its

men who are in love and charity are in correspondence ; for Life itself is received by them in an adequate manner. They, on the other hand, who are in states contrary to love and charity are not in correspondence, because Life itself is not received in an adequate manner. Hence the life has an existence of such a quality as they are themselves. This is capable of illustration from Natural Forms into which the light of the sun flows. Such as are the recipient forms, such are the modifications of light in them. In the spiritual world the modifications are spiritual, therefore in that world such as are the recipient forms, such is the intelligence in them, and such the wisdom. Hence it is that good spirits and angels appear as the veriest forms of charity, whereas spirits that are wicked and infernal appear as forms of hatred." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 3484.)

In the same work (§ 8497), it is shown that "the goodness and truth which flow into man by and from the Lord, are conjoined to man and, as if were, appropriated to him," and also that "the good things of faith and charity cannot be given either to man or angel so as that they *shall be proper* to him ; for men and angels are only recipients, or Forms fitted for receiving life—thus, for receiving goodness and truth from the Lord. Life itself is from no other source. And inasmuch as life is from the Lord, it cannot be appropriated, or made to belong exclusively to man, otherwise than by appearing to be as if it were proper to him. Those, however, who are in the Lord, manifestly perceive that life flows into them, consequently that goodness and truth flow in ; for these belong to life. The reason why life appears as if it properly belonged to the man himself is that the Lord from Divine Love wills to give and conjoin to man all things that are His own ; and in so far as this can be done He does conjoin them to man. This property (of his being) which is given to him by and from the Lord, is called his celestial property, concerning which see §§ 731, 1937, 1947, 2682, 2883, 2991, 3312, 5360." (*Arcana Cœlestia*.)

course, and set itself free. Such persons, moreover, do actually plunge themselves as it were into caverns under ground, where they spend their life in darkness which knows no end.<sup>1</sup> For fallacies issue thence, with-

<sup>1</sup> That the *state* of the wicked in the other world remains unchanged to eternity, is a position maintained and constantly affirmed by Swedenborg throughout his writings. He signalises the condition of *confirmed* Arians, Socinians, certain Romish saints, and others, as examples illustrating the reality and power of the inexorable spiritual law of Divine Order which decrees that if evil be not removed from man in this world it cannot be removed hereafter. As the tree falls so it lies. (Cf. *Divine Providence*, § 277.)

"The Churchman," he observes, "inasmuch as he has no (spiritual) cognition concerning the state of life after death, believes that man, after the life in the body, is forthwith either raised into heaven or cast into hell; when, nevertheless, this is done successively, although it takes place with great variety, both as to time and states. In the case of the good, who are to be raised into heaven, evil is separated successively, and they are filled with what is good according to the faculty of reception which they had acquired in the world. And as for the evil, who are to be cast away into hell, good is separated successively, and they are filled successively with evils, according to the faculty of reception which they had acquired in the world. Moreover, man in the other life enters into new states, and undergoes changes. They who are being raised into heaven, and even after their elevation, are rendered more and more perfect to eternity. On the other hand, they who are being cast down into hell, and afterwards when they have been so cast down, endure evils continually more grievous, and this until they no longer dare to occasion evil to any one. Moreover, they afterwards remain in hell to eternity. Thence they cannot be released, inasmuch as it is impossible to render them able to will what is good to any one, but only to do evil to none, and this owing to fear of punishment—the lust of doing evil always remaining." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 7541.)

The following remarkable passage deserves to be quoted here as bearing intimately on a question which is forcing itself with daily increasing urgency on the minds of all good and true Churchmen. It may, possibly, have a special interest for the more enlightened leaders of what is known as the High Church movement, and all who are endeavouring, according to their measure, to create in some and intensify in others, a real and deep reverence for the most august and sacred solemnity of the Christian Church "It is not to be credited," says Swedenborg, when treating of the Holy

out number, and each one hideous and detestable; as, for example, that God has transfused and conveyed himself into man, and that consequently each man is a kind of divinity; that he lives from himself, and not from God; and thus that he does what is good, and is gifted with wisdom, of himself: in like manner that he possesses faith and charity in himself, and so obtains them from himself, and not from God; besides several other monstrous beliefs, such as are found among those that are in hell, who, while they were yet in the world, held the belief that nature was living, or that by virtue of its own active forces it produced life. The latter,

Supper, "that the Lord closes heaven against those who approach unworthily, for this He never does against any man as long as he lives in this world. It is man that shuts heaven against himself. And this he does by the rejection of faith and by evil of life. He is, nevertheless, preserved continuously in a possible state of repentance and conversion; for the Lord is perpetually present with man and urgent to be received, for He says, (Rev. iii. 20) 'Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come into him, AND WILL SUP WITH HIM, AND HE WITH ME.' It is therefore the man who is in fault, in that he does not open the door. The case is otherwise after death. Then heaven is closed, and is not capable of being opened to those, who, up to the very end of their life, have approached the Holy Supper unworthily; for then the interiors of their mind are fixed and confirmed." (*True Christian Religion*, § 720.) It is therefore an eternal truth declared in the Word of God, and taught in the Church of England— notwithstanding judicial decisions in favour of what is called 'freedom of thought'—that *the punishment of the lost lasts for ever*. See Dr. Pusey's faithful protest against the prevalent 'loose thinking,' and his noble defence of this vital Christian doctrine (*Letter to the Times*, July 23rd, 1873). It is to be well noted, however, that this awful truth, with all that it involves as to the everlasting fixedness of the future state of the wicked in the other life, differs widely, as taught by Swedenborg, from the group of vague and fanciful conceptions which mainly make up the commonly received theological opinion on this subject.

when they look towards heaven, see its light as sheer darkness.<sup>1</sup>

I once heard from heaven the voice of one saying that if there were in man one spark of life, as his own, and not the life of God in him, there would be no such thing as heaven, nor any thing that exists there: there would, consequently, be no church on earth, and therefore no such thing as life eternal. Several other particulars, on this subject, may be seen in the spiritual

<sup>1</sup> It is shown (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 3020), that the natural mind (*animus*) is distinct from the rational mind (*mens*), that it is in a degree beneath the latter, and also acts from a certain principle proper to it. This natural mind is said to contain (α) all that belongs to the exterior or corporeal memory, (β) everything pertaining to the imaginative faculty, (γ) and all the natural affections which man possesses in common with brute animals. As an example of the perverse way in which the *imagination* which is proper to this natural mind may be exercised, when it ignores or forsakes the superior guiding light of the rational mind, the following may be cited from an Essay in which the play of this faculty is exhibited in great natural force. "Now," observes this brilliant writer, "there is in the human intellect a power of expansion—I might almost call it a power of creation—which is brought into play by the simple brooding upon facts. The legend of the Spirit brooding over chaos may have originated in a knowledge of this power." To the rational mind this sally of the scientific 'imagination' recalls, in some respects, the mental characteristics of the famous knight of La Mancha. The writer here coolly and dogmatically assumes that among men of sense the Divine Word must be looked upon as a 'legend' because the mere man of science 'imagines' it to be one. This is an *irreverent freedom, a licentiousness in speculation, and a dogmatism, within the sphere of science, and beyond it*, which, in the sacred interests of truth and humanity, ought to be repressed. False principles like the above, when they pass from the imaginations in which they have been hatched, and come to be worked out, by various means, in the social and civil life of men, to their last results, are among the most powerful of those influences which bring about, by degrees, the ruin of Christian Commonwealths. *Fundamenta subruuntur.* (Ps. xi. 3.)

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Records inserted in the work on CONJUGIAL LOVE  
(§§ 132—136).

X.

*Things spiritual, when thus clothed in man, render it possible for him to live as a rational and moral creature; in other words, as a natural man, but after a spiritual manner.*

§ 12.

This proposition follows as a conclusion from the principle above established, namely, that the soul clothes itself with a body as a man clothes himself with a garment. For the soul flows into the human mind, and conveys with it the *life* which it receives, without interruption, from the Lord; and thus the soul, as a medium, transmits that life into the body, where, by a union of the closest and most intimate kind, it causes the body, as it were, to live. Hence also, from a thousand testimonies derived from experience, it becomes evident that what is spiritual united to what is material—as it were, a *living force* acting with a *dead force*—causes a man to speak as a reasonable being and live a moral life.

The appearance, indeed, is as if the tongue and the lips spake, owing to a certain life in themselves, and also that the arms and hands performed actions, in a similar manner. Nevertheless, it is *thought* which in



itself is spiritual, that really speaks ; and it is *the will*, which likewise is spiritual, that really acts : and, moreover, the movements of both take place by means of their own proper organs, which in themselves are material, being taken from the natural world.

That such is the case appears in the light of day, provided only the following statement be attentively considered. Remove thought from speech, does not the mouth, in an instant, grow mute ? Then remove the will from action, do not the hands forthwith become motionless ?

The union of what is spiritual with what is natural, and the consequent appearance of life in what is material, may be compared to generous wine in a clean sponge, and to sweet must in a grape ; or to grateful juice in an apple ; and also to aromatic fragrance in cinnamon. The fibres which contain all these things are *matter*, which of itself has not the slightest taste or smell except from the liquids contained in and between them. Wherefore, if you press those juices out of them, they are nothing but dead filaments. The case would be similar with the organs of the body, were life taken away.

It is owing to the union of spiritual things with natural that man is a rational being. This is manifest from the analytical character of his thought. That he is a moral being is owing to the uprightness of his actions and the decorum shown in his behaviour. These qualities he possesses by virtue of a faculty which enables him to receive an influx from the Lord by way of

the angelic heaven, which is the very mansion and home of wisdom and love, and so of rationality and morality.

From all this may be obtained a perception of the truth that the spiritual and natural orders united in man, cause him to live a natural life after a spiritual manner.

That the condition of man is similar and yet dissimilar after death, is owing to the fact that his soul is then clothed with a substantial body, just as in the world it was clothed with a material body.

Many believe that the perceptions and thoughts of the mind, by reason of their being spiritual, flow into it naked and bare, without any covering, and not (as is really the case) through the medium of organized forms. Let those, however, indulge in such day-dreams who have never seen the things which are contained within the human head, where perceptions and thoughts reside in their very beginnings and principles; those, for example, who know not that therein are contained the cerebrum and cerebellum formed of substances inwoven and interlaced, to wit, the cineritious and medullary, besides various little glands, ventricles, and septa; and all these surrounded by *meninges* and *matres*, and that according as the state of all is perfect or disordered, man thinks and wills soundly or unsoundly: and so that he is rational and moral according to the organic internal conformation of his mind. In truth, the rational sight of man, that is to say, his understanding, considered apart from *forms* organized for the reception

of spiritual light, would be nothing but an empty unmeaning abstraction, of which nothing could be predicated, just as would be the natural sight when regarded apart from organs of vision – and so on in similar cases.<sup>1</sup>

# XI.

*The reception of that influx is such as is the state of love and wisdom in the man himself.*

## § 13.

It has been shown above that a man is not life, but an *organ recipient of life* from God; that love together with wisdom *is life*; and also that God is Love itself and Wisdom itself, and thus, Life itself. It follows thence, that in so far as a man loves wisdom, or, which is the same thing, in so far as wisdom, embosomed in love, dwells in him, thus far he is *an image of God*, in other words, a *receptacle of life* from God. And *vice versa*, in so far as he is in an opposite love, and, consequently, in a state of mental unsoundness, he is thus far a recipient of life not from God, but from hell; and this life is called *death*.

*Love itself and Wisdom itself are not Life.* They constitute, however, the very ground and being (*esse*) of life. On the other hand, the joys of love and the charms of wisdom, which are affections—these make life; for by

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note R.

the medium of these affections the very being (*esse*) of life has its existence.<sup>1</sup>

The influx of life from God bears along with it these joys and charms, just as the influx of light and heat in the spring season brings with it corresponding affections into the minds of men, and also into birds and beasts of every kind—yea more into the subjects of the vegetable kingdom which put forth buds and become fruitful. For the (higher) joys of love and charms of wisdom open and enlarge the feelings and emotions of the natural mind and adapt them to its reception, just as joy and mirth (in the natural order) expand the features, and adapt them to receive the gladdening influx of the soul.

The man who is deeply influenced by the love of wisdom, is, as it were, a Garden in Eden, in which are two trees—the one of Life, the other of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. The tree of life is the reception of love and wisdom from God, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is the reception of love and wisdom from man himself.<sup>2</sup> In the latter case the

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note 8.

<sup>2</sup> “In the Word, the expression *to eat* signifies to appropriate; and the Tree of Life signifies the Lord with reference to the goodness which is of love. Hence it is that by eating of the Tree of Life is signified appropriation of the goodness of love which is from the Lord. The reason why *to eat* signifies to appropriate is, that in like manner as natural food, when eaten, is appropriated to the life of man's body, so spiritual food, when it is received, is appropriated to the life of his soul. By the Tree of Life is signified the Lord as to the goodness which is of love, because nothing save this is meant by the Tree of Life in the Garden of Eden; and also because man is in possession of celestial and spiritual life by virtue of that goodness which has its source in the love and charity that are by and from the

man is insane, and yet he thinks that he is as wise as God is. The former, however, is truly wise. He also believes that there is none wise but God alone, and that man is wise only in so far as he holds this belief; and the more so, in proportion as he feels within himself that this is the genuine expression of his will. This subject, however, has been considered more in detail in the Spiritual Record to be found in the Treatise on CONJUGIAL LOVE (§§ 132—136).

I will here add, in support of these statements, a truth not hitherto revealed. All the angels of heaven

Lord. *Tree* is mentioned in many places, and by it is signified the Churchman; and also the Church itself, taken in a universal sense. And by the fruit of a tree is meant goodness of life. The ground and reason of all this is that the Lord is the Tree of Life, from whom comes every good which is in the Churchman, and in the Church." (*Apocalypse Revealed*, § 89.)

"The worldly and corporeal man says in his heart, 'If I am not instructed concerning faith and what belongs to faith, by the things of sense, so that I may see them, or by the things of science, so that I may understand them, I will not believe.' In this he confirms himself from the circumstance that what is natural cannot be contrary to what is spiritual. He is therefore desirous of being instructed in what is celestial and Divine, from the things of sense. This, however, is as impossible as it is for a camel to go through the eye of a needle.

"The more he desires to grow wise from such things, the more he blinds himself, till at length he comes to believe nothing, not even in the existence of anything spiritual, nor in such a thing as eternal life. This result flows from the principle he assumes. And this is to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, of which, the more a man eats, the more he becomes a dead man.

"On the other hand, he who wishes to grow wise from a wisdom not of this world, but which comes from the Lord, says in his heart, that he ought to believe the Lord, that is to say, those things which the Lord has spoken in the Word, because they are truths. And from this principle he thinks. He confirms himself in this view by things rational, scientific, sensual, and natural; and what does not confirm this position, he removes from his mind." (*Arcana Cælestia*, § 128.)



turn the forehead to the Lord as a Sun; and all the spirits of hell turn the back of the head to Him. The latter receive an influx into the affections of their will—which in themselves are evil desires—and cause the understanding to become favourable to these affections; but the former receive an influx into the affections of their understanding, which causes the will to incline to them. Hence it is that the angels of heaven are in a state of wisdom, and the evil spirits of hell in a state of insanity.

The human understanding, indeed, has its abode in the cerebrum, that division of the brain which lies beneath the forehead; and the will in the cerebellum, that part or portion situate at the back of the head.<sup>1</sup> Who does

<sup>1</sup> "Sensation in general, or the common faculty of feeling, is distinguished into voluntary and involuntary. The voluntary sense is proper to the cerebrum. The involuntary sense is proper to the cerebellum. These two orders of general sensation are united together in man; but they are, nevertheless, distinct. The fibres which issue forth from the cerebrum present to view, in general, the voluntary sense; and the fibres from the cerebellum exhibit, in general, the involuntary sense. Fibres derived from this two-fold origin become joined together in the two appendices named, respectively, the *medulla oblongata* and the *medulla spinalis*, and by means of these pass into the body, and enter into the formation of its members, viscera, and organs. Those portions which encompass the body, as, for example, the muscles and the skin, as also the organs of the senses, receive for the most part fibres from the cerebrum. Hence it is that man is endowed with sense, and consequently with motion in accordance with his will. But those things which are contained within that cincture or enclosure, and are called the viscera of the body, receive fibres from the cerebellum. Hence it is that man has no feeling of these parts; nor are they under the control of his will. From these facts it may to some extent be evident, what the faculty of sensation in general is; in other words, what is the common voluntary sense, and the common involuntary sense, with which man is endowed." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 4325.)

The above is one of the numberless passages to be met with in the theo-

not know that a man who is in an unsound state of mind owing to false principles, favours the appetites and desires of his own evil state, and by reasons drawn from the intellectual faculty, gives them strength and support? Who, again, does not also know that a wise man from the light of truth, sees the real character of those appetites and desires which proceed from his will, and

logical expositions of our author, which imply, by necessary consequence, the truth of principles previously established in his philosophical treatises; and demonstrate that, however distinct from each other these two classes of his works may be, they are, notwithstanding, intimately connected, and ought to be studied in conjunction. With the physiological doctrine summarily stated in the above, compare the following, from the *Animal Kingdom* (vol. ii. pp. 453—455):—

“The cerebrum and cerebellum not only dwell under distinct septa and tents, and live without familiar intercourse within the bony walls of the skull; but they have their separate provinces beyond these boundary walls in the body also, whither they put forth their fibres. The cerebrum, or the fibre of the cerebrum, occupies the very ultimate boundaries, or the muscular and sensorial circumference of this kingdom; but the fibre of the cerebellum has for its lot the whole interior field circumscribed by these boundaries, where the viscera of the thorax and abdomen live. The fibre, propagated as an offspring by derivation from its parent cerebrum or cerebellum, when sent out to its goals, and determined to uses in the extremes, carries with it only that character, breathes only that power, and exercises only that force, which it has obtained from its parent; thus the fibre sent from the cerebrum involves whatever the mind of the cerebrum appoints to be executed in ultimates as a matter of choice and will; but the fibre from the cerebellum involves whatever its mind or soul deems advisable to be done as a matter of nature. The former takes the reasons of its choice or will from the sensoria disposed in the boundary of the kingdom; the latter, the reasons of its administration, from the papillæ set within the viscera. In this way we see that the kingdom is divided between the cerebrum and cerebellum, or between the will and nature; and this, in such wise, that nature, which manages the domestic, intimate, and secret affairs of the kingdom, is environed and beset by the will, which attends to the external business that is common to the body with the surrounding world . . . .”

puts a curb upon them? The wise man does this because he turns his face to God. In other words, he believes in God, and not in himself. On the other hand, the man who is devoid of sound reason, acts in the manner above stated, because he turns his face away from God; that is to say, he believes in himself and not in God. When a man believes in himself, he believes that he is in the state of loving and being wise from himself, and not from God. This is also what is meant by *eating of the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil*. On the other hand, to believe in God (as in the case of the wise man), is to believe that his state of loving and being wise is from God, and not from himself: and this is to *eat of the tree of Life*. (Rev. ii. 7.)

From the foregoing, a perception of the truth may be obtained—but still faint and as it were in moonlight—that the *reception* of the influx of life from God is according to the state of love and wisdom which exists in man.

This influx is susceptible of still further illustration by means of the influx of light and heat into the subjects of the vegetable kingdom,<sup>1</sup> in that these come into

<sup>1</sup> From the above illustration the reader cannot fail to obtain a clear and definite notion of the sense in which the author uses the now somewhat obsolete philosophical term *influx*. When applied to phenomena of the intellectual and spiritual orders, in a correspondent sense, it is perfectly intelligible to all who believe that such phenomena are real things, and not imaginary entities or mere figures of speech. Just as vegetable substances are subjects of the inflow of natural heat and light from the sun of this earth, so the souls of men, which are spiritual substances, are the subjects of the inflow of spiritual heat and light, that is to say, of love and wisdom, from the Sun of Righteousness. Compare the following, from the

flower and bear fruit according to the manner in which the fibres which enter into their formation are interwoven and compacted, and so, according to the mode of reception. Another illustration is afforded by the influx of the rays of light into precious stones, which modify the rays and thus impart to them the quality of colours, according to the peculiar position of the parts constituting their contexture, thus again, according to the mode of reception. Lastly, an illustration may be derived from the phenomenon of the prismatic *spectrum* as presented by optical glasses and rain-drops, according to the degrees of incidence and refraction, thus according to the various modes in which the light is received.<sup>1</sup>

Human minds are similarly circumstanced with respect to spiritual light which proceeds from THE LORD as a Sun, and flows into them without intermission. The mode of reception, however, varies.

*True Christian Religion* (§ 34) :—"The Divine Life, that by means of its influx from the sun of the angelic heaven, gives activity to man, may be compared with the light which is from the sun of this world, and with its influx into a transparent object. The reception of this life, in the highest degree, is like the influx of light into a diamond; in the second degree, like that into a crystal; and in the ultimate or lowest degree, like that into a glass or a transparent membrane. If, however, this last degree be closed, as to its spiritual part—which happens when God is denied and Satan worshipped—then the reception of life from God may be compared with the influx of light into opaque earthy objects, such as rotten wood, the green sod of a swamp, abominable filth, &c. For in such case, man becomes a spiritual corpse."

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note T.

## CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY.

### XII.

*The understanding in man is such that it can be raised into the light, that is to say, into the wisdom in which the angels of heaven are, according to the degree of culture and development of the rational faculty. His will also can be elevated into heavenly heat, in other words, into love of a like kind, according to the deeds of his life. It is to be observed, however, that the love which pertains to his will, is not thus elevated, except in so far as man wills and does what the wisdom, which belongs to his understanding, teaches him to do.*

#### § 14.

By the Human Mind are to be understood its two faculties called, respectively, the *understanding* and the *will*. The understanding is the receptacle of the light of heaven, which, in its essence, is wisdom; and the will is the receptacle of the heat of heaven, which, as already shown, is, in its essence, love.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This definition of the term mind, which, owing to its apparent simplicity, a superficial reader might readily overlook, demands and deserves most careful study. It is admirably clear and precise; and when once it has been fully grasped, much of what appears at first sight dark or unmeaning in Swedenborg's Psychology becomes easy of comprehension to those who possess any adequate acquaintance with the fundamental facts of that science. The contrast between ancient and modern thought on the subject in question is striking and instructive. Nothing could be more confused, vacillating, and incongruous than the manner in which the term 'mind' is employed in modern metaphysical treatises. While, on the other hand, the eminent philosophers of antiquity invariably make use of the terms *ψυχή* and *νοῦς*, *animus* and *mens*, with a definite and distinct



These two principles, namely, wisdom and love, proceed from the Lord as a Sun and flow into heaven universally and individually. Hence it is that the angels have their wisdom and love. They also flow into this world universally and individually. It is owing to this that men have wisdom and love. Moreover, these two principles proceed, in a united form, from the Lord, and likewise flow, in a united form, into the souls of angels and men. They are not, however, in this united form *received* in their minds. For, first of all, is received there the light which constitutes the understanding, and then, little by little, the love which forms the will. This order is also providential, because every man must be created anew, that is to say, he must be reformed; and this takes place by means of his understanding. The reason is, that man is designed to imbibe, from infancy, such knowledge of goodness and truth as shall teach him to live well—in other words, to will and act in the right way; thus the will receives its form by way of the understanding. For the sake of this end, man is gifted with the faculty of raising his understanding almost into the light in which the angels of heaven are, that he may see what it behoves him to will and hence to do, so as to be prosperous in this world for a time, and also blessed after death to eternity.<sup>1</sup> Man

signification. (See note on p. 24 of the present work.) The fact may be adduced as one of many proofs to show “that the ancients surpassed us in wisdom, in the art and perfection of distinguishing things, and in the shrewdness of their conjectures respecting the occult.” (*Econ. An. Kingdom*, vol. i., p. 13.)

<sup>1</sup> See *Apocalypses Revealed* (§ 424), where the nature of the sensual part

comes into a state of prosperity and blessedness, if he procure for himself wisdom, and keep his will in obedi-

of man, and its relation to the spiritual part, are referred to, and numerous passages of the *Arcana Coelestia* quoted as proving (1), that elevation of the mind above the things of sense was well known to the ancients; and (2) that man, in his own spirit, is able to bring under his observation what takes place in the spiritual world, provided only he could be withdrawn from the things of sense, and be elevated into the light of heaven by the Lord. It must be evident to every candid and intelligent reader that the condition here so definitely laid down, under which alone man is permitted to exercise that faculty of open spiritual vision wherewith he was endowed at creation, differs *toto cælo* from the delusive or unlawful methods adopted by mystics, visionaries, and 'spiritualists.' That between genuine spiritual enlightenment, and every form of mysticism or phantastical illuminism there is 'a great gulf fixed,' may be clearly seen from a careful study of what follows:—

"With respect to man, he is said to be elevated when he makes a nearer approach to things heavenly. The reason of this is, that heaven is believed to be elevated or on high. It is so said owing to the appearance. For heaven, and accordingly those things which pertain to heaven—to wit, things celestial and spiritual—are not on high but in what is internal. . . . Wherefore man is in heaven, as to his interiors, when in a state of spiritual love and faith." (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 4103.)

"As regards the elevation of truths and their respective affections, as also their orderly arrangement in general principles, the case stands thus:—Truths and affections are elevated when a preference is given to those things which belong to life eternal and the Lord's kingdom, above those things which pertain to a life in the body and the kingdom of this world. When a man acknowledges the former to be principal and primary, and the latter to be instrumental and secondary, then truths and their respective affections are elevated in him. For in so far as he is translated into the light of heaven, in which is intelligence and wisdom, to the same extent those things which pertain to the light of the world are to him images and, as it were, mirrors, in which he sees the former. The contrary happens when he prefers those things which belong to the life of the body and the kingdom of this world, above those which are of eternal life and the Lord's kingdom. As in the case where he believes that these latter have no being, because he does not see them, and because no one has come from that other world and declared their existence. As also in the case where he believes that, if there be such things, he will not fare worse than others, and confirms himself in these principles, and lives a worldly

ence to its dictates. On the other hand, he falls into adversity and misfortune when he permits his understanding to become subject to his will. The cause of this is that the will of man, from birth, inclines to evils, even to those which are enormous.<sup>1</sup> Wherefore unless

life, and entirely despises charity and faith. In such a man truths and their affections are not elevated, but are either suffocated, or rejected, or perverted. For he is in natural light, into which nothing of heavenly light flows. Hence it is clear what is meant by the elevation of truths and their respective affections." (*Ibid.* 4104.)

"Man has been so created that through him, as a medium, the Divine things of the Lord may descend even to the ultimate or lowest things of nature, and from these again ascend to the Lord; thus that man might be a medium capable of uniting the Divine Being with the world of nature, and also of uniting the world of nature with the Divine Being, and thus, through the instrumentality of man, as through an uniting medium, the very last or lowest principle of nature might live from the Divine Being; and this would have been the case if man had lived according to the Divine order. That man was so created, is clear from the fact that as regards his body he is a little world. For all the mysteries which are in the world of nature are treasured up in it: that is to say, whatever of hidden and mysterious there is in the æther and in its modifications, the same is stared up in the eye, and whatever of a similar kind is in the air, the same is in the ear. And whatever invisible thing floats and acts in the air, this is in the organ of smell where it is perceived, and whatever invisible thing there is in waters and other fluids, is perceived in the organ of taste; also the very changes of state are everywhere perceived in the sense of touch. (See *Animal Kingdom*, Index s. v. TOUCH, *ubi* abundance of physiological facts concerning this most marvellous sense.) That man was so created is, moreover, evident from the fact that things which are still more recondite would be perceived in his interior organs, were his life according to order. Hence it is manifest that there would be a descent of the Divine Being through the medium of man into the ultimate of nature, and an ascent from the ultimate of nature to the Divine Being, if only man were to acknowledge the Lord as his last and first End, with a faith which is of the heart, that is to say, with love." (*Arcana Cælestia*, § 3702.)

<sup>1</sup> On man's original inclination or hereditary tendency to evil, see the Ninth Article of the Church of England, which treats of 'Original or Birth-sin.' Like all the other Articles, it is worded with the utmost care

that will were put under restraint by means of the understanding, man would rush headlong into unspeak-

and caution, so as to exclude 'private interpretation,' and preserve the mean between excess and defect in stating the fact and general intent of Holy Scripture. Theologians, in their attempts to explain this difficult subject, have fallen into the most grievous errors. Expositors of the Articles rarely imitate the wisdom and prudence of those who framed them.

Nothing can be more evident, as a matter of fact, than the transmission of evil from parents to children. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive anything more repugnant to the most elementary notion of truth and justice, as well as to every right conception of the Divine Being and Attributes, than many of the theological expositions which have received such wide acceptance, touching the origin, nature, and consequences of the 'evil and corrupt affections' that man inherits from parents and forefathers.

Swedenborg alone has thoroughly explored and rationally explained, in accordance both with reason and Revelation, the doctrine of original evil. The following passages sufficiently indicate the character of his teaching on this subject:—

"As to hereditary evil the case stands thus. Every one who commits actual sin, thence induces on himself a certain nature. The evil, also, arising from this source is implanted in his children, and becomes hereditary. It thus proceeds from any one whomsoever; from a man's father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and ancestors in successive order. Thus it is multiplied and grows in his descending posterity; thus it remains in every one, and is increased in every one, by his actual sins. Nor does it ever become dissipated, so as to lose its power to hurt, in any others save those who are regenerated by the Lord. Every one who attends to the subject may know this from the fact that the evil inclinations of parents remain visibly in their children, so that one family, yea, one generation, may in this way be distinguished from another." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 313.)

"The evils attendant on man have several origins. The first origin is from the hereditary principle by continual derivations from grandfathers and great-grandfathers to the father; and from the father, in whom evils are thus accumulated, into the man himself. Another origin is from the actual evil in him, that is to say, what he acquires to himself by a life of evil. This evil man takes, in part, from what is hereditary in him, as from an ocean of evils, and puts into act; and, in part, he superadds several things from himself; whence comes that proper (nature), which man acquires to himself. But this actual evil, which man makes his own proper (nature), has also divers origins; in general, two:—firstly, in that

able wickedness—yea more, from an inherent brutality of nature, he would proceed to rob and murder, for the sake of himself, all without exception who should be unwilling to treat him with favour and indulgence. Besides all this, unless it had been so provided that the understanding could be perfected, in a separate manner, and then the will by means of it, a man would not be a man at all, but a beast. The fact is, that without such a separation, and without an actual elevation of the understanding above the will, man would not have been able to think, and from thought to speak, but merely to give expression to his feelings by certain sounds. Nor would he have been able to act from reason, but merely from instinct; much less would he have been able to acquire those knowledges which relate to God, and by means of which God is known, and thus to be conjoined with God and live for ever. In truth man thinks and wills as if from himself; and this *as if* from himself is the reciprocal principle of conjunction.<sup>3</sup> For conjunction without a reciprocal principle is impossible, just as there can be no such thing as the conjunction of an active with a passive force without some kind of reactive principle.

*God alone acts.*<sup>1</sup> Man also suffers himself to be acted upon, and, moreover, reacts in all appearance *as if* from himself. Nevertheless, this reaction, regarded as to its interior source, is of God.

he receives evils from others without any fault of his own; secondly, in that he receives them from himself, thus, by his own fault." (*Ibid.* § 4171.)

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note U.



From what has been said, if rightly perceived, it may be seen what is the character of the love constituting a man's will, when it is elevated by the understanding, and also of what kind it is when this does not take place. Hence it may be seen what is the character of the man himself. This last-mentioned point, namely, the character of the man himself, when the will is not thus elevated, may be illustrated by comparisons. He is like an eagle flying aloft, which, as soon as it sees beneath such food as is suited to its appetite, for example, poultry, some dusky brood of swans, yea even tender lambs, in an instant it swoops and devours them. Such a man is also like an adulterer, who conceals beneath in a cellar the object of his sin and shame, and ascends at times to the uppermost chamber of the house and converses with those who are staying there as a wise man would, respecting purity of life, and then by turns hurries off from the assembled guests, to the indulgence of his wicked passions. He is also like a robber placed on a watch-tower, where he pretends to keep guard. As soon, however, as he sees an object of plunder below, he quickly makes his way down, and secures it as his prey. Finally he may be likened to marsh flies which hover in a column over a horse's head as he gallops along, but as soon as the horse stops, they fall down into their native swamp.

Such is the character of the man whose will or love is not elevated by his understanding; for in that case he continues to live a merely natural life, immersed in the impurities of nature and the unhallowed desires of

sense. Absolutely different is the life of those who, by wisdom resulting from the due exercise of their understanding, keep in subjection the allurements of those unholy desires which have their seat in the will. With such the understanding enters (so to speak) into a marriage contract with the will, consequently so also does wisdom with love, and in a higher sphere they both dwell together in the enjoyment of every delight.

## XIII.

*The case is absolutely different with the brute creation.*

## § 15.

Those who judge from the mere appearances presented by the bodily senses, come to the conclusion that beasts have will and understanding just as men have, and thence further infer that the sole difference between them consists in the fact that a man is able to speak, and to express his thoughts and desires by words; while, on the contrary, a beast is able to signify such things only by inarticulate sounds. Nevertheless, the truth is that beasts do not possess will and understanding, but only a certain similitude of both, called by the learned an *analogue*.<sup>1</sup> Man is man because his intellect may be raised above the desires of his will. It is thus that man is enabled to become cognisant of those desires, to see them, and also to restrain them within their proper limits. On the other hand, the beast is a

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note V.

beast because its desires impel it to do what it does. Whence it follows that a man is a man by virtue of the fact that his will is kept in obedience to his understanding; but that a beast is a beast by virtue of the fact that its understanding is in subjection to its will.

From all this is deduced the following conclusion, that the understanding of man inasmuch as it receives the inflowing light from heaven, and not only apprehends and perceives it as its own, but also thinks from it analytically with all possible variety, and absolutely *as if* from itself, is *living*. Hence it is a real and genuine understanding. It also follows that his will, in that it receives the inflowing love of heaven, and acts from this *as if* from itself, is also *living*. It is likewise, therefore, really and truly a will. The reverse, however, is the case with beasts. Wherefore those who think from the unrestrained desires of the will, are likened to beasts; and in the spiritual world at a distance, they also appear as beasts.<sup>1</sup> They even act in a similar manner, with this only difference, that they are capable of acting otherwise if they will. Those, on the other hand, who curb the evil inclinations of their will by means of their understanding, and, in consequence, act rationally and wisely, appear in the spiritual world as men, and are angels of heaven. In a word, the will and the understanding in beasts are always intimately united; and as the will, in itself, is blind (for it owes its origin to heat and not to light) it renders the under-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note W.

standing blind also. Hence it is that a beast neither knows nor understands what it does, and yet it acts; for it acts from an influx out of the spiritual world: and an action of this kind is *instinct*.<sup>1</sup>

Some believe that a beast from understanding exercises thought upon what it does. This, however, is not in the least the case. Its action is owing merely to the natural love which is inherent in it from creation, the senses of the body meanwhile supplying aid. That man thinks and speaks is solely and entirely to be ascribed to the fact that *his understanding is capable of being separated from his will*, and of being elevated into the light of heaven: for the understanding *thinks*, and thought *speaks*.

Beasts act according to the laws of order inscribed on their nature; and some, indeed, to all appearance in a rational and moral manner, which is more than can be said of many men. The cause of this is that their understanding is in a state of blind obedience to the desires of their will; and therefore they are not able to pervert those desires by vicious reasoning, as is the case with men.

It is to be noted that by the terms *will* and *understanding*, in the statements just made in reference to beasts, is meant merely a resemblance and analogue of these faculties. They have been designated *analogues*, and so have received their name according to appearance.

The life of beasts may be compared with that of a

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note X.

somnambulist, who by the power of his will walks and acts, his understanding meanwhile being buried in sleep; and also with that of a blind person who proceeds on his way led by a dog. It may also be compared with that of an imbecile who, from custom and a habit thence contracted, performs his work according to prescribed rules. In like manner it may be compared with that of a person devoid of memory, and hence deprived of understanding, who, nevertheless, knows or at least learns how to dress himself, to partake of delicacies, to pay attention to the other sex, to walk through various streets from house to house, and to engage in such things as tend to soothe the senses and gratify the bodily appetites, by all the enticements of which he is borne along, although he does not think, and hence is unable to speak.

From all this it is plain how greatly they err who believe that beasts are in the enjoyment of rationality, and that they are to be distinguished from men merely by their outward shape, and by the fact that they are unable to clothe in language things of a rational kind which they store up within them. From these fallacies many even infer that if a man live after death so will a beast; and, *vice versa*, that if a beast do not live after death, neither will a man; not to mention many other day-dreams arising from ignorance respecting the will and the understanding, and, also, touching the *steps* or *degrees*, by which the mind of man, as if by a ladder, mounts up to heaven.



## XIV.

*There are three Degrees, or Grades of being, in the spiritual world, also three Degrees, in the natural world, according to which all influx takes place.*

## § 16.

It is a truth which may be ascertained by the investigation of causes as seen in their effects, that there are degrees of a two-fold order; one in which are contained things *prior* and *posterior*, another including the *greater* and the *less*. Those degrees which involve the distinction between what is prior and posterior are to be called degrees of *altitude*, and also *discrete* degrees. On the other hand, degrees by which the greater and the less are distinguished from one another, are to be called degrees of *latitude*, and also *continuous* degrees.<sup>1</sup>

Degrees of altitude, or those of the discrete order, are like the generations and compositions of one thing from another. Let one of the nerves be taken for an example. It is a product and compound of *fibres*. Take, again, any one of these fibres you please, it will be seen to be a product and compound of little *fibrils*. It is the same with stone, wood, or metal. They are made up of *parts*; and these parts are composed of still smaller portions, or *particles*.

As to degrees of latitude, or continuous degrees, they

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note Y.

are as the variations of increase and decrease which occur in the *same degree of altitude*, with respect to breadth, length, height, and depth; as in the case of greater and less volumes of water, air, or æther; and also larger and smaller masses of wood, stone, or metal. The things of which both the natural and the spiritual worlds are constituted, all and each, are, by creation, in degrees of this two-fold kind. The whole animal kingdom, in general and in particular, is in these degrees; likewise the whole vegetable kingdom, and the whole mineral kingdom; as is also the atmospheric expanse from the sun to the earth. There are, consequently, *three atmospheres*<sup>1</sup> distinctly or discretely separated

<sup>1</sup> The following on the subject of atmospheres deserves to be carefully studied in connection with some of the latest discoveries in Physical Science :—

“There are always two forces which . . . keep everything in its connexion and in its form, namely, a force acting from without, and a force acting from within. In the midst of these is the thing thus contained. In this manner, also, man as to every individual portion of him, even the most minute, is held together in connexion and form. That it is the atmospheres which keep the entire body in its connexion by their continual pressure or incumbence from without, and by the active force thence arising, is a thing well known: and, also, that the aerial atmosphere, by its influx, performs the same office for the lungs, and in like manner for their special organ, the ear, together with the various forms within it, constructed as they are for the purposes of modifying that atmosphere. The æthereal atmosphere, in like manner, preserves the connexion of the interior parts of the body. For the æther flows in freely through all the pores, and keeps, in their several forms, the entire viscera of the body unseparated, by an almost similar pressure or incumbence, and by the active force thence arising. . . . Now, unless there were certain internal forces which corresponded to these external forces and reacted against them, and in this manner contained and preserved in a state of equilibrium the intermediate forms, they would not subsist even for a moment. Hence it is clear that there must needs be two forces, in order that anything whatever may exist and subsist. The forces which flow in and act from

from one another, according to degrees of altitude, and that too in the spiritual as well as in the natural world, since in each world there is a sun. The atmospheres of the spiritual world, however, derive, from their spiritual origin, the character of being *substantial*; and the atmospheres of the natural world, in accordance with their origin, are by nature *material*.

Now since the atmospheres descend, according to these degrees, from their respective origins, and are also continents of light and heat, as well as vehicles by which these are transmitted, it follows that there are three degrees of light and heat. Moreover, since light, in the spiritual world, is, in its essence, wisdom, and heat there is, in its essence, love (as shown above in its proper Section), it follows, also, that there are three degrees of wisdom and three degrees of love, and so, three degrees of life. For wisdom, love, and life are formed into their respective threefold degrees by the media through which they pass.

Hence it is that there are three angelic heavens: the *within*, are from heaven, and through the medium of heaven, from the Lord; and, in themselves, they have life. This is sufficiently plain and evident from the organ of hearing. Unless there were interior modifications which have their origin in life, to which the exterior modifications pertaining to the air corresponded, hearing would have no existence. The same may be said of the organ of sight. Unless there were an interior light originating in life, to which corresponded the exterior light which belongs to the sun, sight would never have an existence. And so it is with all the other organs and members of the human body.

"There are forces acting from without which, being natural, are in themselves not living; and there are forces acting from within, and these in themselves alive, which hold in their grasp every single thing, and cause them to live—and, indeed, to live according to such a form as has been assigned to them for use." (*Arcana Cœlestia*, § 8628.)

highest, which is also called the third, where dwell the angels of the highest degree ; the middle, also called the second, where are the angels of the intermediate degree ; and the lowest, called also the first, the abode of the angels of the lowest degree.<sup>1</sup>

These heavens are also distinguished from each other according to degrees of wisdom and love. Those who dwell in the lowest heaven are in the love of *knowing* what is true and good ; those in the middle heaven, are in the love of *understanding* them ; and those in the highest heaven are in the love of *possessing wisdom*, that is, of *living according to what they know and understand*.

Now forasmuch as the angelic heavens are distinguished into three degrees, therefore the human mind is also distinguished into three degrees, because it is an image of heaven—in other words, it is a heaven in the least form. Hence it is that man is capable of becoming an angel of one of these three heavens. This also comes to pass according to his reception of love and wisdom, which proceed from the Lord. A man becomes an angel of the lowest heaven if he receive only the love of knowing what is true and good ; an angel of the intermediate heaven, if he receive the love of understanding them ; and an angel of the highest heaven, if he receive the love of being wise, that is, of living in accordance with them.

That the human mind is distinguished into three regions after the manner of the heavens, may be seen

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note Z.

in the Record of a spiritual experience inserted in the work on CONJUGIAL LOVE (§ 270).

From what has been said it is clear that all spiritual influx towards man and into man descends from the Lord by these three degrees, and is received by him in accordance with the degree of wisdom and love in which he is.

A knowledge of these degrees is at this day of the greatest use, inasmuch as many persons, from not being acquainted with them, take their stand and remain fixed in the lowest degree in which are contained their bodily senses; and owing to ignorance, which is intellectual darkness, they are incapable of being elevated into that spiritual light which is above those senses. From this source *Naturalism*,<sup>1</sup> as of its own accord, rushes in, as soon as such persons engage in any inquiry or investigation which has relation to the soul, the human mind, and its rational endowments. This is still more the case if the subject of inquiry be heaven and a life after death. Hence they become, comparatively, like those who stand in places of public resort, with telescopes in their hands; and when they have scanned the heavens publish unmeaning prognostications.<sup>2</sup> They are also like those who indulge in trivial talk and fall to reasoning about every object they see and everything they hear, except that in what they say and think there is still a remnant of reason derived from their under-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note AA.

<sup>2</sup> It is probable that allusion is here made to the itinerant astrologers of the time.



standing. Such persons, however, are like butchers who fancy themselves skilled in anatomy, because they have made an outward survey of the entrails of oxen and sheep, although they possess no knowledge whatever of their internal conformation.

It is a truth, notwithstanding, that to think from an influx of natural light which is not at the same time illustrated by an influx of spiritual light, is nothing else but to dream, and to speak from thought such as this is merely to play the part of a fortune-teller.

Respecting these degrees, however, the reader may see several other particulars in the work *ON THE DIVINE LOVE, AND DIVINE WISDOM*, published at Amsterdam in the year 1763 (§§ 173—281.)

## XV.

*In the first of these degrees are Ends; in the second Causes; and in the third Effects.*

### § 17.

Who does not see that an end is not a cause, but that it produces the cause; and that a cause is not an effect, but that it produces the effect; consequently, that they are distinctly three things which follow each other in order.

An end, such as it is in man, is the love which belongs to his will: for what a man actually loves, this he proposes to himself, and strives to attain. A cause, in man,

is the faculty of reason which pertains to his understanding; for by means of reason the end makes inquiry into mediate or efficient causes. And, lastly, an effect is an operation of the body arising out of, and done in accordance with, the antecedent end and cause.

There are thus three things in man which follow each other in order in a manner similar to the above-mentioned degrees of altitude. As soon as these three things are definitely established, then the end is inwardly in the cause, and also the end, by means of the cause, is in the effect. Wherefore all the three exist together in the effect. Hence it is that it is said, in THE WORD, that every one is to be judged according to his works: for the end, or in other words, the love, which belongs to a man's will, and the cause or the reason, which pertains to his understanding, are both together in the effects, which are the deeds done in and by his body. Thus it is that in *works* resides the real character of the whole man.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There is, perhaps, no point on which Swedenborg insists so earnestly and continuously, throughout his writings, as on that of *good works*. With him, they constitute the very essence and life of all true religion under whatever form it may present itself. The rampant Solifidianism and Antinomianism of his day, he placed among the infallible signs of a Church in ruins. He never loses an opportunity of exposing, with unsparing hand, the deadly character of these heresies—deadly, because they conceal, under reasonings subtle and false, evil principles destructive of man's spiritual life. What *works* really are may be clearly understood from the following passages:—

“Works are often mentioned in the Apocalypse, but few know what is meant by works. This fact, however, is well known. Ten men may do works which outwardly appear alike, but which, nevertheless, are unlike in all the ten, inasmuch as they proceed from different ends and different causes. The end and the cause render the works either good or bad. For every work is a work of the mind. Consequently such as is the

Those who are not acquainted with these principles, and do not, in this manner, make a distinction between the objects presented to the rational faculty, cannot pos-

quality of the mind, such is that of the work. If the mind be charity the work becomes charity ; but if the mind be not charity, the work is not charity. These works may, nevertheless, both appear alike in externals. Works appear to men in their external form, but to angels in their internal form : and to the Lord they appear such as they really are from their inmost to their extremes. Works, in their external form, appear no otherwise than as fruits do on their outward surface ; but works, in their internal form, appear as fruits do beneath their surface, where there are numberless edible portions, and in the midst seeds, in which again there are things without number, that are far removed inwardly, from the keenest glance of human eyes, yea, which are above man's intellectual sphere." (*Apocalypse Revealed*, § 76.)

"It is to be noted that in deeds or works the whole man is presented to view ; and that his will and thought, in other words, his love and faith, which constitute the interiors of man, are not complete previous to their being in deeds or works, which are the exteriors of man. For these latter are the ultimates or extremes, in which the former are brought to an end ; and without such terminations they are as things without bounds, which as yet have no existence, and which therefore, so far, have no place of abode in man. Thinking and willing, without doing when it is in one's power, is as if something of the nature of flame were enclosed in a vessel, and thus extinguished. It is also like seed cast upon sand, where it fails to grow up, and perishes together with its prolific principle. On the other hand, to think and to will and to follow these up by action or deed, is like something of the nature of flame which emits on all sides heat and light. It is also like a seed sown in soil that grows up into a tree, or a flower, and so comes into existence. Every one may know that to *will*, and not to *do* when it is in one's power, is the same thing as not to will ; and also that to *love*, and not to *do* good when it is in one's power, is, in fact, not to love it. Thus it is merely to *think* that one wills and loves ; and consequently it is thought separated from the affections of willing and loving, and such thought disappears and comes to nothing. Love and will are the very soul of deed and work. This soul forms its body in those sincere and just actions which a man performs. The spiritual body, or the body which belongs to a man's spirit, comes from no other source. That is to say, it is formed from nothing whatever but those things which man does from love or will. . . . In a word, all that pertains to man and to his spirit, is in his deeds or works." (*Heaven and Hell*, § 475.)

sibly do otherwise than bring the ideas of their thought to a termination in the atoms of Epicurus, or in the monads of Leibnitz, or in the simple substances of Wolf. Thus it is that they close their understanding as it were with a bolt, so as not to be able even to *think* rationally on the subject of spiritual influx. No further advance of thought is possible; for this author asserts concerning that *simple substance* of his, that, when divided, it is reduced to nothing. Thus, then, it comes to pass that the understanding is brought to a sudden pause, on the first dawning of its own borrowed light, which is derived purely and simply from the bodily senses. It is for this reason that no other notion on this subject is entertained than that the order of being called spiritual, is a more subtle form of what is natural; also that the principle of rationality belongs to the brute creation, as well as to man; and, lastly, that the soul is a mere breath of wind such as is that which a man breathes forth from his breast when he dies. These and several others of a like kind are the common notions on this subject; and they have their source, not in light, but in darkness.<sup>1</sup>

Now since all things, as well in the spiritual as in the natural world, make their progressions according to degrees, as described in a previous Section, it is clear that to have an accurate knowledge of these degrees, to distinguish and separate them, and also to see them in their order, is *intelligence* properly so called. Moreover

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note BB.

the quality of every man is known by means of these degrees as soon as a knowledge is obtained of his love ; for, as already stated, the *end* which belongs to the will, and the *causes* which pertain to the understanding, also the *effects* which have relation to the body, follow in succession from his love, as a tree from its seed, and as fruit from a tree.

States of love are, in general, of a threefold kind ; (1) the love of heaven ; (2) the love of the world ; and (3) the love of self.

The love of heaven is spiritual, the love of the world is material, and the love of self is corporeal.

When the love is spiritual, all things that follow from it, derive, *as forms from their essence*, the quality of being spiritual. In like manner, if the principal love be that of the world, or of worldly wealth and estate, and thus material, then all that follows from it, as results from their first principle, also acquires a material character. It is equally true that if the principal love be the love of self, or of superiority over all others, and thus corporeal, the issues of such an affection partake of what is corporeal. In the last-mentioned case the reason is that a man who is in this state inwardly regards himself alone, and so comes to immerse the thoughts of his mind in the concerns of the body.

Wherefore, as just now above stated, he who is cognisant of the *ruling love* of any one, and at the same time, of the manner in which ends proceed to causes, and causes to effects (which three things follow in order, according to degrees of altitude), the same



acquires a knowledge of the whole man. Thus it is that the angels arrive at a knowledge of every one with whom they speak. They perceive his love from the sound of his speech; from his face they see his inner form; and from the gestures of his body, his outward demeanour and bearing.<sup>1</sup>

## XVI.

*From the foregoing it is plain what the quality of spiritual influx is, when traced from its origin to its effects.*

## § 18.

Up to the present time philosophers have inferred the existence of a spiritual influx proceeding from the soul into the body; but they have not hitherto investigated the subject of an influx from God into the soul, and thence by the way of the soul into the body. This has been owing to the fact that no one knew anything of the spiritual world, or of the Sun there, from which, as from their primal fountain, all things spiritual issue in a continuous stream. Thus it has come to pass that nothing was known touching the influx of things spiritual into what is natural.

Now, forasmuch as permission has been granted to me to be in the spiritual world and in the natural world, *at one and the same time*, and in this way to be enabled to see both worlds and both suns together, I feel bound

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, Note CC.

by my sense of duty, to make these things publicly known. For of what advantage is it to have knowledge, if what one knows, another does not also know? What is the former without the latter? What is it but to heap up riches and store them away in a chest, and then at times merely to gaze at them and count them over without the least intention of rendering them useful to others. This is nothing else but *spiritual avarice*.

In order, however, that it may be fully known what spiritual influx is, and also its distinguishing character, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the three following subjects;—(1) What, in its essence, is the thing called *spiritual*; (2) What is the thing called *natural*; (3) lastly, What is that which is called the *human soul*. Lest, therefore, the present brief lucubration should prove deficient in clearness and force, owing to ignorance on these points, it is of importance to consult certain Records of spiritual experience on the subject, inserted in the work on CONJUGIAL LOVE.

With respect to what the *spiritual* is, see the Record contained in that work, §§ 326—329; on the *human soul*, § 315; and on the *influx of spiritual things into natural*, § 380; and still more in detail, §§ 415—422.

### § 19.

To the preceding I will subjoin the following spiritual Record.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> What is here termed a spiritual Record, is one of those remarkable narratives of spiritual scenes and events which, under the name of *Memora-*

After the above was written I prayed to the Lord to be permitted to speak with the disciples of Aristotle,

*bilia* (ἀπομνημονεύματα, *commentarii, memoranda, reminiscences, memoirs*), form so striking a characteristic of the author's theological writings. Owing to the extreme novelty and strangeness of their contents, they have hitherto proved 'a stone of stumbling and rock of offence' to not a few who have attempted, with more or less earnestness of purpose, to study the new Theology. A steady determination to persevere in the endeavour to comprehend their true meaning and purport, seems to be the only effectual mode of overcoming this serious impediment to the reception of spiritual truth. It is, moreover, to be noted, that as to their publication, Swedenborg had no option. He was not at liberty to suppress what, in obedience to a special Divine mandate, it was his duty to make known to the Church. (See *True Christian Religion*, § 188.)

The authenticity of these records, as in all other cases touching a matter of fact, is purely a question of evidence. Nothing is easier than to hastily prejudice and discard them as fictions or hallucinations. But it will be found that nothing is more difficult than the proof of such charges, provided the evidence be fully and fairly studied. A judgment which ignores this evidence is more than a mere impertinence. It is, in a greater or less degree, a culpable error.

Swedenborg was by no means unaware of the kind of reception which these *Memorabilia* were likely to meet with at the hands of Churchmen (not to mention scoffing sceptics and atheists) immersed in the clouds and darkness of the last century. Accordingly, in his most systematic and mature Theological treatise, *The True Christian Religion*, published in his eighty-third year, he makes the following solemn averment concerning these compendious statements of sayings and doings in the region of the spiritual:—

"I foresee that many who read the *Memorabilia* annexed to each chapter of this work, will believe them to be the inventions of my imagination. But I solemnly affirm, in all truthfulness, that they are not inventions, but were verily and indeed seen and heard; not seen and heard in any state of mind during sleep, but in a state of full and entire wakefulness. For it has pleased the Lord to manifest himself to me, and to send me to teach those things that shall belong to His New Church which is understood by the New Jerusalem in the Book of Revelation. To this end He has opened the interiors of my mind or spirit, from which time it has been granted me to be in the spiritual world with angels, and at the same time in the natural world with men, and this now for the space of twenty-seven years." (§ 851.)

Swedenborg, moreover, in a letter to the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt,

and, at the same time, with those of Descartes and Leibnitz, to the intent that I might elicit the opinions which they entertained in their mind on the subject of the commerce between the soul and the body. When my prayer was ended, there were present nine men. Three were Aristotelians, three Cartesians, and three Leibnitzians. They took their places around me. On

has placed beyond doubt the true character and purport of the *Memorabilia*. He has therein declared that they are not to be regarded as miracles, but merely as evidences, attestations, proofs (*testimonia*) of the fact that he had been permitted, by the Lord, to enter into the spiritual world, as to his spirit, and to speak with angels. Such an asseveration, by whomsoever made, the thoughtless reader may, indeed, regard with indifference, ridicule, or scorn. Nevertheless, its true value will sooner or later be recognised. Those who have been at the pains to *understand* these narratives will have no difficulty in accepting them as being all that they profess to be—trustworthy reports of things really heard and seen in the spiritual order, properly so called. It will scarcely be denied by those who are guided by reason and not ruled by prejudice, that they are remarkable monuments of the spiritual experiences of a mind endowed with marvellous intellectual and spiritual gifts. But whether regarded as mere creations of fancy, or as authentic statements of actual facts belonging to a higher order of existence than the present, they, nevertheless, serve to convey to an intelligent and humble-minded reader profound and precious lessons, bearing intimately on man's spiritual and eternal well-being. If patiently and candidly scrutinised, in connexion with Swedenborg's immense intellectual acquisitions, his deep and solid estimate, as a Christian philosopher, of the spirit of the age in which he appeared, his far-reaching forecast of the Church's future, and the stupendous body of spiritual truths revealed to him in and by the Word of God *alone*, these *Memorabilia* will be found to afford an altogether unique illustration of a truth which the greatest of poets, with his usual matchless insight, has thus dimly indicated :—

“ There is a history in all men's lives,  
Figuring the nature of the times deceased ;  
The which observ'd a man may prophecy,  
With a near aim, of the main chance of things,  
As yet not come to life, which in their seeds  
And weak beginnings lie intreasured.”

the left, stood the devotees of Aristotle ; to the right the followers of Descartes ; and behind, the partizans of Leibnitz. At a considerable distance, and separated from each other by intervals, appeared three men, as if crowned with laurel wreaths ; and from an inflowing perception I became cognisant that these were the very Champions and Head-masters of their respective schools. Behind Leibnitz appeared one who, it was said, was Wolf, holding in his hand the skirt of Leibnitz's garment.

These nine men, when they had each in turn looked upon one another, at first accosted each other in courteous and friendly terms. They then entered into conversation. Just at that moment, however, a spirit rose to view from hell, bearing in his right hand a small torch. This he shook before their faces. Thereupon they became enemies, three against three, and stood regarding each other with stern and haughty looks, owing to a strong desire for wrangling and contention which seized them. Forthwith the Aristotelians, who were also Schoolmen, began, by saying :—"Who does not see that objects flow into the soul through the medium of the senses, just as one enters a room by the door, and that the soul exercises thought according to the mode of the influx ? Is it not so when a lover sees a beautiful maiden or a wife ? His eye sparkles, and conveys a passion for her into his soul. When a miser sees bags containing money, does not an ardent longing for them arise in every bodily sense, whence this feeling is conveyed into the soul, and there stirs up the



strong desire of making them his own? When the proud man hears himself praised by another, does he not listen, so to say, with ears erect? Do not these organs transmit the praises to his soul? Are not the senses of the body so many entrance-halls and passages by which alone admission to the soul is effected? From these and similar phenomena without number who is able to arrive at any other conclusion than that the influx comes from nature, in other words, is *physical*?<sup>1</sup>

The followers of Descartes, who, meanwhile, had stood with the fingers pressed on the forehead, now withdrew them, and said in reply, "Alas! ye speak from *appearances*. Know ye not that the eye doth not love a maiden or a wife from itself, but from the soul. Equally true is it that the bodily sense doth not lust after money in a bag, from itself, but from the soul. Again: it is in this way, and in no other, that the organs of hearing eagerly lay hold of the praises which proceed from flatterers. Is it not *perception* which causeth a person to be sensible of a thing? and doth not perception belong to the soul, and not to the bodily

<sup>1</sup> With this conclusion of the Scholastic philosophy the modern System of Sensualism is in the most complete accord. Both alike teach that the only source of human cognitions are the senses. "The only primitive and irreducible psychological fact is SENSATION." (*English Psychology*, p. 324.) From this, the transition to the naturalistic dogma that the phenomena of mind and matter are merely different phases of the same material subject, is easy and obvious—especially to scientifically trained 'imaginationists.' Thus freedom, religion, morality, the supernatural, the Church, a future life, a Divine Being, come to be regarded as so many figments of an effete superstition, by the deluded victims of this philosophical 'abomination of desolation.'

organ? Declare, if ye are able, what else it is that causeth the tongue and the lips to speak, if it be not thought, or what other than the will it is which maketh the hands to work. Moreover, thought and will are proper to the soul, but not to the body. What, then, maketh the eye to see, the ears to hear, and the remaining bodily organs to feel, if it be not the soul? From these and numberless other facts of a like kind he who hath any relish for what is above and beyond the mere sensuous sphere of the body, concludeth that there is no such thing as an influx of the body into the soul: but that there is an influx of the soul into the body, namely, that which we call *occasional*, and also *spiritual*, influx.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This use of the term ‘occasional,’ on the part of the Cartesians, as synonymous with ‘spiritual’ manifestly involves a special reference to the hypothesis of Occasional Causes or Divine Assistance, elaborated with so much ingenuity and learning by the illustrious Oratorian, Malebranche. Nor is it less evident, for the same reason, that the true theory of Spiritual Influx, as demonstrated by Swedenborg in his philosophical writings as well as in the present work, agrees with the Cartesian Occasionalism, at least *quoad partem*. With respect to the history and fortunes of the philosophic movement inaugurated by Descartes, it is deeply interesting to the thorough-going student of Swedenborg’s writings to note, that notwithstanding the wicked intrigues and merciless persecutions of the Jesuits against every modification of the new philosophy, the spirit of the movement then begun is far from being extinguished. It is still vigorous and active, under the new and more suitable name of Ontologism. Apart from the teaching of Swedenborg, it is the only existing school of Christian Philosophy, properly so-called. When examined from the point of view afforded by the perfect and complete system worked out by the philosopher of Stockholm, it will be found to have a firm grasp of intellectual and spiritual truth in some of its most important aspects—but still, only the truth as seen in shade: *Veritas, in umbra rationis, in qua sunt Hypotheses*. The Ontologism of to-day is, virtually, the Occasionalism of Malebranche, placed on a still more secure basis, and pre-

When these words were heard, the three men who had been standing behind the previously-mentioned groups of three, and who were partizans of Leibnitz, raised their voice, and said :—" We have listened to the arguments advanced on both sides, and have compared them together. We have noticed that, in many respects, the arguments just now advanced alternately prevail. Whereupon, with your permission, we will adjust the points in dispute." On being asked in what manner this was to be done, they replied thus :—" There is, in fact, no influx of the soul into the body, nor yet of the body into the soul. There is, however, a unanimous and instantaneous operation of both together, which a distinguished author has designated by a very expressive and appropriate name. He calls it *Pre-established Harmony*." <sup>1</sup>

sented in a more connected and purer form. Its relations with the theory of Spiritual Influx have, consequently, become more numerous and intimate. Its true principles lead, logically, to the 'perfect day' of genuine truth. There is good reason to hope that the words of one of the most eloquent and spiritually-minded living advocates of what may be called the reformed Christian Philosophy, in reply to the attacks of his not over-scrupulous Jesuit opponent, will be realised in a sense far wider and deeper than the writer himself intended, or could have imagined :—" Un beau rôle est réservé à cette magnifique théorie de l'intelligence humaine, et c'est bien certainement dans cette théorie que la philosophie trouvera son unité." (*Défense de l'Ontologisme, &c.*, par M. l'Abbé Fabre, *Pref.* p. xi.)

<sup>1</sup> Tennemann, in his *History of Philosophy*, has signalled that spirit of toleration which led Leibnitz "always to discover some favourable point of view in what he criticised—something even in the most obscure systems, which might suggest matter for research" . . . . "a capacity fruitful in ingenious hypotheses and in improvements or accommodation." "His object," he elsewhere remarks, "was so completely to reform Philosophy that it might possess a strictness of demonstration analogous to that of Mathematics, and to put an end to all disputes

As soon as all these observations came to an end, the spirit appeared once more with the little torch in his hand (but this time in his left hand), and shook it immediately *behind* their heads. Thereupon the ideas of all became confused, and they cried out together :— “Neither our soul nor our body knoweth which side to take in this question. Wherefore, let us decide these disputes by lot : and we will solemnly declare in favour of the lot that presents itself first.”

Then they took three small pieces of paper, and on one of them they wrote the words PHYSICAL INFLUX,

between its factions, as well as all differences supposed to exist between it and Theology ; with the hope of diminishing the principal difficulties belonging to some great questions, and at the same time, the causes of dispute, by improving the method of philosophy, and ascertaining, if possible, some positive and invariable principles.” (pp. 352, 354.)

The writer of the Second Dissertation prefixed to the Eighth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* justly observes, with respect to the Leibnitzian philosophy, that “while it widely deviates from the most general principles of former philosophers, it is ready to embrace their particular doctrines under its own generalities, and thus to reconcile them to each other, as well as to accommodate itself to popular or established opinions, and compromise with them, according to his favourite and oft-repeated maxim, ‘that most received doctrines are capable of a good sense ;’ by which last words our philosopher meant a sense reconcileable with his own principles.”— (p. 353.)

A brilliant and accomplished philosophical critic, who was himself the author of a vain attempt to reconcile experience and reason on a philosophic basis, has, by a wonderful coincidence of thought, thus succinctly stated, in terms of history, a principal point of the lesson contained in the above *Memorable* :—

“Le génie vaste et conciliateur de Leibnitz essaie de réunir Locke et Descartes, Aristote et Platon ; mais, malgré son impartialité, il penche pour ce dernier. Le combat s’échauffe, la querelle se complique et s’étend. Toutes les philosophies qui s’élèvent aboutissent, en dernière analyse, à Locke ou à Descartes, ou à Leibnitz, qui forme une école séparée, laquelle hérite à peu près du cartésianisme, qui n’a plus de disciples en France après Fontenelle.” (Cousin, *Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i p. 232.)

on the second, SPIRITUAL INFLUX, and on the third, PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY. They next placed the three in a cap, and selected a person to draw them, who, on putting in his hand, laid hold of the piece on which was written SPIRITUAL INFLUX. As soon as they had seen and read it, they all declared—some, however, in a clear and flowing voice, others in an obscure and subdued tone—"Let us give our solemn assent to *this*, inasmuch as it came out first." But just at that moment an angel suddenly stood near and said: "Do not believe that the small piece of paper came out, in favour of *Spiritual Influx*, by chance. On the contrary, it was of Divine Providence: for inasmuch as your ideas of the subject are in a state of confusion, you do not see its truth. Nevertheless, the very Truth itself has presented itself to your hand, in that form, that you might give it your favourable consideration."<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \*

<sup>1</sup> In the spiritual exposition of Exodus xxi. 13 (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 9010), the ancient and true doctrine of chance and Providence is thus given:—"And God caused it to come to his hand. This signifies, appearing as if it were chance; which is manifest from the idea of chance that obtained among the men of old time. Their idea was that it happened from God. Wherefore they described chance accordingly by saying that *God caused it to come to the hand*. For they who belonged to the Ancient Churches were aware that the Providence of the Lord was in all and everything, and that things contingent, that is to say, things that appeared as if they were chance events, were of Providence. Wherefore the simple-minded, who were unable to distinguish between those occurrences which arose from permission and those which were done of good pleasure, attributed to the Lord evil as well as good: good, inasmuch as they were aware that from Him comes all good; but evil, on account of the appearance. For when a man does what is evil, and by that means turns him-



20. Once on a time I was asked how it came to pass that from being a philosopher I became a theologian ; I answered thus :—" In the same way in which *fishermen* were made disciples and apostles by the Lord." I also added that, from my earliest youth, I had been a *spiritual fisherman*. On hearing this he inquired what a spiritual fisherman might be. I replied, "that fisherman, in the Word, *when understood in its spiritual sense*, means a man who thoroughly investigates and teaches truths pertaining to the natural order, and afterwards truths of the spiritual order, *in a rational manner*." In reply to a further question, how this could be shown, I said, it may be shown from the following places in the Word :—" And the waters shall fail from the sea, and the river shall be wasted and dried up. . . . The *fishers* also shall mourn, and all they that cast angle in the brooks shall lament." (Isa.

self away from the Lord, it appears as if the Lord turned Himself away. For then the Lord appears to him from behind, and not from before."

The beautiful observations of Boëthius on this subject seem worthy of being quoted in this connexion :—

" Nihil ne est quod vel *casus* vel *fortuitum* jure appellari queat ? An est aliquid, tametsi vulgus lateat, cui vocabula illa convenient ? Aristoteles meus id, inquit, in *Physicis* brevi ac veri propinquâ ratione definivit. Quonam, inquam, modo ? Quoties, ait, *aliquid cujuspiam rei gratiâ geritur, aliudque quibusdam de causis, quàm quod intendebatur, obtingit, Casus vocatur* : ut si quis, colendi agri causâ fodiens humum, defossi auri pondus inveniat. Hoc igitur fortuitò quidem creditur accidisse, verùm non de nihilo est. Nam proprias causas habet, quarum improvisus inopinatusque concursus *Casum* videtur operatus . . . Licet igitur *Casum* definire *inopinatum ex confluentibus causis in his, quæ ob aliquid geruntur, eventum*. Concurrere verò atque confluere causas facit ordo ille inevitabili connexione procedens, qui de Providentiæ fonte descendens cuncta suis locis temporibusque disponit." (*Cons. Phil.* Lib. v.)

xix. 5, 8.) In another place it is thus written :—" Upon the river whose waters were healed, the *fishers* shall stand from En-gedi . . . . They shall be a place to spread forth nets ; their fish shall be according to their kinds, as the fish of the great sea, exceeding many." (Ezek. xlvii. 9, 10.) And again :—" Behold I will send for many *fishers*, saith the LORD, and they shall fish them " (that is, the children of Israel). (Jer. xvi. 16.)

From these passages it is plain why the LORD chose fishermen for His disciples, and said :—" Follow ME, and I will make you *fishers of men* " (St. Matth. iv. 19 ; St. Mark i. 16, 17) ; and to Peter, after he had taken a multitude of fishes—" From henceforth thou shalt *catch men*." (St. Luke v. 9, 10.)

After this I demonstrated, from the APOCALYPSE REVEALED, the origin of the signification here given to *fishermen* : to wit, that *water* signifies truths of the natural order (§§ 50, 932) ; that a *river* has a similar meaning (§§ 409, 932) ; a *fish*, those who are in natural truths (§ 405) ; and that hence fishermen came to signify those who investigate and teach truths.

On hearing this, my friend who questioned me, raised his voice and said :—" Now, I can understand why the LORD called and chose *fishermen* to be his disciples ; and, therefore, I am not surprised that He also called and chose thee, since, as thou hast said, thou hast been a fisherman, *in a spiritual sense*, from thy earliest youth ; in other words, thou hast been a diligent searcher after truths of the natural order. That thou art now become a searcher after truths of the spiri-

tual order, is owing to the fact that *spiritual truth is based on natural truth.*"

To this he added (inasmuch as he was a man endowed with reason) that the LORD alone fully and perfectly knows who is a suitable person for perceiving and teaching whatsoever pertains to HIS NEW CHURCH. For, said he, "some fitting person was to be found among the Prelates, or if not, then among their servants."

"Besides," said he, "what theologian is there among Christians who has not studied in the schools of Philosophy, previous to his being solemnly invested with the office of Theologian? From what other source could he obtain the requisite intelligence?"

Lastly, he said :—"Seeing that thou hast become a Theologian, disclose to me in what thy Theology consisteth." I replied :—"The two following are its first principles.

I. THERE IS ONE GOD :

II. AND THERE IS A CONJUNCTION OF CHARITY  
WITH FAITH."

To which he rejoined—"Who denieth this?" I answered, "The Theology of the present day, when submitted to a searching internal examination."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, note DD.



## APPENDIX.

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THE main purpose of the following notes is twofold : to furnish some further illustration of the text ; and to indicate a few relations of agreement or opposition which appear to exist between certain speculations which have obtained considerable currency in the present day, and some of the more important principles taught in our author's writings more than a century ago.

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### NOTE A., p. 1.

THE THREE OPINIONS OR HYPOTHESES : PHYSICAL INFLUX, OCCASIONAL CAUSES, AND PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.

The preceding Tractate opens with a few brief introductory sentences which merit, first in order, the reader's attentive consideration. Some general notion of their meaning and scope is obviously necessary to any intelligent and profitable study of its contents. They strike at once the keynote of the entire subject. They state precisely what the problem of Influx is. They bring before the reader, at the outset, and in language of the utmost clearness and precision, the chief points which characterize the three principal methods by which a solution of it has been attempted, during a period of more than two thousand years.

Dualism—in other words, the real and distinct existence of the spiritual and natural orders—is here everywhere assumed. No controversy is held with Monism, whether it be idealistic or materialistic ; much less with that new form of compound, systematized, most ‘cunningly devised’ ignorance which has arisen in the present day, and which professes, with



the utmost presumption, to shed a new light on all things human and Divine, by endeavouring to prove that man's highest knowledge and satisfaction ought to consist in the full and deliberate acknowledgment of a certain occult quality, described as the 'Unknown and Unknowable.' 'The sincere man of science' is gravely invited to worship this metaphysical figment, instead of the living and true God who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets; and lastly, revealed Himself fully in Human Form as the GOD-MAN. In the rational light of Swedenborg's teachings it may be clearly seen, as it can be seen nowhere else, that reckless perversions of the human intellect, such as that indicated by the foregoing new form of idolatry or atheism, tends inevitably to spiritual death.\*

The cardinal facts to be taken into account, in the investigation of Influx, appear, indeed, sufficiently simple at first sight. But a little reflection serves to reveal their deep significance and marvellous complexity.

Stated in broad and general terms, the commerce between the Soul and the Body means (1) the operation of the one upon the other; and (2) the operation of the one jointly with the other. These constitute the two primary and principal elements of this profound philosophical problem. To have any just and definite conception of the subject, the reader must ever keep these two principles distinctly and steadily before his mind. And here, on the very threshold of the inquiry, it will not be without advantage to

\* See *English Psychology* (pp. 147, 148), for a formal statement of the strange and wild chimerical 'knowledge,' which is supposed by the partisans of this school to crown the highest speculative efforts of 'the sincere man of science.' The passage here referred to exemplifies, in a manner not to be mistaken by the most obtuse, the actual character and tendency of that peculiar form of intellectual insanity which, to an extent so alarming, has set its mark on the present age.

bring together, under one view, some of the leading opinions held by several eminent thinkers who have zealously pursued, with much learning and great ingenuity, some of the higher problems of Psychology.

It may be here observed in passing—and the fact is not without significance for the future of Philosophy—that the three above-named hypotheses, once so widely celebrated throughout Europe, have by no means ceased to engage the attention of ardent investigators in the boundless region of psychological research. The bold and brilliant speculations which occupy so large a space in the higher literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are seldom, indeed, referred to in the present day, save by a comparatively small section of the philosophical world. But the subject itself, in another form, still continues, notwithstanding, to absorb a large share of the public interest. The mode of considering it has, undoubtedly, undergone profound modification within the last quarter of a century. It will, nevertheless, be seen in what follows, that two at least of the hypotheses mentioned above have not yet entirely lost their hold on the attention of the schools. From age to age, in every phase of speculation on such questions, they rise to the surface of the seething ocean of human thought, under one or another new aspect.

One of these opinions may, indeed, be said to have been relegated, by general consent, to the region of pure philosophical romance. Pre-established Harmony, name and thing, has apparently ceased for ever to exercise the least influence upon the speculative efforts of any existing school of philosophy. The struggle for existence seems now to lie between the partisans of Peripateticism, whether of the Jesuit or materialistic type, and those who favour that grand counter-movement in the direction of an intellectual and spiritual philosophy inaugurated by Descartes, and elaborated into something like a system by Malebranche. The case was far

otherwise at a comparatively recent date. "Absurd," says Mr. Stewart, "as the hypothesis of a *Pre-established Harmony* may now appear, not many years have elapsed since it was the prevailing or rather universal creed, among the philosophers of Germany. 'Il fut un temps' (says the celebrated Euler) 'où le système de l'harmonie pré-établie étoit tellement en vogue dans toute l'Allemagne, que ceux qui en doutoient, passoient pour des ignorans, ou des esprits bornés.' . . . It would be amusing to reckon up the succession of metaphysical creeds which have been since swallowed with the same implicit faith by this learned and speculative, and (in all those branches of knowledge where imagination has no influence over the judgment) profound and inventive nation." \*

It is plain, from various places in his writings, that Swedenborg was intimately acquainted with the true character and import of each of these three systems. He had studied with care their history and development. With his accustomed sagacity he has signalized and described the salient point of each in his own peculiarly terse and incisive manner. In a few carefully chosen and pregnant expressions the radical fault proper to each is laid bare before the reader. He commences with

#### (a) THE SCHOLASTIC HYPOTHESIS.

The fundamental and fatal defect of Physical Influx consists in its being based on that common and most seductive of all forms of fallacy, namely, mistaking the appearance for the reality. It takes its rise in the deceitful appearances of the senses. The power of this fallacy over the minds of men is proverbial. To use the words of a late Bampton Lecturer,† 'What is reality

\* Preliminary Dissertation to Eighth Edition of *Encyc. Brit.*, p. 126.

† Dean Mansel, *Lect. III.*, p. 87. (Third Ed.)

and what is appearance, is the riddle which Philosophy has put forth from the birthday of human thought.' . . . *Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgment*, is the Divine injunction of Him who is Wisdom itself, and demands our allegiance alike in things intellectual and spiritual. Unhappily it is the very fashion of judging, thus expressly forbidden by the only supreme and infallible Authority, that constitutes the main spring and source of what is erroneous and false in our notions of things natural and spiritual. It is this connate tendency to judge according to the appearance that forms the chief cause of the bitter hostility with which every new disclosure of truth is certain to be assailed. The 'appearances' to which Swedenborg specially refers in the text, still continue to exercise a sway so potent over the mass of mankind, including even the learned, as to render it next to impossible for them to grasp the genuine theory of the commerce between the Soul and the Body, which it is the express design of the present short treatise to unfold. So true is it that to distinguish, without fallacy, between what really *is* and that which only *seems*, is the ever-recurring problem in philosophy.

The most sincere thinkers, ancient and modern, have ever felt the necessity of being on the watch against this deceitful natural bias which leads us to believe as true and real, the mere outward semblance of things, and to trust in and cherish the fallacy that assumes the face of verity. St. Augustine, with his characteristic acuteness of perception and felicity of illustration, thus simply yet strikingly warns his readers against this natural proneness to mistake the shifting shadows of mere sensible impressions for the clear and steady light of real knowledge:— . . . *Illuditur anima similitudinibus rerum, cum approbat ea, quæ similia sunt, pro iis quibus similia sunt.* . . . *Fallitur in visione corporali, cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat quod*

fit in corporis sensibus : sicut navigantibus videntur in terra moveri quæ stant, et intuentibus cælum stare sidera quæ moventur, et divaricatis radiis oculorum duas lucernæ species apparere, et in aqua remus infractus, et multa hujusmodi.\*

The learned and religious Port-Royalists, who were, at the same time, ardent lovers of truth, both new and old, according to their lights, make the following significant reference to the same point, in their excellent treatise on Logic:—‘Since the mind often allows itself to be deceived by *false appearances*, in consequence of not giving due attention to them, and since there are many things which cannot be known, save by long and difficult examination, it would certainly be useful to have some *rules* for its guidance, so that the search after truth might be more easy and certain.’†

‘O mon Sauveur !’ exclaims the pious and devout Father Malebranche, ‘faitez-moi toujours bien distinguer *le vrai du vraisemblable*, et fortifiez mon attention afin que je ne consente jamais à rien avant que j’y sois forcé par l’évidence de votre lumière ou par l’autorité de votre parole ! Mon corps appesantit mon esprit lorsqu’il s’élève aux vérités abstraites ;’ &c. &c.‡

In his introduction to *The Economy of the Animal Kingdom* Swedenborg prescribes the following rule in reference to this most fruitful source of fallacy :—‘To avoid . . . being misled by appearances, we should never give assent to propositions unless general experience sanctions them, or unless they are declared to be true by the unanimous suffrage of nature ; that is to say, unless they form necessary links in the great unbroken chain of ends and means in creation. On this

\* *De Genesi ad litt.* lxii. c. 25.

† *Port-Royal Logic*, p. 6, trans. by T. S. Baynes. (Ed. 1871.)

‡ *Méditations Chrétiennes*, ix. t. ii. p. 145.



condition alone can an edifice be reared, which after the lapse of ages, and the testimony of thousands of additional discoveries, posterity shall acknowledge to rest upon true foundations; so that it shall no longer be necessary for each age to be erecting new structures on the ruins of the former.' (Vol. i. p. 7.) Whether, and how far, he has observed the truly rational rule, thus laid down with such admirable clearness, precision, and breadth of view, can be known, most certainly not before, but only after, due inquiry. The facts respecting this point speak for themselves. They flatly contradict the fanciful and reckless assertions of some who assume to be his critics. No mere human writer, belonging to the past or the present can be named, who has proved himself to have been more deeply alive to the existence of this besetting vice of man's mental nature, or who has more successfully resisted its wily influence.

It may, perhaps, interest the general reader, to indicate briefly in this place the basis of fact on which Swedenborg rests the assertion in the text, attributing the origin of the Physical Influx hypothesis to the ancient philosophers and schoolmen. The following passage from Sir William Hamilton might, alone, abundantly suffice for this purpose. It is taken from a note\* 'On the Doctrine of Species as held by Aristotle and the Aristotelians.' He thus sets forth, with characteristic clearness and force, the views held by two of the ancient philosophers—Democritus and Epicurus—on the subject in question:—†

"The hypothesis, that the immediate object of perception is something different both from the external object and from

\* *Reid's Works*, note M, p. 951.

† At the same time he incidentally establishes, beyond a doubt, the wide difference which exists between the philosophy of Aristotle and the form it subsequently assumed among the common herd of his scholastic disciples and corruptors. The latter is a point once and again specially signalized by Swedenborg.

the mind itself, owes its origin, not merely to a metaphysical opinion in regard to the impossibility of an immediate communication between two substances so opposite as Mind and Matter; but has been likewise introduced as a physical supposition to account for the communication between the external object and the mind. And as a physical hypothesis it has been used, not merely in the infancy of natural science, to afford a medium of communication between the external object and the sense; but it has likewise been employed by some philosophers, who limited the mind to the region of the brain, to connect the intellectual perception with the affection of the organ.

“By Democritus and Epicurus, who both believed only in the existence of Matter, the medium of communication between the organ and the object, and the whole process of sensation and thought, was transacted by the intervention of certain fine images or *exuviae* (εἰδῶλα, ἀπὸρροιαί, ἀποστάσεις, *exuviae, imagines, species, simulacra rerum*), which were continually thrown off from the surfaces of bodies.

‘Esse ea quae rerum simulacra vocamus,  
Quae, quasi membranae summo de corpore rerum  
Dereptae volitant ultro citroque per auras.’

(*Lucretius*, iv. 34.)

“This theory found little favour among the other philosophers of Greece; and Aristotle, to whom a similar opinion is commonly attributed, contented himself with the observation, that the mind obtains a perception of external objects through an impression on the organs of sense, without determining the nature of this impression, or explaining the connection between the sensual affection and the intellectual knowledge. But, although Aristotle had not attempted to expound the origin of our perception of external objects after the manner of Democritus, nevertheless the greater number of those who professed themselves his followers, deceived by

a mistaken interpretation of his language, and believing, as their master had taught, that all sensation was a passive affection of the mind, [held] that, consequently, it was necessary to suppose, for the causes of this affection,—more especially where the object was at a distance from the sense—certain effluxes from the object, which, penetrating the organ, might affect the soul, and determine it to a mediate and representative perception of the outward reality.”

Malebranche, as is well known, opposed with all his force the notion so widely prevalent in his time, and which constituted the principal element in the scholastic hypothesis of Physical Influx, namely, that material objects transmitted species which were resemblances of themselves. He thus states, in his own concise and limpid language, the characteristic feature of the Peripatetic doctrine of perception, as held, almost universally, by his enemies and persecutors the Jesuits :—

‘La plus commune opinion est celle des péripatéticiens, qui prétendent que les objets de dehors envoient des espèces qui leur ressemblent, et que ces espèces sont portées, par les sens extérieurs, jusqu’au sens commun ; ils appellent ces espèces-là *impresses* parce que les objets les impriment dans les sens extérieurs. Ces espèces impresses, étant matérielles et sensibles, sont rendues intelligibles par l’*intellect agent* ou *agissant*, et sont propres pour être reçues dans l’*intellect patient*. Ces espèces, ainsi spiritualisées, sont appelées espèces *expresses*, parce qu’elles sont exprimées des impresses : et c’est par elles que l’*intellect patient* connaît toutes les choses matérielles.’

‘On ne s’arrête pas à expliquer plus au long ces belles choses et les diverses manières dont différents philosophes les conçoivent. Car, quoiqu’ils ne conviennent pas dans le nombre des facultés qu’ils attribuent au sens intérieur et à l’entendement, et même qu’il y en ait beaucoup qui

doutent fort qu'ils aient besoin d'un *intellect agent* pour connaître les objets sensibles, cependant ils conviennent presque tous que les objets de dehors envoient des espèces ou des images qui leur ressemblent; et ce n'est que sur ce fondement qu'ils multiplient leurs facultés et qu'ils défendent leur *intellect agent*.\*

In the phrase 'espèces spiritualisées,' significantly used by Malebranche in the above, is contained the fundamental error of Physical Influx. Such a spiritualizing process—like the 'travail métabolique des cellules ganglionnaires' of a modern French Physiologist,† that is to say, a conversion of the material into the spiritual—is altogether impossible, because contrary to the laws of Divine Order. This fallacy, which is most pernicious in its theological consequences, has been rendered popular by the poetic genius of Milton, in the passage in which he makes his imaginary angel assert of the 'one first matter' that it was—

"Indued with various forms, various degrees  
Of substance, and in things that live, of life;  
But more refined, more spirituous, and pure,  
As nearer to Him placed, or nearer tending,  
Each in their several active spheres assigned,  
Till body up to spirit work,‡ in bounds  
Proportioned to each kind."

The following lucid account of the Scholastic doctrine of 'Species' is here given in full, mainly for the sake of the principle enunciated in the concluding sentence, which, apart from its context, would have been unintelligible to most readers. The ability of the summary will, perhaps, be some apology for its length. It affords, moreover, an ex-

\* Malebranche, *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, t. i. pp. 103, 104.

† Luys, *Recherches sur le Système Nerveux*, p. 345.

‡ Cf. Luys, *ibid.*, p. 346, where this writer assigns various imaginary functions to the *Thalami Optici*, and endeavours to show how they at last become 'progressivement les agents spiritualisés de l'activité des cellules cérébrales.'

cellent illustration of 'ces belles choses,' to which Malebranche above alludes, and which he considered unnecessary to describe in detail.

"According to the opinion which generally prevailed among the Peripatetic philosophers of the middle ages, our faculties of knowledge required for their activity a certain representative medium, different both from the mind itself and from the external object of thought. These intermediate and vicarious objects were called *Intentional Species*; *Species* (*formae, similitudines, simulacra, idola*), because they represented the object to the mind—*intentional*, to express the relative and accidental nature of their manifestation. These intentional species were held to be the formal or virtual similitudes of their object, and which likeness they impressed on the particular faculty of knowledge to which they belonged, whether that faculty were the intellect or the sense, and whether the sense were the external or internal.

"These Species were distinguished, both in the intellect and in the sense, either as *species impressae* or as *species expressae*. A *species impressa* was the vicarious existence itself, as emitted by the object, as impressed on the particular faculty, and as concurring with that faculty in its operation. A *species expressa* was the operation itself, elicited by the faculty and the impressed species together; that is, a perception or an intellection, as including both the object and the act. The *species impressa* was the partial cause of the cognition as co-operating with the mind; the *species expressa* was the result and consummation of the act: the former was to the mind the virtual, the latter the formal, similitude of the object. A species fitted to affect the sense, was called a *sensible species* (*species sensibilis*): it proceeded immediately from the object, either by instantaneous transition or by continuous propagation, to the sense; and, if not altogether immaterial, was of an inter-



mediate nature between matter and spirit. . . . The species of the intellect were called *intelligible species* (species intelligibiles), and were altogether immaterial.

“The intellect was twofold—the Active (agens), and the Passive or Possible (passibilis, patiens, vel possibilis), which a few held to be distinct principles, many to be distinct powers, and some to be the same power manifested in different relations. The function of the Active Intellect was, on occasion of the species in the internal senses, to fabricate from itself *species impressae* for the Passive Intellect. These intelligible species were not, however, formed or abstracted from the phantasmata or sensible species, because the intellect, as wholly immaterial and not conversant about matter, as it could not contemplate, so it could not fabricate from the material species of the internal senses, an immaterial species proportioned to its nature and qualified to concur in an act of intellectual knowledge.

“By a conversion of the Active Intellect towards the phantasms or sensible species, a certain similitude of the external object, abstracted from its individual conditions, is occasioned in the Passive Intellect, which similitude constitutes its impressed species,—the *species intelligibilis impressa*. It was the common opinion that intelligible species were wholly the work of the mind itself. The function of the Passive or Possible Intellect is to receive the *species impressae* from the Active Intellect, and to co-operate with them unto a perfect act of knowledge—an intellection—a *species intelligibilis expressa*. It was not, therefore, called *passive*, as if without an energy, but as receiving the species produced by the Active Intellect, by which, as it were impregnated,\* it

\* This peculiar expression obviously contains the dominating fallacy in the system of Physical Influx. By some imaginary and occult process material images are supposed to be transformed into intellectual perceptions.

could produce an actual cognition. In point of fact, its activity, though subsequent, is of a higher and more enduring character than that of the subordinate and ministering intellect specially denominated *active*,—constituting, as it does, the supreme energy of conscious intellection.”\*

To the foregoing may be added one of the most recently expressed opinions respecting the psychological method and principles of Aristotle. It manifestly represents the Psychology of the Stagirite as containing, in germ, the system of Physical Influx:—

“Aristotle proceeds by gradual steps upwards from the sentient Soul to the Noëtic (cogitant or intelligent) soul—called in its highest perfection, Nous. While refuting the doctrine of Empedokles, Demokritus, and other philosophers, who considered cogitation or intelligence to be the same as sensible perception, and while insisting upon the distinctness of the two as mental phenomena, he recognizes the important point of analogy between them, that both of them include judgment and comparison; and he describes an intermediate stage called phantasy or imagination, forming the transition from the lower of the two to the higher. We have already observed that in the Aristotelian Psychology, the higher functions of the Soul presuppose and are built upon the lower as their foundation, though the lower do not necessarily involve the higher. Without nutrition, there is no sense; without sense, there is no phantasy; without phantasy, there is no cogitation or intelligence. The higher psychical phenomena are not identical with the lower, yet neither are they independent thereof; they presuppose the lower as a part of their conditions.”†

From the above account of Physical Influx, taken in con-

\* Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, note M, pp. 952—954.

† Account of *Aristotle's Psychology*, by Mr. Grote, appended to Professor Bain's work, *The Senses and Intellect*, p. 644.

nection with what follows, it may be clearly seen that between Scholasticism and the Sensation Philosophy of the present day there exists a real radical affinity.

The opinion of Aristotle, touching the mode of Perception, as understood by Suarez, is given in the following form by this learned Jesuit. It openly asserts the doctrine of Physical Influx. The question is—*Utrum visio fiat extramittendo, an intus recipiendo*. The response is as follows:—

‘Sit tamen conclusio. Receptis in oculo speciebus ibidem formatur visio absque illius rei emissionem. Hæc est sententia Aristotelis, quam late probat de sensu et sensibili cap. 2, sequuntur que omnes Aristotelici: atque ita probatur; nam oculus recipit species ab objecto, et per hanc receptionem objectum conjungitur potentie visivæ, quæ proinde constituitur in actu primo ad videndum: ergo satis habet, unde in se formet visionem: omnia vero alia, quæ adduntur, figmenta sunt, ac superflua, &c.’\* In accordance with the principle here taught, one of the ablest of the modern defenders of Scholasticism, in stating his view as to how cognition differs from every other activity, thus contends for the principle of *an inherent activity proper to the organs of sense, and capable of flowing into the soul*; in other words, for the hypothesis of Physical Influx:—

‘Toute connaissance non-seulement est une activité *immanente*, c’est-à-dire, qui se complète dans le principe connaissant même, mais encore c’est une activité par laquelle celui qui connaît possède en lui-même l’objet connu, quant à son être idéal ou intentionnel, comme s’exprimaient les anciens. Pareillement, la perception des sens ne peut avoir lieu que si, au moyen d’une activité plastique interne, la substance sensible possède au-dedans d’elle, par suite d’impressions faites sur ses organes, les objets dont elle les reçoit, quant à

\* *De Anima*, Tract. III. c. xvii. § 2.

leurs phénomènes extérieurs. Si l'on donne à cet être que possèdent les choses dans le sujet connaissant le nom d'image, on ne doit concevoir, pour cette raison, ni la représentation en général, ni même la représentation sensible comme une image dans le sens propre du mot. Il faut sans doute, pour la vision, que les objets soient reproduits sur la rétine par les rayons lumineux, mais cette reproduction n'appartient qu'à l'impression dont l'organe est affecté ; la perception même ne peut avoir lieu que si, par suite de cette impression, une force spéciale, inhérente à l'organe, commence à exercer son activité. Autrement, les organes privés de vie devraient jouir de la perception, ou du moins les organes vivants devraient percevoir l'objet toutes les fois qu'ils en reçoivent une impression suffisante. Or il n'en est pas ainsi. Beaucoup de faits constatés par l'expérience prouvent péremptoirement qu'aucune perception ne succède à l'impression reçue du dehors, même avec des organes parfaitement sains, lorsque le sujet est empêché de diriger son attention sur cette impression. Cette *attention* est une activité par laquelle le sujet connaissant, à la suite de l'impression, se tourne vers l'objet. Il faut, à la vérité, que l'objet influe sur le milieu où il se trouve (la lumière ou l'air) que ce milieu affecte l'organe extérieur (l'œil, l'oreille), et que cet organe transmette l'impression reçue au sens interne (commun) ; mais la connaissance a lieu seulement lorsque l'intelligence, éveillée par cette impression, saisit l'objet en se tournant vers lui. Comme Saint Augustin, les scolastiques reviennent souvent sur cette doctrine. Ils distinguent avec beaucoup de netteté la réception passive de l'impression d'avec l'*activité* (spontanée) qui saisit l'objet et qu'ils appellent *intentio*, parce qu'elle implique une conversion ou direction vers l'objet. Et si, par cette activité, le sujet connaissant possède au-dedans de lui-même l'objet connu, non quant à son être physique, mais quant à la ressemblance,

toutefois il le possède tout autrement qu'un miroir ou la rétine ne contient des images.\*

The principle of an inherent activity *proper to the bodily organs of sense*, so keenly advocated in the above extract, runs through all the speculations and reasonings of the schoolmen. The fallacy it involves lies concealed in such unmeaning phrases as 'activité plastique interne,' 'substance sensible,' 'une force spéciale inhérente à l'organe.' But it is curious and instructive to observe that the self-same principle equally pervades the various forms of the Sensation Philosophy so popular in the present day. In both cases it is couched in a most subtly contrived terminology. But under whatever modification this hypothesis presents itself, in whatever garb it may be ingeniously disguised, it remains in essence the same. It is still virtually the gross naturalism of Democritus and Epicurus. This will be evident after a careful study of the elaborate treatise from which the above extract is taken.†

The task which this learned and painstaking devotee of Peripateticism had set himself, he has laboured at with great ability and ingenuity. He everywhere displays the spirit of candour and fairness towards opponents, and the thoroughness of treatment so characteristic of his countrymen in general. He is essentially a man of books and authorities; and it would, perhaps, be difficult to find the scholastic view more ably and fully defended in presence of the new lights of modern science. But no ingenuity can conceal the fundamental error on which the whole system is founded.

Take, for example, the following reference to a point

\* *La Philosophie Scolastique*, par le Père Kleutgen, t. iii. pp. 382, 383. The author's own italics have been preserved throughout.

† See *Ibid.*, t. iv. ch. 2, *passim*, in which a summary exposition of the various systems of the union between the soul and the body is given. Cf. t. iii. ch. 6, on the activity (spontaneity) of bodily substances.



which, when well considered, will be seen to involve the whole question at issue as between the Schoolmen and Descartes, namely, the opinion which attributes to one and the same soul, sensible acts and intellectual operations.

The learned Jesuit thus remarks on this subject :—‘ *Descartes se sépare des partisans de cette opinion en ce qu’il ne voit pas dans la végétation une fonction vitale proprement dite, mais seulement un mouvement mécanique, et qu’il enseigne plus nettement que l’âme sent bien dans le corps, mais non avec le corps.*’\*

In this passage Father Kleutgen is obviously referring to a characteristic principle of Cartesianism, namely, that the body, as such, is *dead*, and that the soul alone *lives*. Dismissing, for the present, the question as to which of the two views under discussion is the correct one, and fixing the attention on the above distinction, one fundamental contrast between Scholasticism and the philosophy inaugurated by Descartes, comes fully into view. It is, indeed, a salient point in the controversy. The distinction taken by the French philosopher with such absolute precision, between dead matter and the living soul, is, moreover, essential to the existence of a genuine rational psychology. But the admission of this principle on the part of the Scholastics would be altogether fatal to the entire scheme of Physical Influx, which it is the learned Jesuit’s chief object to defend. Hence his earnest and subtle pleading for the Scholastic figment of a plastic activity inherent in the organism.

‘ *C’est,*’ he observes, ‘ *une thèse généralement admise de nos jours qu’on ne peut, avec Descartes, regarder la nature comme une masse morte et inerte qui soit divisée et mise en mouvement par le dehors.*’ †

\* *La Philosophie Scolastique*, t. iv. p. 57.

† *Ibid.*, t. iii. p. 275.

In the same work, the Peripatetic view is given with unusual directness and force, in an attempt to defend a notion advanced by Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that it is not repugnant to the nature of a spiritual substance to be the form of the body ; since this only means that, in relation to the body, it is the principle of those perfections through the instrumentality of which the body has some resemblance to the spirit, and is a being at once actual, subsistent, corporeal, living, and sensitive. This purely imaginary notion however, is not sufficient for the requirements of Scholasticism, whatever be the special sense in which it may be taken. 'Les scolastiques,' says Father Kleutgen, with the utmost frankness, 'vont plus loin et disent que l'âme forme de la matière un tel corps non par une simple opération, mais par une union qui fait d'elle et du corps un seul être, et qu'elle est dans le corps *comme dans son sujet*. Ce n'est pas assez. Ils soutiennent même que l'âme est la forme du corps *en lui communiquant son propre être*. Or une telle communication est absolument impossible ; car elle ferait du corps une substance spirituelle ou de l'âme un principe matériel.

'Nous répondons : De cette communication on ne peut conclure qu'une seule chose, c'est que le corps et l'âme deviennent *une même nature humaine* ; car l'être le quel l'un et l'autre subsiste est l'être humain.'\*

Now it is obvious that the reply contained in the concluding passage of the above statement in no wise meets the objection which immediately precedes it. The real question has, in fact, been wholly evaded. A term is invented under which the error is concealed. An appeal, as usual in such cases, is made to the 'system of ignorance.' A bar is thus put upon all further inquiry. Refuge is taken in an occult

\* Kleutgen, *La Philosophie Scolastique*, t. iv. pp. 118, 119. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

quality, whereby the mind becomes enchained in the prison-house of a self-imposed nescience. The authority on which this 'darkening of counsel by words without knowledge' is at last made to rest, is the following passage from Thomas Aquinas which his Jesuit disciple reproduces in a note:—  
*Habet anima esse subsistens, in quantum esse suum non dependet a corpore, utpote supra materiam corporalem elevatum; et tamen ad hujus esse communionem recipit corpus, ut sic sit unum esse animæ et corporis, quod est esse hominis.\**

In the dictum of the 'Angel of the Schools' here given, lies the gist and marrow of the entire controversy touching Physical Influx. It is plain that the system necessarily results in pure naturalism. It endeavours, in the interests of a certain theological hypothesis, by means of reasoning the most subtle, to materialize spirit, and spiritualize matter. It would thus envelope the entire subject in the thick darkness of 'a fundamental and final mystery from which we cannot escape.' In this way it has come to pass that, regarded from the Scholastic point of view, soul and body have been confounded, and deprived of their peculiar and distinctive characteristics, under cover of such unmeaning phrases as 'one human nature,' '*unum esse hominis*.'

Against sophistical teaching of this kind the new philosophy of the seventeenth century was a noble and to some extent a successful protest. Descartes and his followers have, in no small degree, succeeded in breaking the power of the vulgar Scholasticism. But as the source of this false principle has its roots deep in human nature, the monster must needs appear in another form. The Sensation Philosophy of our time is, strange to say, merely a masked Scholasticism.† In reference to the doctrine of perception there exists a true

\* *Quæst. Disp. de Spir. Creat.*, a. 2 ad 3.

† This singular fact deserves most careful study at the present time. It has received a remarkable and, no doubt, quite unintentional illus-

and curious kinship between the views of Aquinas and his Jesuit expositor on the one hand, and those advocated by writers as Bain, Mill, and Spencer on the other. This, the following extracts from a recent work on English Psychology clearly prove.

According to the system of Mr. Herbert Spencer, as summarized in that work, 'the first result of the law of continuity is that there is no *precise* line of demarcation between physiological and psychological facts, and that every *absolute* distinction is illusory. Sensations, sentiments, instincts, intelligence, all constitute a world apart; but which comes out of the animal world, in which it is rooted, of which it is, as it were, the efflorescence. Between the most humble function and the most lofty thought there is no opposition of

tration in the following curious passage from the pen of an enthusiastic Jesuit partisan of Scholasticism, in whose opinion all systems, except that which he so ardently advocates, are absurd and impious.

In exposing the errors of the materialists, this fervid writer ironically remarks:—" 'D'après nos maîtres et nos oracles à nous, l'âme, n'est qu'une étincelle de feu, ou une goutte de sang, ou un atome, de la même nature que les atomes qui forment le corps. La matière subtilisée, ou à l'état de vapeur ou de fluide aériforme, voilà l'âme; la matière grossière, lourde et à l'état d'inertie, voilà le corps. Or rien n'est plus simple ni plus naturel que l'action mutuelle de ces deux portions de matière, combinées dans l'homme; car ne voit-on pas à chaque instant, par exemple, le feu chauffant l'air, et l'air alimentant le feu? C'est de la même manière que les choses se passent entre l'âme et le corps; et, par leur *influx* ou par leur activité propre, la matière-âme agit aussi simplement, aussi naturellement sur la matière-corps que la matière-corps sur la matière-âme; et voilà tout. Dieu n'a rien à faire dans l'uniformité des mouvements intérieurs et extérieurs de l'homme, ni le rêve des CAUSES OCCASIONNELLES non plus.' C'est sur ces principes et sur ces autorités que l'école anglaise a établi son système matérialiste de l'*influx physique*, et que, par des utopies matérialistes, plus extravagantes et plus dangereuses encore, elle a fait justice des extravagantes et dangereuses utopies spiritualistes de l'école française et allemande, touchant l'homme." (*La Philosophie Chrétienne*, par Le Père Ventura de Raulica, vol. ii. p. 199.)

nature, but there is difference in degree, each being only one of the innumerable manifestations of life. 'The life of the body and mental life are species, of which life, properly so called, is the genus.' (*Principles of Psychology*.) . . . Vulgar psychology separates the thinking being from its mechanism, thus reducing itself to (an) abstraction, experimental psychology never separates these two terms. Between the external and the internal world there is a constant and necessary correspondence. It is only by the action of the without on the within, and by the reaction of the within on the without, that mental life is possible.' \*

To the rational psychologist this passage presents a mass of mere fallacies and gratuitous assertions. What is meant is clear, namely, to advocate an absolute *identity of nature* between what is here called 'the life of the body,' and 'mental life.' In accord with the formula of Kleutgen, these two are held to be 'une même nature humaine;' or, in the still more definite language of his master Aquinas, '*unum esse animae et corporis, quod est esse hominis.*' The terminology of the English naturalistic psychologist is, indeed, adapted with much adroitness to the needs of his chimerical hypothesis, but it is virtually the Scholastic figment of Physical Influx in another form. Thus the Jesuit and the non-Christian Sensationalist are both able to plead, each from his respective point of view, in behalf of 'a law of continuity' which denies the existence of any *precise* line of demarcation between spirit and matter. Both schemes manifestly result in mere naturalism.

The true character of the so-called English Psychology is seen in its doctrine respecting Sensation, as indicated in what follows:—

"Sensation is a composite phenomenon. But what is its primordial element? Can it be discovered?

\* See *English Psychology*, p. 149.



“Mr. Herbert Spencer believes that it can. ‘The last unit of consciousness is what we may call a *nervous shock*.’” \*

The paralogism by means of which this clever and versatile writer attempts to prove that a *blow* may be taken for the primitive and typical form of the nervous shock—which, in his opinion, is ‘the last unit of consciousness’—stands almost without parallel in the history of human speculation. By the side of a fancy so wild and lawless, common-sense, in its crudest form, is worthy of the name of wisdom. Comment on such vagaries are not needed.

We call a nettle but a nettle, and  
The faults of fools but folly.

Again, it is said that ‘The only primitive and irreducible psychological fact is SENSATION.’

The school of experimental psychology, of which this is declared to be a fundamental principle, ‘recognizes in mind a proper spontaneity which elaborates and transforms materials which come from without; but this spontaneity has its root in the organism, especially in the constitution of the nervous system.’ †

The same principle is inculcated in its lowest and grossest form by such writers as the following, who have at least the merit of expressing their views with the utmost openness and candour:—

‘Pour soutenir la thèse des idées innées, on a essayé de faire servir de preuve les animaux en disant : les animaux ont les sens tels que l’homme et souvent encore plus subtils, et restent pourtant des animaux. Cette objection n’est qu’apparente. Les sens ne produisent pas immédiatement, ils ne sont que les *médiateurs* des qualités intellectuelles, ils trans-

\* See *English Psychology*, p. 152.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 324—326.

mettent les impressions extérieures au cerveau, qui les reçoit, les élabore et les reproduit en raison de son énergie matérielle ; tout ce procédé ne peut se faire *sans les sens*, et toute connaissance intellectuelle a par conséquent son origine dans les sens ; mais les sens les plus subtils ne peuvent rien dans tout ce procédé, si l'appareil de la pensée est vicieux dans son organisation.' \*

In a recently published physiologico-psychological treatise a similar doctrine seems to be openly taught, as far as the author's special mode of treating his subject would permit. It is there contended that the two agencies, namely, the Mental and Corporeal, 'must both be accepted as fundamental facts of Man's composite nature, which can only be viewed aright in their mutual relation.' To this conclusion, it is alleged, intelligent and independent thinkers are, in general, converging. The late Charles Buxton is given as a 'type' of this class of thinkers. Convinced of 'the necessity of no longer attempting to keep apart in our Scientific investigations that which Nature (?) has so inseparably united,' the latter thus expresses himself on this point: 'Irresistible, undeniable facts demonstrate that man is not a den wherein two enemies are chained together ; but *one being*—that soul and body are one—one and indivisible. We had better face this great fact. 'Tis no good to blink it. Our knowledge of Physiology has come to a point where the old idea of Man's constitution must be thrown aside. To struggle against the overwhelming force of science, under the notion of shielding religion, is mere folly.' †

\* Büchner. *Force et Matière*, pp. 167, 168. Ed. Septième, 1863.

† *Notes of Thought*, p. 286. Quoted in Dr. Carpenter's *Principles of Mental Physiology* (Pref. pp. xi. xii.) The substantial identity between the opinion here formulated so definitely, and that maintained by the Jesuit Father Kleutgen and Thomas Aquinas, as given above (p. 133), is

On the above statement the author of the interesting work, from which it is taken, grounds the following appeal to his readers in behalf of this essentially Scholastic and naturalistic notion of man's unity and indivisibility:—"These well-considered conclusions of a deeply religious mind may be specially commended to the consideration of those, who may be disposed to condemn without examination anything that savours of a 'Materialism' which they have been accustomed to regard as philosophically absurd and morally detestable. And those who assume that a Physiological Psychology strikes at the root of Morals and Religion, may be fearlessly asked to show in what a system which leaves the Will of Man free to make the best use he can of the Intellectual and Moral Capacities with which his Bodily Organism has been endowed by his Creator, and which gives him the strongest and noblest motives both for Self-discipline and for Philanthropic exertion, is unworthy of the nature and destiny of the being whose creation 'in the image of God' can have no higher meaning than his capacity for *infinite progress*." \*

To the calm, keen, searching glance of Malebranche, even in the dim light of his own obscure hypothesis, the pernicious fallacies involved in such speculations were openly manifest. Again and again he lays bare their flimsy character, so as to be seen by any mind 'not trammelled by System or obscured by the dust that has been so continually raised in philosophical discussion.' In proof of this it may suffice to quote one of the numberless places in his brilliant and beautiful essays in which he shows the absurdity implied in the notion of a 'corporeal agency,' that is to say, in the supposition

manifest. Soul and body are said to be 'one being,' 'one and indivisible,' '*une même nature humaine*,' *unum esse animæ et corporis, quod est esse hominis*.

\* See Dr. Carpenter's *Mental Physiol.*, Pref. p. xii.

that dead matter could be endowed with any sort of inherent virtue :—

‘Je conçois bien que les corps, en conséquence de certaines lois naturelles, peuvent agir sur notre esprit en ce sens, que leurs modalités déterminent l’efficace des volontés divines ou des lois générales de l’union de l’âme et du corps ; ce que je vous expliquerai bientôt. Mais que les corps puissent recevoir en eux-mêmes une certaine puissance, par l’efficace de laquelle ils puissent agir dans l’esprit, c’est ce que je ne comprends pas ; car que serait-ce que cette puissance ? Serait-ce une substance ou une modalité ? Si c’est une substance, les corps n’agiroient point, mais cette substance dans les corps. Si cette puissance est une modalité, voilà donc une modalité dans les corps qui ne sera ni mouvement ni figure. L’étendue pourra avoir d’autres modalités que des rapports de distance.’ \*

It will be found by all enlightened and sincere Christian philosophers that any attempt to regard matter as inherently possessing a self-active force co-ordinate with mind, renders a just conception both of matter and spirit an utter impossibility. It leads, by inevitable consequence, to that Naturalism and Materialism which true philosophy will for ever reject, and which no Christian, deserving the name, can look upon as other than ‘morally detestable,’ in presence of all laws Divine and human.

A careful study of this single passage will render it evident that the spiritually-minded Oratorian was well aware of the purely naturalistic character of the Scholastic philosophy. From the dilemma thus definitely and precisely put, the Schoolmen, with all their ingenuity, have never been able to escape. Nor would it be easy to state with greater clearness and force the principal point of the discussion as

\* Malebranche, *Entretiens*, VII., § ii.

between the Cartesians and their subtle opponents. In presence of such a difficulty the partisan of Peripateticism seeks in vain to save his system by betaking himself to that common refuge of all perplexed and despairing advocates of irrational systems—mystery. As a typical instance of this mode of conducting a Theologico-philosophical controversy, reference may be made to the work of a learned Jesuit, a professor in the Roman College, who clearly saw and felt the difficulty raised by Malebranche. The following is his frank but futile attempt to reply :—‘*Aliquid semper,*’ he says, ‘*hac in re debet remanere impervium; est enim mysterium quoddam naturale, cujus ratio adaequata in sola lege extrinseca Auctoris naturae quaerenda est.*’\* In this way a mystery of man’s own making is turned into a pretext, *more scholastico*, for putting an end to all further philosophical investigation of the subject; while another writer of the same school denounces, in a tone of arrogance and menace not to be mistaken, the laborious and laudable attempts which are being made by the Ontological school in his own religious communion, to elevate the mind of Christian Europe above the low level of the gross naturalism in which it now lies. The new Christian Philosophy he arrogantly declares to be ‘*quandam excogitationem prorsus novam, quae omnino proinde delenda est.*’†

Talibus ex adyto dictis Cumæa Sibylla

Horrendas canit ambages, antroque remugit,

Obscuris vera involvens.

That the principle which lies at the base of the modern ‘Sensation Philosophy,’ ‘Experimental Psychology,’ and similar systems, is in spirit and intent at one with Scholasticism has been expressly signalized by a recent writer, who worthily

\* Dmowski, *Institutiones Philosophicae*, vol. ii. p. 199 (Ed. Lovan. 1840.)

† Lepidi, *Examen Philosophico-Theologicum de Ontologismo*, p. 285. (Ed. Lovan. 1874.)



represents the true spirit of the New Philosophy. As in the seventeenth century, so in the nineteenth, enlightened reason revolts against the false system of Physical Influx, or Peripateticism, whether in its ancient or its modern form.

The Abbé Fabre, in his courageous and able defence of what perhaps may be termed Christian Cartesianism, has accurately described the character and tendency of that hypothesis which, as already shown, Swedenborg rightly attributes to the ancient philosophers and schoolmen. This learned and indefatigable labourer in the interests of Christian philosophy in France, does not scruple to stigmatize the system—advocated by his Jesuit opponent in a small work bearing the significant title *De l'Unité dans l'enseignement de la Philosophie*—as being “une espèce de péripatétisme, qui nous amènerait infailliblement à nous enfermer dans la sensation avec Condillac, et à nous en tenir au positivisme de M. Taine. Il proteste sans doute contre ‘l’abject sensualisme de Locke et de Condillac ;’ mais ses intentions ne peuvent rien contre la marche logique du système, et son péripatétisme, s’il est conséquent, supprime la métaphysique et nous jette dans le matérialisme.”\*

The same writer, in his recently published *Cours de Philosophie*, makes some observations on the special point now under consideration, so apposite and significant as perhaps to excuse their being here reproduced.

‘Les disciples du Stagirite,’ says the learned and candid Abbé, ‘se divisent en trois groupes qui se perdent dans les abîmes de la sophistique.’ In the third class are to be found, he says, those who admit of nothing in the human soul but *sensation*. He proceeds:—‘ils rendent, dès-lors, cette âme incapable d’aucune pensée, puisque, dans toute pensée, il y a un objet éternel et indépendant des sensations ;

\* *Défense de l’Ontologisme*, par M. L’Abbé Fabre, Pref. pp. iii. iv.

ceux-là s'égarent dans le scepticisme intellectuel, c'est-à-dire dans le matérialisme de Leucippe, de Démocrite, d'Epicure, de Hobbes, de Holbach, de Taine, et de Littré. D'un côté, les péripatéticiens se débattent donc vainement contre le panthéisme; celui-ci les déborde et les envahit malgré leurs protestations. De l'autre côté, le principe sensualiste de la théorie d'Aristote désespère les âmes humaines et les noie dans le monde des corps: le dernier mot de cette philosophie est la formule matérialiste la plus nette qui se puisse donner.\*

In what immediately follows the above trenchant exposure of the real character of Scholasticism, language still more hostile to this system is quoted as employed by the Abbé Seni, even in Rome itself. The whole passage is deeply instructive, in presence of the unprecedented political and theological movements that have taken place in Europe during the last ten years.

Condillac gave to France his biassed and perverted reading of the system taught by Locke. The fundamental principle of the Frenchman's scheme may be seen in the following extract:—

'Locke,' says Condillac, 'distingue deux sources de nos idées, les sens et la réflexion. Il seroit plus exact de n'en reconnoître qu'une, soit parce que la réflexion n'est dans son principe que la sensation même, soit parce qu'elle est moins la source des idées, que le canal par lequel elles découlent des sens.

Cette inexactitude, quelque légère qu'elle paroisse, répand beaucoup d'obscurité dans son système; car elle le met dans l'impuissance d'en développer les principes.'†

Reflection, according to Condillac, is only another name for attention. But what is attention? It is only another

\* *Cours de Philosophie*, t. ii. pp. 558, 559 (Paris, 1867).

† Condillac, *Traité des Sensations*, pp. 468, 469.

form of sensation. 'L'attention . . . est comme une lumière qui réfléchit d'un corps sur un autre pour les éclairer tous deux, et je l'appelle *réflexion*. La sensation, après avoir été attention, comparaison, jugement, devient donc encore la réflexion même.'\*

The *Traité des Sensations* first made its appearance in 1746, three years after the opening of Swedenborg's spiritual sight. It was a worthy precursor of the moral and spiritual deluge which was so soon to overwhelm the devoted nation to which it was addressed. The soil was thoroughly suited for the reception of such noxious seed. In the words of the author, 'Cette tentative parut neuve et eut quelque succès.' This, unhappily, was only too true. To the influence of that small treatise, in which the degrading doctrine of Sensualism was carried out to its last limit, in which was advocated the gross falsity that ideas are nothing but transformed sensations, must be attributed no mean share in preparing the way for the advent of the terrible national cataclysm which so soon followed.†

With the mere naturalism of Condillac may be compared

\* *Traité des Sensations*, p. 473.

† In a passage full of instruction and warning for all who take an interest in the grave question of public education, M. De Bonald has clearly indicated the manner in which the subtle intellectual poison contained in the writings of Condillac found their way into the French mind.

'Condillac,' says this enlightened thinker, 'a eu sur l'esprit philosophique du dernier siècle, l'influence que Voltaire a prise sur l'esprit religieux, et J. J. Rousseau sur les opinions politiques. Condillac a mis de la sécheresse et de la minutie dans les esprits; Voltaire du penchant à la raillerie et à la frivolité; Rousseau les a rendus chagrins et mécontents . . . Condillac a encore plus faussé l'esprit de la nation, parce que sa doctrine étoit enseignée dans les premières études à des jeunes gens qui n'avoient encore lu ni Rousseau ni Voltaire, et que la manière de raisonner et la direction philosophique de l'esprit s'étendent à tout.' (*Recherches Phil.*, t. i. pp. 187, 188. Quoted in Prelim. Dissert. to *Encyc. Britan.*, p. 177, note.)

the following recent deliverance on the subject of a so-called 'Physical Causation of mental action,' from the pen of a distinguished physiologist who rejects as exploded errors 'those older notions of the essential independence of Mind and Body, which a truly philosophical Psychology can no longer accept as consistent with the fundamental facts of our composite nature.'\*

'Nothing can be more certain,' says Dr. Carpenter, 'than that the primary form of Mental activity—*Sensational* consciousness,—is excited through Physiological instrumentality.' After describing the physiological changes which take place in the formation of a luminous image upon the retina, the writer proceeds to say :—'Now in what way the *physical* change thus excited in the Sensorium is translated (so to speak) into that *psychical* change which we call *seeing* the object whose image was formed upon our Retina, we know nothing whatever ; but we are equally ignorant of the way in which Light produces Chemical change and Chemical change excites Nerve-force : all we can say is, there is just as close a succession of sequences—as intimate a causal relation between antecedent and consequent—in the one case, as there is in the other. In other words, there is just the same evidence of what has been termed *Correlation*, between *Nerve-force* and that primary state of Mental activity which we call *Sensation*, that there is between *Light* and *Nerve-force* ;—each antecedent, when the Physiological mechanism is in working order, being invariably followed by its corresponding consequent.'†

Rash and unqualified assertions like the above, respecting what this writer is pleased to call 'exploded errors,' only serve to show the superficial and perfunctory manner in

\* *Principles of Ment. Physiol.*, p. 140.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.

which those who venture to make them have observed the facts in question. Men of science who write thus, from the stand-point of mere Physiology, overlook a fundamental principle which must needs be conceded in all truly rational investigations bearing on the present subject. Apart from all hypotheses, the real existence of two totally distinct and opposite orders of being, *spirit* and *matter*, must be granted at the outset. For the truth of this Catholic principle of Philosophy the unsophisticated Intuition or Common Sense of mankind is a sufficient voucher.\* With those who call in question its deliverances Swedenborg holds no argument. He well knew, as in the case of Kant, that it would be worse than useless to attempt to reason with the votaries of the various delusions which usurp the venerable and sacred name of Philosophy.

This is not the proper place to examine in detail the series of mere assertions contained in the above extract. It may be remarked, however, that the language employed is, to say the least, strangely deficient in that accuracy and precision which might reasonably have been expected in a professedly scientific exposition of a most abstruse subject. On due consideration it will be found to be far from hypercritical to object to the phrase 'primary form' as applied to what the author terms *Sensational Consciousness*. The expression 'lowest or most external form' would correctly express the fact. But passing over this, an error of the gravest character

\* Those who stand in need of testimony on a point so elementary, may possibly read with profit Sir William Hamilton's learned Dissertation (Note A) *On the Philosophy of Common Sense*, appended to his edition of Dr. Reid's Works, Section VI., which treats of 'The Universality of the Philosophy of Common Sense; or its general recognition in Reality and Name, shown by a chronological series of Testimonies from the dawn of speculation to the present day.' Swedenborg had special claims to a place in this distinguished list, but Hamilton seems to have been unacquainted with the Swedish philosopher's Works, or else he ignored their existence.



presents itself in the tacit assumption that a mere *physical* change in the sensorium is 'translated (so to speak) into that psychical change which we call seeing.' So to speak—without proof—is unphilosophical: but to speak thus at all contradicts the facts of the case. It is impossible, by any process of subtilization, to *translate* matter into spirit. The assertion is based on a common fallacy, like that which led our ancestors not so long since to insist that the earth was at rest because it *appeared* to the senses to be so. The fallacy is thus exposed by Swedenborg:—

'It is according to the appearance that the eye sees. On the contrary, it is the intellect that sees by means of the eye. Wherefore also seeing is spoken of concerning the intellect. It is an appearance that the ear hears: but it is the intellect that hears, by means of the ear. It is on this account that hearing is spoken of with respect to attention and listening, both of which pertain to the intellect.\* It is an appearance that the nostrils smell, and that the tongue tastes: on the contrary it is the intellect that from its own perception smells, and also tastes. Therefore it is that smelling and tasting are spoken of in relation to perception. And so of the rest.'†

\* Cf. the adage attributed to Epicharmus, and the interesting notes of Sir William Hamilton, upon its origin and history (*Reid's Works*, pp. 246, 278.)

Νόος ὁρῇ καὶ νόος ἀκούει πολλά κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

What sees is Mind, what hears is Mind;  
All things else are deaf and blind.

(See Mullach's *Frag. Phil. Græc.*, p. 144.)

† *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 363. Between the above, which appeared in 1763, and the following from Dr. Reid's *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, published the following year, the coincidence in thought, and even in expression, is curious:—

'Another necessary caution in this matter is, that we ought not to confound the organs of perception with the being that perceives. Per-

The same fallacy is repeated \* where it is said that the Ego becomes conscious 'of the retinal changes which are translated † (as it were) by the Sensorium into visual sensations, and of the Cerebral changes which it [the Sensorium] translates into Ideas or Emotions. The mystery lies in the act of translation.' ‡ The case, however, is not one of mystery, but of error, due to the ever-recurring fallacy of believing that things are as they seem. The alleged 'translation' is a wholly gratuitous assertion, and manifestly implies a

ception must be the act of some being that perceives. The eye is not that which sees; it is only the organ by which we see. The ear is not that which hears, but the organ by which we hear; and so of the rest.' (p. 246. Hamilton's Ed.)

\* Dr. Carpenter's *Mental Physiol.*, p. 111.

† A distinguished physicist, speaking of the aether as an all-pervading substance, which takes up the molecular tremors of the most distant visible stars, and conveys them with inconceivable rapidity to our organs of vision, proceeds to say, under the stimulus of a vivid imagination, that 'it is the transported shiver of bodies countless millions of miles distant, which translates itself into human consciousness into the splendour of the firmament at night.' The 'physiological' account of this fanciful process is thus given by M. Luys in his *Recherches sur le Système Nerveux* (p. 350), when treating of the transmission of sensorial impressions in connection with the grey cortical substance of the brain:—

'C'est au milieu de ces mêmes réseaux (de la substance corticale) que nous allons dorénavant les poursuivre (les impressions sensorielles) dans leurs transformations secondaires; c'est là que nous allons les retrouver lorsque, déposées au sein des réseaux de la substance corticale, elles en opèrent l'imprégnation, fertilisent par leur influence stimulatrice le sol qui les reçoit, et deviennent ainsi sous des modalités nouvelles, et métamorphosées en idées, les éléments primordiaux qui enfantent les conceptions de l'entendement, et les matériaux générateurs à l'aide desquels il accomplit l'infinité variée de ses merveilleuses opérations!'

M. Luys regards the subject au point de vue medico-physiologique pur. He therefore quite consistently dispenses with the unintelligible abstraction named the Ego, and boldly puts in its place the cerebral substance as the chief and all-pervading agent in what are called par excellence the mental operations.

‡ Dr. Carpenter's *Mental Physiol.*, p. 111.

materialistic hypothesis of perception like that of Epicurus and the Schoolmen. The naturalism of this author is still more strikingly seen in his allusion \* to the well-worn illustration of the shield with the golden and silver sides. The application of 'the Moral of this fable' to the subject of Mind and Body with their mutual relations, betrays an entire misconception of the problem under discussion. The language of this writer is in the last degree ambiguous when he attempts to approach the confines of psychology proper. The remarks on controversies respecting 'the Materialistic and Spiritualistic hypothesis' leave the reader in doubt as to whether the author refers to hypotheses in explanation of *matter* and *spirit*, or to that hypothesis according to which these two orders of real being are held to be merely figments of the imagination. If the former be meant, then it must be said that it is unreasonable, if not presumptuous, to stigmatize as 'absurd' the noble efforts made by great philosophers in all ages to arrive at more accurate conceptions of soul and body, matter and spirit. If the latter, then writers of this school must be reminded that whatever hypothesis may be excogitated or imagined with the view of explaining the origin, essence, and qualities of spirit and matter, the *real and separate existence* of these two orders cannot rationally be called in doubt, after the manner of Hume's day-dreaming when he says, 'Within myself I am conscious only of impressions and ideas. The substance called Mind is a mere fiction, imagined for the support of these, as the substance called Matter is imagined for the support of sensible qualities.' † Against this shallow and pernicious dogmatism may fairly be placed, as one of a thousand similar testimonies, the deliberate asseveration of a singularly calm and profound thinker, the

\* Dr. Carpenter's *Mental Physiol.*, p. 2.

† *Treatise of Human Nature*, part iv., sect. 5, 6, referred to in Dean Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 135.

Cardinal de la Luzerne, who only repeats the conviction of the great lights of Philosophy in all ages :—

‘La vie de l’homme consiste dans l’union de son âme avec son corps ; sa mort est la séparation de ces deux substances . . . Je conçois de même une substance spirituelle existante sans qu’elle soit unie à de la matière. J’ai l’idée de Dieu, l’idée de l’ange ; je puis de même avoir l’idée de l’âme isolée et indépendante de son corps.’ \*

To return to the comparison of Mind and Brain to a shield ‘entirely made up of a gold-half and a silver-half *which joined each other mid-way,*’ it may be observed that by no ingenuity can this be construed into any other than a purely naturalistic hypothesis. This is evident from the author’s own words where he speaks of the properties of Mind and Body as being so different that they are placed ‘in different philosophical categories,’ and yet are capable of being ‘blended in their actions,’ that is, *mingled and confounded*. In other and plainer language, just as the gold and silver, although having different properties, unite to form one shield, so Mind and Body, each endowed with different properties, unite to constitute ‘one composite nature.’ Gold differs from silver, but both are *metal*. Mind differs from body, but both are *material*.

This is precisely the doctrine of Dr. Priestley and the Schoolmen, concealed under the garb of a new terminology. According to the former ardent champion of materialism, the doctrine of Physical Influx (the hypothesis of the Schools) is the only philosophical notion. ‘Here,’ he says, ‘the two substances mutually act and *re-act* upon each other.’ He subsequently arrives at the conclusion that if the necessity of a *physical influence* between the body and mind be acknowledged, the notion of *two distinct* principles must necessarily be abandoned, and one must adopt that of the *uniform composition of the whole man*. †

\* *Dissertation sur la spiritualité de l’âme*, tom. v. p. 56.

† *Disquisition on Matter and Spirit*, pp. 70—72. (Ed. London, 1777.)

The following passage strikingly illustrates the manner in which the modern Scholastics apply the 'moral of the fable' of the two-sided shield. It is taken from a recent work expressly written to confute, and if possible extirpate, the intellectual and spiritual theory.

"Anima intellectiva," says this violent partisan of mediæval Psychology, "est forma corporis, et habet conjunctum corpus tanquam instrumentum, cujus ipsa indiget pro cognitione rerum sibi comparanda. Etenim anima hominis, secundum conceptionem toti scholæ communem, in ordine substantiarum spiritualium est infima omnium; \* in ordine autem rerum corporalium principatu intelligentiæ et voluntatis omnibus praeest. . . . Audiamus modo ipsum Angelicum: 'Substantiæ,' inquit, 'inferiores, scilicet animæ, habent esse affine corpori in quantum sunt corporum formæ, et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis *ut a corporibus, et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur, alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur.*' Hinc, 'mens nostra naturali cognitione phantasmata respicit quasi objecta, a quibus species intelligibiles accipit, ut dicitur in 3<sup>o</sup> de anima; unde omne quod intelligit secundum statum viæ, intelligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas.'" †

\* Widely different is the enlightened and truly celestial teaching of Swedenborg. 'In homine,' says he, 'communissimum universale, quod continet singula, est Anima, ita quoque est Divinum Verum procedens a Domino, nam hoc continue infuit et facit ut anima talis sit' (*Arcana Cælestia*, § 6115.) Again he says, 'Anima cujusvis hominis ex origine sua est cælestis, quare illa a Domino immediate recipit influxum, recipit enim ab Ipso conjugium amoris et sapientiæ, seu boni et veri, et hic influxus facit illum hominem, et distinguit a bestiis.' (*De Amore Conjugiali*, &c., § 482.)

† Lepidi, *Examen Philosophico-Theologicum de Ontologismo*, pp. 252—254. Cf. Dr. Carpenter's *Mens. Physiol.*, pp. 109, 110, where this Epicurean doctrine is virtually taught in the more concrete terms furnished by Physiology. The Cerebrum is there said to be the instrument exclusively of the 'inner life' of animals—"that is," (to use the author's



Now, according to the well-known Scholastic dictum the soul is the *form* of the body; and 'Forma et id cuius est forma debent esse in eodem ordine';\* consequently, if this teaching be admitted, the true and proper notion of the soul's spirituality must be denied. Thus Peripateticism, by strict consequence, leads at last to mere materialism.

A recently published Essay by Professor Bain affords another instructive illustration of the manner in which the modern Sensation Philosophy applies the 'moral of this fable' of the two-sided shield. This author refers his readers to what he is pleased to consider as 'by far the ablest defence of the single-substance doctrine in the last century'—a doctrine which, he is careful to state, became 'the creed of great numbers at the end of that century and the beginning of this.'† The remarks there made conclusively show the close resemblance existing between what *seems* to be his own views (for this writer is on certain points provokingly reticent) and the materialistic lucubrations of the eminent chymist.

The Scottish Professor complacently observes that Dr. Priestley commences his work on *Materialism* by an appeal to what was 'emphatically the eighteenth century logic . . . the logic of Newton.' Now it is well known that the great Newton did not pretend to be either a logician or a philosopher, in the strictly technical sense of these terms. He was, indeed, a mathematician and physicist of the highest order, or to use the words of Swedenborg, who was intimately acquainted with his writings, he was 'the greatest of *natural* philosophers.' Unhappily, however, there are British metaphysicians now, as in times past, who need to be reminded

own words) the instrument 'of those *psychical* operations, of which the sensations received from the outer world constitute the mental *pabulum*.'

\* Lepidi, *Ibid.*, p. 255.

† *Mind and Body*, p. 189.

that Physical Science, in its most exalted relations, is but a handmaid to her mistress, Philosophy; and that in language pretending to any degree of accuracy and clearness, the terms *natural* and *rational* may not be used as synonymous, inasmuch as they serve to connote spheres of thought and being which, however closely connected, are nevertheless wholly distinct and different. In a vein of indiscriminating adulation, Dr. Priestley is pronounced to be 'the fit man to deal with the crude and inaccurate notion adduced as an argument for spiritualism,\* viz., that matter is wholly passive and indifferent to rest and motion except as acted upon by some power foreign to itself' 'Dr. Priestley,' it is added, 'contends, in opposition to this, that the only rational and truly philosophical hypothesis is that matter is gifted essentially with active properties. He is disposed to adopt the theory of Boscovich.' †

\* This term is, happily, coming into use in its true Christian sense, as denoting that system which asserts the existence of a distinct and separate order of being, prior and superior to matter.

† This allusion to the Jesuit Father Boscovich serves to illustrate, in the way of an undesigned coincidence, the identity which, for all practical purposes, subsists between the speculations of schoolmen and sceptics with respect to the mutual relations between the soul and the body. As to the figment of 'an inherent activity of matter,' advocated alike by the materialists and schoolmen, more will be seen in what follows. The fanciful hypothesis of Boscovich seems to have met with little favour from any school. At first sight it seems slightly similar, in one of its phases, to the philosophic doctrine of the origin and constitution of matter as given by Swedenborg in his *Principia*. There is, however, not the least likeness in reality. The 'points' of the Jesuit Father differ *toto coelo* from those of the Swedish philosopher. According to Boscovich matter is made up of points which are mere *centres of force*, devoid of dimension, but endowed with attractive and repulsive properties. Swedenborg, on the contrary, knows nothing of forces apart from *substances*, or of substances without *forms*, or of *actio in distans* without an intervening medium. He regarded such notions as so many phantasies, mere ghosts of ideas, and their deluded votaries as so many visionaries. And yet these notions and their like make no small part of what passes by the names of physical philosophy and metaphysic.

It does not fall within the scope of the present remarks to enter upon a special examination of the brief and evidently sympathetic summary Professor Bain has given of Dr. Priestley's materialistic reveries—his fancied vindication of the 'inherent activity' of matter; his reckless assertion of the mere 'concomitance' of what he chooses to term 'body and mind'; the difficulties he alleges against the idea of 'an immaterial and unextended substance joined with matter in the relation of place, as well as mechanically acting on matter'; his reckless calumnies against the Fathers; his intolerance of all 'mystery' outside the dark and contracted sphere of his own private opinions; his profane attempt 'to prove that the language of the Old and New Testaments are in accord with his grossly materialistic conception of 'a single substance with spiritual properties or adjuncts'; and the wild and daring assertion that 'the doctrine of a separate soul embarrasses the whole system of Christianity.' \*

These and similar hallucinations are the natural and necessary outcome of debasing principles like those espoused by Dr. Priestley, who 'thought he had sufficiently proved that mind is nothing but a modification of matter,' † who was not ashamed to say that 'in fact, we have no proper idea of any *essence* whatever,' and that 'the term substance or essence, therefore, is, in fact, nothing more than a help to *expression*, but not at all to conception,' ‡ and who has also ventured to assert that 'truth is only a *property*, and no *substance* whatever.' §

The contrast between the views of Dr. Priestley and those

It is to be noted that Swedenborg's *Principia* appeared in 1734, and Boscovich published his 'point' hypothesis in 1745.

\* *Mind and Body*, pp. 187, 189.

† *Disquisition on Matter and Spirit*, p. 355 (Ed. London, 1777).

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

of his nominal co-religionist Dr. Channing is striking, and contains lessons of deep import for the present time. The earnest protest of the spiritually-minded New England preacher against the degrading doctrines of the English materialist, still avails in face of the attempt now being made to revive, under new forms, the naturalistic reveries of the last century. Channing, who has not inaptly been styled the Fénelon of the religious community in which he was by far the truest and purest light, had attained to a conception of the reality and separate existence of the spiritual world so vivid as forcibly to suggest some acquaintance with the writings of Swedenborg. Be this as it may, his faith in the reality of the *supernatural* and in a *spiritual world* greatly surpasses in quality and intensity that shown by any other member of the religious communion to which he belonged. In view of the disorders, anomalies, and miseries of human life on earth, he exclaims, 'There is a world of true perfect freedom.' He had a sacred awe of being 'immersed in matter,' however alluring the form in which it might present itself. Of necessity he recoiled with horror from the gross materialistic speculations of Dr. Priestley. He looked upon them as inevitably tending to dishonour Deity, to degrade and brutalize man, to destroy every thing that is truly noble and allied to the Divine in humanity. He could not but regard with abhorrence the principles which had 'palsied,' in its first efforts, the peculiar religious system in the interests of which he had so ardently laboured. He doubts Dr. Priestley's moral greatness, whose teachings, he avers, 'shock the highest moral principles,' and whose 'system of materialism, of necessity, and of the derivation of all our moral sentiments from *sensations*, variously modified by association, does seem to strike a blow at our most intimate and strongest moral convictions, whilst it robs our nature of all its grandeur.' 'Yet Priestley,' he continues, 'not only vin-

icated it as true, but entered into it with his whole soul. I cannot easily reconcile this with clear moral perception or deep moral feeling.' Again he says—writing, doubtless, under the combined restraints of friendship and courtesy—'I have little sympathy with his ethical and metaphysical doctrines, and seldom turn my thoughts to the religious controversies in which he spent so much of his zeal.' He endeavours to soften, as far as honesty will allow, his severe judgment respecting Dr. Priestley's views, but there is no ground for supposing that he modified essentially his previous strongly expressed opinions. One who shuddered to think of the deadly consequences likely to arise from the spread of Hume's 'cloaked Atheism,' could not but feel disappointed and offended to find Dr. Priestley denying, with all the fire of the most vulgar zealot, the independent existence and proper spirituality of 'that mysterious thing, the human soul.' 'To be a spiritual being,' he exclaims, 'to have the power of thought, of virtue, of disinterestedness, progress without end—this does seem to me an infinite good.' He expressed a wish to see the English mind waked up on the great subject of intellectual philosophy, and the true object of that science separated from the idle topics associated with it. He had no sympathy with the mechanical, necessarian philosophy of the human mind so long the orthodoxy of England.

What a contrast to the dark, narrow, tortuous, intolerant, and earthly tone and temper of Dr. Priestley's lucubrations is presented in the following broad, generous, lofty, enthusiastic pleading in defence of the 'malady called Mysticism.' 'Mysticism,' says this ardent admirer of the great Cambridge Platonists, 'is so vague a word, that one hardly knows what it means; but it is a glorious extravagance, and perhaps a necessary reaction against the general earthliness of men's minds. I pardon the man who loses himself in the clouds,



if he will help me upwards.' This warm utterance of a devoted seeker after higher forms of truth, has in it something of the spirit of philosophical prophecy. And the following warning is needed now more than ever, in presence of the attempts of the so-called School of English Psychology to destroy even the minutest germ of a truly intellectual philosophy:—'Woe unto us,' he says, 'if our philosophers are to be as hostile to the employment of reason in the investigation of truth as our high-priests!'<sup>\*</sup>

Such naturalistic day-dreams as those of Dr. Priestley and his followers, Swedenborg had already described with astonishing accuracy. 'Scarcely any one,' he says, 'at the present day (*circ.* 1770) is aware that there is any power inherent in truths; for it is supposed that truth is only a word spoken by one who is in power, and that therefore it must needs be done. Thus it is thought that truth is only like the breath of the mouth, or like a sound in the ear. When, notwithstanding, truth and goodness are the principles of all things that are in both worlds, the spiritual and the natural. By means of these principles, also, the universe was created, and by their means the universe is preserved. Moreover, by their means man was made. These two principles, therefore, are all in all.

'That the universe was created by means of Divine Truth is openly declared in St. John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the word was God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made. And the world was made by Him." (i. 1, 3, 10.) And in David: "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made." (Psalm xxxiii. 6.) By the Word in both places Divine Truth is understood. Now, inasmuch as the universe was created by means of it, therefore the universe also, by

<sup>\*</sup> See, *passim*, the recently published *Correspondence of Dr. Channing and Miss Aikin*.

means of it, is preserved. For as subsistence is perpetual existence, so preservation is perpetual creation. That man was made through the medium of Divine Truth, is because all things belonging to man have reference to the intellect and the will. The intellect, moreover, is the receptacle of Divine Truth, and the will that of Divine Goodness. Hence it follows that the human mind which consists of these two principles, is nothing but a form of Divine Truth and Divine Goodness, organized in a spiritual and natural manner. This form is the human brain. And since the whole man is dependent on his mind all things in his body are appendages which, by virtue of these two principles, are actuated and live.'\*

In another place, writers of the class to which Dr. Priestley belongs, are thus described to the life :—'Those who look into the causes of things, from considerations of an external and earthly character, are able to perceive no otherwise than that Truth which is from the Divine Being, is a something of the nature of thought, belonging to no real essence. On the contrary, it is the veriest essential thing from which are all the essences of things in both worlds, that is to say, the spiritual and the natural world.'†

Professor Bain, who seems to linger over the materialistic opinions of Dr. Priestley with all the fondness of a devotee, further informs his readers that the recent materialistic movement in Germany is 'in part a reaction from the high-flown philosophy that so long prevailed, and in part an application to mind of the physical science of this century, as Priestley in his day applied the physical science of the last century.' After acutely signalizing the important fact that Dualism, that is, the doctrine of Common Sense, was never the philosophic creed of Germany, he proceeds to point out the gross inconsistency of Kant, and the outcome of his chimeras,

\* *True Christian Religion*, § 224.

† *Arcana Cœlestia*, § 8209 (cf. § 6880).

namely, that no one believed in 'two substances,' and that the prevalent belief was in materialism or idealism. The latter he omits to say is only a masked materialism. The 'handling' of their subject, on the part of materialistic men of science, he next observes, 'turns partly on the accumulated proofs, physiological and other, of the dependence of mind on body, and partly upon the more recent doctrines as to matter and force, summed up in the grand generality known as the Correlation, Conservation, or Persistence of Force.' The Professor adds, with characteristic adroitness, 'This principle enables them to surpass Priestley in the cogency of their arguments for the essential and inherent activity of matter; all known force being in fact embodied in matter.'\*

Passing over, as a palpable absurdity, into which no truly intelligent or cautious thinker would suffer himself to fall, the baseless and pernicious assumption that all known force is embodied in matter, it may not be without profit to place before the reader an example of the manner in which modern physical science is supposed to have added new force to the materialistic sophism of Dr. Priestley, more especially in reference to the purely imaginary concept of 'an essential and inherent activity of matter.' It has been shown above that the schoolmen vehemently contend for this very principle, as being a necessary basis of their metaphysical fallacies and superstitions. It will be seen, from what follows, that on this point the fancies of the physicist and the schoolman are in virtual accord.

It has recently been asserted with respect to the formation of a crystal of salt, that 'while certain blocks of Egypt were laid down by a power external to themselves, these molecular blocks of salt are *self-posit*ed, being fixed in their places by the forces with which they act on each other.' It is

\* See *Mind and Body*, pp. 193—195.

further alleged that 'this tendency on the part of matter to *organize itself*, to grow into shape, to assume definite forms in obedience to the definite action of *force* is . . . all-pervading. It is in the ground on which you tread, in the water you drink, in the air you breathe. *Incipient life*, as it were, manifests itself throughout the whole of what we call inorganic nature.'

Of a *living* grain of corn it is said that 'when it is examined by polarized light, chromatic phenomena, similar to those noticed in crystals, are observed. And why? Because the architecture of the grain resembles the architecture of the crystal. . . . But what has built together the molecules of the corn?' . . . The reply given to this question is 'that the molecules of the corn are *self-posit*ed by the forces with which they act on each other.'

It is further affirmed of the *animal body*, that it is 'just as much the product of molecular force as the stalk and ear of corn, or as the crystal of salt or sugar.' Animal heat is said to be '*the same in kind* as the heat of a fire, being produced by *the same* chemical process.'

The admission is indeed made with laudable candour, that 'associated with the wonderful mechanism of the animal body we have phenomena no less certain than those of physics, but between which and the mechanism we discern no necessary connexion. A man, for example, can say *I feel, I think, I love*; but how does *consciousness* infuse itself into the problem? The human brain is said to be the organ of thought and feeling; when we are hurt the brain feels it, when we ponder it is the brain that thinks, when our passions or affections are excited it is through the instrumentality of the brain.'

The tissue of fallacies and perverted facts contained in the above would never have appeared, had the writer been so fortunate as to have acquired the remotest idea of a *vera*

*causa* ; in other words, had he known that in all and everything in nature, without exception, there exists a latent cause derived from the spiritual world. If the following passage be duly pondered, apart from scientific prejudices and superstitions, it will suffice to expose the errors and absurdities contained in the above and similar dogmatic deliverances of certain physicists whose reasonings never transcend the sphere of mere effects. It will also serve to bring clearly into the view of an intelligent mind what that *really is* which, to the superficial observer, *appears to be* the 'essential and inherent activity' of dead matter.

'Whatsoever the thing may be, within the entire compass of nature, that has not a correspondence with the spiritual world, the same has no existence. It has no cause from which to exist, and therefore no cause from which it may subsist. Those things that are in nature are nothing else but *effects*. Their *causes* are in the spiritual world ; and in the interior heaven are the causes of these causes, which are *ends*. An effect cannot subsist unless the cause be in it with persistive constancy. For when the cause ceases the effect also ceases. An effect, considered in itself, is nothing but a cause ; but it is the cause so clothed from without as to be of service in a lower sphere, in order that the cause may act there as a cause.

'And as the case is with the effect in respect of the cause, so in like manner is it with the cause in respect of the end. Unless this cause exist from its own cause, which is an end, it is not a cause. For a cause without an end is a cause in no order : and where there is no order nothing takes place.

'Hence it is clear that an effect, considered in itself, is a cause ; and a cause, considered in itself, is an end ; and that the end of what is good is in heaven, and proceeds from the Lord ; consequently, that an effect is not an effect,



unless the cause inhere in it, and inhere in it unceasingly,\* and that an end is not an end of what is good, unless the Divinity which proceeds from the Lord inhere in it. Hence, also, it is clear that all and everything in the world, as they have their existence from the Divine Being, so also do they continue to exist from the Divine Being.' †

From the above concise and truly rational account of the respective spheres of *end*, *cause*, and *effect*, it will not be difficult for an intelligent mind to estimate at its proper value the following curious specimen of metaphysical sooth-saying with which Professor Bain brings to a close his meagre and shallow summary of opinions respecting what he is pleased to call *Mind and Body*. In his very dogmatic statement it is difficult to decide which to wonder at most—the transparent absurdity of the assertion, or the over-weening confidence with which it is advanced. 'The rapid sketch,' observes the Professor, ‡ 'thus given, seems to tell its own tale as to the future. The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—a *double-faced unity*,§

\* The truth here expressed with such marvellous clearness and simplicity plainly includes such merely natural ideas as the so-called Correlation, Conservation and Persistence of Force, Evolution, and the like. What passes for wonderful discoveries, in the present day, with those who do not think but simply dream with their eyes open, is little else, in fact, than the mere bark and rind of truth. The philosophy of Swedenborg already contains what is true and intelligible in many of these generalizations, together with numerous intimately allied truths of an incomparably higher order. Will it be deemed an offence if one asks, When will 'the veils of prejudice and ignorance' which blind the intellectual eyes of our modern scientific Sauls be removed?

† *Arcana Celestia*, § 5711.

‡ *Mind and Body*, p. 196.

§ The italics are the author's.

would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case. We are to deal with this, as in the language of the Athanasian Creed,\* not confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. The mind is destined to be a double study—to conjoin the mental philosopher with the physical philosopher; and the momentary glimpse of Aristotle is at last converted into a clear and steady vision.†

It should seem, then, that the system which the so-called English School of Psychology delights in diffusing has for one of its cardinal principles, a doctrine which has been named—and by no means inaptly, in more senses than one—‘a double-faced unity’ of substance, as constituting man’s nature. The phrase may be thought, by its inventor, to be ingenious. Be this as it may, it is plainly nothing more than a periphrasis for *materialism*—a term which the more honest and outspoken Dr. Priestley preferred. The new verbal

\* It is not the part of a calm and unprejudiced thinker to permit himself to pass the boundary line of his special subject, that he may indulge in a most uncalled-for and irreverent allusion to a symbol of religious faith held sacred by a vast multitude of Christians, as containing the doctrine of the Church respecting such deep and mysterious points as the Divine Essence and its modes of existence and subsistence, as also the special form in which the one only Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier of His creatures, has vouchsafed to reveal Himself to men. The allusion to the Creed reads like a sneer; but it also serves to show that the writer’s Theology is quite as umbrageous as his psychology. A carefully formed opinion, however hostile to the Creed, expressed in becoming language and at a proper time and place, is entitled to a most respectful consideration. The above unmeaning allusion is as unworthy of attention as it is offensive to all who cherish a true and manly reverence for topics which others regard as holy.

† This vague and misty reference to Aristotle may be passed over with the remark that thorough-going students of the Stagirite are familiar with many profound albeit dim glimpses into a mysterious region beyond and above this lower world, that are to be met with in his works, but which do not seem to have yet come within the extremely contracted intellectual view of the Scotch Professor.

coinage presents another example of the manner in which the 'moral of the fable' of the two-sided shield is employed in the interests of Naturalism. The notion the phrase is intended to convey does not differ essentially from the 'Matter and Force' hypothesis of such writers as Büchner. However disguised under the veil of words, 'when the phantom is put in motion it dissolves.' When subjected to analysis the 'double-faced' formula presents a more difficult puzzle than the riddle of the Sphinx. Like that fabulous creature, in its higher aspects it seems human, in its lower, bestial, and both conjoined make a hideous monster.

The authors of such chimæras must be reminded that it is a grave mistake to imagine that the arguments for the separate and distinct existence of spirit and matter have lost their validity. It will doubtless in due time be seen, in the light of a true Christian philosophy, that the general argument for the ancient and true Dualistic doctrine possesses incomparably more force in the present day than at any previous period in the world's history.\* Those who reason

\* The view here expressed has recently received remarkable corroboration from a most unexpected quarter :—' Apart from all curiosity,' says a recent reviewer, 'as to the future of the human intellect—a curiosity which may well claim the respect which attends the name of Religion—the question as to the true limits of Science is one which, in the interest of Science itself, it is necessary to solve, and which happens to be just now ripe for solution.' (*Westminster Review* for July, 1874, p. 105.)

The same writer, referring to the war of extermination proclaimed by Science against Metaphysic, further observes :—' The latest outpost of Science, Physiology, and especially that division of it which one may call Neurology, has brought opposing forces face to face, and the battle must now be decided once for all. The result will be either that Psychology (in the old sense) and Metaphysics will be swept clean away, or that the frontier line between them and Science will be set out by metes and bounds, and each of the rivals forced to confine itself to its proper territory.' (*Ibid.*, p. 106).

from a mere surface view of things, and those who never think at all, will doubtless continue to be deceived, for a long time to come, by the equally transparent sophisms of materialism and scholasticism. But sound reason easily penetrates the flimsy disguises of both. Happily for the cause of human progress, there will always be some who will use their understanding.

‘ Yet some there be, that by due steps aspire  
To lay their just hands on that golden key  
That opens the palace of eternity.’

And although for a while the possession of a true philosophy may be a privilege confined to a few, it will one day, in some region of the earth spread and flourish side by side with a genuine Theology, in a renovated state of the Christian Church.

One of the most subtle and pernicious forms which the ‘two-sided shield’ or ‘double-faced unity’ hypothesis has lately assumed, is that presented in the voluminous writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In the way of perverse ingenuity that astute speculator deserves to be placed among the chief corruptors of philosophy. In his power of abusively employing terms of art proper to that science for the purpose of weaving, *ad captandum*, his fine-spun metaphysical cobwebs, he has proved himself a successful rival of that unwearied metaphysical spider, Kant. Of Mr. Spencer may be justly affirmed what a great critic has said respecting a great poet—‘He delighteth to tread upon the brink of meaning, where light and darkness begin to mingle.’ As for example when it is asserted that ‘The establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be used to assimilate either to the other; according as we set out with one or other term.’

In other and plainer language, psychologically speaking body is to be regarded as a modification of mind, and mind as a modification of body: both being different modes of one single substance. And this phantastical verbiage is gravely proposed for the acceptance of reasonable men, as being the last and highest result of the most elaborate investigations. A time will surely come, and it is hoped not far distant, when an enlightened public opinion will pronounce upon such lucubrations according to their deserts—

And be these juggling friends no more believed  
That palter with us in a double sense ;  
That keep the word of promise to our ear  
And break it to our hope.

A careful scrutiny of the facts adduced in the foregoing extracts will show that there is a substantial unity of opinion among the various writers belonging respectively to the two Schools above referred to, with regard to the supposed nature of man. In other words, as previously stated, there exists a real radical affinity between Scholasticism and the modern Sensation Philosophy on the subject in question. On the one hand the Schoolmen speak of '*une activité plastique interne*' as inherent in matter, of '*une force spéciale inhérente à l'organe*,' of soul and body as constituting together '*une même nature humaine*,' of '*unum esse animæ et corporis, quod est esse hominis*.' On the other hand, the Sensation Philosophers and Materialists, affirm the same doctrine in a somewhat different terminology. They speak of the '*oneness* of man's being,' of '*the blending* of the properties of mind and body,' of '*the abandonment* of two distinct principles, and the adoption of a *uniform* composition of the whole man,' of '*mind being merely a modification of matter*,' of the triumph of the '*single substance doctrine*,' and of '*the double-faced unity*' of man's being.



The virtual identity of doctrine, on this point, thus shown to exist between two schools of thought apparently so diverse, is in itself extremely curious.\* The whole subject abounds in practical lessons of the gravest import for the Christian philosopher and Theologian. One thing is clear.

\* The following noble passage can hardly fail to interest the reader, in this connexion, as showing the clearness and depth of St. Augustine's insight into the great question of the relation between soul and body. He has described with wonderful accuracy the Scholasticism and Sensation Philosophy of the present day. It presents one of numberless examples which prove that between the psychology of the Bishop of Hippo and that of the mediæval Schools, there exists an irreconcilable opposition.

Poteram pro mea mediocritate (says this great Father of the Church), discutere singula, et eruere ac demonstrare quæ accepi, in quorum excellentia et altitudine plerumque verba deficiunt. Sed crassas omnino mentes et corporeorum simulacrorum pestifero pastu morbidas ad divina judicanda defertis, quæ multò altiora sunt, quàm putatis. *Nam et ab ipso Platone persuasum est non corporeis oculis, sed purâ mente veritatem videri*; cui quaecumque anima inhaesisset, eam beatam fieri atque perfectam: ad quam percipiendam nihil magis impedire, quam vitam libidinibus deditam et falsas imagines rerum sensibilibum, quæ nobis ab hoc sensibili mundo per corpus impressæ, varias opiniones erroresque generarent: quamobrem sanandum esse animum ad intuendam incommutabilem rerum formam et eodem modo semper se habentem, atque undique sui similem pulchritudinem, nec distentam locis, nec tempore variatam, sed unum atque idem omni ex parte servantem, quam non crederent esse homines, cum ipsa vere summeque sit: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; et tamen inquantum sunt, ab illo æterno Deo per ejus veritatem fabricata consistere: in quibus animæ tantum rationali et intellectuali datum est, ut ejus æternitatis contemplatione perfrueretur atque afficiatur, orneturque ex ea, æternamque vitam possit mereri. Sed dum nascentium atque transeuntium rerum amore ac dolore sauciatur, et dedita consuetudini hujus vitæ atque sensibus corporis, inanibus evanescit imaginibus, irridet eos qui dicunt esse aliquid, quod nec istis videatur oculis, nec ullo phantasmate cogitur, sed mente sola et intelligentia cerni queat. Tali enim *sensibilibum* amore plerumque decipitur anima, ut aut nihil putet esse nisi corpus: aut etiam si auctoritate commota, fateatur aliquid esse incorporeum, de illo tamen nisi per imagines corporeas cogitare non possit, et tale aliquid esse credere, quale fallax corporis sensus infigit.—*August. Philos.*, pp. 191, 192.

Under whatever guise these various writers may be pleased to present their opinions, the speculations themselves have their origin in the one common root of Naturalism, the prolific parent of unbelief and superstition in all ages. The schoolman and the sceptic show themselves akin—

Like to a double cherry seeming parted,  
But yet a union in partition.

A distinguished physiologist of the present day, who, by exposing some of the absurd fancies of certain physicists which pass too often among the unthinking for valid scientific conclusions, has done valuable and permanent service to the cause of sound science and common sense, has also drawn attention to the kinship above indicated. He thus pointedly alludes to the attempts that are being made to revive Epicurean principles with the view of destroying all belief in the supernatural, and consequently subverting the foundations on which man's religious life and future hopes are based. Referring to certain writers who appear to have this end in view, he justly observes that they "laugh at the 'Schoolmen,' but spend all their strength in efforts to revive and intensify the very systems they ridicule and censure. The new modern sophistry is the weakest and most hollow of all sophistry; and although it must be admitted that it is at this time popular, it has unquestionably merited what it will without doubt receive in due time—the unqualified condemnation of sensible Englishmen."\*

Never, perhaps, in any previous age of the world was the philosophical distinction between *spirit* and *matter* so capable of being demonstrated, with superabundant force of natural evidence and rational illustration, as in these palmy days of physical science. The domain of matter in its minuter forms

\* Dr. L. S. Beale's *Protoplasm*, p. 178 (Third Ed.)

has been extended beyond all former precedent, owing to the varied and indefatigable researches of the most accomplished physicists. It may also be said, that there never was a time when the reassertion of this central principle of a genuine Rational Philosophy was more urgently needed, in the sacred interests of intellectual freedom and progress,—not to mention other considerations of an incomparably higher order. Now more than at any previous period in the history of the race has it become the bounden duty of all Christian philosophers to take up anew, and reiterate with all possible earnestness, the solemn protest of Malebranche against the naturalism and worldliness of the age in which he lived, but which was altogether unworthy of him. ‘*Tout ce qui peut agir sur nous,*’ says the enlightened Oratorian, ‘*comme cause véritable et réelle, est nécessairement au-dessus de nous, selon Saint Augustin et selon la raison ; et selon le même saint et la même raison, c’est une loi immuable que les choses inférieures servent aux supérieures. C’est pour ces raisons que ce grand saint reconnaît que le corps ne peut agir sur l’âme, et que rien ne peut être au-dessus de l’âme, que Dieu.*’\*

If the various modes in which the present subject has been handled by the so-called English School of Psychology be examined carefully and without bias, it will be found that the great questions in issue with respect to matter and spirit, nature and the supernatural, mind and body, are either wholly ignored, or else they are studiously concealed beneath a mass of mere verbiage, to which no ingenuity can impart an intelligible sense. Wherever the eye turns ‘darkness is on the face of the deep.’ The tone of thought which

\* *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, tom. i. p. 219 ; where the following remarkable statement is quoted from St. Augustine (L. vi. *Mus.* c. 5):—*Ego enim ab anima hoc corpus animari non puto, nisi intentione facientis ; nec ab isto quicquam illam pati arbitror, sed facere de illo et in illo, tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationis suae.*

pervades current speculations is 'of the earth earthy.' Technical terms are subjected to the most subtle and violent contortions with the sole view of assimilating purely materialistic notions to principles hitherto acknowledged by the most illustrious thinkers to belong to the intellectual and spiritual order. To this alarming state of things, as it existed in his own day, Swedenborg was keenly alive. Not only in his philosophical but also in his theological works, he repeatedly directs the attention of his readers to the deplorable and dangerous fact, in terms the most precise and specific. His deep words of warning remained, and with a few exceptions, still remain unheeded. He passed into the other world in the year 1772, and the first French Revolution, within twenty years afterwards, formed an appalling commentary on his philosophical prophecy. Now, as a matter of fact, the materialism and atheism of the last century has been continued to the present hour. It grows and spreads in all Christian countries, under a somewhat changed aspect, indeed, but not the less deadly in its nature and tendencies. In the last century it showed itself as a fiend and a savage. In the present more materially refined and enlightened age it has assumed, with certain terrible and never-to-be-forgotten exceptions, the features and garb of the syren. This state of the human mind is described by Swedenborg, in his peculiarly pregnant and compendious terminology, as *the goodness of the human intellect perishing*. In one of those remarkable and profoundly instructive *Memorabilia* so frequently to be met with in his works, he thus portrays the nominal Churchmen of his time :—

"I was told," he says, "that among those who lived before the flood the *good state of the will* (*bonum voluntarium*) which existed in the men of the Most Ancient Church was entirely destroyed. But at this day, in the men of the Christian Church, the *goodness which is of the intellect*

(*bonum intellectuale*) is beginning to perish—and this to such a degree that very little of it is left remaining. This is owing to the fact that they believe nothing but what they comprehend by the senses, and that in the present day (*circ.* 1750) they not only reason from the senses, but they also reason thus concerning Divine mysteries, by means of a philosophy unknown to the ancients. In this way the light of the intellect is altogether darkened, and the darkness has become such as to scarcely admit of dispersion.”\*

That the above statement is not to be regarded as a mere mystical dream or idle fancy, will be evident from a consideration of the following extracts, which serve to place in a striking light the grave and solemn moral aspect of the entire subject.

‘Of the prevalence of Atheism at Paris,’ says Mr. Stewart, ‘among the higher classes, at the period of which we are now speaking, the *Mémoires* and *Correspondance* of the Baron de Grimm afford the most unquestionable proofs. His friend Diderot seems to have been one of its most zealous abettors’ . . .

‘How far the effects of that false philosophy of which Grimm’s correspondence exhibits so dark and so authentic a picture, were connected with the awful revolution which soon after followed, it is not easy to say.† That they contributed greatly to blacken its atrocities, as well as to revolt against it the feelings of the whole Christian world, cannot be disputed. The experiment was indeed tremendous, to set loose the passions of all classes of men from the restraints imposed by religious principles; and the result

\* *Arcana Cælestia*, § 2124.

† They were intimately connected, and Swedenborg alone has given the true *rationale* of the connexion. He saw, in his own day, these effects from the sphere of causes, the certain precursors of these dire effects. (See *An. King.*, vol. i. p. 9.)



exceeded, if possible, what could have been anticipated in theory. The lesson it has afforded has been dearly purchased; but let us indulge the hope that it will not be thrown away on the generations which are to come.\*

Alas! Vain hope! How vain, who would have ventured to predict before 1870? The awful lesson has been repeated in a new and appalling form.† When will the true meaning and design of these terrible visitations reach the real mind and heart of France? When will France begin to 'make war along with THE LAMB?' (Rev. xvii. 14.) When will her chief religious teachers and political guides have the courage to proclaim the deep truth contained in the following lines:—

But in these cases  
We still have judgment here; that we but teach  
Bloody instructions, which being taught, return  
To plague the inventor; thus even-handed Justice  
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice  
To our own lips.

As bearing immediately on the principal subject of the present work, one other illustration may be given of the great danger to public morals and to the higher and nobler life of man, which is to be apprehended from the predominance of a false philosophy concerning the distinction between *matter* and *spirit*—or in the terms of a Christian philosophy—concerning the real and separate, albeit corresponding, existence of two worlds, the natural and the spiritual.

According to Mr. Stewart—who, it should be observed, was himself far from possessing any clear and definite notions on this subject—the objections of Gassendi against Descartes' argument for the distinction between mind and

\* Prelim. Dissert. to *Encyc. Britan.*, p. 181. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

† See *Med. Chir. Rev.* for July, 1874, on 'The Psychology of Communism' for revelations, almost incredible, of the infernal states of life into which a godless populace could plunge itself, reckless of all the lessons and warnings of the past.

matter are frivolous and puerile. They amount to this, that all our knowledge comes through the senses. Every object of the understanding may at last be resolved into *sensible images*. In the words of Gassendi himself 'there is no real distinction between *imagination* and *intellection*'—a conclusion coinciding exactly with the tenets of his English contemporary Hobbes. "It is worthy of remark," adds the Scottish metaphysician, "that the argument employed by Gassendi against Descartes, is copied almost *verbatim* from his own version of the account given by *Diogenes Laertius* of the sources of our knowledge, according to the principles of the Epicurean philosophy:—so very little is there of novelty in the consequences deduced by modern materialists from the scholastic proposition, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu*. The same doctrine is very concisely and explicitly stated in a maxim formerly quoted from Montaigne, that 'the senses are the beginning and end of all our knowledge;'—a maxim which Montaigne learned from his oracle Raymond de Sebonde . . . which, if true, would at once cut up by the roots, not only all metaphysics, but all ethics, and *all religion, both natural and revealed*." \*

Swedenborg had long before clearly assigned the real reason why philosophers, in their investigations into the nature of the human soul, had arrived at the conclusion that it is corporeal. This is best given in his own words:—

"That the mind of man," says he, "is his spirit, and that the spirit is a man, can with difficulty be received in faith by those who think that the spirit is a wind, and that the

\* Prelim. Diss. to *Encyc. Britan.*, pp. 71, 72. See (note in *loc.*) the highly characteristic letter of Madame du Deffand to Voltaire, as openly indicating the abominable state into which the human mind had fallen in Christian Europe, at the period in which it was written, and as affording one of the many illustrations which might be adduced of what Swedenborg meant by *intellectual good perishing*. Such *Femmes Savantes* and their admirers are not without their representatives in the present age.

soul is, as it were, something aethereal such as is the breath exhaled by the lungs. For they say, 'How can a spirit be a man, when he is a spirit; and how can the soul be a man when he is a soul?' They speak in the same way of God, inasmuch as He is called a Spirit. This idea concerning spirit and soul they have derived from the fact that spirit and wind in some languages are one and the same word; and also from this consideration that when a man dies he is said to yield up his spirit or soul, and life is said to return when the spirit or soul (breathing) of the lungs returns, in the case of those who have undergone suffocation or swooning. And inasmuch as on such occasions they have no apperception of aught but wind or air, they form their judgment from the eye and the bodily sense, that the spirit and soul of a man, after death, are not a man."\*

And in the following passage our author exposes the shallowness and moral deformity of the various systems of Sensation Philosophy with wonderful simplicity and power.

'In the interiors of the mind of man,' says he, 'there is such an infinitude of things as cannot be defined in numbers. This is evident from the infinity of things in the body of which nothing reaches sight and sense but mere action—and that too in great simplicity. And yet for such action thousands of motive or muscular fibres concur, thousands of nervous fibres, thousands of blood vessels, thousands of things in the lungs, which co-operate in every action, thousands of things in the brain and in the spinal cord; and much more besides in the spiritual man, which is the human mind, all things pertaining to which are forms of affections, and also of perceptions and thoughts thence derived.

'Does not the soul which disposes things interior, also dispose the actions which arise from them? The soul of man is nothing else but the love which is of his will, and the

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 386.

love which is of his intellect thence originating. Such as is this love, such is the whole man. And he becomes such as he is according to the disposition in things external, in which man is together with the Lord. Wherefore if he attribute all things to himself and to nature his soul becomes *the love of himself*; but if he attribute all things to the Lord, his soul becomes *the love of the Lord*: and the latter love is heavenly, whereas the former is infernal.\*

From the concluding words of the above extract, when weighed with ordinary care and fairness by a mind not sunk beyond hope in the abyss of a wilful atheism, it may be evident how hurtful, and even wicked, from a Christian point of view, is much of what it is now the fashion to call science and philosophy.

A remedy is urgently needed for the present deplorable state of Christendom, arising from the wide prevalence, among all orders of society, of 'philosophy and vain deceit,' as well as from 'oppositions of science falsely so-called.' The method proposed by Swedenborg for the regeneration of learning and religion is one very far removed from anything that partakes of the fanciful or mystical. On the contrary, time and experience will show that it is an absolutely essential means of restoring to something of its pristine integrity the disordered mind of man, and imparting to it a new and higher spiritual freedom and insight. One of its primary principles is plainly set forth in the following passage:—

'Unless the faculty of thought in man be raised above the things of sense, so that he can behold them, so to say, beneath him, he can in no wise attain to a due sense of anything interior in the Word; still less of what pertains to heaven, considered apart from the things of the world. For the things of sense absorb and suffocate them. Hence it happens

\* *Divine Providence*, § 199. Cf. *Arcana Cælestia*, § 9274, where it is shown that the will is the man, the intellect is its minister.

that the votaries of sense, and those who have applied themselves to the study of matters of science, seldom comprehend anything of what relates to heaven ; for they have immersed their thought in the things of the world, that is to say, in terms and distinctions taken from terms, thus in what belongs to the sphere of the sensuous, from which they cannot further be elevated, and so kept in a state of intuition above them. Thus neither can their thought be further extended freely around the whole field of memory, so as to choose those that are in agreement, as well as reject what is repugnant, and make application of what stands in any connexion with the subject. For, as already stated, the faculty of thought is kept closed and immersed in terms, and hence in the things of sense, so that it is unable to take a comprehensive survey. This is why the learned believe less than the simple-minded : yea more, that in what relates to heaven they have even less wisdom. For the simple in mind are able to view a subject above terms and matters of science, thus above the things of sense. Not so the learned, who regard a matter from the point of view of terms, and then from things of science ; for their mind is in the latter ; thus it is bound as it were in a gaol or prison-house.\*

The claim here made for the superiority of mental vision in things spiritual, which the simple-minded enjoy as compared with the learned, is by no means new ; although it is here advanced under relations more or less novel. The terminology of a false philosophy joined with an exclusive contemplation of mere matters of science, have become so many most potent means of darkening and enslaving the intellect. St. Paul, 'Comparing spiritual things with spiritual,' under the influence of a light not his own, had taught mankind ages ago that 'the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him : neither

\* *Arcana Cælestia*, § 5089.



can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned.' And He who is Divine Wisdom itself, 'rejoiced in spirit' in that Divine secrets had been hid from 'the wise and prudent' (of this world), and had been revealed to 'babes' (the simple and true of heart).

Judging from the terms of strong disparagement in which the learned are spoken of in the above quotation, it might be inferred by some that our author was one of those alleged *timid sectarians, who are alarmed at the progress of knowledge*,\* and was therefore averse to the full and free exercise of the rational faculty, on all subjects human, and Divine. Such a supposition would be grossly erroneous. Swedenborg, indeed, heartily despised empty abstract metaphysic, as being merely a collection of ingenious trifles or of mischievous subtleties. But of all other thinkers that ever lived, he knew and felt 'How charming is Divine philosophy.' He had long and steadily laboured, with incredible zeal and industry, to build up a true and permanent system of philosophy, to resuscitate and restore to her true and rightful place and order in the intellectual world, this queen and mistress of all rational cognitions. And his truly amazing efforts were crowned with a most signal success. In the following passage, little known, he discloses what true philosophy is, what it once was, and what it ought to be, as also the real cause of its corruption and present degraded state.

'It may be manifest, indeed, that philosophy, considered in itself, can never be contrary to what is contained in the Divine Word. For natural things themselves and spiritual things are in mutual accord, just as the case is with man, as to his natural principle itself and his spiritual principle, when man is a true man. For nature was made by the Most High Creator so as to be altogether yielding and obedient to things spiritual. The world itself, together with its

\* See Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Essays*, quoted in *English Psychology*, p. 147.

nature, is such as to furnish whatever is compliant and accommodated to those things that are commanded by heaven, altogether as is the case in man, where the body with its nature has been so made as to be obedient to the spiritual mind in all those things which that mind intends, and has in view, as an end or purpose. So that effects are in nature, whereas causes and principles are in heaven ; just as in the case of the human body.

‘Philosophy itself, or human learning, forms its judgments and draws its conclusions from things natural with respect to what is spiritual. And inasmuch as ever since the Fall the natural man is of such a character as to be wholly contrary to the spiritual man, and continually fights against the latter, hence it is that the philosophy which is derived from man, that is to say, which is taken from his rational mind, is such as to destroy those things which are drawn from the Divine Word. Wherefore, it is not philosophy itself, regarded in itself, that is in fault. On the contrary, it is the human mind itself whose state is such since the Fall. It is from this latter mind that philosophy is derived.’\*

When studied in its various profound relations, this compendious and apparently simple statement will be found to involve the truest and deepest philosophical utterance which has ever appeared in any age, on the subject of true and false philosophy. A just and adequate exposition of the principal questions involved in it would fill a volume. It contains implicitly the foundation principles of a true and complete Christian Philosophy. It points to the real cause

\* See Swedenborg's Posthumous *Explicatio in Verbum Historicum Vet. Test.* (§ 911), edited with scrupulous care by the late Dr. Iman. Tafel of Tübingen, under the altered title of *Adversaria &c.* ; a title which, unhappily, fails entirely to indicate the true character and design of this wonderful and most precious record of Biblical interpretation.

of the present degraded state of opinion concerning the human soul and mind, and also accounts for the fact that 'the past history of philosophy has, in great measure, been only a history of variation and error.'\* It clearly reveals the true source of that spurious and corrupt psychology, of which examples have been adduced in the preceding pages.

Leaving, then, these vain phantoms and delusive lights of a false philosophy, let us seek higher and holier ground, a purer and brigher air, by following in the steps of those who have laboured 'up the hill of heavenly truth,' by the sure and safe path of sound Common Sense.

One of the most sagacious and cautious thinkers belonging to this by no means numerous school of philosophers thus bears his testimony to the truth of what has ever been received as an axiom by enlightened minds in all ages, namely, that matter is a dead inactive thing, and that mind, owing to its very essence, is living and active :—

'Some philosophers,' says Dr. Reid, 'among the ancients as well as among the moderns, imagined that man is nothing but a piece of matter, so curiously organized that the impressions of external objects produce in it sensation, perception, remembrance, and all the other operations we are conscious of. This foolish opinion could only take its rise from observing the constant connexion which the Author of Nature hath established between certain impressions made upon our senses and our perception of the objects by which the impression is made; from which they weakly inferred that those impressions were the proper efficient causes of the corresponding perception.

'But no reasoning is more fallacious than this—that, because two things are always conjoined, therefore one must be the cause of the other. Day and night have been joined

\* See Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, p. 747.

in a constant succession since the beginning of the world ; but who is so foolish as to conclude from this that day is the cause of night, or night the cause of the following day ? There is indeed nothing more ridiculous than to imagine that any motion or modification of matter should produce thought.\*

After illustrating with great care and minuteness the manner in which the appearances and fallacies of the senses give rise to false notions concerning Perception, this judicious and eminently thoughtful writer thus proceeds :—

‘The vulgar give themselves no trouble how they perceive objects ; . . . philosophers conceiving some similitude between a body that is put in motion, and a mind that is made to perceive, they are led to think that, as the body must receive some impulse to make it move, so the mind must receive some impulse or impression to make it perceive. This analogy seems to be confirmed, by observing that we perceive objects only when they make some impression upon the organs of sense, and upon the nerves and brain ; but it ought to be observed that such is the nature of body that it cannot change its state, but by some force impressed upon it. This is not the nature of mind. All that we know about it shows it to be *in its nature living and active, and to have the power of perception in its constitution*, but still within those limits to which it is confined by the laws of Nature.’\*

‘Whether we speak,’ says Swedenborg, ‘of the external organs or the internal, they are exactly conformed in their state to the modifications of the auras of their degree ; as the ear, to the modulation of the air ; and the eye, to the modification of the æther ; of the truth of which, acoustics and optics have abundantly informed the learned at the present day. For the more perfectly artificial organs or instruments are framed on the model of the natural art of

\* Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, pp. 253, 254.

the animal body, the more exquisitely are phenomena apprehended by their means. If the external organs are evidently adapted to the nature of the auras, how can we deny the same of the internal organs, to which no aura can penetrate, except one of a higher and more eminent power? Deny it, however, we may, if we think it of no consequence to deprive effects of their causes, and causes of their principles. But whether this be rational, or even natural, let any one consult the analytic powers of his mind, and judge for himself.

. . . 'But by the mediation of the auras we are merely moved, but do not live. The principle of life must be sought or in a higher sphere than the auras. Even the most eminent aura does not live, but is the instrumental and auxiliary cause, which enables us while we live to undergo modifications and be moved distinctly. Thus and not otherwise could the will, which is the attribute of life, pass into any effect. The heavens (or the auras of the world), as Aristotle, guided by the instinct of a sound reason, observes, are indeed animated, but have only an assistant soul, without intellect. Wherefore we are endowed with a spirituous fluid or most pure blood, which, although formed with reference to the whole amazing faculty of the first aura of the world, still could not possibly live as the soul of its kingdom, unless life were in it from the highest of origins.'\*

That nature in itself is dead is a doctrine which our author never loses an opportunity of impressing on his readers, with every form of argument and illustration of which the subject seems capable, as for example, in the following passage :—

"Life," he says, "is one thing and nature another. Since the mind is in a natural subject, and partakes, both of life and nature, it can hardly see either the one or the other in itself, or disjunctively. But if it descends a little into the phenomena of its body, or if it expatiates upon

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 193, 195.



the objects of the earth, it immediately perceives, by means of the senses, that the two are perfectly distinct ; for we often know the eye to be either wholly or partly deprived of sight, the ear of hearing, the tongue of taste, and the brain of sense, and the mind of understanding, just as organs are deprived of their forms, mutual connexions, and the determination of their fluids. All pathology, all medical art, whether relating to the body or mind,—an art which is no other than that of restoring to the several natures of both their declining life, and of uniting those things that begin to separate,—bears witness to the truth of this observation ; for it both teaches us the means between the two, and applies them. Every person who has once seen the organic body a corpse, at once acknowledges that life has departed from it. The objects on the earth, as minerals, waters, vegetables, &c., demonstrate the same truth to the sight. The air and ether, or the circumambient world, with all its modified sounds and images, do not in the least partake of life, before they flow into the organic world, or into an animated system. But when they do this, modifications at once become sensations, and images ideas, which for the sake of distinction from intellectual images, or those of a higher life, are generally called material ideas. Therefore life is one distinct thing, and nature another.”

“Nature, in respect to life, is dead. This follows from what we have already stated. But let us ascend still higher. If nature lived it would live either from itself, or from some other thing, or by some other thing. *If it lived from itself*, then that would live, which we clearly see does not live ; and nature would destroy itself, whenever it destroys its forms, in which and according to which, life exists. So also it would not only be the principle of its own causes and effects, but also the principle of its principle ; or else this principle would convert itself into nature, in order that it

might be enabled to be what it is not ; which every one sees to be opposite to common sense. But nature itself, by its degrees and moments, in every motion, form, and time, more particularly by its mutations, inconstancies, relatives, opposites, and contraries, manifestly declares that it does not live of itself, but is so emprincipled as in a manner to move of itself. Nature, says the Philosopher [Aristotle] is that, by the primary inexistence of which anything is generated ; also the *materia prima* ; it likewise expresses the substance of those things that exist in nature. (*Metaph.* Lib. v. cap. iv. ; *Natur. Auscult.* Lib. ii. cap. i.) It is a principle and cause of motion and rest in that thing in which it is . . . *per se.* (*Natur. Auscult.* Lib. ii. cap. i. ; Lib. viii. cap. iii.) And Wolff says : ‘ By universal nature, or nature simply so called, we mean the principle of mutations in the world,—the principle intrinsic to the world. Since nature is intrinsic to the world, it cannot be a distinct entity from the world. Universal nature is an aggregate of all the motive forces that there are in the bodies co-existing in the world taken collectively.’ (*Cosmologia*, §§ 503, 504, 507.) If nature does not live of itself, it does not follow from this that it so lives from another as not to be relatively dead. . . . For it is apparent from visible phenomena, that life corresponds as a principal cause to nature as an instrumental cause. For what is motion in nature is action in a living subject ; what is modification in nature is sensation in a living subject ; what is effort in nature is will in a living subject ; what is light in nature is life in a living subject ; what is distinction of light in nature is intellect of life in a living subject ; what is cause and effect in nature is end in a living subject ; and so on with other things. . . . Thus natural being respects vital being as an instrument respects its principal cause extrinsic to itself.” \*

\* *Æc. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 223—225.

## (β) THE CARTESIO-MALEBRANCHIAN HYPOTHESIS.

The scheme of Divine Assistance, or (according to a more accurate terminology) Occasional Influx, is in harmony with sound reason, since it takes its rise from the principles and laws of Order, which require that the purer element should flow into the grosser, and not *vice versa*. So far, then, the Malebranchian view is founded on truth. This last determination is of the highest importance, inasmuch as it bears intimately upon the relations between the Cartesian Philosophy and that taught in the present Treatise.

‘It was Geulinx, in fact,’ observes Mr. Morell, ‘who first brought out, in its proper form, the celebrated doctrine of *occasional causes*, according to which God himself is the direct agent in all the related movements of the soul and the body, while the affections of the latter afford the *occasion* upon which He produces the corresponding sensations in the former. This was clearly an additional step taken towards the formation of a system of objective idealism.’ . . .

‘Malebranche, as a thinker, as a writer, and as an earnest lover both of truth and goodness, merits to stand almost at the head of the *literati* of his country. His thoughts are always clear, his observations acute, his style luminous and attractive, and his spirit truthful and sincere.’ . . .

‘The notion of the absolute, . . . had been brought by Descartes so prominently into his later philosophy, that the idea of finite mind as a self-acting and causative principle was much weakened, and its perception of the material world made to depend in every case upon the interposition of Divine Power. Now the whole of what is peculiar to Malebranche arose from the more intense view which he took of this feature in the Cartesian philosophy, from the still greater predominance which was thus given to the power of the

great First Cause, and the tendency consequently engendered of absorbing in it, the influence of all secondary causes throughout the universe.' \*

Mr. Morell, as a critic of philosophical opinions, can scarcely be said to be profound; but his judgments are generally liberal and genial. In pointing out a principle in the speculations of the Oratorian which lies at the root of Occasionalism, namely, that the Deity is the sole source of mental modifications, it seems going too far to assert that this philosophical determination, at least in the form it assumed in the mind of Malebranche, was a step towards 'objective idealism.' And while cordially admitting that the eulogium which follows is just and well-merited, exception must in fairness be taken to the opinion expressed in the concluding part of the last sentence above quoted. It evinces a want of appreciation of the actual depth of that intellectual and spiritual insight which Malebranche undoubtedly brought to bear on one of the deepest of problems—the relation between the Infinite and the Finite, in other words, the bond which conjoins Deity to man and to nature. Mr. Morell, without intending it, is here unjust to Malebranche; and the error into which he has himself fallen contains germs of pernicious consequence both to philosophy and theology. Selfactivity and causation do not properly belong to anything finite. That *God alone acts*; that, nevertheless, men are free moral agents; that they act *as if* of themselves; and that nature in itself is dead: all these are eternal truths, as will be seen more clearly in the sequel.†

. . . . 'The Malebranchian philosophy,' says Sir William Hamilton, 'is fundamentally Cartesian, and after De la Forge and Geulinx, the doctrine of *Divine Assistance*, implicitly maintained by Des Cartes, was most ably de-

\* Morell, *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. i. pp. 158, 159.

† See note U.

veloped by Malebranche, to whom it owes, indeed, a principal share of its celebrity.' \*

'According to his system, the images or traces in the brain, are not perceived at all—they are only occasions upon which, by the laws of Nature, certain sensations are felt by us, and certain of the Divine ideas discovered to our minds.' †

'By those not possessed of the Key to the Cartesian theory, there are many passages in the writings of its author which, taken by themselves, might naturally be construed to import, that Des Cartes supposed the mind to be conscious of certain *motions in the brain*, to which, as well as to the *modifications of the intellect itself*, he applies the terms *image* and *idea*. ‡ Reid, who did not understand the Cartesian philosophy as a system, was puzzled by these superficial ambiguities. Not aware that the cardinal point of that system is,—that mind and body, as essentially opposed, are naturally to each other as zero, and that their mutual intercourse can only be *supernaturally* maintained by the concurrence of the Deity; Reid attributes to Des Cartes the possible opinion, that the Soul is immediately cognizant of *material images in the brain*. But in the Cartesian theory, mind is only conscious of itself; the affections of body may, by the *law of union*, be the proximate occasions, but can never constitute the immediate objects of knowledge. Reid, however, supposing that nothing could obtain the name of *image*, which did not represent a prototype, or the name of an *idea* which was not an object of thought, thus misinter-

\* *Reid's Works*, p. 265.

† *Ibid.*, p. 273.

‡ The distinction here referred to was well known to Swedenborg, who frequently alludes to it in his theological as well as in his philosophical works. He alone has succeeded in demonstrating the real difference which exists between the modes or ideas of the natural mind (*animus*) and the intellectual mind (*mens*), thus enabling the materialist to understand his ideas, and the idealist, his. See *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 270. 217.



puted Des Cartes ; who applies, abusively indeed, these terms to the *occasion* of perception (i.e., the motion in the sensorium, *unknown in itself and resembling nothing*), as well as to the *object* of thought (i.e., the representation of which we are conscious in the mind itself). In the Liebnitio-Wolfian system, two elements, both also denominated *ideas*, are in like manner accurately to be contra-distinguished in the process of perception. The *idea in the brain*, and the *idea in the mind*, are, to Des Cartes, precisely what the '*material idea*,' and the '*sensual idea*' are to the Wolfians. In both philosophies, the two ideas are harmonic modifications, co-relative and co-existent ; but in neither is the organic affection or material idea an object of consciousness. It is merely the unknown and arbitrary condition of the mental representation ; and in the hypotheses both of Assistance and of Pre-established Harmony, the presence of the one idea implies the concomitance of the other, only by virtue of the hyperphysical determination.'

As a note to a statement in the above passage with respect to the supernatural concurrence of the Deity being, according to Descartes, that which maintains the mutual intercourse of soul and body, the following occurs. It serves to show clearly the position taken by Swedenborg that Occasionalism contains, implicitly, the principle of Spiritual Influx, but obscured by the difficulties which beset an hypothesis in which the principal *data* necessary to the solution of the problem are utterly unknown :—

'That the theory of *Occasional Causes* is necessarily involved in Descartes' doctrine of *Assistance*, and that his explanation of the connexion of mind and body reposes on that theory, it is impossible to doubt. For while he rejects all physical influence in the communication and conservation of motion between bodies, which he refers exclusively to the ordinary concurrence of God (*Princ. P. II., Art. 36, etc.*) ; consequently,

he deprives conflicting bodies of all proper efficiency, and reduces them to the mere occasional causes of this phenomenon. But *à fortiori*, he must postulate the hypothesis, which he found necessary in explaining the intercourse of things *substantially the same*, to account for the reciprocal action of two substances, *to him*, of so *incompatible a nature*, as mind and body. De la Forge, Geulinx, Malebranche, Cordemoy, and other disciples of Descartes, only explicitly evolve what the writings of their master implicitly contain.\*

The following extracts from the French Oratorian himself are given as specimens of the manner in which, throughout his beautiful but often fanciful and baseless speculations, he makes use of the principle of Occasionalism, or Spiritual Influx, to displace that of Physical Influx. Near the commencement of his celebrated *Inquiry after Truth*, the pious and meditative recluse of Rarey enters upon the difficult subject of the occasional causes of human error and self-deception. Of these causes, he says, there are five sorts. He further asserts that the real causes of our errors are to be found in the bad use we make of that faculty of freedom with which we are endowed.

‘Mais, quoiqu’ à proprement parler il n’y ait que le

\* Sir William Hamilton’s *Discussions*, pp. 70, 71. See note U of this Appendix, on the special point in question.

‘The theory [hypothesis] of Malebranche,’ according to Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid’s Works*, p. 264, note), ‘has been vainly sought for in the Bible, the Platonists, and the Fathers. It is, in fact, more clearly enounced in Homer than in any of these graver sources.’

Τῶς γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων  
Ὅλον ἐκ’ ἡμᾶς ἄγρει πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

It would not be difficult to show that the Scottish philosopher has here fallen into a strange error. The subject is one which is of primary importance in the History of Philosophy. It has never yet been thoroughly investigated, involving as it does the stupendous questions of the origin of man and the beginning of a Divine Revelation.

mauvais usage de la liberté qui soit cause de l'erreur, on peut dire néanmoins que nous avons beaucoup de facultés qui sont cause de nos erreurs, non pas causes véritables, mais causes qu'on peut appeler *occasionnelles*. Toutes nos manières d'apercevoir nous sont autant d'occasions de nous tromper ; car, puisque nos faux jugements renferment deux choses, le consentement de la volonté et la perception de l'entendement, il est bien clair que toutes nos manières d'apercevoir nous peuvent donner quelque occasion de nous tromper, puisqu'elles nous peuvent porter à des consentements précipités.\*

Thus it is evident that, according to the psychological system of Malebranche, the *veritable* cause of error is within man. It is only the mere occasion of error that comes from without. To this extent, at least, the view he advocates is in general agreement with the true doctrine of Spiritual Influx.

In the fourth of those brilliant and fascinating *Conversations on Metaphysics*, the doctrine of Occasional Causes is introduced to explain some of the very darkest and most difficult theological questions. Here the reader is surprised and charmed by the novel and beautiful lights in which this writer, by the aid of a fertile imagination and a truly wonderful ingenuity, contrives to place subjects generally considered to be among the most arid and abstruse. In the following singularly bold and original speculation—the original revelation of God to man, the Fall, the remains of the primeval state, and the wisdom of the laws which regulate the union of the soul and the body—the reader of Swedenborg will discover gleams of spiritual light which remind him of truths which the Swedish theologian has fully developed and clearly established :—

“Demeurez donc ferme, Ariste, dans cette pensée que la raison fait naître en vous, que l'Être infiniment parfait suit toujours l'ordre immuable comme sa loi, et qu'ainsi il peut

\* *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, chap. iv.

bien unir le plus noble au moins noble, l'esprit au corps, mais qu'il ne peut l'y assujettir ; qu'il ne peut le priver de la liberté et de l'exercice de ses plus excellentes fonctions, pour l'occuper malgré lui et par la plus cruelle des peines, à perdre de vue son souverain bien pour la plus vile des créatures. Et concluez de tout cela qu'avant le péché il y avait en faveur de l'homme des exceptions dans les lois de l'union de l'âme et du corps. Ou plutôt concluez-en qu'il y avait une loi qui a été abolie, par laquelle la volonté de l'homme était la cause occasionnelle de cette disposition du cerveau, dans laquelle l'âme est à couvert de l'action des objets, quoique le corps en soit frappé, et qu'ainsi elle n'était jamais interrompue malgré elle dans ses méditations et dans ses extases. Ne sentez-vous pas en vous-même quelques restes de cette puissance, lorsque vous êtes fortement appliqué, et que la lumière de la vérité vous pénètre et vous réjouit ? Apparemment le bruit, les couleurs, les odeurs, et les autres sentiments moins pressants et moins vifs ne vous interrompent presque plus. Mais vous n'êtes pas supérieur à la douleur : vous la trouvez incommode malgré tous vos efforts d'esprit. Je parle de vous, Ariste, par moi-même. Mais pour parler juste de l'homme innocent et fait à l'image de Dieu, il faut consulter les idées divines de l'ordre immuable. C'est là que se trouve le modèle d'un homme parfait, tel qu'était notre père avant son péché.\* Nous sens troubler nos idées et

\* 'When this globe had luxuriated in its various vegetable productions, and animals of all kinds had come into being, then was the FIRST MAN introduced into Paradise, having been created into all the harmony of the visible world ; being made partaker of a more subtile or of a rational aura, in order that he might know how to render the various parts of creation around him still more perfect, by doing what could not be effected except through the medium of a living and rational agent endowed with a material body ; a being who should enjoy the charms and varieties of nature ; who should learn wisdom in order that he might know to reverence, love, and worship that infinitely wise God who is the Author and

fatiguent notre attention. Mais en Adam ils l'avertissaient avec respect. Ils se taisaient au moindre signe. Ils cessaient même de l'avertir à l'approche de certains objets, lorsqu'il le souhaitait ainsi. Il pouvait manger sans plaisir, regarder sans voir, dormir sans rêver à tous ces vains fantômes qui nous inquiètent l'esprit et qui troublent notre repos. Ne regardez point cela comme des paradoxes. Consultez la raison, et ne jugez point, sur ce que vous sentez dans un corps dérégulé, de l'état du premier homme, en qui tout était conforme à l'ordre immuable que Dieu suit inviolablement. Nous sommes pécheurs, et je parle de l'homme innocent. . . .

"Ne cessez donc point d'admirer la sagesse, et l'ordre merveilleux des lois de l'union de l'âme et du corps, par lesquelles nous avons tant de divers sentiments des objets qui nous environnent. Elles sont très-sages. Elles nous étaient même avantageuses en tout sens en les considérant dans leur institution ; et il est très-juste qu'elles subsistent après le péché, quoiqu'elles aient des suites fâcheuses ; car l'uniformité de la conduite de Dieu ne doit pas dépendre de l'irrégularité de la nôtre. . . . Un jour viendra que les descendants des peuples les plus barbares seront éclairés de la lumière de l'Évangile, et qu'ils entreront en foule dans

Builder of the universe, and whose better and more refined nature, though clothed with a material garment, might aspire even to Heaven itself. Oh! man, how happy, thrice happy thy destiny; to be born to the joys both of earth and of heaven.'—*Principia*, vol. ii. p. 362.

. . . 'Man did not begin to exist till the kingdoms (of nature) were completed. The world and nature concentrated themselves in him; in order that in the human microcosm the entire universe might be exhibited for contemplation, from its last end to its first.'—*Econ. An. King.*, vol. i. p. 3.

'It is evident, from our general definition of the soul, that the soul of every offspring is derived from its parent, and the souls of all from Adam, who received his soul immediately from the Creator of the universe.'—*Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 273. Cf. *Arcana Cælestia* (§ 5113), on the state of integrity of the First Man.



l'Eglise des prédestinés. Nos pères sont morts dans l'idolâtrie, et nous reconnaissons le vrai Dieu et notre adorable Sauveur. Le bras du Seigneur n'est point raccourci. Sa puissance s'étendra sur les nations les plus éloignées ; *et peut-être que nos neveux retomberont dans les ténèbres, lorsque la lumière éclairera le nouveau monde.*"\*

"L'homme est composé de deux substances, esprit et corps. Ainsi, il a deux sortes de biens tout différents à distinguer et à rechercher, ceux de l'esprit et ceux du corps. Dieu lui a aussi donné deux moyens très-sûrs pour discerner ces différents biens, la raison pour le bien de l'esprit, le sens pour le bien du corps, l'évidence et la lumière pour les vrais biens, l'instinct confus pour les faux biens. J'appelle les biens du corps de faux biens, ou des biens trompeurs, parce qu'ils ne sont point tels qu'ils paraissent à nos sens ; et que quoi qu'ils soient bons par rapport à la conservation de la vie, ils n'ont point en propre l'efficace de leur bonté : ils ne l'ont qu'en conséquence des volontés divines ou des lois naturelles, dont ils sont *les causes occasionnelles.*"†

The Abbé Blampignon thus briefly describes, in terms of great moderation and impartiality, the general character and aim of the philosophical speculations of the excellent and spiritually-minded Father of the Oratory.

'The campaign,' says this congenial writer, 'which Malebranche opened in 1674, was directed against the *senses*, and through the medium of these against the numerous enemies which the philosophy of Descartes reckoned under the banner of Aristotle and in the camp of Epicurus. After having pointed out the errors to which our senses suffer themselves to be allured in their judgments, made through the medium of outward impressions, the Oratorian teaches that a constant effort is required to keep the flesh in sub-

\* *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique*, iv. §§ 18, 19.

† *Ibid.*, § 20.

jection, and that an appeal must be made to the mind in order that truth may be sought by means of a principle superior to the corporeal world.\*

The Abbé cautiously adds that 'by the aid of principles sometimes very just, frequently otherwise and even false, his wish was to refute that school† which attributes to the senses and to the body a power too great, and also the followers of Gassendi who lean entirely upon them.'

#### (γ) PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.

Lastly, Swedenborg exposes, in a single sentence, the radical error latent in the system of Pre-established Harmony. He shows that it is built on the crumbling basis supplied by the appearances and fallacies arising from the incautious exercise of the rational faculty. He points out that this ingenious but wholly fanciful scheme entirely ignores one of the essential elements of the problem. In attempting to explain the mutual relations of soul and body, Leibnitz rashly assumed the mere fact of *simultaneity*, and denied the equally cardinal fact of *succession*.

A few extracts from the illustrious philosopher of Hanover will suffice to place this point in a perfectly clear light :—

'I don't assent,' he says, 'to the vulgar notions, that the *images of things* are conveyed by the organs (of sense) to the soul. For, it is not conceivable by what passage, or by what means of conveyance, these images can be carried from the organ to the soul. This vulgar notion in philosophy is not intelligible, as the new *Cartesians* have sufficiently shown. It cannot be explained, how *immaterial* substance is affected by *matter*. And to maintain an unintelligible notion thereupon, is having recourse to the scholastick chimerical notion of I

\* *Etude sur Malebranche*, par l'Abbé Blampignon, pp. 104, 105.

† The Scholastic Peripatetica.

know not what inexplicable *species intentionales*, passing from the organs to the soul. Those *Cartesians* saw the difficulty; but they could not explain it. They had recourse to a concourse of God, which would really be miraculous. But, I think, *I have given the true solution of that Enigma.* . . .

'In truth and reality, this way of perception (*i.e.* by the percipient being *present* to the things perceived)\* is wholly chimerical, and has no place even in *human souls*. They perceive what passes *without* them, by what passes *within* them, answering to the things without; in virtue of the *Harmony* which God has pre-established by the most beautiful and most admirable of all his productions; whereby *every simple substance* is by its nature, (if one may so say,) a *concentration*, and a *living mirror* of the *whole universe*, according to its *point of view*. Which is likewise one of the most beautiful and most undeniable proofs of the existence of God; since none but God, *vis.* the Universal Cause, can produce such a harmony of things.' . . .

'The harmony or correspondence between the *soul* and the *body* is not a perpetual *miracle*; but the effect or consequence of an original miracle worked at the creation of things; as all natural things are. Though indeed it is a perpetual *wonder*, as many natural things are.'

\* In the course of the remarkable correspondence between Clarke and Leibnitz, the former had asserted that 'The soul . . . not by its simple *Presence*, but by its being a *living Substance*, perceives the *images* to which it is present' . . . (p. 598.) But supposing this to be admitted, the chief questions necessary to the solution of this '*Enigma*' remain unanswered. Among these may be mentioned the following:—1. What is a living Substance? 2. What is the true nature and character of these '*images*,' and their mode of communication? 3. What are the conditions of the soul's '*Presence*' to these images? As an example of the utter impotence of modern metaphysic, when brought face to face with questions such as these, see '*Notes and Illustrations*,' I. and K., pp. 242, 243, appended to the Preliminary Dissertation prefixed to the Eighth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

'The nature of *every simple substance, soul, or true monad*, being such that its following state is a consequence of the preceding one; here now is the cause of the Harmony found out. For God needs only to make a *simple substance* become *once* and from the beginning, a *representation of the Universe*, according to its *point of view*: since from thence alone it follows that it will be so *perpetually*; and that *all simple substances* will always have a *Harmony* among themselves, because they always *represent* the same *Universe*.\* . . .

'The scholastick philosophers were of opinion, that the *Soul and Body mutually affected each other* by a *natural influence*:† but since it has been well considered that thought‡ and *extended substance* have no connexion with each other, and are beings that differ *toto genere*; many modern philosophers have acknowledged, that there is *no physical communication* between the *soul* and the *body* though a *metaphysical communication* there always is, by means of which the *soul* and the *body* make one *suppositum*, or what we call a *Person*. If there was any *physical communication* between them, then the *soul* could change the degree of swiftness, and the line of direction of certain motions in the *body*. And, on the other

\* Correspondence between Leibnitz and Clarke. *Clarke's Works*, vol. iv., pp. 657—660

† 'The Monads of Leibnitz,' says Mr. J. S. Mill, 'do not really differ from the imaginary Essences of the Schoolmen, except in not being abstractions, but objective realities in the completest meaning of the word; which, indeed, the *Substantiæ Secundæ* of the Realists already were, only that they were essences of classes, and were conceived as inhering simultaneously in numerous individuals, while the Monads of Leibnitz were *lively little beings*, the principles of animation and activity, each of them the *real agent or Force*, at the bottom of one individual.' *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 558.)

‡ Clarke acutely adds in a note:—'*The thinking substance*, he should have said: for *thought*, or the *act of thinking*, is not a substance.' Cf. the language of Newton and Clarke referred to in Prelim. Dissert. to *Encyc. Britan.*, note N. p. 246.

side, the *body* could cause a change in the series of thoughts which are in the *soul*. But now, such an effect as this, cannot be deduced from the notion of any thing we can conceive in the body and soul ; though nothing be better known to us than the soul, because 'tis intimate to us, that is, to itself.'

' I cannot help coming into this notion, that God created the soul in such manner at first, as that it *produces within itself*, and *represents in itself* successively, what passes in the *body*; and that he has made the *body also* in such manner, as that it *must of itself* do what the soul wills. So that the laws which make the thoughts of the soul *follow each other* successively in the order of final causes, and in the order of its perceptions arising within itself, *must* produce images, which shall be *coincident*, and go *hand in hand* with the impressions made by bodies upon our organs of sense. And the laws by which the motions of the body *follow each other* successively in the order of efficient causes, are likewise *coincident* and go *hand in hand* with the thoughts of the soul, in such manner as that these laws of motion make the body act at the *same time* that the soul wills.

' Mr. Jaquelot has very well shown, in his book concerning the *agreement of Reason and Faith*, that this is just as if one who knew before-hand every particular thing that I should order my footman to do to-morrow all the day long, should make a *machine* to resemble my footman exactly, and punctually to perform all day to-morrow every thing I directed. Which would not at all prevent my freely ordering whatever I pleased, though the actions of my machine-footman had no liberty at all.'

' The true means by which God causes the soul to have a perception of what passes in the body is this : that He has made the *nature of the soul* to be *representative* of bodies, and to be beforehand so constituted, as that the *representations* which shall arise in it, one following another according to



the natural succession of thoughts, shall be *coincident with* such change as happens in bodies.' \*

The vulnerable point in the scheme of pre-established harmony did not escape the notice of one of Newton's most able and strenuous defenders against the attacks of Leibnitz, as the following passage abundantly proves :—

'The power of mechanism was never more magnified,' says Mr. Maclaurin, 'than by Mr. Leibnitz's famous doctrine of a *Pre-established Harmony*, as he calls it. According to Des Cartes, the brutes were mere machines; and this doctrine, to many, appeared incredible. But this is nothing in comparison to what Mr. Leibnitz would have us believe, when he tells us that the soul does not act on the body, nor the body on the soul; that both proceed by necessary laws, the soul in its perceptions and volitions, and the body in its motions, without affecting each other; but that each is to be considered as a separate independent machine. The volitions of the mind are followed instantly by the desired motions of the body, not in consequence of those volitions in the least, but of the nice and well adjusted machinery of the body. The impressions produced in the sensory have no effect on the mind, but the corresponding idea arises, at that precise time, in consequence of a chain of causes of a different kind. Thus, all that men do or say, is no more than the effect of exquisite machinery, according to him.' The writer of the above just and accurate description of this once famous hypothesis, apparently feeling ashamed of the absurdity he had so clearly exposed, somewhat abruptly concludes by adding that it was time 'to leave those fictions, lest the reader should be tempted to think that all philosophy is illusion.' †

\* Correspondence between Leibnitz and Clarke. *Clarke's Works*, vol. iv., pp. 705—707.

† Maclaurin's *Essay on Newton's Philosophy*, pp. 89, 90.

Mr. Stewart has placed the same point in a striking light. He describes Pre-established Harmony as a scheme in which 'the human mind [soul] and human body are two independent but constantly correspondent machines;—adjusted to each other like two unconnected clocks, so constructed that, at the same instant, the one should *point* the hour, and the other *strike* it.' Elsewhere the same writer quotes Leibnitz as asserting that 'everything goes on in the soul as if it had no body, and that everything goes on in the body as if it had no soul.' \*

The same writer has acutely observed with respect to Leibnitz that 'his opinions and reasonings in particular, on the necessary concatenation of all events, both physical and moral (which accorded but too well with the philosophy professed by Grimm and Diderot), have been long incorporated with the doctrines of the French materialists, and they have been lately adopted and sanctioned, in all their extent, by an author, the unrivalled splendour of whose mathematical genius may be justly suspected, in the case of some of his admirers, to throw a false lustre on the dark shades of his philosophical creed.' †

The foregoing extracts will, it is hoped, be sufficient to place clearly before the general reader the more prominent

\* Prelim. Dissert. to *Encyc. Britan.* p. 124.

† *Ibid.*, p. 186. See the important note on this place in which this learned author quotes a passage from La Place's *Essay on Probabilities*, which, as he alleges, contains the very spirit of the *Theodicaea* of Leibnitz, and when combined with the other reasonings from the same *Essay*, the very essence of Spinozism.

He is, however, careful to add, that 'notwithstanding this important and unfortunate coincidence, no two systems can well be imagined more strongly contrasted on the whole, than the lofty metaphysics of Leibnitz and that degrading theory concerning the origin of our ideas, which has been fashionable in France since the time of Condillac.'

features of the principal hypotheses hitherto devised with a view to explain the mutual commerce of the soul and the body. When examined with due care they will be found to contain principles which fully justify the succinct but solid and comprehensive criticisms made upon them by Swedenborg, which it may be useful here to re-state:—

1. That they are all mere opinions and hypotheses which do not go to the root of the matter.

2. That *Physical Influx*, or what is known in the present day as *Scholastic Peripateticism*, has its origin in the fallacies of the senses.

3. That *Occasionalism* (more correctly termed, *Spiritual Influx*) has its source in the principle and laws of Order, but that owing to the want of necessary *data* it is the truth as seen in the shade of an imperfect hypothesis.

4. That *Pre-established Harmony* is based upon the mere appearances and fallacies of the rational faculty, and errs fundamentally by defect, in that it attempts to establish *simultaneous*, to the exclusion of *successive* action, in psychical operations.\*

#### THE SYSTEM OF IGNORANCE.

THE three above-mentioned modes of accounting for the origin of ideas and the cardinal psychological fact of perception, failed to obtain the suffrages of succeeding philosophers in general. A fourth supposition is, however, impossible. Two of the three have long since been discarded by many earnest seekers after a truly rational psychology, inasmuch as they serve to darken rather than illustrate the phenomena they were excogitated to explain. Even in the judgment of those

\* On the true meaning and philosophical value of the terms *simultaneous* and *successive*, see Note G of this Appendix.

who were by no means indisposed to give them at least a candid, if not a favourable consideration, there is one fatal defect common to them all.

Dr. Reid, for example, in his strictures on the hypotheses of Leibnitz and Malebranche, as also on what he terms the common system of ideas or images in the mind (in other words, the system of Physical Influx) remarks that they *all* agree in completely overturning the authority of our senses. 'And this one thing,' he adds, 'as long as men retain their senses, will always make all these systems truly ridiculous.'\*

These speculations, once so celebrated, have accordingly come to be almost entirely neglected throughout the Protestant portion of Christendom, contemporaneously with the writings of Christian Wolf. These latter may be regarded as containing the last great effort made by any one mind, outside the pale of the Roman Catholic Communion, to build up a complete and self-consistent system of Christian Philosophy, on the basis of rational Realism.† They were followed by the chimerical lucubrations of Kant, which culminated in the grotesque and shocking absurdities of Hegelianism. As might have been anticipated, such unheard-of follies, ushered into the world with much parade of learning and pretension of profundity, ultimately created in sober and intelligent minds, a strong disgust of all such speculations. German 'thought,' unable any longer to keep itself, like the coffin of Mahomet, poised in mid air, suddenly sunk into the mire and clay of naturalism and atheism.

In the present day a persuasion widely prevails that all problems which transcend the sphere of mere nature and the bodily senses are beyond the reach of human inquiry. Upon

\* *Reid's Works*, p. 309. (Hamilton's Ed.)

† From this statement must be excepted, of course, the perfect Philosophical system of Swedenborg, the transcendent merits of which are certain to be recognised in due time.

this false notion is based another, namely, that it is the duty of the philosopher to acquiesce blindly in what may be called a systematized ignorance. These and similar principles are beginning to produce in abundance, their proper fruit, a subtle Nature-worship, a new form of Paganism without parallel in ancient or modern times—the worship of the Unknown and Unknowable.

The investigation of the ‘doctrine of the human soul, from whose treasures all other doctrines are derived,’ has, consequently, become more and more beset with obstacles of various kinds. From the point of view, both of mental and physical science, the central problem of Rational Psychology, namely, the nature of ‘the common tie of soul and body,’ has been repeatedly declared, in most peremptory terms, to be one for the solution of which man has no faculties. By a coincidence which deserves notice, the *authority* of the late Professor Dugald Stewart has been formally invoked in two recently published psychological treatises,\* apparently for the express purpose of *fixing the limit* beyond which inquiry on this subject may not pass.

The *ipse dixit* to which appeal is thus made, declares that it is agreeable to the rules of just philosophy ‘to ascertain the *laws* which regulate the union between the soul and the body, without attempting to explain *in what manner* they are united.’ The rule here laid down has its origin in unphilosophical and pernicious prejudice. The interest of truth and free thought demand that it be treated as it deserves. It implies *retrogression* to the methods of the dark ages. It will be disregarded by all who are honest and fearless pioneers of new truths.

This combined appeal to the self-same passage in the writings of the Edinburgh Professor, affords a fair opportunity

\* Dr. Carpenter’s *Ment. Physiol.* pp. 1, 2, and Professor Bain’s *Mind and Body*, p. 191.



to place before the reader explicitly, and in some detail, an appropriate and instructive illustration of the way in which the pseudo-authority of one who is little more than a mediocre metaphysician, may be employed to check the progress of discovery, and to facilitate the corruption of science.

The principle of perpetual ignorance, to the guidance of which the writers above referred to seem to have committed themselves without reserve, is thus expressed by its author in its most general form :—

‘ The most profound discoveries which are placed within the reach of our researches lead to a confession of human ignorance ; for, while they flatter the pride of man, and increase his power, by enabling him to trace the simple and beautiful laws by which physical events are regulated, they call his attention, at the same time, to those general and ultimate facts which bound the narrow circle of his knowledge ; and which, by evincing to him the operation of powers, whose nature must for ever remain unknown, serve to remind him of the insufficiency of his faculties to penetrate the secrets of the universe. Wherever we direct our inquiries ; . . . we perpetually perceive the effects of powers which cannot belong to matter. To a certain length we are able to proceed ; but in every research *we meet with a line, which no industry nor ingenuity can pass.* It is a line too, which is marked with sufficient distinctness ; and which no man now thinks of passing, who has just views of the nature and object of philosophy. It forms the separation between that field which falls under the survey of the physical inquirer, and that unknown region, of which, though it was necessary that we should be assured of the existence, in order to lay a foundation for the doctrines of natural theology, it hath not pleased the Author of the universe to reveal to us the wonders, in this infant state of our being. It was, in fact, chiefly

by tracing out this line, that Lord Bacon did so much service to science.'\*

Now passing over the numerous *petitiones principii*, assumptions, and incongruity of thought which characterize the above passage, it may be safely asserted that no such 'line' as that indicated was ever traced out by Lord Bacon. His writings, both in letter and spirit, when fairly interpreted, lead to a conclusion directly opposed to that advocated in the above extract. The great author of the *Instauratio Magna*, with a combined wisdom and prudence, unhappily rare in the present age, cautions his readers against rashly confounding the two distinct, but intimately connected, spheres of the Divine and the human. He pleads, notwithstanding, once and again, for the largest freedom of investigation in both, as the following passage shows. After declaring 'that it is a vain attempt to draw down the sublime mysteries of religion to our reason,' and that 'we should rather raise our minds to the adorable throne of heavenly truth,' he proceeds to say:—'*It is otherwise*, as to the nature of spirits and angels; this being neither unsearchable nor forbid, but in a great part level to the human mind, on account of their affinity. We are, indeed, forbid in Scripture to worship angels, or to entertain fantastical opinions of them, so as to exalt them above the degree of creatures, or to think of them higher than we have reason; but the *sober inquiry* about them, which either ascends to a knowledge of their nature by the scale of corporeal beings, or views them in the mind, as in a glass, *is by no means forbid*. The same is to be understood of revolted or unclean spirits: conversation with them, or using their assistance is unlawful; and much more

\* *Elements of the Phil. of the Hum. Mind*, vol. i., pp. 88, 89. (Ed. 1818.) This despairing confession of philosophic impotence has recently been echoed by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his *Study of Sociology*, pp. 310, 311.

in any manner to worship or adore them : but the contemplation and knowledge of their nature, power, and illusions, appears from Scripture, reason, and experience, to be *no small part of spiritual wisdom.*'\*

The remainder of this remarkable passage deserves to be consulted in the present connexion. The whole, indeed, reads as if this consummate lawyer held a brief, for the most enlightened of theologians, as against narrow-minded and intolerant adversaries, in a Court where Christian philosophers sat as judges in the case.

There is surely 'scope and verge enough' given here for the energies of speculative intellects of the highest order. The alleged definite 'line' does not appear where, if any where, it might have been expected. The illustrious restorer of the Inductive Method, obviously pleads earnestly for freedom of inquiry into subjects which certain men of science, and so-called experimental psychologists, regard as puerile superstitions. The exalted and mysterious region indicated in the above extract must be held to be open to all explorers. Nor does the 'line' in question show itself even when the 'doctrine of man' and the 'doctrine of union, or the common tie of soul and body,' are the subjects specially treated of in the *Advancement of Learning*. On the contrary, the man of science and the philosopher, properly so called, are even encouraged to enter upon this alleged forbidden 'border-ground' lying between the natural and the spiritual spheres. No *limit* of any kind is even hinted at.

The point here insisted upon is strikingly illustrated by the fact that Bacon makes specific reference to the 'one particular hitherto slightly touched, or not well examined, as its usefulness and abstruse nature require ; namely, how far a fixed and riveted imagination may alter the body of the imaginant.' . . . It is rendered still more evident from a

\* *Advancement of Learning*, Book iii., c. 2.

consideration of another passage in which he observes, with his usual sagacity and far-reaching foresight, that 'among these doctrines of union, or consent of soul and body, there is none more necessary than an inquiry into the proper seat and habitation of each faculty of the soul in the body and its organs. Some, indeed, have prosecuted this subject ; but all usually delivered upon it is either controverted or slightly examined, so as to require more pains and accuracy. The opinion of Plato, which seats the understanding in the brain, courage in the heart, and sensuality in the liver, should neither be totally rejected nor fondly received.'\*

These are truly noble words. They are worthy of their illustrious author. They contain a salutary lesson in largeness and liberality of mind, much needed in these days of superficial and random philosophizing. They also involve a well-merited rebuke of that small and narrow sect of physicists, who evince such ill-directed zeal in the attempt to stop the further progress of the human intellect, and condemn it perpetually to ring the changes on a few fanciful naturalistic hypotheses.

Fortunately for the cause of intellectual progress, the race of independent thinkers never dies out. There are still to be found a few who do not despair of philosophy ; who refuse to recognise any authority within her boundless realms save human reason fairly and fearlessly applied to facts ; and who regard as puerile the *quasi* ukases issued from time to time, by metaphysicians and physicists, prohibiting every attempt to pass beyond the limiting line, arbitrarily traced on the free soil of philosophical speculation, by such self-constituted rulers and guides of thought.

Nor would these vain endeavours, on the part of bygone writers, to limit the use of reason, have merited special notice, were it not that traces of their influence, as respects

\* See *Advancement of Learning*, pp. 153—156.

the point in question, are only too visible in the present day. The same narrow and dogmatic spirit continues to show itself in a form which borders on, if it does not at times reach, a point of arrogance which emulates the Vatican. A well-known class of writers seems to be labouring with all possible energy and industry to arrest the march of human reason by attacking its foundations, and calling in question its unalienable right to absolute freedom of philosophical inquiry.

Mystery has ever been the favourite subterfuge, not only of the baffled metaphysician, but also of the naturalistic man of science. When perplexed by difficulties, both alike despairingly resort to the *principle of ignorance*, as to an asylum in which they may, with the greater security, continue to weave the flimsy web of their little systems. Thus it is that some physicists emulate certain theologians. The former read the Book of God's works, the latter the Book of His Word, with the mind's eye veiled. Each, in their own peculiar way, seek 'the living among the dead.'

As an example of the manner in which the physicist appeals to the principle of ignorance, as against any inquiry beyond his own sphere of investigation, the following is worthy of notice on several accounts.

It has been recently asserted, with surprising self-confidence, as being determined, not only for the present, but for all time to come, that "the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted (it is said) that a definite thought, and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously ;\* we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor

\* This is the fundamental fallacy of the Leibnitzian system of the connexion between the soul and the body. No such phenomenon as that here supposed is possible, as a little reflection will serve to show. The reasoning based upon it, therefore, is wholly imaginary. All simultaneous action,



apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one to the other. They appear together, but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened and illuminated as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain ; were we capable of following out all their motions, all their groupings, all their electric discharges, if such there be ; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem, 'How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?' The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impossible."

With futile attempts of this kind to obstruct the free exercise of the human intellect upon one of the noblest of all subjects of investigation, Swedenborg overtly joins issue. He claims to have successfully effected the very 'passage' in question. He asserts that man does possess an organ or instrument such as that vaguely hinted at in the above extract. This organ is no other than genuine *Rational Philosophy*, based on facts derived from experience, and proceeding by the method of analysis. He further asserts that he has passed from the sphere of the body proper, to that of the soul proper, by means of a legitimate process of close, continuous, analytical thought, resting at every point on indubitable experience in the various sciences, especially in that of physiology. He proves the truth of his assertion

in a living organism, necessarily presupposes successive action. For example—thought precedes speech ; and will precedes act. When the mind is excited from without, molecular movement of the brain must actually precede sensation. When the brain is set in motion from within, mental activity must actually precede cerebral movement. The error into which the distinguished physicist has here fallen, reveals the fact that he has not duly attended to the purely *psychological* aspects of the subject which he has undertaken to discuss.

in the most convincing of all ways—by making use of the proper organ, solving the problem, and crossing the so-called chasm which has been declared to be impassible. He was the first to investigate the soul's mode of being and nature by the analytic method. 'The soul,' he says, 'has engaged the profound attention of nearly all human minds, ever since the infancy of philosophy; and still holds them in suspense, division, and perplexity. . . In order, therefore, to follow up the investigation (of the soul's mode of being and nature), and to solve the difficulty, I have chosen to approach by the analytic way; and I think I am the first who has taken this course professedly.' \*

Referring to those who go in opposition to nature, and thus do violence to their own powers, Swedenborg makes the following remarks, in which much that is being transacted before one's eyes in the present day is depicted to the life: 'The more,' he says, 'they attempt a transition from one reason to another, and to draw a single conclusion from all, the more do they entangle the threads of their argument, till they enclose themselves within the folds of the intricate web they have woven; and at last are enshrouded in darkness, from which they find it impossible by their own endeavours to escape. . . . .

'These chiefly are they who invent senseless hypotheses, and gravely invite the public to visit their castles in the air. Who display an absurd ambition to narrow the limits of knowledge, and persuade themselves that there is no cultivated land beyond the borders of their own muddy lake. Who, if haply their eyes be opened, nevertheless contend to the last for the false against the true. Who proclaim that nature is altogether beyond the reach of human comprehension, and consign her to chains; bidding the world despair of seeing her liberated at all, or at least for ages. Who claim all

\* *An. King.*, Part I., pp. 10, 11.

wisdom as an attribute of memory, and hold nothing in esteem but bare catalogues of facts, regarding as of no account any enquiry into their causes. Who, in imitating the character of others, and omitting their own, or in fighting fiercely under another's standard, fancy themselves among the leading geniuses of the age, and think they have merited the leadership. Who consider themselves as having revealed the secrets of Delphi, if they have only been able to invest the obscure oracles of another mind with some new, and as they suppose, ornamental costume of their own. All which errors of theirs arise from the fact, that they have not learnt to measure their genius by the rule of nature.'\*

The true origin and cause of this system of ignorance is clearly shown, in the following remarkable passage, the real meaning and full scope of which can in no wise be seen, without a previous patient and careful study of our author's system of Rational Philosophy and Psychology.

*'There is,' he says, 'a correspondence of the will and understanding with the heart and lungs, and consequently a correspondence of all things of the mind with all things of the body.*

*'This is new,' he continues, 'inasmuch as it has been heretofore unknown. The reason is that what the spiritual is has not been known, nor in what it differs from the natural. Hence it comes to pass that correspondence has also remained unknown. For there is a correspondence between things spiritual and natural, and by means of this correspondence their conjunction takes place. It is said that, heretofore, what the spiritual is has not been known, nor what its correspondence is with the natural order, nor consequently what correspondence itself is. Nevertheless both might have been known.'*

After noting the fundamental facts relative to the cor-

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. i., pp. 10, 11.

relation and contrast of the spiritual and the natural as displayed in the correspondent functions of the will and understanding with the heart and lungs, Swedenborg proceeds to say: 'That such things have remained unknown—although they might have been known—is because man has become so external that he is not willing to acknowledge anything but what is natural. The latter has been and is the delight of his love and therefore of his intellect. Wherefore it comes to pass that to raise his thought above and beyond what is natural to anything spiritual, separate from what is natural, has been and is for him distasteful. On this account he has been and still is unable, from his natural love, to think otherwise than that the spiritual order is merely a more purely natural order, and that correspondence is a something, the inflow of which is by continuity.\* Yea more, the merely natural man is unable to think of any thing separate from what is natural: to him this would be nothing.

'The following is also a reason why these things have not been seen and known up to the present time. All things belonging to religion, which are called spiritual, have been removed from man's sight by means of the dogmatic principle which prevails throughout the whole Christian world, that theological matters of a spiritual kind which councils and chosen leaders have determined, are to be blindly believed, inasmuch as (according to their mode of speaking) they transcend the intellect.

'Hence some have therefore supposed that what is spiritual is, as it were, a bird which flies above and beyond the air in the æther, whither the sight of the eye cannot reach; when, notwithstanding, it is, so to say, a bird of Paradise which flies near the eye, and touches the pupil

\* The truth of this is amply and painfully illustrated in the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer.

thereof with his beautiful wings, and is desirous of being seen. By the sight of the eye is meant the sight of the intellect.\*

The foregoing extracts will be fitly supplemented by the following, in which a contrast is drawn between the principles of science as existing among the men of the old time, and the science of the present day. The view advanced is, indeed, such as to provoke a smile in those who cherish a blind belief in the airy speculations now current respecting the origin and early condition of the human race. Those, however, who ponder the subject more soberly and profoundly, those, especially, who are in the greatest degree conversant with the actual results arrived at by Egyptian, Assyrian, and other patient explorers of the records of a most remote antiquity, will doubtless read what is here stated with some interest.

‘The principles of science among the ancients,’ says our author, ‘were altogether different from those of the present day. The science of the ancients treated of the correspondences of things in the natural world with those which are in the spiritual world. Matters of science which are now called philosophy, such as are those of Aristotle and the like, were unknown to them. This is also evident from the books of the earlier writers, several of which are written in such terms as signified, represented, and corresponded to interior things.

‘The science of the ancients was such as to lead them into a knowledge of things spiritual and celestial, of which the very existence is, at this day, scarcely known. That which succeeded it, and which is properly called Philosophy, rather withdraws the mind from what is spiritual and celestial, inasmuch as it may be applied to the confirmation of what is false. It has a tendency, likewise, to obscure the

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 374.



mind when truths receive confirmation from it, inasmuch as it consists, for the most part, of bare terms, by which such confirmations are made, and these come within the grasp of only a few. Nor is there agreement about the terms even among these few. Hence it may be seen how far mankind has departed from the learning of the ancients, which led to wisdom.\*

Dr. Thomas Reid, a century since, openly despaired of any satisfactory philosophy of perception being ever reached. 'I believe,' he says, 'no man is able to explain how we perceive external objects, any more than how we are conscious of those that are internal.' But Mr. Stewart goes much further. It is not a little irksome to find this writer taking advantage of every opportunity to advocate the *system of ignorance* so decidedly and deservedly condemned by Christian Wolf. The Scottish Professor uniformly treats, with a contempt and scorn which stand in painful contrast with the moderate and liberal spirit that usually marks his criticisms, the efforts made by great minds to solve a problem which he has unwarrantably assumed to be one of those that transcend the utmost reach of the human faculties. At the close of an impartial and instructive account of the Leibnitzian hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony, in his interesting Preliminary Dissertation prefixed to the Eighth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Mr. Stewart remarks that the hypothesis of Occasional Causes is liable to the objection 'that it presumes to decide upon a question of which human reason is altogether incompetent to judge.'† This, however, is not the language of a cautious, hopeful, far-seeing, and large-minded philosopher. The writer does not seem to have been in the least aware that an intensely dogmatic expression of individual opinion such as this, carries with it the spirit and tone

\* *Arcana Cælestia*, § 4966.

† Page 125.

of a dictate pronounced by some Pontiff who imagined himself intellectually infallible, and fully authorized to prescribe bounds to the free exercise of the human faculties. In another part of the same Essay the following passage occurs, in which this distinguished writer invokes the co-operation of the arch-sceptic Hume, in the attempt to place a bar upon the progress of human reason in its pursuit of this, the most legitimate and also the noblest among all the subjects of philosophical research. "It is very justly observed," he says, "by Mr. Hume,\* with respect to Sir Isaac Newton, that 'while he seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he showed, at the same time, the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy, and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity in which they ever did, and ever will remain.' When the justness of this remark (adds Mr. Stewart) shall be as universally acknowledged in the science of Mind as it now is in Natural Philosophy, we may reasonably expect that an end will be put to those idle controversies which have so long diverted the attention of metaphysicians from the proper objects of their studies.

"The text of Scripture, prefixed by Dr. Reid, as a motto to his *Inquiry*, conveys, in a few words, the result of his own modest and truly philosophical speculations on the origin of our knowledge, and expresses this result in terms strictly analogous to those in which Newton speaks of the law of gravitation:—'*The inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding.*' Let our researches concerning the development of Mind, and the *occasions* on which its various notions are first formed, be carried back ever so far towards the commencement of its history, in *this* humble confession of human ignorance they must terminate at last."†

\* Mr. Stewart seems fond of this fancy of Hume's, for the same passage is again alluded to in the above-mentioned Dissertation; and introduced by the words, 'It is justly and profoundly remarked,' &c.

† *Ibid.* Page 73.

This is not the proper place to enter upon a minute criticism of the grounds upon which this usually cautious writer thus rashly ventures to mark out, with such rigid precision, the actual limits beyond which the seeker after psychological truth may not pass. A few general remarks will suffice to indicate the character and tendency of such attempts to close peremptorily all psychological inquiry that, on the one hand, aims at rising above the low level of mere general deductions from physiological phenomena, and, on the other, endeavours to shun the barren regions of mere metaphysical musings.

It may be allowed to ask, in the first place, whether this sublime utterance of the Ancient Church, preserved in the Book of Job, can be justly alleged as a warrant for making the above complacent 'confession of human ignorance?' Does it not rather, implicitly at least, teach an exactly opposite doctrine? Ought it not to be understood by Christian philosophers (among whom, perhaps, Hume would decline the honour of being classed) as a revelation of heavenly truth from the Deity Himself, making known the Divine origin and relations of man's inner life, and thus indirectly suggesting the existence within him of boundless capacities for exploring the mysteries which encompass his spiritual being?

It may also be permitted to inquire further, on what principle the above words of Elihu can be so interpreted as to limit the free exercise of the human faculties in their 'researches concerning the developement of mind, and the occasions on which its various notions are first formed.' Taken according to its obvious meaning, the devout exclamation of Elihu does not afford a shadow of support to the interpretation in question. On the contrary, when understood in its true sense, it constitutes a sure ground on which to build our hopes of ever-increasing knowledge.\*

\* See a sublime passage in *The Wisdom of Solomon*, c. ix., 9-17.

Nor does Dr. Reid's special application of his own motto authorize the view taken by Mr. Stewart. The author of the *Inquiry into the Human Mind*\* simply observes, as a matter of fact, that 'memory is an original faculty, given us by the Author of our being, of which we can give no account, but that we are so made. . . . I believe most firmly, what I distinctly remember; but I can give no reason of this belief. It is the inspiration of the Almighty that gives me this understanding.' There is here no attempt made to discourage others from entering upon investigations into the essence and properties of what Mr. Stewart is pleased to term 'that which thinks,' or 'the heterogeneous existences of matter and mind.'† But be this as it may, it is clear that the real or supposed inability of a metaphysician to give a reason for believing that he remembers, cannot be allowed to be made a pretext for laying a metaphysical interdict on all efforts to discover the true *rationale* of that inner and transcendent mechanism involved in the marvellous phenomena of memory. The kind of objections, indeed, which are urged by such writers against any fresh researches in directions which they choose to regard as closed to all human inquiry, appear ridiculous in the present state of physiological science.

It is in connexion with this question of the bond between the soul and the body that the Edinburgh Professor has more especially shown throughout his works a spirit of obscurantism altogether unworthy of a true philosopher. Since his time the science of physiology, more particularly in its psychological relations, has made advances which might almost be called miraculous. An immense mass of new and wonderful facts, in that mysterious field of scientific research which lies between the mere crass material body

\* Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, pp. 340, 341.

† *Encyc. Eritan. Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 243.

and its inmost animating spirit, have been brought fully into light within a comparatively recent period. Of all this wealth of science the Scottish 'metaphysical' psychologists knew nothing. Were they permitted to reappear in this lower world, and contemplate these additions to the stock of human knowledge, it is not too much to say that feelings of unbounded astonishment would be excited within them. Their opinions, as to what is possible to be known would suddenly become profoundly qualified, and their language much more guarded respecting what, on a superficial view, had formerly seemed to them to be 'impotent attempts to explain a mystery unfathomable by human reason.'

An amazing advance has been made within the last twenty years in a knowledge of the mere physiological conditions connected with the hidden activity of this faculty of memory in particular. A flood of light has been shed upon the microscopic mechanism of the cerebral nerve-cells, of which the chiefs of the Scottish School of Psychology had not the most remote conception. And yet a careful and unprejudiced study of Swedenborg's wonderful physiological and psychological researches, would have put them in full possession of all the clearly established fundamental principles that, up to the present time, have been detected in connexion with the *mechanism of the operation between the soul and the body*; together with the addition of countless others not even yet suspected by the Psychologists of the present day. It may be proper to observe here that Swedenborg's analysis of the faculty of memory as far transcends the commonly received notions on the subject, as the Newtonian system of Astronomy does that of Ptolemy. Our author has done incomparably more than merely anticipate what has been hitherto written on what has been most erroneously denominated, 'unconscious cerebration.'

Nor has the Edinburgh Professor been more successful in



his appeal to Newton and the law of gravitation. Unintentionally he is guilty of a grave injustice to the transcendent genius of Newton, in the attempt made to represent that consummate natural philosopher as raising obstacles to the free play of the human intellect in the pursuit of truth. The mistake is the more surprising, inasmuch as the immortal author of the *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* has been at the pains, once and again, to intimate clearly that his discovery of the law of gravitation, so far from precluding inquiry into its causes, only served to prepare the way for such inquiry. The absurd notions prevalent on this point among certain disciples of Newton are destined soon to disappear for ever from the scientific world. It is at last beginning to be generally understood and acknowledged, that on this subject the greatest of natural philosophers has been strangely misunderstood, and his views persistently misrepresented. What those views were may be clearly gathered from the following remarks in his *Opticks*: \*—

‘It seems to me . . . that these (primitive material) Particles . . . are moved by certain active principles, such as is that of Gravity, and that which causes Fermentation, and the Cohesion of Bodies. These principles I consider, not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from the specifick Forms of Things, but as general Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are form’d; their Truth appearing to us by Phænomena, though their Causes be not yet discover’d. For these are manifest Qualities, and their causes only are occult. And the *Aristotelians* gave the Name of occult Qualities, not to manifest Qualities, but to such Qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in Bodies, and to be the unknown Causes of manifest Effects: Such as would be the Causes of Gravity, and of magnetick and electrick Attrac-

\* p. 377. Ed. London, 1730.

tions, and of Fermentations, if we should suppose that these Forces or Actions arose from Qualities unknown to us, and incapable of being discovered and made manifest. Such occult Qualities put a stop to the Improvement of natural Philosophy, and therefore of late years have been rejected. To tell us that every species of Things is endow'd with an occult specific Quality by which it acts and produces manifest Effects, is to tell us nothing: But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phænomena, and afterwards to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in philosophy, though the Causes of these Principles were not yet discover'd. And therefore I scruple not to propose the Principles of Motion above-mention'd, they being of very general Extent, and leave their Causes to be found out.'

'He has complained to me,' says Mr. Pemberton, in the concluding paragraph of his valuable *View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy*, 'of having been misunderstood in this matter. What he says on this head was not intended by him as a philosophical explanation of any appearances, but only to point out a power in nature not hitherto distinctly observed; the cause of which, and the manner of its acting, he thought was worthy of a diligent inquiry. To acquiesce in the explanation of any appearance, by asserting it to be a general power of attraction, is not to improve our knowledge in philosophy, but rather to put a stop to our farther search.'

But the point under consideration—the right of reason to search after truth—is so important, and in many of its relations so sacred, that it is worth while to reproduce Newton's deliberate statement on the subject. It is contained in the celebrated Scholium appended to the Third Book of the *Principia*, and is here transcribed from Cotes's translation:—

‘Hitherto we have explain’d the phaenomena of the heavens and of our sea, by the power of Gravity, but have not yet assign’d the cause of this power. This is certain that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very centers of the Sun and Planets, without suffering the least diminution of its force; that operates, not according to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles upon which it acts, (as mechanical causes use to do,) but according to the quantity of the solid matter which they contain, and propagates its virtue on all sides, to immense distances, decreasing always in the duplicate proportion of the distances. Gravitation towards the Sun, is made up out of the gravitations towards the several particles of which the body, of the Sun is compos’d, &c. . . . But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phaenomena, and I frame no hypotheses. . . . And to us it is enough, that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.

‘And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle Spirit, which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and action of which Spirit the particles of bodies mutually attract one another at near distances, and cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this Spirit, mutually propagated, along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles. But these are things that cannot be explain’d in few words, nor are we furnish’d with that

sufficiency of experiments which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates.' \*

To the above may be added the following vindication of Newton, taken from a remarkable work which appeared a few years since, and which is destined sooner or later to influence profoundly prevailing modes of thought respecting the philosophy of Physical Forces. The author quotes the following explicit statement from Newton's *Third Letter to Bentley* :—

'That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a *vacuum*, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.'

Upon this passage the author proceeds to remark :—

'And yet not long after Newton's time the view that he took was discarded, occult qualities were admitted, and force was considered to be inherent in matter. This *scientific heresy*, as it may be called, arose apparently from a misunderstanding of the distinction between *law* and *causation*.† Sub-

\* *Mathemat. Principles of Nat. Phil.*, vol. ii., p. 392. (Ed. London, 1729.)

† "It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; for it is the only mode according to which an agent proceeds. It implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The expression 'the law of metallic nature,' may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as 'the law of vegetable nature,' 'the law of animal nature,' or, indeed, as 'the law of nature' in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion

sequently Hume added to the confusion by his dogma that by experience we have no perception of causation, but only of a succession of events according to immutable law. This view, which has obtained wide acceptance, was in different ways advocated by Thomas Brown of Edinburgh, Baden Powell of Oxford, and other writers, and gave occasion to endless perplexities, from which neither Scotch nor German metaphysicians have been able to extricate themselves.\*

'For a long time,' says Professor Challis, 'there has prevailed in the scientific world a persuasion that it is unphilosophical to inquire into the *modus operandi* of gravity. I think, however, it may be inferred, from the passage quoted in p. xix.,† that the author of the *History of the Inductive Sciences* did not altogether share in this opinion. . . . It would have been a fatal objection to my general physical theory if it had not been capable of giving some account of the nature of the force of gravity.'‡

From the foregoing the reader will be able to estimate at its true value the above quotation from Hume, to which the Edinburgh Professor has given so cordial an approval. When examined in the light of facts, each proposition contained in it is seen to be either false or unmeaning.

of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these." (Paley's *Nat. Theol.*, Chap. I.)

\* *Principles of Mathematics and Physics*, by the Rev. Professor Challis, (p. 683.)

† The passage here referred to runs thus:—"Kepler's laws were merely *formal* rules, governing the celestial motions according to the relations of space, time, and number; Newton's was a *causal* law, referring these motions to mechanical reasons. It is no doubt conceivable that future discoveries may both extend and farther explain Newton's doctrines;—may make gravitation a case of some wider law, and disclose something of the mode in which it operates; questions with which Newton himself struggled."

‡ *Principles of Mathematics and Physics*, Introduction, pp. 55, 56.



To all but sceptics, blinded by their own proper self-conceit, it is obvious that Newton did not 'seem,' but actually did 'draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature.' And how the revelation of 'the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy' (whatever the phrase may mean) became instrumental in restoring the 'ultimate secrets' of nature 'to that obscurity in which they ever did, and ever will remain,' may be fairly regarded in its turn as another profound and sublime secret, which this infatuated thinker has not condescended to disclose for the benefit of his benighted admirers.

The text of the sceptic, and the comment of the metaphysician, taken together, form a striking illustration of that strange phenomenon, which the judicious author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* has acutely analyzed in the seventh chapter of that instructive work, under the head—'What is the cause that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the Writer and the Reader?' It is, clearly, quite possible for eloquent historians and learned metaphysicians to write essays, as the Spanish poet wrote some of his sonnets, *without in the least understanding what they have written.*

It is refreshing to turn from such solemn trifling with the most sacred rights of reason, to the noble and generous sentiments, dictated from his dying bed by a contemporary and countryman of the imperturbable and perverse sceptic. They form a striking contrast in all that is elevated, pure, and holy in human thought and feeling, to the blind unbelief, and its concomitant stupid credulity, displayed in the lucubrations of the Scottish arch-sceptic. Colin Maclaurin, illustrious at once for intellectual abilities, high moral qualities, disinterested patriotism, and sincere piety, has left behind him the following beautiful reflections, made in full prospect of his earthly dissolution. Regarding man as the chief being on this globe, this writer was of opinion that his present

state was only the dawn or beginning of his existence, and a state of preparation or probation for farther advancement. 'And whoever,' he proceeds to say, 'attentively considers the constitution of human nature, particularly the desires and passions of men, which appear greatly superior to their present objects, will easily be persuaded that man was designed for higher views than of this life. These the Author of nature may have in reserve to be opened up to us, at proper periods of time, and after due preparation. Surely it is in His power to grant us a far greater improvement of the faculties we already possess, or even to endow us with new faculties, of which, at this time, we have no idea, for penetrating farther into the scheme of nature, and approaching nearer to Himself, the First and Supreme Cause. We know not how far it was proper or necessary that we should not be let into knowledge at once, but should advance gradually, that, by comparing new objects, or new discoveries, with what was known to us before, our improvements might be more complete and regular; or how far it may be necessary or advantageous, that intelligent beings should pass through a kind of infancy of knowledge. For new knowledge does not consist so much in our having access to a new object, as in comparing it with others already known, observing its relations to them, or discerning what it has in common with them, and wherein their disparity consists. Thus our knowledge is vastly greater than the sum of what all its objects separately could afford; and when a new object comes within our reach, the addition to our knowledge is the greater, the more we already know; so that it increases, not as the new objects increase, but in a much higher proportion.' \*

The question which Newton here deliberately left open,

\* *Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Works*, pp. 391, 392.

his inconsiderate disciples have done their utmost to close. 'But,' it has been modestly asked, 'may we not attempt to find the *cause* of gravitation, and of other phaenomena which we call laws of nature? No doubt we may. We know not the limit which has been set to human knowledge, and our knowledge of the works of God can never be carried too far.' In the remarkable work already referred to—on the actual character and merits of which the present writer does not presume to give an opinion—Professor Challis has formally laid claim to having made some solid advances in the way of 'giving some account of the *nature* of the force of gravity.' Thus the embargo which, for two centuries, the votaries of philosophic nescience succeeded in laying upon the free passage of the intellect into a higher region than that of natural law, has at length been legitimately, and once for all, removed.

#### PHILOSOPHICAL FREEDOM.

It is not a little remarkable that in these days of apparently boundless liberty of thought and speech on all subjects sacred and secular, it should be necessary to put in a plea for *liberty to philosophise freely* on certain difficult and much disputed questions. Such, however, is the fact. There exists at present a strong tendency to suppress, by all available means, every form of thought which has for its object a clearer unfolding of the true character and laws of the intellectual and supra-natural world, on the basis of sound reason and Divine Revelation. That such a tendency exists, and is daily on the increase, there can be no reasonable doubt. What may be justly described as a new, narrow, exclusive, and pernicious sect, has recently made its appearance, the leaders of which boldly denounce, and so to say, excommunicate from the body of what they are pleased

to regard the most enlightened thinkers, all who venture upon the rational and methodical investigation of such questions as they have arbitrarily pre-determined to be utterly incapable of solution.

The new 'pseudo-scientific sect of Darwinian evolutionists,' and the so-called 'metaphysical' teaching which is so strongly marked by 'a passionate hatred of religion' have come to be the subjects of honest and earnest public rebuke, on the part of those who take a deep and sacred interest in the preservation of genuine intellectual freedom.\*

Lord Bacon seems to have had clearly before his mind the exact type of this narrow-minded and arrogant class of intellectual obstructors, when he penned the following pregnant passage:—

'Nay, those very authors who have usurped a kind of dictatorship in the sciences and taken upon them to lay down the law with such confidence, yet when from time to time they come to themselves again, they fall to complaints of the subtlety of nature, the hiding-places of truth, the obscurity of things, the entanglement of causes, the weakness of the human mind; wherein nevertheless they show themselves never the more modest, seeing that they will rather lay the blame on the common condition of men and nature than upon themselves. And then whatever any art fails to attain, they ever set it down upon the authority of that art itself as impossible of attainment; and how can art be found guilty when it is judge in its own cause? So it is but a device for exempting ignorance from ignominy.'†

Among the champions, without reserve, of the great prin-

\* See extracts from the *Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews*, quoted in the Appendix to Mr. Howard's interesting paper on 'The Contrast between Crystallization and Life,' (*Journal of Transactions of VICTORIA INSTITUTE*, vol. viii. pp. 201, 202.)

† *Bacon's Works*, iv. pp. 15, 16. (Ed. by Spedding, Ellis, and Heath.)

ciple of *proving all things and holding fast that which is good*, Swedenborg, in his day, occupied the foremost ranks. In the sublime and solid system of intellectual truth which he taught, it is a first principle that the faculty of reason in him is the very receptacle of the light of heaven. It is also a law of Divine Order that no truth, as such, can be received unless in and by a free mind. In opposition to this enlightened stand-point of free and fearless inquiry, the only one worthy of a true philosopher, certain men of science, metaphysical speculators, and mere *littérateurs*, ardently emulate those partizan theologians to be found in every Christian Communion, who insist upon keeping the human mind hopelessly borne in the chains of a blind irrational faith in the 'unknown and unknowable.' All alike, in their respective domains, agree in forbidding inquiry into subjects which overpass the boundaries which they have presumed to prescribe to the exercise of reason, for all time to come.

In these days of wanton and profane hostility to all that bears the name or semblance of supra-natural existence, the burning words of an indignant Christian poet inspired by the mad impieties of his own age, still retain their full force and point :—

" Ye that the rising morn invidious mark,  
And hate the light—because your deeds are dark ;  
Ye that expanding truth invidious view,  
And think, or wish, the song of Hope untrue ;  
Perhaps your little hands presume to span  
The march of Genius, and the powers of man ;  
Perhaps ye watch, at Pride's unhallow'd shrine,  
Her victims, newly slain, and thus divine :—  
' Here shall thy triumph, Genius, cease, and here  
Truth, Science, Virtue, close your short career.'

" Tyrants ! in vain ye trace the wizard ring  
In vain ye limit Mind's unwearied spring



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What ! can ye lull the winged winds asleep,  
 Arrest the rolling world, or chain the deep !  
 No !—the wild wave condemns your scepter'd hand—  
 It rolled not back when Canute gave command."

Nearly a century and a half ago, Swedenborg had entered his bold and manly protest, as a rational philosopher, against all unrighteous attempts, made by whatsoever class or order of men, to load the heaven-born human intellect with the vile shackles of their own forging. At the close of his great, and as yet almost unknown, *PRINCIPIA*, he says :—

"I cannot conclude without referring to the name of Christian Wolff, who has bestowed so much attention to the cultivation of his intellectual powers, and who has so much contributed to the advance of true philosophy by his various scientific and experimental researches. I refer more particularly to his *Philosophia Prima*, as also to his *Cosmologia Generalis*, in which he has formed various rules and axioms to guide us in our progress to the attainment of first principles, and a perusal of which has served very considerably to confirm my views ; although the principles laid down in the present work had been formed and committed to paper two years before I had an opportunity of consulting his works. In the revision of the present volume I acknowledge myself much indebted to his publications ; so much so, that if any one will take the trouble to compare the two, he will find that the principles I have here advanced and applied to the world and its series, almost exactly coincide with the metaphysical and general axioms of this illustrious author. We cannot but acknowledge, therefore, in the words of this learned writer, 'that in philosophy we must grant a place to philosophical hypotheses, so far as they prepare the way to a clear discovery of the truth.' Again : 'Science can make no progress, unless we allow of a liberty to philosophise.'

Again: 'Full liberty must be granted to all who philosophise in a philosophical manner; nor have we any reason to apprehend from such a liberty any danger either to religion, to virtue, or to the state.' \* \*

The above reference to the works of an almost forgotten philosopher is full of meaning, in connexion with the great subject of the right to investigate, without limit or restriction of any kind, all problems actual and possible, that may happen to present themselves in any field of inquiry. Few, perhaps, in the present day, have any adequate notion of the fiery ordeal through which Wolf was obliged to pass, in his pursuit and promulgation of what he deemed to be truth.

Born in the year 1679 (nine years before Swedenborg), the son of a Breslau tradesman, carefully educated for the Christian Ministry, he gradually won his way, *Proprio Marte*, to the first rank of European philosophers. An academical Discourse pronounced by him in the year 1721, raised against him a perfect storm of theological indignation, and he became the object of a relentless persecution on the part of the Dean and Theological Faculty of his university. He was charged with diffusing dangerous opinions—teaching a *brutum fatum* is specially mentioned—and rumours of banishment for the atheist speedily grew rife. The King, weakly yielding to the pressure of theological fanaticism, commanded him to quit Prussia in twenty-four hours, under pain of the halter! He prudently took his departure in twelve hours, leaving behind him his little son, a year old, and his wife in the near prospect of an addition to his family. Such was the position of an eminently distinguished Professor of Philosophy in Christian Europe in the early part of the last century! Such the state of intellectual and theological liberty in Protestant Prussia! Taken in connexion with

\* *Principia*, vol. ii. pp. 366, 367.

the persecuting spirit of the Papacy during many centuries previously, how completely does all this justify Swedenborg's sweeping charge against the entire Christian Church, that *charity had forsaken it*, and that from a *spiritual* point of view it had arrived at its last days?

The enemy which free thought has to encounter to-day, is not so much the Church as the World, not so much religious superstition as a deadly naturalism and atheism, not so much the old *odium theologicum* as the insane fanaticism which has seized hold of certain believers in the divinity of dead 'Matter and Force.'

To return to Wolf. Seven years after he fortunately found himself under the powerful protection of Frederick the First, King of Sweden. The two important works, of which Swedenborg makes special mention above, were published respectively in the years 1730 and 1731, and were both dedicated to the Swedish king. The *Principia* of Swedenborg made its appearance in the year 1734. The above courageous and graceful allusion to the works of Wolf is therefore not without interest in connexion with the great struggle for philosophical freedom.

The modern so-called 'free-thinker' often deeply deceives himself and his too easy dupes in this matter. Many are ardent in their advocacy of 'unfettered progress in natural knowledge;' and while they are passionate pleaders for their one favourite pursuit, they are at the same time serenely oblivious of all else beside. According to times and circumstances, their antagonism is either wild or wary towards every notion that involves belief in any form of genuine intellectual and spiritual philosophy. These are the most formidable foes of intellectual freedom.

In connexion with the above reference to Wolf, it may be worth while to cite the opinion of a metaphysical writer, who, in this case, cannot reasonably be suspected of undue

partiality for the method or principles of his eminent countryman. Kant, as is well known, was by no means lavish of laudations, either on his predecessors or his contemporaries. His liberal praise of Wolf's method, in the passage which follows, is all the more noteworthy, as that method, in all its essential characteristics, stands in striking contrast to his own, as, indeed, it does to that adopted by the 'Sensation' philosophers of the present day. It is not a little curious to find the author of the 'windy egg' known as the 'Critick of Pure Reason,' a writer at once so wily of words and chary of praise, referring in terms of warmest commendation to the now almost forgotten philosopher of Marburg. He writes thus :—

'In the execution of the plan which Critick prescribes, that is, in the future system of Metaphysick, we must follow some day the strict method of the famous *Wolf*, the greatest amongst all dogmatic philosophers, who first gave the example (and by means of this example, was the author of that spirit of profoundness, not yet extinguished in Germany), how, by means of a legitimate, firm laying down of principles, clear determination of conceptions, tried severity of proofs, caution against rash jumps into conclusions, the sure march of a science is to be taken—who, on this account, was especially suited to place such a one as Metaphysick is, in such a state, had it occurred to him, through Critick of the *Organ*, that is to say, of Pure Reason itself, to prepare the field previously ;—a failing which is to be attributed not so much to him, but rather to the dogmatic mode of thinking of his age, and whereupon philosophers of his, as well as of all previous times, had no cause to find fault with one another. Those who reject his method, and, still at the same time, the mode of proceeding of the Critick of Pure Reason, can have nothing else in mind, but to throw off entirely the bonds of

Science—to change work into play—certainty into opinion—and philosophy into philodory.\*

This deliverance of Kant is given for what it is worth. It may however be observed that, as there does not exist the slightest similarity between the speculative methods of Wolf and Kant, the remarks of the Königsberg metaphysician are as devoid of real meaning as most other portions of his chimerical lucubrations.

The wise and weighty testimony of Wolf, however, against the system of ignorance and in behalf of the *possibility* of a genuine rational psychology, is worthy of being reproduced at a time when the problem in question is in danger of being abandoned in despair, by common consent. It presents a valuable protest, by a thinker of wide and deep culture, against that cowardly and retrogressive spirit which would systematize ignorance, and attempt to hide its hideousness, by clothing it in a pretentious but utterly unmeaning phraseology.

The opinion of Wolf is as follows :—

Non leve est iudicium de singulis ex veritate statuere ; et valde vereor, ne qui vulgo sibi iudicium sumunt de hypothesebus philosophorum, quibus commercium inter mentem ac corpus explicare conati fuere vel hodiernum conantur, tanto acumine non sint instructi, quo opus est, ne iudicium praecipitent. Ut igitur famae suae consulant, nec molesti sint aliis difficultatem perpendentes cautius mercari discant et aliis dijudicanda relinquant, quae ipsorum iudicio submitti nequeunt. Ex historia literaria omnis aevi probari potest, quantum veritati investigandae obfuerint praecoces hypothesis philosophicarum censurae. Nostrum igitur est earum fontes detegere ne quis in ignorantia praesidium aliquod positum esse existimet.†

\* Kant, *Critick of Pure Reason*. Preface to 2nd Ed. p. xxxvii., (Haywood's translation.)

† *Psychol. Rat.* adnot. in § 532.



Quaestio de commercio inter mentem et corpus inter difficillimas omni tempore a philosophis relata, ac plurimis nodus prorsus indissolubilis visus. Non defuere qui, cum de eo solvendo desperarent, eum secarunt alterutrius substantiæ existentiam in dubium vocantes, veluti Idealistæ ac Materialistæ, quorum hi corporum, illi animarum tanquam substantiarum immaterialium existentiam impugnarunt. In re adeo difficili muneris sui partes adimplet philosophus, si in excogitanda hypothese vires suas periclitetur, ut, dum ex ea rationem eorum reddere studet, quæ observationum fide certa sunt, appareat, num veritatem assecuti fuerimus, vel quantum adhuc ab eadem distemus. Si quis postulaverit, ut liquida statim proponatur veritas, is ea exigit, quæ in hominem non cadunt: quaedam enim veritates adeo inaccessæ sunt, ut plures frustra tentandæ sint viæ, antequam ad eas perveniatur. In arte inveniendi alieni ac hospites sunt, qui sibi persuadent ad veritatem quamcunque latentem eruendam solam sufficere philosophi voluntatem. Quodsi vero ab iis abstinere jusseris philosophum, quæ nondum certa ac explorata sunt; posteris præcludis viam ad veritatem, ad quam tibi inaccessa est. Si Astronomis idem fuisset animus, nobilissima, quam profitentur, scientia ad id fastigium nunquam evecta fuisset, ad quod eandem evectam vident intelligentes.\*

In commenting on a certain *Systema Ignorantiæ*, apparently prevalent in his own day, this courageous champion of philosophical freedom further observes:—Non improbamus, ut, qui vel imbecilliores sunt quam ut veritatem philosophicam capere possint, vel quorum non est nodos in philosophia intricatos extricare, malint ignorantiam suam profiteri, quam assensum profiteri: id enim utique laudandum potius est, quam vituperandum. Necesse tamen est ne id fiat in detrimentum veritatis et ut philosopho integra sit sua philoso-

\* *Psychol. Rat.* § 531.

phandi, quemadmodum aliis sua ignorandi libertas. Quodsi quis demonstrasset impossibilitatem inveniendi systematis, quod veritati consentaneum sit; is omnino quaestioni arduae satisfecisset: perinde enim est quaestionem solvere, et solutionis impossibilitatem demonstrare. Enim vero ne ea in re iudicium praecipitetur, sequentem subjungimus propositionem.\*

In this proposition he contends for, at least, the possibility of forming a system of Influx:—

*Systema explicandi commercium animae atque corporis possibile est.* Commercium animae atque corporis dari admissio Dualismo certum est. Idealistae enim et Materialistae, qui Monistae sunt, nullo systemate habent opus. Quoniam itaque eorum omnium, quae sunt, ratio reddi potest, cur sint potius, quam non sint; necesse est rationem quoque dari commercii, quod inter animam atque corpus intercedit. Quoniam itaque ex systemate ratio reddenda est huius commercii; quin systema explicandi commercium inter mentem atque corpus intercedens possibile sit, dubitari haud quamquam potest.†

To the above he adds an explanatory note which applies with wonderful accuracy to current modes of speculation:—

Constat itaque impossibilitatem inveniendi systematis non manare a re ipsa, si demonstrari possit, sed a subjecto cognoscente. Quamobrem demonstraturus systema nullum, quod satisfaciat veritati, inveniri posse, evincere tenetur, non esse homini tantas animi dotes, quantae ad systema istud in aprium protrahendum requirantur. Equis vero, nisi in arte inveniendi ac historia literaria veriori prorsus hospes, istiusmodi demonstrationem viribus suis parem iudicabit? Cum itaque temerarium foret hoc iudicium, philosophi vero sit veritatem latentem eruere; reprehendendus is minime

\* *Psychol. Rat.* adnot. in § 554.

† *Ibid.* § 555.

venit, ubi ingenii sui vires in re tam ardua perclitetur, nec vertendum vitio est, si recta ad veritatem liquidam non statim pertingere potest, sed per hypothesium ambages incedere tenetur.

The following passage also is instructive, in this connexion, as indicating the manner in which this problem of Influx presented itself specifically to the mind of a metaphysician, to whom such frequent reference has been made in these pages. It also serves to show how vague and indeterminate were the notions he entertained as to its true character, although aided by widely extended researches into psychological literature, both ancient and modern.

'The mutual action,' says Mr. Stewart, 'or (as it was called in the schools) the mutual *influence* (*influxus*) of soul and body, was, till the time of Descartes, the prevailing hypothesis, both among the learned and the vulgar. The reality of this *influx*, if not positively denied by Descartes, was at least mentioned by him as a subject of doubt; but by Malebranche and Leibnitz it was confidently rejected as absurd and impossible. (See their works *passim*.) Gravesande, who had a very strong leaning towards the doctrines of Leibnitz, had yet the good sense to perceive the inconclusiveness of his reasoning in this particular instance, and states in opposition to it the following sound and decisive remarks:—Non concipio, quomodo mens in corpus agere possit; non etiam video, quomodo ex motu nervi perceptio sequatur; non tamen inde sequi mihi apparet, omnem *influxum* esse rejiciendum.

'Substantiæ incognitæ sunt. Jam videmus naturam mentis nos latere; scimus hanc esse aliquid, quod ideas habet, has confert, &c., sed ignoramus quid sit subjectum, cui hæc proprietates conveniant.

'Hoc idem de corpore dicimus; est extensum, impenetrabile, &c.; sed quid est quod habet hæc proprietates? Nulla nobis via aperta est, qua ad hanc cognitionem pervenire possimus.

‘Inde concludimus, multa nos latere, quæ proprietates mentis et corporis spectant.

‘Invicta demonstratione constat, non mentem in corpus, neque hoc in illam agere, ut corpus in corpus agit ; sed mihi non videtur inde concludi posse, omnem *influxum* esse impossibilem.

‘Motu suo corpus non agit in aliud corpus, sine resistente ; sed an non actio, omnino diversa, et ejus ideam non habemus, in aliam substantiam dari possit, et ita tamen, ut causa effectui respondeat, in re adeo obscura, determinare non ausim. Difficile certe est influxum negare, quando exacte perpendimus, quomodo in minimis quæ mens percipit, relatio detur cum agitationibus in corpore, et quomodo hujus motus cum mentis determinationibus conveniant. Attendo ad illa quæ medici, et anatomici, nos de his docent.

‘Nihil, ergo, de systemate *influxus* determino, præter hoc, mihi nondum hujus impossibilitatem satis clare demonstratam esse videri.’ (*Introductio ad Philosophiam.*)\*

The question of *Influx*, then, must still be regarded as a perfectly open one, and the above cautious and sagacious pleading of Gravesande for *some* system of Influx, meets after all with approval on the part of the Scottish metaphysician. †

Nor, happily, are there wanting modern, and in some respects, more competent authorities, on behalf of the more hopeful view of the subject, from whom the following are adduced as examples :—

‘In truth,’ says Dr. Beale, ‘when we enter upon the

\* Prelim. Dissert. *Encyc. Britan.* p. 125.

† “The doctrine of Reid and Stewart, in regard to our perception of external things, bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of *Divine Assistance*, or of Occasional Causes. It seems, however, to coincide most completely with the opinion of Ruardus Andala, a Dutch Cartesian, who attempted to reconcile the theory of Assistance with that of *Physical Influence*. (*Reid's Works*, p. 257, note, in which the entire passage from Andala is cited.)

consideration of the *cause* of the changes in living matter, we get beyond the limits of observation and experiment. It will, of course, be said that such discussions are therefore futile, and out of the province of science. But if this view be accepted, we must cease to inquire into the nature of living things almost as soon as we have commenced to investigate the things. The growth, formation, and action of the simplest being, and of every elementary unit entering into the formation of the tissues of every living creature, would in that case be to us a sealed book. And it would be absurd to attempt to describe the processes of growth, formation, and secretion, as they occur in living beings. In truth, the question not only lies at the very root of physiology, but forces itself upon our consideration at every step. It must, therefore, be discussed, and provisional hypotheses may be advanced, if only to mark the paths already traversed in the course of our difficult and never-ending exploration.

‘The physical school may try to stop all enquiry at this point. The subject is obviously out of the path of physical enquiry ; but it by no means, therefore, follows that nothing is to be learnt concerning it. No wonder that those who would have us believe that the highest aspirations of the soul are but manifestations of so many units of force, desire to chain the mind so close to the material, that it shall no longer be able to exercise one of its remarkable endowments—that of tending towards regions where the senses cannot penetrate. Is the mind to obey the senses, instead of leading, controlling, and directing them? Are the senses to govern the intellect, and to dictate to it the conditions under which it may work?’ \*

Dr. Carpenter also justly observes that “every one who accepts as facts, merely on the evidence of his own senses,

\* *Protoplasm*, pp. 274, 275. Third Ed.



or on the testimony of others who partake of his own beliefs, what Common Sense tells him to be much more probably the fiction of his own imagination—even though confirmed by the testimony of hundreds affected with the same epidemic delusion—must be regarded as the subject of ‘a diluted insanity.’” But he also is careful to add the following judicious qualification:—“At the same time, every one who admits that ‘there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy,’ will be wise in maintaining a ‘reserve of possibility’ as to phenomena which are not altogether *opposed* to the Laws of Physics or Physiology, but rather *transcend* them. Some of the Writer’s own experiences have led him to suspect that a power of intuitively perceiving what is passing in the mind of another, which has been designated as ‘thought-reading,’ may, like certain forms of sense-perception, be extraordinarily exalted by that entire concentration of the attention, which is characteristic of the states we have been considering. . . . Looking at Nerve-force as a special form of Physical energy, it may be deemed not altogether incredible that it should exert itself from a distance, so as to bring the Brain of one person into direct dynamical communication with that of another, without the intermediation either of verbal language or of movements of expression. A large amount of evidence, sifted with the utmost care, would be needed to establish even a *probability* of such communication. But would any Man of Science have a right to say that it is *impossible* ?”\*

With the courteously expressed but altogether unwarrantable dogmatism of writers like Dugald Stewart, and with the wild and worse than Pagan deliverances of a crowd of modern materialistic sciologists, may be profitably compared the following eminently calm, candid, and profound judgment, in

\* *Ment. Physiol.* pp. 632—634.

reference to the subject now under consideration, as formally given by one of the most illustrious living physicists :—

‘Il faut remarquer d’abord que la connaissance que nous avons des phénomènes dont il s’agit n’est pas encore assez complète pour permettre de considérer l’une des théories comme admissible à l’exclusion de toutes les autres. Je crois que jusqu’ici, dans le choix qu’ils ont eu à faire entre les différentes opinions, les auteurs se sont plutôt laissé influencer chacun par la tendance métaphysique de son esprit que par l’autorité des faits ; et, dans le domaine de la psychologie, bien des questions de principe sont encore pendantes, qui sont depuis longtemps résolues dans celui des phénomènes de la nature inorganique.

\* \* \* \* \*

‘J’accorde que nous sommes bien loin de connaître les phénomènes psychiques d’une manière rigoureusement exacte. Chacun peut, suivant la tendance spéculative à laquelle il accorde la préférence, nier absolument, comme les spiritualistes, ou admettre absolument, comme les matérialistes, la possibilité de pénétrer dans la nature de ces phénomènes. Mais le naturaliste, qui doit s’en tenir aux faits et à la recherche des lois qui les régissent, n’a pas à décider cette question. Il ne faut pas oublier que le matérialisme est une spéculation ou hypothèse métaphysique tout aussi bien que le spiritualisme ; aussi lui refuserons-nous le droit de s’immiscer dans l’explication des faits naturels, avec des raisonnements *a priori*, sans s’appuyer sur des faits.’ \*

‘Cependant je reconnais d’une manière formelle que les questions que nous avons discutées ici ne sont pas encore complètement résolues. J’ai choisi mon point de vue à cause de la simplicité des explications que l’on peut en déduire ; j’ai été guidé davantage encore par certaines considérations de méthode ; en effet, il me semble toujours préférable de

fonder les explications des faits naturels sur les hypothèses *les moins nombreuses et les plus déterminées* possible. Mais je dois le dire aussi, dans le cours de ces recherches, qui ont absorbé une bonne partie de mon existence, plus j'ai appris à soumettre à ma volonté les mouvements de mes yeux et mon attention, moins il m'a paru admissible d'expliquer les phénomènes principaux de ce ressort, par l'action d'un mécanisme nerveux préexistant.' \*

#### HYPOTHESES IN PHILOSOPHY.

It is to be distinctly noted that Swedenborg has expressly characterized as hypotheses or conjectures the three celebrated systems, by means of which it has been sought to explain the mutual commerce of soul and body.

In laying down the principles and method of his own system, he sets out by deliberately discarding hypotheses of every kind. His aim, from the first, was to establish, on the impregnable basis of undoubted experience, a solid and permanent system of Rational Philosophy, which should serve for the enlightenment and advancement of posterity in all time to come. This vast design he undertook to accomplish under the guidance of a new and completely adequate method. For every quality that ought to distinguish a good method no parallel to his can be found. Let those who doubt the accuracy of this assertion examine for themselves.

On the Use and Abuse of Hypotheses in Philosophy, Dr. Reid observes :—

‘ Every branch of human knowledge hath its proper principles, its proper foundation and method of reasoning ; and if we endeavour to build it upon any other foundation, it will never stand firm and stable. Thus, the historian builds

\* *Helmholtz*, p. 1027.

upon testimony, and rarely indulges conjecture; the antiquarian mixes conjecture with testimony, and the former often makes the larger ingredient; the mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything, by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion,\* but cannot produce knowledge. Natural philosophy must be built upon the phenomena of the material system, discovered by observation and experiment.'

After some instructive observations on the early attempts of men to philosophise, on the futility of all hypotheses and conjectures, and specially on the fanciful notions of the Peripatetics and Descartes, this generally cautious and judicious thinker proceeds to give what appears to him to be sufficient reasons for treating all hypotheses, in every branch of philosophy, with contempt, and for despairing of ever advancing real knowledge in that way.

'There is,' he adds, 'such proneness in men of genius to invent hypotheses, and in others to acquiesce in them, as the

\* It is to be observed that Swedenborg is careful to distinguish mere speculations, conjectures, and opinions concerning the problem of Influx, from a clearly established theory, the truth of which may be verified by experience and reason. It is of the highest moment to bear in mind, in connexion with present-day speculations, the distinction between truth and opinion. Opinion is always more or less overshadowed by doubt and uncertainty. Truth is ever seen in and by its own light. Opinion is, to some extent, a thing of the fancy. The light of reason never falls directly upon it. Locke has well described it as "the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so." "*Opinio*," says a modern philosopher of a high order, "*est assensus propositioni, cujus extremorum unionem non clare ac distincte cernimus, unita tamen esse ex medio quodam probabili argumentamur.*" (Gerdil, *Institutiones Phil.*, tom. i. pp. 264, 265. Ed. Romæ, 1867.) Both these views well set forth Swedenborg's estimate of the three hypotheses under consideration.

utmost which the human faculties can attain in philosophy, that it is of the last consequence to the progress of real knowledge, that men should have a clear and distinct understanding of the nature of hypotheses in philosophy, and of the regard that is due to them.

‘Although some conjectures may have a considerable degree of probability, yet it is evidently in the nature of conjecture to be uncertain. In every case the assent ought to be proportioned to the evidence; for to believe firmly what has but a small degree of probability, is a manifest abuse of our understanding. Now, though we may, in many cases, form very probable conjectures concerning the works of men, every conjecture we can form with regard to the works of God, has as little probability as the conjectures of a child with regard to the works of a man.

‘The wisdom of God exceeds that of the wisest man, more than his wisdom exceeds that of a child. If a child were to conjecture how an army is to be formed in the day of battle—how a city is to be fortified, or a state governed—what chance has he to guess right? As little chance has the wisest man when he pretends to conjecture how the planets move in their courses, how the sea ebbs and flows, and how our minds act upon our bodies.’\*

These strictures of Dr. Reid, when taken with the necessary qualifications, are in no way opposed to the philosophical principles assumed by Swedenborg. The latter has described, in language of incomparable clearness and force, the essential characteristics belonging to the two systems, respectively, of Materialism and merely abstract Metaphysics, and to every modification of which they can be conceived susceptible. ‘Many,’ he says, “stubbornly refuse to stir a step beyond visible phenomena for the sake of the truth; and others prefer to drown their ideas in the occult at the very outset.

\* *Reid's Works*, pp. 234, 235.



To these two classes our demonstration may not be acceptable. For, in regard to the former, it asserts that the truth is to be sought far beyond the range of the eye ; and, in regard to the latter, that in all the nature of things there is no such thing as an occult quality ; in fact, that there is nothing but what is either already the subject of demonstration, or is capable of becoming so." \*

No one knew better than the philosopher of Stockholm the utter futility of employing the *a priori* method to build up a genuine Rational Psychology. 'To deduce,' says he, '*a priori*, the mode in which the soul flows into its mind, and the mind into its body, would be to act like an augur who should utter his predictions before he had inspected the entrails of the victim ; or, if I may use the simile, would be like describing, from the egg, the body which has yet to be formed, instead of taking the description from the body itself after it has been already formed.' †

It is a surprising circumstance, and one which serves to illustrate the worthless, reckless, and even insincere character of the common criticisms of Swedenborg's method and principles, that the vulgar opinion respecting both these points, is exactly the opposite of that so clearly laid down in the above definite and express disclaimer. With, at least, equal force reason, he could declare with Newton—*Hypotheses non fingo* ; and with Bacon—*Non fingendum aut excogitandum, sed inveniendum quid natura faciat, aut ferat*.

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. p. 210.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 39.

## SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT PROBLEM.

(a)—*Metaphysical.*

The swiftness of thought has in all time been a favourite figure with the poets, and has furnished to the philosopher one of the most arduous themes for the exercise of his ingenuity.

Homer sings of the

*Nēes ōkeîai ōsei pteron hē νόημα.*

Shakspeare, as might have been expected, abounds in allusions to the 'swift pace' of thought. He speaks of 'wings more momentary swift than thought,' of 'wings swift as meditation or the thoughts of love,' of 'conceits that have wings fleeter than arrows, bullets, wind, thoughts, swifter things.'\*

Mental philosophers, from the dawn of speculation, have dimly apperceived or divined, the fact that mental processes are intimately connected with certain occult states of the material organism. It was reserved, however, for the comparatively recent science of Physiology to reveal to some extent, the true character of the marvellous mechanism required to give outward manifestation to the secret operations of the soul, and to demonstrate the necessity of admitting, under some idea or other, the existence of an intermediate substance of almost inconceivable tenuity, constituting a link or bond between the gross *corporeal body*, and the spiritual substance commonly called the *soul*.

The following extracts have been selected from a vast

\* 'The number and quick succession of the operations of the mind, make it difficult to give due attention to them. It is well known, that if a great number of objects be presented in quick succession, even to the eye, they are confounded in the memory and imagination. . . . No succession can be more quick than that of thought.' (*Reid's Works*, p. 240, Hamilton's Ed.)

number of a similar character, with the view of placing before the reader some of the more general aspects of the point in question, as they have presented themselves both to metaphysicians and physiologists.

And, first, with respect to the metaphysicians, it will be obvious that, in their deliverances, they are, for the most part, like 'infants empty of thought.'

#### I.—THOMAS HOBBS.

'If,' says this master in the school of metaphysical materialism, 'I should ask any most subtle distinguisher, what middle nature there were between an infinitely subtil substance, and a mere thought or phantasm, by what name could he call it?' To this question let a great poet reply. It will be seen how near the truth was his poetic divination, aided by the science of his time. He says :—

Man's Architect distinctly did ordain  
The charge of muscles, nerves, and of the brain,  
Through viewless conduits, spirits to dispense,  
The springs of motion from the seat of sense.

#### II.—THE CARDINAL DE LA LUZERNE.

The following opinion of a distinguished philosopher, is clear and intelligible as far as it goes, but it fails just at that point where light is most needed. It contains in germ, however, a cardinal doctrine of Swedenborg's psychology.

'*Mon corps est un intermédiaire nécessaire entre mes pensées quelconques et tous les corps de la nature. Il y a donc entre la substance qui pense en moi, et que j'appelle âme, et la substance composée de membres, que j'appelle corps, une correspondance mutuelle, une correspondance constante, mais en même temps une correspondance exclusive que mon âme n'a qu'avec mon seul corps. Or, c'est cette réciprocité, cette corrélation, cette correspondance continuelle*

entre ces deux êtres, que nous appelons l'union de l'âme et du corps.' \*

'L'âme étant unie au corps, on demande dans quelle partie du corps elle réside ? Nous avons exposé, en traitant de la spiritualité et de l'immensité de Dieu, la manière dont des substances spirituelles sont présentes à l'étendue. Nous avons vu que c'est par l'intelligence, qui leur fait connaître ce qui s'y passe, et par la volonté qui agit. Nous avons remarqué que ces expressions, *être dehors*, *être dedans*, sont impropres, et même inexactes, appliquées à la substance spirituelle qui n'a, ni ne peut avoir de localité.' †

### III.—SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

As to the alleged fact 'that in perception mind is immediately cognisant of matter,' Sir William Hamilton makes the following remarks:—

'*How* self can be conscious of not-self, *how* the mind can be cognisant of matter, we do not know; but we know as little *how* mind can be percipient of itself. In both cases we only know the fact, on the authority of consciousness; and when the conditions of the problem are rightly understood—when it is established that it is only the *primary* qualities of body which are apprehended in themselves, and this only in so far as they are in immediate relation to the organ of sense—the difficulty in the one case is not more than in the other.' ‡

From confessions of learned nescience such as this nothing can be hoped. They who are resolved not to despair of a true philosophy, must needs believe that the method which conducts to such darkness must be radically vicious.

\* *Dissert. sur la Spiritualité de l'âme.* (Œuvres, tom. v. p. 222.

† *Dissert. sur la Spiritualité de l'âme*, p. 223

‡ *Reid's Works*, Supplementary Dissertations, Note A. p. 755.

## IV.—PROFESSOR UBAGHS.

On the special point of the *union* of the soul and the body, Professor Ubaghs makes the following observations:—

‘L’âme et le corps de l’homme sont unis de la manière la plus intime. Tous les philosophes s’accordent là-dessus. En outre, tous ceux qui ont réfléchi sur la nature de la substance spirituelle conviennent que l’âme n’est pas mêlée avec le corps, ni fondue ou répandue dans les pores ou les interstices des molécules corporelles, ni blottie, comme une molécule de la plus petite dimension, soit dans un coin, soit dans un point central du cerveau, ou dans une autre partie minime du corps. La simplicité de l’âme n’est pas comparable à celle d’un point mathématique, et son existence dans le corps n’est nullement semblable à celle d’un corps mêlé ou répandu dans un autre corps similaire ou dissimilaire. Elle est une force active, qui n’a pas de siège, à parler strictement, mais une sphère d’activité dans notre corps, et qui est tout entière partout où elle est.

‘Quelle est l’étendue de cette sphere? Tout en regardant le cerveau comme l’instrument principal de l’âme, la plupart des philosophes lui accordent avec Gærres le corps tout entier pour sphere de son activité: *tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte*; d’autres lui assignent avec Burdach comme résidence le système nerveux tout entier. Or, comme ce système est lui-même répandu dans tout le corps, ces deux opinions se concilient facilement.

‘Mais comment faut-il concevoir cette union si intime et si étendue? Pour faire comprendre notre pensée à cet égard, nous dirons que cette union est 1° une union de compénétration et 2° une union hypostatique.

‘Nous l’appelons 1° union de compénétration, par opposition à l’impénétrabilité que tous les physiciens attribuent aux



molécules matérielles des corps ; et ainsi nous désignons par cet mot que l'âme, parce qu'elle est une force et non pas un agrégat d'atomes, n'est ni ne peut être exclue par le corps des points de l'espace que celui-ci occupe.

'2° Nous l'appelons union hypostatique ou personnelle, parce que c'est par cette union que l'âme et le corps de l'homme ne sont ensemble qu'une seule personne, et que l'on peut affirmer d'un individu humain les propriétés de son âme et celles de son corps, quoique ces propriétés soient opposées entre elles au point de s'exclure mutuellement d'une même substance.'\*

#### V.—DEAN MANSEL.

Nearly a century after Swedenborg's *brochure* on Influx appeared, an eminent Oxford Professor and Bampton Lecturer, placed some of the principal points of the present problem thus graphically before his hearers, from the pulpit of the University Church :—

'All action, whether free or constrained, and all passion implies and rests upon another great mystery of Philosophy, —the Commerce between Mind and Matter. The properties and operations of matter are known only by the external senses : the faculties and acts of the mind are known only by the internal apprehension. The energy of the one is motion : the energy of the other is consciousness. What is the middle term which unites these two ? and how can their reciprocal action, unquestionable as it is in fact, be conceived as possible in theory ? How can a contact between body and body produce consciousness in the immaterial soul ? How can a mental self-determination produce the motion of material organs ? How can mind, which is neither extended, nor figured, nor coloured in itself, represent, by its ideas, the extension and figure and colour of bodies ? How can the body be determined to a new position in space by an act of

\* *Précis de Psychologie*, ss. 373–376. Ed. 1857.

thought, to which space has no relation? How can thought itself be carried on by bodily instruments, and yet itself have nothing in common with bodily affections? What is the relation between the last pulsation of the material brain and the first awakening of the mental perception? How does the spoken word, a merely material vibration of the atmosphere become echoed, as it were, in the silent voice of thought, and take its part in an operation wholly spiritual? Here again, we acknowledge, in our daily practice, a fact which we are unable to represent in theory; and the various hypotheses to which Philosophy has had recourse,—The Divine Assistance, the Pre-established Harmony, the Plastic Medium, and others, are but so many confessions of the existence of the mystery, and of the extraordinary, yet wholly insufficient efforts made by human reason to penetrate it.\*

The above may be regarded as a rough general summary of the principal difficulties which naturally present themselves in connection with this question. Several of the statements advanced contain much that is open to adverse criticism. But allowing this to pass, the obvious and sufficient reply, from Swedenborg's point of view, is that many of the alleged difficulties are purely imaginary, and arise from ignorance of the true *data* necessary to the solution of the problem; and that in the theory given by the philosopher of Stockholm, the real difficulties that present themselves in a thorough-going analysis, are one by one made to disappear. When his various psychological treatises are patiently and candidly examined by those, who from previous culture, are competent to the task, they will be found to satisfy, at all points, the conditions of the problem. But no opinion, entitled to the least consideration, can be pro-

\* *Bamp. Lect.* p. 137, &c.

nounced upon the actual merits of the solution he has given, until the grounds upon which it is based shall have been carefully studied and thoroughly understood.

This is a work, however, which will be found to be by no means easy to accomplish. The very first step in such an undertaking will be to reject utterly the barren method of metaphysics, and enter at once upon a systematic study of physiology. The soul has for her proper kingdom the body. Here alone, if anywhere, she is to be found.

( $\beta$ )—*Physiological.*

The immense mass of facts brought to light by recent physiological researches, is such as to impress powerfully upon all intelligent psychologists the necessity of making a distinction between a *mental state*, and the actual *manifestation* of that state, through the medium of the amazingly complex mechanism, provided for the purpose, in 'the quick forge and working-house of thought,' the brain. This distinction is of fundamental importance in all psychological inquiries deserving of the name.\*

In all investigations into the essence and quality of psychological phenomena, according to any rational method, the distinction here indicated must never be lost sight of. It involves, so to say, a 'previous question,' the examination of which takes precedence of all inquiries into the nature of the soul. In the solution of it is to be found the key to the

\*See Dr. Beale's *Protoplasm*, pp. 208, 209. The present writer ventures to state that in the various works of this distinguished physiologist will be found a keen and trenchant, but always honest and manly, exposure of much absurd and mischievous writing that passes current with thoughtless readers for legitimate deductions from scientific facts. It may be added that they also afford invaluable aid (doubtless altogether undesignedly) in the way of enabling a student of Swedenborg's writings to comprehend not a few of the most important principles advanced in the system of Rational Psychology taught by the philosopher of Stockholm.

chief difficulties by which the problem is surrounded. This 'previous question' is the existence of an *intermediate* between the  $\psi\nu\chi\eta$  on the one hand, and the crass corporeal organism on the other. The *facts* involved must be clearly grasped. The battle-ground of a Rational Psychology lies here. Now, more than at any previous time, it behoves all who desire to contribute to the real and solid advance of psychological science, to endeavour, by adequate analysis of the phenomena, to penetrate the mysterious middle region occupied by what has been called the 'animal spirits.' Here is the 'passage,' 'gulf,' 'film,' *limbus*, or by whatsoever name called—alleged, without an attempt at proof, to be impassible—which divides the two distinct but closely correlated spheres of soul and body.

What, then, have those psychologists to say on the subject of this intermediate region, which they have attempted to approach, by the combined aid of reason and physiology?

#### I.—CHRISTIAN WOLF.

Christian Wolf thus writes on the subject of the nervous fluid, or animal spirits, as generally understood in his time:—

*'Quando anima affectibus commovetur, sanguis ac fluidum nerveum in corpore motu extraordinario agitur. Res facti a posteriori probatur. Nemo dubitat iram in numerum affectuum referri debere. Jam vero si quis ad iram concitatur, facies rubet, sudor in capite præsertim erumpit, vultus ac gestus mutantur, quamvis non in singulis eodem prorsus modo. . . . Mutatio vultus et gestuum fiunt mediante muscolum motu: muscoli non moventur sine motu fluidi nervei. Ex mutatione adeo vultus et gestuum colligitur extraordinarius fluidi nervei, aut si mavis, spirituum animalium motus, quando ira excandescit animus. Idem eodem modo patet in*

terrore. Si quis enim in terrorem conjicitur, facies tota pallet, manus frigent, cor palpitât, &c.\* . . .

‘Qualis sit ille motus, qui nervis sensoriis imprimitur, utrum oscillatione, fibrillarum nervearum, an progressu fluidi cujusdam ex organo in cerebrum, vel alio quocunque modo absolvatur; hic non disquirimus. Nobis enim hic loci perinde est, quicquid horum veritati consentaneum sit. Sufficit constare in organo sensorio motum quendam excitari ab objecto sensibili, qui ad cerebrum usque nervorum auxilio propagatur, nec nisi motu ad cerebrum propagato sensibili percipi: . . . . Neque novimus ullum unquam extitisse philosophum, qui motus hujus ad cerebrum propagationem in dubium vocaverit, ipsaque Anatomia, eum satis superque insinuat, si ex eadem systema nervosum tibi fuerit perspectum.’†

## II.—RAYMOND VIEUSSIENS.

‘Cum spiritus animalis, (says a favourite author of Swedenborg’s), succo nervoso admistus, ejusque particulis veluti irretitus ubique reperiatur, utriusque historiam uno eodemque capite comprehendemus. Ille est substantia insensilis, tenuissima, volatilis, aethereaeque materiae indolem quandantenus referens, diversis facultatum animalium actibus edendis naturaliter dicata. Spiritum autem animale tenuissimam ac volatilem substantiam esse, ex hoc manifestè colligitur, quòd ipse praeterquam quod oculorum aciem subterfugit, insensiles nervorum poros subeat, facilè avolet, nullaque sui vestigia relinquat: ipsūque praeterea maximā mobilitate, et activitate aethereae materiae, tum mobilitatis, tum activitatis, quodammodò aemulā praeditum esse censendum est; siquidem is, licèt leni fluxu, per cerebrum, medullam spinalem, totūque nervosum genus naturaliter diffundi soleat, aequè citò ac lux moveri videtur, ubi scilicet

\* *Psychologia Empirica*, § 611. (Ed. 1738.)

† *Psychologia Rationalis*, adnot. in § 111 (Ed. 1740.)



voluntariis, imò et involuntariis quibusdam motibus peragendis inservit. Demum tenuissimam ac volatilem eandem substantiam actionibus animalibus edendis aptam comparatam esse nullus est ambigendi locus, cùm totali denegato illius influxu, omnis evanescat conceptus, motus omnis, et sensus omnis illicd pereant.\*

This illustrious neurologist has also carefully distinguished between the animal spirit, so beautifully described in the above passage, and the nervous juice, or as it is now called, the cerebro-spinal fluid. He observes:—

‘Succus nervosus est humor aquosus et defaecatissimus, in cinerea cerebri, et medullae spinalis substantia, arterioso è sanguine elicited, qui cerebrum ipsum, medullam spinalem, totùmque nervosum genus alit.’† . . .

### III.—J. A. UNZER.

‘All the phenomena of motion and sensation manifested through the nerves, render probable the existence of a remarkably subtle fluid essence, which is present invisibly in the medulla of the brain and nerves, and is the means whereby all the functions of both are performed. It is termed the *vital spirits* or *nervous fluid*, but it is not known how and when it contributes to the animal actions. It is not that fluid matter which is seen in the medulla of the brain and nerves, but a much more subtle spirit imperceptible to the

\* Vieussens, *Neurographia Universalis*, pp. 94, 95.

† *Ibid.* p. 95. It is worthy of remark that Winslow erroneously uses the two terms as synonymes. He speaks of ‘Ce liquide subtil, nommé communément esprit animal, suc nerveux, ou lympe nerveuse, (*Expos. Anat. Traité de la Tête*, § 191.) Cf. the following:—‘When removed from the body a few moments after death, this fluid is, according to Majendie, remarkably limpid; it has a sickly odour and a saltish taste, and is alkaline,’ (Todd and Bowman, *Physiology. Anat. &c.*, vol. i. p. 253.)

On the distinction between the spirituous fluid proper, and the nervous juice, without a clear notion of which the understanding of Swedenborg's psychology is impossible, see his *Econ. An. King.*, vol. i. §§ 157, 510.

senses. It is inferred from the phenomena which betray its existence, that this nervous fluid is a remarkably mobile fluid, a spirituous vapour, which can be neither aqueous, nor glutinous, nor elastic, nor etherial, nor electrical.\*

"The brain is the laboratory of the vital spirits. 'It appears certain that there is such a fluid essence secreted from the vessels of the gray matter of the brain into the hollow tubes of the medullary matter, which is carried in the tubes of the nerves to their termination, and supplies the principle whereby the nerves are rendered capable of being the organs of the senses and of movements.' (Haller's *Physiology*, sec. 383.)" To this is appended the following note.

'Although little is known of the nature and properties of the forces of the vital spirits, the physician can content himself therewith, even although the little that we think we know is doubtful, and at the best only probable : for they may remain undetermined for ever without any loss to science, because we are under no necessity † to show the origin and nature of the animal forces, inasmuch as we learn their true actions and laws from observation only. ‡

#### IV.—PROFESSOR BAIN.

'The structure of the nervous substance, and the experiments made upon the nerves and nerve centres, establish beyond doubt certain peculiarities as belonging to the force that is exercised by the brain. This force is of a *current* nature ; that is to say, a power generated at one part of the structure is conveyed along an intervening substance, and discharged at some other part. The different forms of

\* *Princ. of Physiol.* p. 19. (Syd. Soc. Ed.)

† The problem is one which transcends the limits of mere science, and properly belongs to rational philosophy.

‡ *Princ. of Physiol.* pp. 17, 23. (Syd. Soc. Ed.)

Electricity and Magnetism have made us familiar with this sort of action.\*

V.—DR. MAUDSLEY.

The nervous tissue 'in its simplest type may be represented as two fibres that are connected by a nerve-cell or a ganglionic group of nerve-cells; the fibres are apparently simple conductors, and might be roughly compared to the conducting wires of a telegraph, while the cell, being the centre in which nerve force is generated, may be compared to the telegraphic apparatus; in it the effect which the stimulus of the afferent or centripetal nerve excites, is transmitted along the efferent or centrifugal nerve, and therein is displayed the simplest form of that *reflex* action which plays so large a part in animal life.'†

VI.—DR. BEALE.

'With regard to the nature of the nerve current little positive is known, the general opinion of physiologists being that it is some mode of force correlated with heat, electricity, &c., but not exactly identical with any form or mode of energy known. The arguments upon which this opinion is based appear to me very inconclusive. Is it reasonable to assume new modes or forms of force? Surely the evidence is strongly in favour of the view that the nerve current is electricity, and I think that most, if not all, the phenomena familiar to us may be explained upon this view.'‡

'I have already shown, that in all bioplasm the operation of some force or power of a nature different from any form or mode of energy yet discovered, must be admitted. This

\* Professor Bain. *The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 48. (Ed. 1868.)

† Dr. Maudsley. *The Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, p. 47. (Ed. 1868.)

‡ Dr. Beale. *Protoplasm*, pp. 126, 127. (Ed. 1870.)

unknown agency acts upon the material particles of which every mass of bioplasm consists, and induces changes in them which can neither be explained nor imitated. Every attempt hitherto made to show relationship \* between inorganic force and living force has absolutely failed.' . . .

And again:—'No doubt it is easy to explain by physics and chemistry the transmission of a current along the nerve fibres in many cases, especially if it be admitted, and I am quite disposed to believe this to be the case, that the nerve current is electricity. The little bioplasts are, we will suppose, the batteries where chemical changes occur, and electricity is generated. But then we must bear in mind that the very nerves through which the current passes were produced by the bioplasm, and the bioplasm was instrumental in the arrangement of these nerves. The phenomena of the nervous system, the action of nerves, depend entirely upon the arrangement of the nerve fibres and the bioplasts. Although, therefore, the nerve current may be due to chemical change, and the arrangement of the nerves might be accounted for by physical actions, both series of phenomena are dependent upon antecedent operations, which must at last be referred to the direct influence exerted by the peculiar power which is associated with the matter of the bioplasm during its living state.' †

#### VII.—M. CLAUDE BERNARD.

. . . . 'Pour se tirer d'embarras,' says this great experimenter, 'on appelle d'ordinaire l'action du nerf l'*influence nerveuse*, ce qui ne nous apprend pas grand' chose sur la nature de cette action. Mais les physiciens ont voulu

\* A relationship of essential identity is impossible. There exists, however, a relationship of intimate and complete correspondence, discovered and philosophically demonstrated by Swedenborg.

† *Bioplasm*, pp. 206–208.

réduire cette influence à un autre agent, à un agent physique; et c'est l'électricité qui se présentait tout naturellement, car, lorsqu'on a soustrait un muscle à l'influence de la volonté qui se transmet par le nerf moteur, on peut très-bien remplacer cette action par électricité. Cependant cette théorie n'est pas démontrable dans l'état actuel de la science. . . .

'L'influence nerveuse est donc pour nous jusqu'à présent une action spéciale, un agent physiologique distinct. Mais ce n'est pas à dire qu'il ne se passe pas dans le nerf des phénomènes électriques d'une importance réelle au point de vue de leur action physiologique, ni que ces phénomènes ne soient liés par certain rapports plus ou moins étroits à l'influence nerveuse et à la contraction du muscle.'\*

#### VIII.—DR. RICHARDSON.

A remarkable hypothesis, apparently an approximation to Swedenborg's theory of the animal spirit, or spirituous fluid, has recently been proposed. Dr. Richardson, according to Dr. H. Tuke, 'suggests that there exists, in addition to a nervous fluid, a gas or vapour, pervading the whole nervous organism, surrounding, as an enveloping atmosphere, each molecule of nervous structure, and forming the medium of the influences transmitted from a nerve-centre to the periphery, and from the periphery to a nerve-centre.'†

The view advocated by Dr. Richardson is, as already observed, only an apparent approximation to the theory of

\* *Leçons sur les Propriétés des Tissus Vivants*, pp. 262, 263. Paris, 1866.

† *Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body in Health and Disease*, p. 354. See (*Ibid.*) the interesting extract from Sir Benjamin Brodie's *Psychological Inquiries* in which that writer has suggested, as a probable opinion, that the nervous agent in some degree resembles the electric force.



Swedenborg, as will be seen in what follows. It is, however, a great advance on the common notions entertained by the best physiologists, in reference to what is vaguely termed *nerve-force*.

#### IX.—DR. GEORGE MOORE.

‘Currents of some influence,’ says Dr. Moore, ‘are constantly passing, with the rapidity of lightning, from side to side and to and from the nervous centres, by means of which the soul and body commonly act in unity notwithstanding the complicity of our organs and their dual distribution;’ . . .

And again: ‘Possibly the nervous substance is constructed for the purpose of enabling the will to act upon some more refined material, or it may be that the more subtile matter thus enables the mind to influence the grosser matter in a manner consonant with the common laws of corporeal organisation, *the proper body of the soul*\* taking form, direction, and power, according to the will, or as demanded by the contact of that body with other agencies. We possess evidence that there exists an all-pervading something, not to be defined as matter, but which may be regarded as the substantial medium of those actions known as light, heat, electricity, gravitation, and magnetism. That the mind operates on this medium in our visible bodies we find in the fact that a man, by the mere act of his will in contracting the muscles, say of his arm, causes a current of influence which sensibly deflects the needle of the galvanometer, the currents being opposite in the opposite arms. Moreover, it appears that the nerves of sensation are positive, the nerves of motion negative, so that every act of impression and of will seems to operate through an agency similar to that of an electric

\* The italics are those of the present writer.

telegraph. The will being capable of moving this agency and of being moved through it, may we not reasonably imagine it possible that the soul is to be for ever associated with it in some specific and identical form? This agency is probably one with the all-penetrating medium of the universe, called, for lack of a name sufficiently definite, ether. It is calculated to serve as a spiritual body, which, taking direction and impression as the vehicle of the soul, might be capable of influence and action in sympathy with all the changes, mental and physical, of the universe.\*

The reader is here requested to re-examine with attention the above extracts in which are set forth various opinions that have been advanced with respect to the amazing swiftness of thought and its mysterious connexion with a nervous mechanism of surpassing subtilty and complexity, and endeavour, as far as possible, to collect and concentrate into one view what these opinions may have in common that can be clearly referred to the point in question. In the next place, let the idea thus obtained be carefully compared with that presented in the following statement of Swedenborg, as to the nature and properties of the spirituous fluid or animal spirit. A conclusion may then be fairly drawn, as to which view is in most close accord with the facts, and is thus best entitled, on principles of sound reason, to be adopted as containing the true doctrine of a nerve-force:—

‘There is,’ he observes, ‘a certain fluid of the highest degree of purity called by some the animal spirit, which enters into

\* *The Power of the Soul over the Body.* By George Moore, M.D. &c., pp. 107–109. (Sixth Ed.) The author of this deeply interesting and genially written Treatise will, it is hoped, excuse the writer of these pages for venturing to recommend it earnestly to all who are interested in the noble subject of which it treats, as being, in many respects, an admirable introduction to the system of Christian Psychology taught by Swedenborg.

the red blood as its principal substance, and which constitutes its vital essence. There likewise appertain to the red blood, in different proportions, numerous salts, which enter into the composition of its parts. Whence the blood exists as a compounded liquor, and is the ultimate fluid which discharges the functions of the soul in the animal kingdom.\*

The experimental facts and reasonings on which this remarkable Induction is based, are fully given in that portion of the work from which the extract is taken.† It is shown :—

i. That such a spirituous fluid is interiorly conceived in the cortical and cineritious substance of the brain, the medulla oblongata, and medulla spinalis, and sent into all the medullary fibres or origins of the nerves.

ii. That it is carried along the nerve-fibres into all the provinces and smaller districts of the body, and terminates its course in its ultimate boundaries, the blood-vessels.

iii. Hence is inferred, a certain circulation of the fluids of the body more universal than the circulation of the blood, which, so far as the author knows, has never been fully investigated and developed by any one ; that is to say, *a circulation from the nerve-fibres into the vessels, and from the vessels into the fibres.*

To this the author subjoins the following caution which, at the same time, places in a clear light his claim to be regarded as a careful and conscientious investigator of scientific truth.

‘This subject,’ he says, ‘which is of the utmost im-

\* *Æon. An. King.*, vol. i. p. 32.

† *Ibid.*, §§ 37—41. The author here refers to Parts III., V., and VI. of his great but unfinished work on the Brain, a considerable portion of which has been preserved, and will doubtless be given to the world in due time. He expresses his inability to enter into the particulars contained in those parts, but presents to the reader the principal points they contain.

portance, and deserves a voluminous explanation, ought not to be lightly despatched ; but as we cannot here enter more at large into its consideration, the reader must be content for the present to keep in mind the leading points I have just enumerated, since they are necessary to a right understanding of the remarks I have to offer, and since without some such general idea as that I have given, he would not be justified in presuming that such a fluid enters the blood, and constitutes its vital essence. Still, it is my wish that the positions above enumerated, should be placed, before they are confirmed by actual fact, on the ground of simple hypothesis, or they may be expressed by the sign of the unknown quantity  $x$ , as in the algebraic analysis, until it be clearly ascertained whether or not the additional data will elicit its value.\*

Again, he observes, with reference to this turning-point of every intelligible psychological system :—

‘ However obscure our idea may be, yet we shall clearly perceive by a little attention, that the stupendous machine of the animal body could by no means have come together without a *positive directive force* ; and we shall acknowledge at once, if we think up to causes and origins, that such a directive or formative force is not without but within the chick or embryo ; and that it must exist within that substance that was the first in the ovum, and that has life or soul within it. Now if we consult the anatomy of bodies, particularly those of early fetuses, or those that are still in the egg, we shall meet with a certain most fluid substance, that from the first stamen, by a wonderful determination, successively projects, delineates, and describes, the entire image of the future body. Surely then we must grant that this directive force is seated in this fluid, and if so, we

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. i. § 39.

must also conclude from the infinite variety of particular effects, that it involves *a certain wonderful form* in the whole and in all its parts; for if not, mighty miracles of formation would result from mere chance. Hence it follows that this substance is the form of forms, or the supereminent organ of organs. To suspend our belief in this until the microscope shall visibly present it to the eye, is only to appeal to future generations, which will certainly cheat our hope. Is it not enough that a host of effects expound it to the rational sight; and that, at the same time, the doctrine of the order of the universe declares that all things are involved more perfectly in first substances; and that the first substance or force of every series plainly exhibits its own nature to view in the sphere of things posterior; as we have often and often shown in the preceding pages? Thus this fluid bears the name and prerogatives of a supereminent organ.\*

It may now be left to the judgment of the candid reader, to decide for himself, how far the facts which have been adduced, justify the following indignant rebuke of that ignorant and flippant scepticism, which contemptuously denies, altogether, the existence of a spirituous fluid such as that above described:—

‘The majority of the learned, particularly since the time of Malpighi, have maintained the opinion, that the cortical substance conceives and produces the spirituous fluid, or as they call it, the animal spirits, which they agree in describing as a pure fluid. This opinion is confirmed by a vast number of observations that have been made in the body, and by nearly all that have been hitherto made in the brain. . . .

‘But as to those who deny the existence of this fluid, that is to say, of an animal spirit proper and indigenous to every

\* *Æcon. An. King. The Human Soul*, § 275.



(living) kingdom, and who deny the conspirability and perspirability of all parts of the body, according to the theorem of Hippocrates,—with them, as denying first principles, I hold no disputation. Their minds, sunk in unwisdom, are entirely confined to their eyes, and all causes with them are confused in effects ; nay, the microscope is often more penetrating and acute than their rational sight.\*

#### SUMMARIES OF THE THREE HYPOTHESES.

At the risk of wearying the reader by repetition, a few summaries of the three hypotheses under consideration, are here given. They have been selected, as typical examples, from eminent writers belonging to various schools of thought. By this means the subject is clearly placed before the mind in a compendious form, and a comparison with the theory taught by Swedenborg is facilitated.

I. The first is taken from that prince of philosophical methodists, Christian Wolf.

It may be observed, in passing, that the terminology used by Swedenborg on this subject bears a manifest resemblance, in some respects, to that of his celebrated contemporary. Both writers, moreover, have scrupulously observed the chronological order, in the expositions they have given of the three systems—a point entirely disregarded by Dr. Reid in his very full, impartial, and interesting review of the ‘sentiments of philosophers about the perception of external objects.’† This circumstance may appear to be scarcely

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. pp. 179, 180.

† ‘It is not easy to conceive,’ says Sir Wm. Hamilton, ‘by what principle the order of the history of opinions touching Perception, contained in the nine following chapters, is determined. It is not chronological, and it is not systematic.’ (*Reid’s Works*, p. 262. Note.)

deserving of special notice; but it is alluded to here, as indicating the minute accuracy of thought, and strict regard for method, which marks every movement of Swedenborg's intellect, in everything he has written. The false and malignant charge of insanity so readily made, without the smallest scruple, by shallow and flippant writers, betrays a coarse vulgarity of mind, and a disregard of truth, which would be incredible were it not that occasionally these base and repulsive qualities of man's lower nature, thus reveal the fact of their existence in a form so shameless.

As his wont is, Wolf commences by explaining and defining the terms of art employed in the investigation.

'*Tria hodie,*' he says, \* '*in philosophia occurrunt systemata explicandi commercium, quod inter animam atque corpus intercedit, scilicet systema influxus, systema causarum occasionalium, et systema harmoniæ præstabilitæ . . . Sane usque ad tempora Cartesii systema influxus physici in scholis philosophorum solum erat, quod docebatur. Cartesii autoritate accessit systema causarum occasionalium. Leibnitius denique addidit systema harmoniæ præstabilitæ.*'

'Substantia una dicitur *physice influere* in alteram, si quædam realitas, quæ inerat uni substantiæ, transfertur in alteram, cui ante non inerat . . . Exemplum habemus in igne, qui per influxum physicum calefacit aquam, et similiter visibilia per influxum physicum agunt in oculum, lumen scilicet per reflexionem in eundem immittendo.'

'Hinc *corpus* nostrum organicum *physice influere* dicitur in *animam*, quatenus ex corpore quædam in animam transfertur realitas, quæ cum ante corpori inesset, nunc insit animæ. Et vicissim *animal physice influere* dicitur in *corpus*, quando in eandem transfert quandam realitatem, quæ ante non inerat.'

\* *Psychol. Rat.* §§ 553, 558, 559.

'Influere,' he adds in a note, 'proprie liquidorum est, ut aqua, vinum influunt. Metaphorice est immittere quasi influxu seu influendo dare seu communicare, seu per influxum causare, effective sese impertiri. (Goclenius. *Lex. Phil.*)

'*Systema influxus physici* dicitur, quo commercium inter mentem et corpus explicatur per influxum physicum corporis in animam et animæ in corpus, seu, quod perinde est, per actionem corporis in animam, qua corpus in animam influit, et per actionem animæ in corpus, qua anima in corpus influit.

'*Systema causarum occasionalium*\* dicitur, quo commercium inter mentem et corpus explicatur, per modificationes harmonicas immediate a Deo factas, seu per voluntatem Dei generalem et certis legibus liberrime adstrictam.

'*Causae occasionales* dicuntur, quæ vi agendi propria destituantur, Deo tamen agendi occasionem præbent.'

In a note which follows this definition, Wolf is at some pains to evince that his own opinion coincides with that of the ancients and the Aristotelian Schoolmen, in attributing their own proper active forces to created substances. In this, while following his master, Leibnitz, he is opposed at once to the teachings of the genuine Cartesians and of Swedenborg, on the nature and constitution of matter. As the subject is one of the first importance to a clear understanding of the whole subject, the words of Wolf are here subjoined:—

'Opponitur causa occasionalis causæ physicae, quæ vi agendi propria instructa est. Ita non modo in systemate influxus physici corpus et anima sunt causæ physicae, quippe non minus corpus, quam anima vim agendi habet; verum etiam juxta theoriam superiorem anima vi activa prædita est, unde actiones ipsius consequuntur, et juxta theoriam cosmologicam singulis elementis rerum materialium vis activa

\* *Psychol. Rat.* §§ 589, 590.

inest, unde vis activa seu motrix in corporibus tanquam in composito resultat. Nostra enim theoria in eo consensit cum theoria veterum et Aristotelico-Scholasticorum, quod substantiis secundis, quas appellant, hoc est, creatis vires agendi proprias, etsi creatas, tribuamus.

*'Systema harmoniae praestabilitae dicitur, quo commercium animae et corporis explicatur per seriem perceptionum atque appetitionum in anima et seriem motuum in corpore, quae per naturam animae ac corporis harmonicae sunt, seu consentiunt.*

*'In systemate harmoniae praestabilitae anima vi sibi propria producit omnes suas perceptiones et appetitiones continua serie.*

*'Quoniam in systemate harmoniae praestabilitae anima vi propria producit omnes perceptiones et appetitiones independenter ab omni principio externo; praesentia idearum materialium in cerebro ad eas producendas nihil prorsus confert, adeoque perceptiones et appetitiones in anima eodem, quo nunc modo consequerentur, etiamsi corpus non existeret, consequenter etiam anima eodem, quo nunc modo sibi repraesentaret hoc universum, etiamsi mundus adspectabilis non existeret.*

*'In systemate harmoniae praestabilitae vi mechanismi corporis ex ideis materialibus sensibilibus nascuntur motus volitionibus et appetitionibus animae respondentes citra ullam determinationem extrinsecam immediatam.'* \*

II. The following succinct and lucid compendium is from the pen of a distinguished Professor of Philosophy in the Roman Catholic University of Louvain:—

*'Entre l'âme et le corps de l'homme il existe un véritable commerce, ou une action mutuelle.*

*'La notion que nous devons nous former de ce commerce est celle-ci : Quoique l'âme puisse faire certains actes intel-*

\* *Psychol. Rat.* §§ 613, 614, 615.

lectuels sans agir sur le corps, et que le corps puisse exécuter certaines fonctions organiques sans affecter l'âme, cependant chacun de ces deux êtres peut aussi agir sur l'autre, au point d'y produire une modification qui sans son action n'y serait pas produite."

\* \* \* \* \*

'De tous les systèmes inventés par des philosophes pour expliquer la manière dont l'âme et le corps agissent l'un sur l'autre, trois seulement ont été en vogue dans les écoles : ceux de l'influence physique, des causes occasionnelles et de l'harmonie préétablie. Ces systèmes seraient moins importants, si l'on ne s'en servait, spécialement des deux derniers, pour expliquer en même temps tous les rapports entre Dieu et l'homme, ou la portée de toutes les actions de Dieu sur le monde physique et moral. Ils méritent donc d'être examinés avec soin.

'Le système de l'*influence physique* date d'Aristote ; il a été soutenu pendant tout le moyen-âge et compte encore aujourd'hui le plus de partisans. Il consiste à dire que l'âme et le corps exercent l'un sur l'autre une influence physique et mutuelle, c'est-à-dire que l'âme agit physiquement sur le corps et que le corps agit physiquement sur l'âme.

'Selon la philosophie ancienne *physiquement* ne signifie autre chose que naturellement, et par conséquent toutes les questions qu'on a soulevées pour savoir comment le corps peut agir physiquement sur l'âme et l'âme sur le corps, ou par quel procédé physique, par quel instrument physique ils peuvent mutuellement s'atteindre et s'influencer, toutes ces questions vont au-delà de ce que les anciens se sont proposé de résoudre.

'Aussi est-il juste de dire que ce système reconnaît expressément le fait de l'influence mutuelle ; mais il ne répond



pas à la question de savoir comment cette influence physique, naturelle ou réelle, s'exerce."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Le système des *causes occasionnelles* relève de Descartes, mais il a été formulé, expliqué et défendu par Malebranche. Voici en quels termes il en expose les points fondamentaux : 'Aucun corps, dit-il, n'a la force de se remuer . . . il n'y a aucun esprit créé qui puisse remuer quelque corps que ce soit . . . la force mouvante des corps n'est point dans les corps . . . il n'y a point de forces, de puissances, de causes véritables dans le monde matériel et sensible . . . Non-seulement les corps ne peuvent être causes véritables de quoi que ce soit, les esprits les plus nobles sont dans une semblable impuissance ; ils ne peuvent rien connaître, si Dieu ne les éclaire ; ils ne peuvent rien sentir, si Dieu ne les modifie ; ils ne sont capables de rien vouloir, si Dieu ne les meut vers le bien en général, c'est-à-dire vers lui ; ils peuvent déterminer l'impression, que Dieu leur donne pour lui, vers d'autres objets que lui, mais je ne sais si cela se peut appeler puissance . . . Non-seulement les hommes ne sont point les véritables causes des mouvements qu'ils produisent dans leurs corps, il semble même qu'il y ait contradiction qu'ils puissent l'être . . . Les causes naturelles ne sont point de véritable causes, ce ne sont que des causes occasionnelles. Il n'y a que la volonté de Dieu qui soit véritablement cause.' (*Recherche de la Vérité*, liv. 6, p. 2, c. 3. Cf. ib. liv. 1, c. 1, art. 1 et 2, et *Eclaircissement*, 10\*, obj. 1\*.)

\* \* \* \* \*

"Le système de l'*harmonie préétablie* a pour auteur Leibnitz, qui l'expose en ces termes :—

"'Figurez-vous deux horloges ou deux montres qui s'accordent parfaitement. Or cela se peut faire de trois façons. La première consiste dans l'influence mutuelle d'une horloge sur l'autre ; la seconde, dans le soin d'un homme qui y prend garde ; la troisième, dans leur propre exactitude.

“La première façon, qui est celle de l'influence, a été expérimentée par feu M. Huygens, à son grand étonnement . . . La seconde manière de faire toujours accorder deux horloges, bien que mauvaises, pourra être d'y faire toujours prendre garde par un habile ouvrier qui les met d'accord à tous moments ; et c'est ce que j'appelle la voie de l'assistance. Enfin la troisième manière sera de faire d'abord ces deux pendules avec tant d'art et de justesse qu'on se puisse assurer de leur accord dans la suite ; et c'est la voie du consentement préétabli.

“Mettez maintenant l'âme et le corps à la place de ces deux horloges. Leur accord ou sympathie arrivera aussi par une de ces trois façons. La voie de l'influence est celle de la philosophie vulgaire ; mais comme on ne saurait concevoir des particules matérielles, ni des espèces ou qualités immatérielles qui puissent passer de l'une de ces substances dans l'autre, on est obligé d'abandonner ce sentiment. La voie de l'assistance est celle du système des causes occasionnelles ; mais je tiens que c'est faire venir *Deum ex machina* dans une chose naturelle et ordinaire, où, selon la raison, il ne doit intervenir que de la manière dont il concourt à toutes les autres choses de la nature. Ainsi, il ne reste que mon hypothèse, c'est-à-dire que la voie de l'harmonie préétablie par un artifice divin prévenant, lequel, dès le commencement, a formé chacune de ces substances d'une manière si parfaite et réglée avec tant d'exactitude qu'en ne suivant que ses propres lois qu'elle a reçues avec son être, elle s'accorde pourtant avec l'autre ; tout comme s'il y avait une influence mutuelle, ou comme si Dieu y mettait toujours la main au-delà de son concours général. Après cela je ne crois pas que j'aie besoin de rien prouver, si ce n'est qu'on veuille que je prouve que Dieu a tout ce qu'il faut pour se servir de cet artifice prévenant dont nous voyons même des réchantillons parmi les hommes à mesure qu'ils sont habiles gens. Et supposé qu'il le puisse, on voit

bien que c'est la plus belle voie et la plus digne de lui. Il est vrai que j'en ai encore d'autres preuves ; mais elles sont plus profondes et il n'est pas nécessaire de les alléguer ici.' (*Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l'union qu'il y a entre l'âme et le corps, 1<sup>er</sup> éclaircissement.*) "

'En jetant un regard,' continues Professor Ubagha, 'sur l'ensemble de ces trois systèmes, on voit que les deux derniers nient le fait du commerce mutuel entre le corps et l'âme, et que le premier seul maintient le fait, mais ne résout pas la difficulté qui concerne le *comment* de ce fait.

'Cette difficulté consiste principalement à concevoir comment deux êtres de nature aussi différente que le corps et l'âme, la matière et l'esprit, puissent agir l'un sur l'autre.

'Cette difficulté est grande et peut-être insoluble, si l'on ne voit dans la matière que l'étendue ou une masse purement passive, et qu'on regarde le corps humain comme n'étant, abstraction faite de l'âme, qu'une masse pareille.

'Mais, si l'on considère avec les dynamistes toute substance matérielle comme étant essentiellement une force active, on n'aura plus tant de peine à concevoir une action mutuelle entre l'esprit et la matière, entre deux forces essentiellement actives, quoique douées de propriétés différentes. Le dynamisme diminue donc au moins considérablement la difficulté, si même il ne la fait disparaître, indépendamment de la question concernant la différence ou l'identité de la vie et de l'âme. Si donc on admet en outre que la vie corporelle est une force active différente de l'âme, la difficulté ne sera pas plus grande que celle qu'il y a à concevoir l'action mutuelle dans l'homme de la raison sur l'instinct animal et de l'instinct animal sur la raison.

'C'est en nous plaçant à ce point de vue que nous regardons le fond de l'âme et le fond du corps vivant comme deux forces actives, étroitement unies, réellement distinctes,

dont l'une peut agir librement et dont l'autre n'agit qu'avec une aveugle nécessité. Et de cette différence fondamentale nous concluons que l'âme, en agissant sur le corps, y *détermine* une modification, une action ou un mouvement auquel le corps ne peut se soustraire; tandis que, quand le corps agit sur l'âme, celle-ci ne peut ne pas subir l'impression qu'elle reçoit, mais elle peut s'abstenir de faire les actes que cette impression, *sollicite* sans toutefois les déterminer irrésistiblement.\*

III. Dr. Hartley thus refers to the three systems, in their relation to his own hypothesis of 'Vibrations' published in the year 1748:—

'It may afford the reader some entertainment, to compare my hypothesis with what Des Cartes and Leibnitz have advanced, concerning animal motion, and the connexion between the soul and the body. My general plan bears a near relation to theirs. And it seems not improbable to me, that Des Cartes might have had success in the execution of his, as proposed in the beginning of his Treatise on Man, had he been furnished with a proper assemblage of facts from anatomy, physiology, pathology, and philosophy, in general. Both Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, and Malebranche's system of occasional causes, are free from that great difficulty of supposing, according to the scholastic system, that the soul, an immaterial substance, exerts and receives a real physical influence upon and from the body, a material substance. And the reader may observe, that the hypothesis here proposed stands clear also of this difficulty. If he admit the simple case of the connexion between the soul and body, in respect of sensation, as it is laid down in the first proposition, and only suppose, that there is a change made in the medullary substance, proportional and corre-

\* *Précis de Psychologie*, par G. O. Ubahs, &c., &c., pp. 156-164 (Cinquième Ed. 1857.)

spondent to every change in the sensations, the doctrine of vibrations, as here delivered, undertakes to account for all the rest, the origin of our ideas and motions, and the manner in which both the sensations and these are performed.\*

In what may be regarded as his first formal entrance upon the field of Philosophy proper, in a truly wonderful but almost unknown Treatise,† which preceded the *Observations on Man* by fourteen years, Swedenborg had already anticipated all the leading facts in the 'Vibration' hypothesis, which were capable of scientific and rational verification. After showing how the elemental world makes itself sensible, by means of the membranes, in the small world of the living microcosm, he observes:—'This too it is which has caused many previous inquirers (for I am by no means the first in this walk, but have had learned predecessors,‡ with whom I will not venture to compare myself) seeing the correspondence that subsists between the motions in the elements, and the motions in the membranes, to declare that vibratory or tremulous motion is the cause of sensation. Former writers, however, have not attempted to go beyond this general induction, but have betaken themselves to certain animal spirits of unknown operation, finding in them a general asylum, to make an end and mode somewhere to their investigation.'§

IV. One of the most distinguished of living physicists

\* *Observations on Man*, p. 70. (Ed., London, 1748.)

† *Prodromus Philosophiæ ratiocinantis de Infinito et Causa Finali Creationis; deque Mechanismo operationis animæ et corporis*. (Dresd. et Lips. 1734.)

‡ He refers, doubtless, to Newton and the older physiologists. It is well known that the former had foreshadowed, in no indistinct terms, the hypothesis of vibrations, as afterwards elaborated by Dr. Hartley.

§ P. 139. (Dr. J. J. Garth Wilkinson's translation.) See *Ibid.*, p. 141. Sect. xii., where it is shown that the soul is the centre of such motions.



has recently directed attention to this subject, from a somewhat novel point of view ; and in doing so, has slightly modified the hitherto received terminology. For the further consideration of the questions involved, the reader is referred to the elaborate work from which the extract has been taken. It will suffice for the design of these pages to have thus indicated one of the most recent forms which this ancient and much disputed question has assumed, in presence of the new lights thrown upon it by discoveries in physical science. It is evidently not likely to become obsolete with the general advance of knowledge.

On the subject of 'physical influences' in connexion with the problem of *visual perceptions*, Professor Helmholtz thus writes :—

'Comme nous ne savons pour ainsi dire rien sur la nature des activités psychiques et que nous ne connaissons qu'une série de faits, nous ne devons pas nous étonner de ne pas pouvoir donner de véritable explication de la production des perceptions sensuelles. La *théorie empiristique* cherche à démontrer que cette production n'exige du moins aucune autre force que les facultés connues de notre âme, et cela sans se préoccuper de l'explication de ces facultés. Comme il est, en général, convenable, dans l'étude des sciences naturelles de ne faire aucune nouvelle hypothèse aussi longtemps que les faits connus paraissent suffisants pour l'explication et que la nécessité d'hypothèses nouvelles n'est pas démontrée, j'ai cru devoir adopter, dans ses points essentiels, l'opinion empiristique. La *théorie nativistique* explique encore moins la production de nos notions des objets, avec son hypothèse d'après laquelle certaines notions de solidité se produiraient directement, à l'aide d'un mécanisme inné, lorsque certaines fibres nerveuses sont excitées. Dans la forme primitive de cette théorie, le sujet est censé observer sa rétine : on lui attribue une connaissance innée de la forme de cette mem-

brane et de la position qu'y occupent les différentes extrémités nerveuses. D'après la forme la plus récente de cette opinion, qui a été défendue en particulier par E. Hering, il faudrait admettre au-devant de nous un espace subjectif, dans lequel nous localiserions, d'après certaines lois innées, les sensations des différentes fibres rétinienne. Cette théorie ne se borne donc pas à admettre l'opinion de Kant, d'après laquelle la notion générale de l'espace serait une forme originelle de notre conscience ; elle considère, de plus, comme innées, certaines notions spéciales de l'espace.

'L'opinion nativistique a aussi été nommée plus spécialement *théorie des points identiques*, parce qu'elle exige qu'on admette une fusion complète des impressions des parties correspondantes dans les deux rétines. La *théorie empiristique*, au contraire, porte le nom de *théorie des projections*, parce que, d'après elle, les représentations que nous nous faisons des objets sont projetées dans l'espace par des actions psychiques. Je préférerais éviter cette dénomination, parce que des adversaires, aussi bien que des partisans de cette théorie, ont attaché une importance exagérée à vouloir que cette projection se fit suivant les lignes de direction, ce qui, en tous cas, n'était pas la désignation exacte du processus psychique, et ne donnerait même pas, dans un très-grand nombre de cas, une détermination exacte de la position apparente des objets.

'Je reconnais que, dans l'état actuel de la science, il est impossible de réfuter la théorie nativistique ; pour ma part, je préfère l'opinion contraire. . . .

'Je vais encore donner quelques explications pour éviter tout malentendu au sujet de mon point de vue, et pour le rendre plus facilement accessible à ceux des lecteurs qui n'ont pas encore réfléchi sur leurs perceptions sensuelles.

'Je n'ai désigné, plus haut, les sensations que comme des *symboles* des circonstances extérieures, et je leur ai refusé toute analogie avec les choses qu'elles représentent. Nous

touchons ici à cette question, si controversée, de savoir jusqu'à quel point les représentations que nous faisons s'accordent avec les objets, de savoir, comme on disait, si elles sont *vraies* ou *fausses*. Cet accord a été tantôt affirmé et tantôt nié. A cet effet, on a admis une *harmonie préétablie* entre la nature et l'esprit, ou bien, on a soutenu l'*identité* de la nature et de l'esprit, en considérant la nature comme un produit de l'action d'un esprit général, dont l'esprit humain serait une émanation. La *théorie nativistique* des notions d'espace se rattache à ces opinions, en ce sens qu'elle admet un mécanisme inné et une certaine harmonie préexistante des notions qui, quoique d'une manière assez incomplète, devraient répondre aux faits réels." \*

Speaking of his newly discovered DOCTRINE OF SERIES AND DEGREES, as an introduction to Rational Psychology, and as designed "to teach the nature of Order and its rules as observed and prescribed in the succession of things," Swedenborg makes the following remarks upon the true and false Psychological methods, in connection with the hypotheses above-mentioned, and lays down four *criteria* of a true system, which deserve to be considered with the utmost care and attention, by all who engage in investigations of this kind.

'The rational mind,' he says, 'by means of this doctrine (of series, degrees, and order) carefully investigated and established, will see opened to its view a broad and even path leading to the principles of causes, and will behold the dissipation of those occult qualities, which, like the shadows of a thicket, deepen at every step so as to shut out all further prospect and progress: for as often as nature betakes herself upwards from visible phenomena, or, in other words, withdraws herself inwards, she instantly as it were disappears, while no one knows what is become of her, or

\* *Optique Physiologique*, pp. 577-579. (Ed. Paris, 1867.)

whither she is gone, so that it is necessary to take science as a guide to attend us in pursuing her steps. Without a guide of this kind, moreover, we shall have a tendency to fall into various premature opinions; we shall be apt to think, for instance, that the soul, either from principles proper to herself, or from such as are above herself, flows immediately into the effects of her own body; whence, it necessarily follows, that the communication of operations between the soul and the body must be explained either by *Physical Influx*, or by *Occasional Causes*; or if by neither of these, a third is assumed, as the only alternative, namely, that of *Pre-established Harmony*. Thus the one or other system flows, as a consequence, from our want of knowledge respecting the subordination of things, and the connection of things subordinate; even supposing the most accurate examination and the most profound judgment to have been exercised upon the phenomena: for reasonings naturally follow the course of their principles. But whereas all things in succeeding each other follow one another in order, and whereas in the whole circle of things, from first to last, there is not a single one which is altogether unconnected or detached from the rest.\* I am therefore compelled, as I said, previous to developing the subject of Rational Psychology, to take into consideration this doctrine concerning order and connection, so remarkably conspicuous in the animal kingdom. In the meanwhile, whether there be truth in what has been said, and in what remains to be said, may be easily ascertained from the four following considerations:—

‘*First*, In case the truth spontaneously manifests itself, and as it were establishes a belief in its presence, without re-

\* Cf. Cic. *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 4: Est enim admirabilis continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alise ex aliis nexæ, et omnes inter se aptæ conligatæque videantur. Compare also, the modern views as to ‘the continuity of nature.’

quiring any support from far-fetched arguments ; for we often, by a common notion, and, as it were, by a rational instinct, comprehend a thing to be true, which afterwards, by a multiplicity of reasonings, drawn from a confused perception of particulars, unarranged and unconnected with others, which are more remote from our notice, is brought into obscurity, called in question, and at last denied.

'*Secondly*, In case all experience, both particular and general, spontaneously favours it.

'*Thirdly*, In case the rules and maxims of rational philosophy do the same.

'*Lastly*, In case the proposed view makes the different hypotheses, which have been advanced on the subject, to coincide, supplying us with the proper condition, or common principle, which brings them into order and connection, so that, contemplated in this manner, they are agreeable to the truth.

'We may remark that a system constructed on the ground of such an agreement, merits the title of CO-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.' \*

Elsewhere, in connection with this subject, he observes :—

'Now since the soul does not flow into the actions of its body, except by intermediates ; nor by a continuous medium, but as it were by a ladder divided into steps ; there can be no such thing as Occasionality of Causes and Physical Influx. For if the state proper to the soul be called a moral state, in which is found the beginning of reason, or the principle from which reason originates ; and if the state proper to the intellectual mind (*mens*) be called a rational state, in which is found the beginning of affections and impelling causes, or the principle from which these originate ; and if the state proper to the external mind (*animus*) be called a physical (natural) state, in which are found affections as the impelling

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 2, 3.



causes of the actions of the body ; and if the state proper to the body be called a mechanical state, it then follows that there can be no influx from the moral state into the mechanical state of the body, except by the rational state, and thence by the physical (natural) state, or by two intermediates (§ 611) ; and this also, for the most part, not by direct determination, but by a mode of concurrence or consent ; by reason that the powers and faculties are distinct, whence results liberty (§ 610) : according also to the rule in § 648, connection is requisite, whence result dependence and mutual relation. Consequently, there can be no such thing as Pre-established Harmony. Hence the more an inferior principle derives from a superior one, the more the inferior partakes of its state, or of the perfection of its state ; for instance, either more of morality, or more of rationality, or more of solicitation from the affections as impelling causes. Thus there is a CO-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.' \*

#### THE CORRELATION AND CONTRAST OF SOUL AND BODY, AND THEIR MUTUAL COMMERCE.

In the Second Part of the author's *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* which treats of the Human Soul, it is shown that the spirituous fluid or animal spirit above described, is the organ of organs, the supereminent organ, in its own body. The soul and the body, respectively, are next described in some detail, and the distinction between them drawn with rigid precision.

The following series of extracts contain the principal momenta of this wonderful analysis. They constitute the first complete and satisfactory solution that has yet been

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. p. 51.

proposed, of the appalling difficulties by which this problem is beset.\*

'*The soul,*' says Swedenborg, '*is a faculty distinct from the intellectual mind, prior and superior to, as well as more universal and more perfect than the latter.* When we say that the soul is above the intellectual mind, or is not identical with it, we are well aware that we are going against the stream of a general opinion, but what matter is this, if all the facts we know in the animal kingdom with one accord confirm the truth of our position. Surely there is no one who enters into his own mind however superficially, and views its operations by reflection, but must acknowledge at once, *that something flows into it from above*, and enables it to understand, think, judge, will, speak, and do many other things that are the exclusive privileges of man. Not one of these is in the mind itself; for the mind grows in perfection with our advancing years. It is nothing in the infant; less than nothing in the embryo: nay, even in adults it is in a state so far below truths, that it often studies to acquire them by means of the sciences, and not unfrequently with vain attempt. Nay, we sometimes see the mind become insane, and afterwards return to healthy knowledge; and yet in the very midst of its insanity, all the economic functions of the body proceed according to laws in

\* The chief of these have been thus strikingly described, and evidently regarded as hopelessly insoluble:—

'But how the immaterial can be united with matter, how the unextended can apprehend extension, how the indivisible can measure the divided,—this is the mystery of mysteries to man, "*Modus* (says the Pseudo Augustin)—*Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendi ab hominibus potest; et hoc ipse homo est.*" Thus paraphrased by Pascal:—"Man is, to himself, the mightiest prodigy of nature. For he is unable to conceive what is Body, still less what is Mind, and least of all, how there can be united a body and a mind. This is the climax of his difficulties; yet this is his peculiar nature."—(Sir W. Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, note D. p. 880.)

the truest order . . . That the mind is the first determination of the soul, and that a way of communication requires to be opened, in order that the light of the soul may flow in, will also be shown in the sequel.' . . .

'*The next organ under the soul is the mind ; whose office it is to understand, to think, and to will.* The mind is a distinct faculty from the soul ; namely, posterior and inferior to, as also less universal, and more imperfect than the latter. The one can act separately from the other, and conjointly with the other. The mind is the first determination of the soul, and partakes at once of the soul and the body. There is a difference between the two, as great as between the forms of words that appeal to the ear, and the images that appeal to the eye ; or as between the material ideas of the natural mind (*animus*), and the intellectual ideas of the mind proper (*mens*). The mind must be imbued with principles by the mediation of the external senses, that is, *a posteriori*, and illuminated with the light of the soul, that is, *a priori*, in order to understand and think.' . . .

'*The third in order is the natural mind (animus), whose office it is to conceive, to imagine, and to desire.* The existence of a more general or common faculty, very distinct from that of the mind, and which we call the *animus*, is a fact more evident to us than the existence of a soul distinct from the mind : the reason of which is, that those things which occupy an inferior place, are comprehensible, and appear to the sensorium of superior things as contiguous ; whence we gain a notion of degrees and moments, or of space and time : but still more evidently from the fact, that ideas at first enter *a posteriori*, or by way of the senses, as material ideas, before they are born into the higher ideas that we term intellectual or immaterial. The aforesaid material ideas are not unlike the images of the eye, for they appear under a limited form, or with figure, magnitude, situation, place, and time, but as

soon as they enter the sphere of the mind, their gross coverings are taken off, and they are contemplated apart from their former limits . . . The affection of the cerebrum, which is the common sensorium, is the *animus*, and the operation of the soul in the organic cortical substance is the *mind*.'

'The fourth or last (organ of the soul) is constituted of the organs of the five external senses, namely, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. That these senses are distinct from internal sensations seems not to be doubted. The only question is, as to their communication with them, and as to their elevation into the corresponding higher sensations, of which subject we shall treat in the sequel; we would here only premise, that this communication is effected according to natural order, from a lower faculty to the proximately higher faculty, or from the higher to the proximately lower; but not from the highest to the lowest except through those that are intermediate. For in this way the corporeal system is constructed and perfected, and one thing is so subordinated to, and co-ordinated with, another, that all things respect each other mutually, and depend upon each other mutually.'

'It is plain, from actual fact, that the sensations of the body are distinct from the sensations of the natural mind (*animus*), or the external from the internal; for the external are deprived of their acumen in proportion as the internal are sharpened and intensified: in sleep indeed the external are perfectly dormant, while the internal are awake. The imagination survives even where sight, hearing, or any of the other senses are extinct. On the other hand, all external sensation perishes when internal sensation perishes, because the latter reigns universally in the former . . .

'It is also evident that the *animus* is a distinct faculty from the mind. This is clearly shewn in somnambulists, in whom, as in brutes, the corporeal machine is set in motion without any light flowing in from the sphere of reason. So

also in many who may be compared to somnambulists, as being led solely by the instinct of the *animus*, and by little or no instinct of the understanding.

‘It is plain, also, that the mind is a something distinct from the soul, and this, not only from the arguments already brought forward, but also from the conflict of the mind, as it were, with itself; also from a certain intimate consciousness, that twinges and solicits from principles unknown; very often even in merely natural things, originating deeply from self-love . . . This one thing is clear, that there is in us an internal man that fights with the external; a manifest proof, that as the mind may be in collision with the *animus*, so may the soul with the mind, and the essential life that comes from the spirit of God, with the soul.’

“The existence of four different faculties, has also, I find, the sanction of Augustine, a Father distinguished for his enlightened judgment. ‘When anything,’ says he, ‘is seen with the *eyes*, straightway an image of it is formed in the spirit; but the formation of this image is not discovered unless the eyes are taken off from the object, which through their medium we saw in the *animus*. And although the *spirit* be irrational, as in the case of brutes, nevertheless the *eyes* make their report to it. But if the *soul* be rational, then the image is announced to the *intellect*.’ (*De Trinitate*.) ‘So far does the *soul* operate, and it judges of the innumerable differences of tastes, smells, and forms, by tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. No one denies that the soul in beasts can do all these things: therefore it rises to the *third degree*.’ (*De Anima*.) Add to this *Deuteronomy* vi. 5. We gather from these words of Augustine, that he separated the *intellect*, or faculty of the mind, from the *animus*; and the *animus* from *sensation*, which belongs to the body; and maintained that the *soul* presides over all; exactly according to our proposition.”



'Although there is this number of degrees, yet the animal system consists of nothing but the soul and the body; for the intermediate organisms are only determinations of the soul, of which, as well as of the body, they partake. We have hitherto been stating what the soul is, but pray, what is the body? It is quite necessary that we should know what the latter is, because the soul and the body are like two opposite extremes, between which the organisms are intermediates: they are indeed so opposite, that the body may be said to be deprived of that of which the soul cannot be deprived. The body, *in so far as it lives*, is actually the soul, because the body is the ultimate organic form of the soul; but in order to live in the world, and inhabit the earth, it must undergo motion conformably to terrestrial conditions; and in order to undergo motion, the soul must descend to the earth by essential determinations, according to the series of the forces and substances of nature. In order to descend elements are requisite, borrowed from the earth's three kingdoms. These elements, whatever they be, for instance, saline corpuscles of all kinds, aqueous, serous; matters in themselves inert and gravitating, terrestrial and material, void of life, because taken from the bosom of nature, summoned for the purposes of combination and connection, constitute that which is merely corporeal in an animal. Thus, properly speaking, the body is that well-known something borrowed of earth; but apart from these borrowed matters it is the ultimate form or organism of the soul, that is to say, it is the soul itself; hence the body is both what the *Egoists* describe it, and what the *Dualists* describe it' \* . . .

\* This attempt at a Psychological Eirenikon is eminently characteristic of our author. He is ever desirous of discovering points of possible agreement in the opinions of those who may differ from him, to conserve whatever of true may have been handed down from the past, to build up and not to destroy.

On these sects of *Egoists* and *Dualists*, see Mr. Stewart's Preliminary

‘ Now if the body with all its organic forms, of which forms indeed it is the general complex, be the ultimate determination of the soul, produced in order that the soul may be enabled, in a suitable manner, to feel the ultimate modes of the world, and to produce ultimate forces or actions upon the earth ; it follows, that the intercourse between the soul and the body is nothing more than the translation of common or general modes to the individual modes of the soul ; and the translation of the individual forces of the soul to those that are common or general ; there being in this way a kind of progression of operations, according to natural order, by a ladder divided into degrees. A clearer idea of this subject may be obtained at pleasure from other parts of our Work.’ \*

#### MAN'S PLACE IN THE COSMOS.

A recent writer on the subject of what he calls ‘ Man's Place in Nature ’ † has indulged in great plainness of speech, in expressing his opinions on what appears to be his favourite topic. He cannot justly complain of a liberty similar to that of which he has so largely availed himself, being claimed and exercised, to some extent, by those who regard many of his speculations with the utmost abhorrence, as being the noxious products of a perverted reason.

In the following counter-statements, as to the allotted place and final purpose of Man in the universe of created things, the subject is presented from the point of view of

Dissertation (*Encyc. Britan.*, p. 79, note 4), and Sir W. Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, Appendix, Note C, *passim* ; but especially pp. 269, 293 (foot-notes). Cf. also Swedenborg, *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. p. 271.

\* *Econ. An. King.*, Part ii. §§ 277—301.

† *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, by Thomas Henry Huxley, Fellow of the Royal Society. See especially pp. 108—112.

Christian Philosophy. It remains with the candid and impartial reader to determine on which side the truth lies. The appeal is made, with the utmost confidence, to men of sound common sense.

The first extract is taken from a brief psychological treatise by a distinguished Roman Catholic philosopher. It will be seen that the view of the subject given by the writer, which is at once eminently sublime and beautiful, is intimately connected with the special subject of the present note. He says :—

‘ Une des conséquences les plus remarquables qui résulte de l’union et du rapport entre le corps et l’âme de l’homme, et que nous aimons à consigner ici, c’est que par cette union l’homme a des relations avec toute la nature. Si la variété des éléments constitutifs et la complexité de ses organes, les forces de son corps, les facultés de son intelligence, la nature multiple de tout son être, lui ont fait donner le nom de *microcosme*, il est juste de voir en lui, à cause des rapports qu’il a avec tous les êtres, le lien de l’univers. En effet, rien n’est entièrement isolé dans le monde, chaque être créé existe, se conserve ou se modifie par d’autres êtres qui agissent sur lui ; pour se montrer plus visiblement dans les corps vivants, cette vérité n’enest pas moins universelle. Cependant, sans l’homme, on ne conçoit point le but de l’existence de tous ces êtres destitués de conscience et de liberté et par là incapables de moralité, on ne trouve rien qui forme le lien général de la nature ou qui la rattache au Créateur ; l’homme est en quelque sorte la clef de voûte de la création ; par son corps il est en relation avec le monde matériel, par son âme il est en société avec le monde des intelligences.

‘ Centre du monde des corps, animaux, végétaux, minéraux, tous se rapportent à lui ; les uns lui servent de nourriture, d’autres de vêtement, d’autres de médicament, d’agrément d’aide de ses travaux, &c. La terre, l’eau, l’air, le feu et

tous les corps impondérables ont avec lui des rapports mécaniques, physiques, chimiques et organiques. Toute sa vie corporelle se passe dans un échange de ces substances avec sa propre substance.

‘Placé aux confins des deux mondes, tandis que par les sensations et les mouvements volontaires l’homme aperçoit et régit son existence physique et ce qui s’y rapporte, la vie de son intelligence s’entretient par un commerce plus noble avec le monde spirituel à l’aide des rapports de vérité et d’amour. Par ces liens il est uni non-seulement à ses semblables, il est aussi mis en relation avec Dieu lui-même.’\*

The following contains a glimpse of Swedenborg’s teaching on the subject of Man’s Place in Nature:—

‘With respect,’ he says, ‘to the nature and series of finite things we observe, that man is introduced into the world and its mechanical order as an intermediate between its least and greatest things; for his senses perceive such things as are in general equidistant between the extremes of nature. The whole of what exists is not comprehended within the sphere of his observation: his wonder is excited as well by what he sees as by what he does not see; thus, whichever way he turns his eyes, he cannot but feel astonishment, one extreme of nature being above his senses, the other being below them. He aspires, however, to a knowledge of both. Now inasmuch as nature maintains the highest similarity to herself both in her greatest and in her least entities, we may, from what we see and feel, arrive at a knowledge of what we neither see nor feel. Thus has nature designed that we should be instructed through the medium of the senses: in addition to which is imparted to us a soul, and to the soul a faculty of reasoning and analyzing, a faculty which may extend its operations even to the senses; so that, by help of reasoning and analysis, or of the ratios of the things we per-

\* Ubagha, *Précis de Psychol.* pp. 178, 174.

ceive by sense, we may arrive at some knowledge of those we do not.' \*

Again : he thus demonstrates, as a Christian philosopher, how the Divine purpose in Creation is fully realized in man alone ; that in man dwells the veriest final cause of Creation :—

The Divine principle in man, he observes, consists in the fact 'that man can acknowledge, and does acknowledge, God ; that he can believe, and does believe, that God is infinite ; that though he is ignorant of the nature of the Deity, yet he can acknowledge, and does acknowledge, his existence—and that, without the shadow of a doubt : and especially does it consist in this further privilege, that by that undoubting faith, he is sensible in love, or delight resulting from love, of a peculiar connection with the Infinite. But where he doubts he does not acknowledge, and the Divinity is not in him. All divine worship proceeds from this fountain of faith and love. . . .

'Thus the true Divinity in man, who is the ultimate effect in which the divine end dwells, is none other than an acknowledgment of the existence and infinity of God, and a sense of delight in the love of God. Here then is the solution of the problem.

'Yet this divine principle could never be realized in man, unless his body had a soul given to it out of the purer and more perfect world ; and unless reason were accorded as the fruit of the intercourse between the two, with a power of concluding by means of self-contemplation, by the view of effects, and by everything in the world, that there is a God, and that He is infinite. Although human reason cannot do this of itself, inasmuch as man, with all his parts and his very soul, is finite ; notwithstanding which, he may be a

\* *Principia*, vol. ii. p. 230.



fit recipient, and as he is in the finite sphere, he may concur to dispose himself for reception.

‘Thus we see that the end is obtainable through man alone, and through no other creature, although other creatures may be regarded as means to the existence of the ultimate effect, and therein of the divine End.’ \*

The present Note may be fitly concluded by placing before the reader what, according to Swedenborg’s principles, makes man to be, in reality, man; and also what was the divine purpose in creating the universe. The passages selected with this view are taken from that marvellous theological treasure-house, the *Arcana Coelestia*, in which spiritual truths are rationally demonstrated for those who, loving truth for truth’s sake, have eyes to see.

These compendious statements of principles, requiring volumes for their full explanation, will suffice, when duly examined, to make evident to all who can think above the level of mere sense-perceptions, that those physicists and physiologists who undertake to instruct the public so magisterially on the subjects of ‘Man’ and ‘Nature,’ have a vast world of pure and lofty ideas to compass before they attain to even a *general* intellectual perception of the real significance of these two most profound and comprehensive, but much misunderstood terms.

First, then, as to what constitutes man, Swedenborg thus writes:—

‘Man is man from his mind; for the mind constitutes the man: and such as is the mind, such is the man. By mind is here meant that which belongs to the intellect and will of man, and therefore his veriest life. Those who are stupid suppose that man is man owing to his outward form, that is to say from his having an outward make and figure such as belong

\* On the Infinite, pp. 71, 72.

to man. Those who are less stupid say that man is man from the fact that he is able to speak. And those who are less stupid still, assert that man is man from the circumstance that he is able to think. Man, however, is not man owing to any of these things, but from the fact that it is in his power to think what is true and to will what is good ; and that at the very time when he is thinking what is true and willing what is good, he is able to have an intuition of the Divine Being, and receive Him in a perceptible manner. In *this* it is, that man is distinguished from brute animals.

‘In other respects—as that he appears like a man, that he can speak, and think—all this he does not do, in that he is a man ; for if he thinks what is false and wills what is evil, he does so, as being not only like a brute animal, but as even worse than a brute : for by means of these very faculties (thus abused) he destroys what is human in himself, and makes himself a wild beast. That this is the case may be specially manifest from such men in the other life. For such men, when they appear in the light of heaven, as also when they come under the inspection of angels, appear at that moment as monsters, some also as wild beasts, the deceitful as serpents, and others in other forms. When, however, they are removed from that light (*lux*), and allowed to return into their own light (*lumen*) which they have in hell, they appear among themselves like men.’\*

Secondly, as to the Final Cause of the created universe :—

‘Man’ says our author, ‘has it in his power to believe that there are more earths in the universe than one, from the fact that the visible universe resplendent with so many stars without number, is of such immense extent ; and nevertheless that it is merely a means to an end, which is the ultimate end of creation : and this end is a heavenly king-

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 5302.

dom in which the Deity may dwell. For the visible universe is a means to the end that earths (*tellures*) might come into existence, and upon these earths men, from whom a heavenly kingdom might be formed. Who can in anywise think that a medium so immense was made for an end so small and limited as would be that of peopling a single earth, with a view to the existence of a heaven from this earth alone? What would this be for the Deity who is infinite; to whom a thousand, yea, tens of thousands of earths full of inhabitants are a very small thing, and indeed scarcely anything?\*

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NOTE B., p. 3.

THE PRINCIPLE AND LAWS OF ORDER.

THE importance of the admission made in the text, in favour of the system of Occasional Causes, may be gathered from a study of the following statements on the subject of Order.

I. ARISTOTLE.

In his *Metaphysics*, the prince of philosophers in the old world, makes the following remarkable allusion to the principle of Order, in connection with the problem of the origin of that transcendental Goodness so strikingly displayed in the visible universe. He commences his investigation by raising the two-fold question, (1) Has this Supreme Good its origin in a something which exists apart and *per se*, or, (2) in the Order which is so conspicuous in all and every part of the Cosmos? The philosopher concludes that it has its origin in both, and illustrates his meaning by the comparison of an

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 6698.

armament and its commander-in-chief, as also by that of a household with its rule and administration. The passage, which is, on many accounts, a remarkable one, presents one of the earliest recorded philosophical speculations on the subject, and well deserves transcription. It is as follows :—

Ἐπισκεπτόν δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὄλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἢ τὴν ταξίν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στρατεύμα. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ταξί τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. Πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ· καὶ οἷ' οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηθέν, ἀλλ' ἐστί τι. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὁ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρόν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὁ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. Λέγω δ' οἷον εἰς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἐστὶν ὡς κοινωνεῖ ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον.\*

## II.—ST. AUGUSTINE.

'Pax omnium rerum, tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.'

'Nos enim Catholici Christiani Deum colimus, a quo omnia bona sunt, seu magna seu parva; a quo est omnis modus seu magnus seu parvus; a quo omnis species, seu magna seu parva; a quo omnis ordo, seu magnus seu parvus. Omnia enim, quanto magis moderata, speciosa, ordinata sunt, tanto magis utique bona sunt: quanto autem minus moderata, minus speciosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona sunt. Hæc itaque tria, *modus, species, et ordo*, ut de innumerabilibus taceam, quæ ad ista tria pertinere monstrantur; hæc ergo tria, *modus, species, ordo*, tanquam generalia bona sunt in

\* *Metaph.* L. XI. c. x. §§ 1-4 (Ed. Oxon. 1837.)

rebus a Deo factis, sive in spiritu sive in corpore. Deus itaque supra omnem creaturæ modum est, supra omnem speciem, supra omnem ordinem : nec spatiis locorum supra est, sed ineffabili et singulari potentia a quo omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo.' \*

### III.—MALEBRANCHE.

' Puisque la vérité et l'ordre sont des rapports de grandeur et de perfection réels, immuables, nécessaires, rapports que renferme la substance du Verbe divin, celui qui voit ces rapports voit ce que Dieu voit ; celui qui règle son amour sur ces rapports suit une loi que Dieu aime invinciblement. Il y a donc entre Dieu et lui une conformité parfaite d'esprit et de volonté. En un mot, puisqu'il connaît et aime ce que Dieu connaît et ce qu'il aime, il est semblable à Dieu autant qu'il en est capable.' †

### IV.—SWEDENBORG.

' Order itself is truth, according to philosophers. He that investigates the essential order of nature, investigates truth ; and he that investigates truth, investigates the rules and laws of order.'

' From the light of our nature alone, in which life is not inherent in an orderly manner, we cannot easily discover the quality of this Order. For all things in us appear so complicated, so mutually involved one in the other, that we are unable to distinguish one thing from another, and thus have them distinctly in view : for the veriest vital life itself remains so entirely enfolded in the reasons of the understanding, or in the ideas of our thought, and these latter in the

\* *De Civ. Dei*. L. XIX. c. xiii. ; *De Nat. Boni cont. Manich.* c. iii.

† *Traité de Morale*, c. I. § xiv.

‡ *Æcon. An. King.* vol. ii. p. 254.



ideas of the imagination, and these again in the images of sight, that we have a very indistinct and obscure view in them of things superior and also of things inferior. But the cause of this obscurity is solely due to the inversion of our state ; to wit, that things prior must be evolved and thoroughly examined, from and by things posterior, and thus finally wisdom be attained. For in things posterior lie concealed those that are prior, as causes and principles in effects, thus they lie deeply latent within, as it were, in shade. But that one thing may come forth from another, and that we may behold it distinctly, it is necessary that we regard it from what is prior, that is to say, from light itself, whether inspired or revealed ; and consequently through the medium of that order which is the special subject of this article. For it is allowable from what is superior to contemplate things inferior, but not *vice versa*. Consequently intellectual light must, so to say, be separated from the light of nature, in which there inheres more of shade than of light ; and thus the higher or intellectual mind is to be removed from, and, as it were, is to keep watch and ward over, the lower or natural mind, and the grosser objects of the senses.

‘But what the quality of that Order is, and what the quality of the influx which is according to that order, must be drawn from the doctrines of order and of degrees, as well as from the doctrine of Influences : and these must be cultivated with the utmost care. But just to give a faint sketch of the respective qualities of that order and that influx, it must be known that things prior are altogether distinct from those that are posterior, in other words, the superior from the inferior ; just as are the forms themselves, one of which begets another. The form which begets or is the parent, the same is called prior or superior ; but that which is begotten is posterior or inferior. Or if instead of forms we say substances, the case is precisely similar.

The Supreme Form we have spoken of as the Spiritual, that which is next to it, which follows in order, as the Heavenly. Thence arise the inferior forms, by a like generation, even to the last which is called the Angular, properly the Terrestrial, Corporeal, and Material Form; and this in like manner is separated into forms superior and inferior, which are *as if* active.

‘Such now is the Order of substances. According to this order the organism of our body is instituted. Wherefore the soul is said to be in those things that are first and supreme, belonging to its own kingdom, where it is of a spiritual form. From this form are derived all the rest, which by the successive generation of one from the other, become clothed with the quality of the forms that follow, which on this account are also called inferior or posterior. According to this order in which the forms succeed each other, are also the perfections of all qualities and faculties. For those which are superior in themselves and in their own nature are infinitely more perfect than those which are inferior in themselves and in their own nature; and this every one may understand from the mere fact of generation.

‘But the question now is, what is the quality of Influx? One form does not by itself flow-in into another, for the prior or the parent, acts only in the manner of a cause of another; in other words it either bestows upon it a nature, or gives it a potency of acting thus or otherwise according to the influx of active forces. But all active forces, which ought to excite these forms, as being bare potencies, flow in from an external source; just as into our first form or soul, life itself flows-in, which is the living force of all things; in like manner into the second, but mediately by the Divine Spirit. For there are as many active forces as there are potencies or passive forces in us; of which, God willing, we

shall treat in their own order. These are the forces which flow-in, the order of whose inflowing ought to be altogether according to the order of our faculties, to wit, from the highest to those that are lower, but not *vice versâ*. Nevertheless we may, in some measure, conceive the influx of the soul into the rational mind, from one that is similar, that is to say, from the influx of that mind into the muscles. For the muscles are forms which are excited to action in a manner suited to the idea of their own mind, just as the mind to the idea of its own soul.\*

'Order is the quality of the disposition, determination, and activity of the parts, substances, or entities, which constitute the form of a thing; whence comes its state, the perfection of which, wisdom produces from its own love, or the imperfection of which, the insanity of reason forges and fashions from evil desire. In this definition mention is made of Substance, Form, and State; and by substance we mean, at the same time, form, because every substance is a form; and the quality of a form is its state, the perfection or imperfection of which results from order. . . .

'God is Order, because He is Substance itself and Form itself. He is substance; because all things that subsist, have derived their existence and continue to exist from Him. He is Form; because every quality belonging to substances has had its origin and still originates from him. The existence of quality is in no way possible except from form. Now since God is the very, the one only, and the first substance and form, and at the same time the very and one only love, as well as the very and one only wisdom; and since wisdom derived from love constitutes form, and the state and quality of this form is according to the order inherent in it, the conclusion follows that God is Order itself. Consequently God,

\* *Worship and Love of God*, § 66, note h.

from Himself, introduced order both in the universe and into all and each of its parts ; therefore He introduced the most perfect order, because, as we read in the book of Genesis, all things that He had created were good.\*

‘ Whosoever traces effects to their causes may know that the consistence of all things depends upon Order ; and that orders are manifold, general, and particular ; and that there is one which is the most universal of all, on which the general and particular depends in a continuous series ; and that this most universal order enters into all the rest, as the essence itself into its respective forms, and that thus it is, and not otherwise, all things make one. It is this unity which effects the preservation of the whole, which without it would go to ruin, and return not only into its original chaos, but even into nothing. What would man be apart from existence and reception of an influx from heaven proceeding in the most perfect order ? What, moreover, would this influx be apart from that most universal influx on which the rule and government of the whole and of all its parts depend ? What would it be unless it were from God, and unless in Him and from Him all things had their being, lived, and moved ? This may be illustrated and brought within the view of even the natural man, by such examples as these :—what else would an empire or a kingdom be without order, but a band of robbers, a number of whom combining together would slay thousands, and at last a few of this gathering would destroy the rest ? What would a city be without order, yea what would a house be ? And what would a kingdom, a city, or a house be, unless in each there was some one who should possess supreme control ?’†

\* *True Christian Religion*, §§ 52, 53.

† *Ibid.*, § 679.

NOTE C., p. 7.

SUCCESSIVE AND SIMULTANEOUS ORDER.

THE extreme importance of the philosophical distinction here referred to, has always been recognised by the greatest observers, whether in the sphere of physics or of philosophy, as will be evident from the following examples.

*'By the rays of light,'* says Newton, *'I understand its least parts, and those as well successive in the same lines, as contemporary in several lines.* For it is manifest that light consists of parts, both successive and contemporary : because in the same place you may stop that which comes one moment, and let pass that which comes presently after ; and in the same time you may stop it in any one place, and let it pass in any other. For that part of light which is stopped cannot be the same with that which is let pass. The least light or part of light, which may be stopped alone without the rest of the light, or propagated alone, or do or suffer any thing alone, which the rest of the light doth not or suffers not, I call a ray of light.' \*

In a passage, remarkable for the depth of thought and continuity of reasoning it displays throughout, Swedenborg has described in much detail what is to be understood by truths being in successive order. It will serve to throw light on the nature of the fallacy referred to in the text. He says :—

*'All and each of those things contained in the entire domain of nature exist in an order from things interior. They are so many derivations and successions. Interior things, however, do not cohere with those that are exterior by continuity, but are distinct, and are conjoined by pro-*

\* *Opticks*, p. 2. (Ed. 1730.)



jections or offsets, as it were fibres, by means of which there are communications. The qualities of these derivations and the successions thence arising, such as they are in general, may be presented to view in idea from fruits, as for example, from citrons, apples, and the like. Of these, the parts which are in the greatest measure external, are the rinds which enwrap them; within these is the fleshy part which is so encompassed. The parts still more interior are the seeds surrounded by cases or sheaths externally, then the seeds themselves, with membranes. Under the latter is the interior fleshy part, in which is the first form, as it were a soul, from which again come new trees and new fruits.\*

‘All these are in *successive order*, and are, moreover, distinct from one another and also conjoined. The communication of the interiors with the exteriors takes place, in a wonderful manner, by means of transitions, so to say, of a fibrous character. These things, when they are being formed at the first, are almost in a state of coherence; but

\* ‘Seeds have two coats, the *testa* and *tegmen*, or external and internal membrane, and, according as the seed is or is not albuminous, an albumen enclosing the embryo, or an embryo of larger size immediately invested by the coats.’—The *albumen* or *perisperm* of seeds ‘is a technical term used in botany to denote the cellular structure which exists in greater or less quantity in all seeds where the development of the embryo is not accompanied by the entire absorption of the nucleus of the ovule. . . . The structure of albumen corresponds to that of the cotyledons of seeds devoid of albumen, both serving the same office, namely, that of reservoir of nutriment for the germinating seed.’ *Embryo* ‘is the name applied to the rudimentary plant contained in all true seeds.’ *Ovule* or *Ovulum* is ‘the name applied to the rudiment of the seed of Flowering Plants, produced in the ovary or germen during the development of the flower, fertilised by the pollen-grains when complete, and afterwards converted into a Seed by the development of the Embryo and other secondary structures during the conversion of the ovary into the fruit.’ *Micrographic Dict.* of Griffith and Henfrey, where abundant additional information may be found, illustrative of the principle of *successive order*.

in process of time they are separated. For the first form, which is inmost in the seed, before it can be expanded into forms similar to their parent forms, must be opened successively. And when it is opened, and begins to grow, the fleshy parts by which it is enclosed adapt themselves to it, and serve at first for soil, and then for fertilising juice. After this time, which is the time of its being in the womb, it springs forth, and is then left to the soil of the earth in which as seed it was sown.

‘From all this an idea may be formed as to how the case stands with derivatives in successive order.

‘As it is in the vegetable kingdom, so also is it in the animal kingdom; but in the latter much more perfectly. In the animal kingdom these are things exterior, interior, and also inmost, that are, in like manner, in a successive order: and these are distinct from one another, and also conjoined. In this, however, they differ, that the forms in the animal kingdom were created to receive life. Hence it is that as the forms recipient of life are in successive order, so also are the lives which thence result. For the forms or substances recipient of life are subjects, and those things resulting from the changes and modifications they undergo are forces, which must be called lives, for they are living forces.

‘From what has been here stated it may be manifest what is meant by *Divine Truths in successive order*. For all things which pertain to life have relation to truth, and their perfection to goodness; and in the opposite sense to what is false, and their imperfection to evil. The transitions from the one to the other, are also called degrees.’ \*

‘In man, there is an inmost principle, there are interior principles under this inmost, and there are exterior principles. All these are most exactly distinct from one another. They succeed in order, thus they proceed from what is

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 8603. On Degrees, see Note Y. of this Appendix.

inmost to the remotest boundary. They also flow in according to the order in which they succeed. Hence it is that the inflow of life is by means of what is inmost into the interiors, and by means of these interiors into what is exterior, thus according to the order in which they succeed. Hence it is that they never rest till they arrive at the ultimate or extreme of order, where they stop. And inasmuch as the inflow of things interior is according to order even to the last or remotest extreme, and there stops, it is clear that interiors are, altogether, in this last or ultimate, but in this order:—the inmost principle which has thus flowed in, keeps the centre there, the interiors which are ranged under this inmost surround that centre, and the exteriors constitute the circumferences, and this not only in general but also in every single point. The former kind of order is called *successive*, the latter is named *simultaneous*. The latter takes its rise from the former; for everything simultaneous arises from what is successive. And since its origin is such, as such it exists.

‘Now, inasmuch as all interior things are in the ultimate or extreme, and are also there together, therefore the appearance is as if life were in the ultimate, that is to say, in the body, when, nevertheless it is in the interior. Nor is it even there, but in what is supreme; in other words, it is in the Lord, from whom is the all of life. From this it also follows that life in things exterior, as compared with life in things interior, is respectively obscure. For in things exterior the life is general, existing as it does from the inflow of several, yea of innumerable, things from and by the interiors; and these appear together, and in a general manner.’\*

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 6451.

## NOTE D., p. 8.

## CARTESIANISM PREFERRED BY THE WISE AMONG THE LEARNED.

THE reference in the text is plainly to the system of Occasional Causes, which, as elsewhere observed, agrees in part, at least, with the author's doctrine of spiritual Influx.\*

The truth of this significant averment is abundantly confirmed and illustrated by the annexed series of statements in which is described the special characteristic of the philosophical movement inaugurated by Descartes.

'The great revolution which Des Cartes produced in Philosophy, was the effect of a superiority of genius, aided by the circumstances of the times. Men had for more than a thousand years looked up to Aristotle as an oracle in philosophy. His authority was the test of truth. The small remains of the Platonic system were confined to a few mystics, whose principles and manner of life drew little attention. The feeble attempts of Ramus, and of some others, to make improvements in the system, had little effect. The Peripatetic doctrines were so interwoven with the whole system of scholastic theology, that to dissent from Aristotle was to alarm the Church. The most useful and intelligible parts, even of Aristotle's writings, were neglected, and philosophy was become an art of speaking learnedly, and disputing subtilly, without producing any invention of use

\* A similar allusion to the character of contemporary philosophical opinion touching the point in question, occurs in the author's work on *Conjugal Love*, (§ 328), published in the preceding year (1768), in which it is affirmed that there exists a *consensus* of the learned, as to the impossibility of any natural influx into what is spiritual, whilst they admit that there is a spiritual influx into the natural order.

in human life. It was fruitful of words, but barren of works, and admirably contrived for drawing a veil over human ignorance, and putting a stop to the progress of knowledge, by filling men with a conceit that they knew everything. It was very fruitful also in controversies ; but, for the most part, they were controversies about words, or about things of no moment, or things above the reach of the human faculties. And the issue of them was what might be expected—that the contending parties fought, without gaining or losing an inch of ground, till they were weary of the dispute, or their attention was called off to some other subject.

‘Such was the philosophy of the schools of Europe, during many ages of darkness and barbarism that succeeded the decline of the Roman Empire ; so that there was great need of a reformation in philosophy as well as in religion. The light began to dawn at last ; a spirit of inquiry sprang up, and men got the courage to doubt of the dogmas of Aristotle, as well as of the decrees of Popes. The most important step in the reformation of religion, was to destroy the claim of infallibility, which hindered men from using their judgment in matters of religion ; and the most important step in the reformation of philosophy, was to destroy  
• the authority of which Aristotle had so long had peaceable possession. The last had been attempted by Lord Bacon and others, with no less zeal than the first by Luther and Calvin.

‘Des Cartes knew well the defects of the prevailing system, which had begun to lose its authority. His genius enabled him, and his spirit prompted him, to attempt a new one. . . .

‘In regard to the philosophy of Des Cartes, we ought to distinguish between the theories he put forth and the impulse he gave to the human mind. Many of his theories have been abandoned ; but the impulse communicated by Des Cartes



in his resistance to the yoke of routine and the prejudices of the Schoolmen has always lasted.

'The triumph of the Cartesian system over that of Aristotle is one of the most remarkable revolutions in the history of philosophy. . . . The authority of Aristotle was now no more. That reverence for hard words and dark notions, by which men's understanding had been strangled in early years, was turned into contempt, and everything suspected which was not clearly and distinctly understood. This is the spirit of the Cartesian philosophy, and is a more important acquisition to mankind than any of its particular tenets; and for exerting this spirit so zealously, and spreading it so successfully, Des Cartes deserves immortal honour.'\*

'After the Peripatetic system,' says Dr. Reid, 'had reigned above a thousand years in the schools of Europe almost without a rival, it sunk before that of Des Cartes; the perspicuity of whose writings and notions, contrasted with the obscurity of Aristotle and his commentators, created a strong prejudice in favour of this new philosophy. . . . The system which is now generally received, with regard to the mind and its operations, derives not only its spirit from Des Cartes, but its fundamental principles; and, after all the improvements made by Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, may still be called the Cartesian system:† . . .

'Considered,' it has been said, 'in respect to its principles and its starting point, the philosophy of Des Cartes excited the observation of internal facts, as the philosophy of Bacon excited the observation of external facts. The latter was the flowing outward of thought towards sensations; the former was the flowing back of thought upon itself. Modern psychology was born of Cartesianism.'

\* Sir W. Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, pp. 268, 274.

† *Ibid.* p. 204.

‘The endeavours of the Jesuits in France,’ observes Sir William Hamilton, ‘to prohibit the introduction of every form of the Cartesian doctrine into the public seminaries of education, are well known.’\*

A general notion of what these ‘endeavours’ imply, may be gathered from what follows :—

‘Quoi qu’on en ait dit, Descartes lui-même n’a jamais été persécuté. Il consommait une révolution, il ne la commençait pas. Ceux qui la commencèrent réellement lui payèrent la rançon fatale de fautes et de malheurs, imposée à tous ceux qui commencent. Descartes, qui, sans s’en douter, continuait l’œuvre de Bruno et de Ramus, comparé à ses devanciers, fut un modèle de sagesse et d’esprit de conduite. Trouvant déjà une révolution philosophique à accomplir une entreprise assez difficile, il ne la mêla point aux autres révolutions qui troublaient alors le monde. Réformateur en philosophie, il ne le fut ni en religion, ni en politique. Gentilhomme et fort à son aise, il put éviter l’écueil de l’enseignement public ; et quoique passionné pour la gloire, il passa sa vie dans la solitude ou en perpétuels voyages. Il dédia ses *Méditations* à la Sorbonne, fit des avances aux Jésuites retint prudemment sa démonstration mathématique du mouvement de la terre, après le procès de Galilée, reçut, sans l’avoir demandé, il est vrai, et sans en avoir jamais profité, le brevet d’une assez forte pension du cardinal de Richelieu, et finit par donner des leçons de philosophie à une Reine. Son premier écrit, le *Discours de la Méthode*, est de 1637 ; il mourut en 1650 ; et en ces douze ou treize années, la révolution philosophique à laquelle son nom est attaché, était consommée. Descartes était dès lors le philosophe de tout ce qui pensait en Europe et en France. MM. de Port-Royal étaient cartésiens ; Bossuet l’était aussi, en même temps que Fénelon.

\* Reid’s Works, p. 266. (Foot-note.)

Les congrégations enseignantes, et particulièrement celle de l'Oratoire, avaient embrassé et répandaient les nouveaux principes. Les Jésuites chez qui Descartes avait été élevé, et qu'il avait toujours ménagés, ne comprenant guère la portée de ce qui se faisait, laissaient faire et laissaient passer. Mais, après la mort de Descartes, tout changea bientôt de face. Peu à peu, ses disciples le compromirent en le développant. L'apparition du livre de Spinoza où l'auteur déclarait n'avoir fait que réduire à une forme plus rigoureuse les principes de son maître, réveilla partout l'autorité, et l'avant-garde de l'autorité de cette époque, les Jésuites prirent décidément parti contre la philosophie nouvelle, et lui firent une guerre qui se termina par une persécution véritable.\*

'Durant le dix-septième siècle,' says M. Nourisson, 'au sein du Cartésianisme, s'élève un souffle de liberté. Car, le Cartésianisme, c'était l'élite de la société en France et presque en Europe; c'était tout le dix-septième siècle dans ce qu'il avait de plus original et de plus grand; c'était à la fois les sciences, les lettres, la philosophie, le christianisme, dans leur plus admirable harmonie; c'était une école immense, essentiellement française et devenue promptement européenne, où les esprits les plus différents venaient puiser des inspirations communes, où se rencontraient Port-Royal et l'Oratoire, l'Ordre antique de Saint-Benoît, et la jeune Congrégation de Saint-Sulpice, la Magistrature, l'Université, l'Eglise. Là toutes les pensées se vivifiaient à un foyer commun, et en même temps elles s'éclairaient et se corrigeaient l'une l'autre.'—*Œuvres Philosophiques du P. André*, Introduction, p. ccxvi. †

In an admirable preface to a careful translation of Descartes' *Meditations*, the following remarks occur. They

\* Cousin, *Frag. Phil.* t. ii. pp. 175, 177.

† Quoted by M. Nourisson, *La Philosophie de Leibnitz*, p. 174.

afford an interesting corroboration of the statement in our author's text:—

'First given to the world more than two hundred years ago, and thus coëval with, and at the same time in a great measure the cause of, the rise of philosophical thinking in its modern epoch, the writings of Descartes are the fountain whence, during this period, its various streams have flowed, and are yet, in more ways indeed than at first sight appear, exercising a modifying influence on the thought of our country and time . . . The history of speculation since the date of the works of Descartes, shows indeed that they contain not a little that is capable of extravagant consequence ; but it proves no less manifestly that they are characterised by the spirit, embrace the elements, and afford the conditions, of a genuine philosophy.'\*

'When thinking on a certain class of questions is once awakened, it seems impossible for us, constituted as we are, to rest merely in the observed, or among phenomena. We feel ourselves constrained by the very conditions of the exercise of our faculties of knowledge to pass beyond this circle to further questions and inferences which phenomena suggest and warrant. In dealing with the observed, there are certain thoughts that perpetually obtrude themselves on our attention, to which there are no corresponding prototypes in the world of observation, and in virtue of which the mind is *projected*, as it were, into a region beyond the limits of its own modifications, and of those of the outer world. The principles of substance and phenomenon, and of cause and effect, when we essay to exhaust them, may serve as illustrations. To the same general class belongs the knowledge of the infinite in contrast to the finite, the absolute in contrast to the relative, whether realized as absolute cause or the first sub-

\* *The Meditations of Descartes*, translated from the Latin, &c. (Edinb. 1853.) Translator's Preface.

stance. These thoughts are not the peculiar property of the speculator. They are present, all of them, whether but dimly felt or reflectively known, in the consciousness of every one. They overshadow our every-day life and experience, imparting to it solemnity, elevation, and mystery; and appeal to the tendencies and needs both of our intellectual and moral nature. With regard to these thoughts, we naturally seek to know their character and import, and we thus at once come in contact with the inquiry as to whether they are merely regulative notions, fitted to complete the symmetry of thought, but of no avail in adding to our knowledge of the sum of existence; or whether there be in any sphere, however remote from our observation, reality corresponding to what is so impressively suggested to us, and forced on our attention. In the existence of this kind of knowledge and in the inquiries to which it gives rise, lie the origin and matter of all high speculation; for philosophy in its highest and last form is but a striving to connect the seen with the unseen—what is passing with what is subsistent—the relative with the absolute—the finite with the infinite—man and the world with God.’

‘It cannot at least be doubted that, if we would know anything intelligently of the nature of these problems (of the First Philosophy) as the history of modern thinking presents them . . . we must refer to the philosophical writings of Descartes as the starting point of the race—as the great moving power that in modern times set them afloat on the current of speculation.’ \*

To the above may be added one of the most recent protests against the fanatical attempts of certain modern Peripatetics to pervert intellectual philosophy in the interests of superstition and spiritual tyranny. It is from the pen of an enlightened Roman Catholic writer, who defends, with

\* *Op. cit.* pp. viii. ix.



singular fearlessness, force, and candour, Augustinian and Cartesian principles, under the name of Ontologism. He thus writes :—

‘Il s’agit ici de la propriété constitutive de l’esprit humain ; c’est l’honneur et la gloire la plus pure de l’homme qui sont en jeu. Les ontologistes, sur ce point, combattent *pro aris et focis*. Ils défendent la patrie commune des intelligences ; et s’ils sont pleins de confiance dans le succès de leur entreprise, c’est qu’ils savent très-bien que leur système est le palladium du spiritualisme, et la sauve-garde du domaine qui appartient en propre à l’humanité.’ \*

Testimonies such as these, from witnesses of unquestionable general intelligence and special competence, are of the greatest value in presence of current controversies ; and, as touching the position taken by authors in the disputes between empiric and intellectual thinkers, will not be disregarded by any fair and unprejudiced student of philosophy.

One of the most pernicious of the many evil influences now prevalent in Europe, is the so-called ‘philosophy’ which bases itself exclusively on the mere experience of the senses. As shown above (Note A.), it is virtually identical with Scholasticism. The occult qualities and empty speculations of the Peripatetics lie concealed under the mask of a newly-invented phraseology, constructed with remarkable ingenuity, so as to hide human ignorance, under the pretence of promoting scientific truth. In origin, character, and tendency, the philosophical principles assumed by the modern devotees of Naturalism, and those so ardently advocated by the Jesuit partisans of Peripateticism, are at one. Both alike lead

\* *Réponse aux Lettres d’un Sensualiste contre Ontologisme*, par L’Abbé Jules Fabre, Preface, p. x. (Ed. Paris, 1864.) See, another protest apparently by a writer of the same school, Dr. Laforet, *Hist. de la Phil.*, vol. i. pp. 383–391. (Ed. Bruxelles, 1867.)

naturally and necessarily, however unconsciously, to the abyss of materialism.

As in the seventeenth century, so now, the Cartesian philosophy, notwithstanding its grave defects, remains in spirit and aim one of the most powerful antidotes against the subtle intellectual poison which, from so many different sources, is being industriously instilled into the minds of ignorant, incautious, or inconsequent thinkers, through the medium of the sensualistic method of philosophising at present so popular.

#### NOTE E., p. 19.

##### SUBSISTENCE IS PERPETUAL EXISTENCE.

This maxim is frequently referred to by our author as a canon of thought universally accepted by all intelligent minds. The profound truth it involves was more or less distinctly seen even by the ancient Gentile philosophers, who evidently derived it from a primeval Revelation, as the following remarkable passage proves :—

Ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκεν, οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐστὶν αὐτάρκης, ἐρμωθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας. Διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἱερεῖν τινὲς προήχθησαν ὅτι πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι θεῶν\* πλεία† τὰ καὶ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἰδαιλλόμενα ἡμῖν καὶ δὲ ἀκοῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, τῇ μὲν θείᾳ δυνάμει πρίποντα καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον, οὐ μὴν τῇ γε οὐσίᾳ. Σωτὴρ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ἀπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν ὁπωσδήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ θεός, οὐ μὴν αὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου ζῆον κάματος ὑπομένων, ἀλλὰ

\* Cf. *Psal.* lxxii. 6. (Vers. LXX.) :—'Εγὼ εἶπα, θεοὶ ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ὑψίστου πάντες, (also St. John. i. 36.)

† Other MSS. read ἐμπλῆς.

δυνάμει χρώμενος ἀτρίτῳ δι' ἧς καὶ τῶν πόρρω δοκούντων εἶναι περιγίνεται.\*

‘Un corps existe, parceque Dieu veut qu’il soit ; il continue d’être, parce que Dieu continue de vouloir qu’il soit ; et si Dieu cessait seulement de vouloir que ce corps fût, dès ce moment il ne serait plus . . . Le monde n’est point un émanation nécessaire de la Divinité. Dieu peut d’une volonté éternelle et immuable le créer pour un temps. Mais Dieu ne peut avoir une volonté positive et pratique de le détruire ; il ne peut point agir, pour ne rien faire ; son action ne peut tendre au néant. Cela est clair. Ainsi, puisque les corps existent à cause que Dieu veut qu’ils soient, puisqu’ils ne cessent point d’être, à cause que Dieu ne cesse point de vouloir qu’ils soient, il est évident que la création et la conservation ne sont en Dieu *qu’une même action.*’ †

‘We have,’ says an Anglican admirer at once of St. Augustine and Malebranche, ‘our being not only *from* God,

\* Aristotle, *De Mundo*, vi. §§ 1-4. (Oxford Ed.) Cf. *The True Christian Religion*, § 273, where it is declared to be incredible that the ancient philosophers, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others, who have written concerning God, and the immortality of the soul, had their first information on these points from their own understanding. They received it from others, it is averred, to whom it had been handed down, in succession from a primæval Revelation, called by our author the ANCESTR WORD. This being admitted, the language of Aristotle is seen to be strictly accurate and deeply significant. He calls the ancient tradition, *Ἀρχαῖος λόγος*.

† Malebranche, *Méd. Chrét.* Ch. V. § vii. ; Cf. Hale, *Origin of Mankind*: —‘There is the same necessity for the Divine influence and regimen to order and govern, conserve and keep together, the universe, in that consistence it hath received, as it was at first to give it, before it could receive it.’ The same principle seems implied in the following observation: —‘The adaptation and arrangement of natural forces, which compass these modifications of animal structure (under varying external conditions of existence), in exact proportion to the need of them, is an adaptation in the nature of Creation. It can only be due to the working of a Power which is in the nature of Creative Power.’ (Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, p. 227.)

but also in him. And therefore St. Austin tells us expressly that the power and influence of the Creator is the cause of subsistence to every creature. And that if this should be withdrawn, universal nature would sink. His words are (*De Gen. ad lit.* Lib. 4, cap. 12.): *Creatoris potentia, et omnipotentia atque omnitenentis virtus, causa subsistendi est omni creaturæ. Quæ virtus ab eis quæ creata sunt regendis, si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura conderet.*\* †

‘God hath his influence into the very essence of all things, without which influence of Deity supporting them their utter annihilation could not choose but follow. Of him all things have both received their first being and their continuance to be that which they are. All things are therefore partakers of God, they are his offspring, his influence is in them, and the personal wisdom of God is for that very cause said to excel in nimbleness or agility, to pierce [*Wisdom*, vii. 23] into all intellectual, pure, and subtile spirits, to go through all, and to reach unto every thing which is. Otherwise, how should the same wisdom be that which supporteth, beareth up [*Heb.* i. 3], and sustaineth all!’ †

‘From all the considerations which have been hitherto adduced concerning the life which is from the Lord, and concerning the existence of all things in the universe from it, every one who is wise in heart may see, that nature produces nothing from itself, but that it is merely subservient, as a mean of producing, to the spiritual principle which proceeds from the Sun of heaven, which is the Lord; it is subservient as the instrumental cause to its principal cause, or as a dead force to its living force. It is evident from this how greatly they err who ascribe to nature the various generations of animals and productions of vegetables. Such persons are:

\* Norris, *Immortality of the Soul*. (Ed. 1708, pp. 57, 58.)

† Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* Book V. ch. lvi. § 5. (Keble's Ed.)

like those who ascribe magnificent and splendid works to the instrument and not to the artificer, or who adore a graven image and not God. The fallacies, which are innumerable, in all reasoning concerning things spiritual, moral, and political, have thence their origin. For a fallacy is the inversion of order. It is also a judgment of the eye and not of the mind. It is, moreover, a conclusion from the appearance of a thing and not from the essence of a thing.

‘Wherefore to reason from fallacies concerning the world and the existence of things in it, is like confirming by reasoning processes that darkness is light, that what is dead is living, and that the body flows into the soul, and not contrariwise. When, nevertheless, it is an eternal truth that influx is spiritual, and there is no such thing as physical influx. In other words, there is an influx of the soul, which is spiritual, into the body which is material; and also of the spiritual world into the natural world. It is, moreover, an eternal truth that in like manner as the Divine Being from Himself, and through the medium of what proceeds from Himself, created all things, so he sustains all things; and that sustentation is perpetual creation, just as subsistence is perpetual existence.’ \*

To deny the truth of the above maxim, implies the rejection of Deity as being always and everywhere present and active throughout the universe—as well in the natural as in the spiritual world. The fashionable scientific formula, ‘The Unknown and Unknowable,’ is, in many cases, merely a magniloquent and delusive phrase, employed to soften the impious notion of Atheism.

On the other hand, as soon as the principle under consideration is clearly perceived, the crude speculations which, in these days, pass current with so many, as something new and profound, under the fine name of ‘Evolution’ will be

\* *Apocalypse Explained*, § 1215.



seen at once to be nothing but the mere figments of an unbridled imagination. There is a true philosophy of Evolution : but it is too high for the disciples of Lamarck and Darwin. They 'cannot attain unto it,' without the aid of higher principles than they seem willing to adopt.

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NOTE F., p. 20.

I HAVE SEEN THAT SUN.

It must be granted that the claim here made, in terms so definite and precise, is such as to startle and perplex, even if it do not excite ridicule and contempt, in the minds of many who may meet with it for the first time. On the other hand, it must also be admitted that its extreme novelty and strangeness do not, of themselves, constitute a valid ground on which to reject it. As it ought not to be admitted until after it has been subjected to the closest and most rigid scrutiny of the reason, and to a conscientious examination of all the evidence advanced in support of it, so it will not be rejected and despised, arbitrarily and blindly, by any reasonable and candid mind. No one knew better than its author the almost insuperable difficulties that lay in the way of its general acceptance.\*

The evidence on which it rests is fully supplied by the author's own works throughout, to which, accordingly, the reader is referred. Those who elect to decline entering upon an honest and careful investigation of the whole subject, are bound by every rule of just and fair dealing, to observe a becoming hesitation in pronouncing any sort of opinion, touching a subject of which they must be wholly ignorant.

It may, nevertheless, be asked in a general way :—

\* Vid. *Arcana Coelestia*, § 4622.

(1.) Is the alleged fact possible?

(2.) And if so, is Swedenborg's testimony credible?

(3.) Is the fact, in itself (supposing it to be a fact), of such a character as to harmonize with all the most pure and exalted apperceptions of the Deity and of Divine Truth, that have been arrived at by the wise and good of every age, Gentile as well as Christian.

To the first of these questions, the records of Divine Revelation furnish to the Churchman a sufficient reply. The evidence derived from this source, no Christian properly so-called, is at liberty to reject.

(a) We read that Moses, with Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy elders of Israel '*saw* the God of Israel: and there was under his *feet* as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone, and as it were the *body of heaven* in his clearness.' (*Exod.* xxiv., 10.)

(β) The prophet Isaiah '*saw* also the Lord (*Adonai*) sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple.' (*Ch.* vi. 1.)

(γ) The disciples, Peter, James, and John, *saw* the Lord\* '*transfigured before them: and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light.*' (*St. Matthew* xvii. 2.)

(δ) That disciple whom the Lord loved, while an exile for his name's sake in the rocky and desolate isle of Patmos, *saw* the face of his Divine Lord, '*as the sun shineth in his strength.*' (*Rev.* i. 16.)

(ε) The same Lord is the Light of the Heavenly Jerusalem. (*Rev.* xxi. 23; xxii. 5.)

This, then, is that *Sol justitiæ*, the Sun of heaven, whose radiance our marvellously gifted and heaven-illuminated author, in all solemn earnestness, avers that he also sometimes *saw*. His language on this subject is calm, deliberate, measured.

\* The self-same *Adonai*, see Malachi, iii. 1.

It is wholly free from the slightest tinge of 'enthusiasm.' It was granted him (he says) to see the *Sun* of heaven sometimes (*aliquoties*). He declares that he has seen the *Light* of heaven very frequently (*sæpius*).

Whether or not the fact that about the middle of the last century, the Christian Church was in its final stage of decay and death, constituted a sufficient reason to call for some special and extraordinary exercise of Divine interposition, in the way of revealing, by a rigidly *intellectual* process, new and higher spiritual conceptions of that Divinely revealed Truth of which the Church had possession, from the beginning, in the volume of Holy Writ, is a question which well deserves the most conscientious consideration of all intelligent Churchmen. This is pre-eminently, in the present day, a problem for the Clergy.

To the second question—the credibility of Swedenborg's testimony—it seems sufficient to reply that, beyond all question, as a witness, he possesses, in the highest degree, every single qualification by which a trustworthy witness ought to be characterized, according to the most certain and approved maxims and rules. The assertion here made is capable of superfluous proof; although, unhappily, no amount or kind of evidence avails to convince unwilling and prejudiced minds.

As to the third question—the harmony of the alleged fact with man's highest apperceptions of God and Truth—let the following extracts be an answer. They are only a few out of a vast number that might be adduced from the most distinguished thinkers of every age, dating from the dawn of philosophy to the present day. They illustrate, in a striking manner, the fact of the wide acceptance, by minds of the most varied and richest culture, of what our author declares to be the most universal of all truths, namely, that the Lord Jesus Christ is the Sun of Heaven, and that all light in the

other world proceeds from Him. They may serve to evince that this sublimest and most sacred of truths has, in all ages, been affectionately 'felt after,'\* and more or less dimly seen *per transennam*, by minds the most reverent and devout, and endowed with the highest reach of thought. It is thus expressed by the father of Dialectics :

## PLATO.

Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον, ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατόν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ξὺν ὄλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὄλῳ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιεκτεῖον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γίνηται ἀνασχίσθαι θεωμένη. τοῦτο δ' εἰναί φαμεν τὰγαθόν.†

Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τὰγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ· ὃ τι περ αὐτό ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.‡

Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν; §

Τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστία εἶναι, ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὁρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν τε νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρία ἀληθείαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τον μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξαι ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. ||

\* Acts, xvii. 27.

† *De Repub.*, Lib. VII. c. iv. § 519 (Ed. Stallbaum.)

‡ *Ibid.* Lib. VI. c. xix. § 508.

§ *Ibid.* c. xx. § 509.

*Ibid.* Lib. VII. c. iii. § 517.

## ARISTOTLE.

. . . ἵσται γάρ τι δ' αἰεὶ κινεῖ τα κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον αὐτό.\*

Ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὅν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. Τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὐ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτῆται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.†

## ST. AUGUSTINE.

Aliud autem est IPSUM LUMEN quo illustratur anima, ut omnia vel in se vel in illo veraciter intellecta conspiciat : nam illud ipse Deus est, hæc autem creatura, quamvis rationalis et intellectualis ad ejus imaginem facta, quæ cum conatur lumen illud intueri, palpitat infirmitate, et minus valet. Inde est tamen quicquid intelligit sicut valet. Cum ergo illuc rapitur, et à carnalibus subtracta sensibus, illi visioni expressius præsentatur non spatiis localibus, sed modo quodam suo, etiam SUPRA SE videt illud, quo adjuta videt quicquid etiam se intelligendo videt. Si enim quemadmodum rapta est à sensibus corporis, ut esset in istis similitudinibus corporum, quæ spiritu videntur : ita et ab ipsis rapiatur, ut in illam quasi regionem intellectualium vel intelligibilium subvehatur, ubi sine ulla corporis similitudine perspicua veritas cernitur ; nullis opinionum falsarum nebulis obfuscatur. Ibi virtutes animæ non sunt operosæ ac laboriosæ. In illo FIRMAMENTO disciplinæ homo spirituales intelligentias operatur atque distinguit ; videt quæ sit incommutabilis veritas, quæ tanquam SOL fulget in anima : et quemadmodum anima ipsius veritatis particeps fiat.

Sic enim Deus cum homine non per aliquam creaturam loquitur corporalem, corporalibus instrepens auribus, ut

\* Aristot. *Metaph.* Lib. III. c. viii. § 8.

† Ibid. Lib. XI. c. vii. § 6.



inter sonantem et audientem aerea spatia verberentur; neque per ejusmodi spiritalem quæ corporum similitudines figuratur, sicut in somniis vel quo alio tali modo; nam et sic velut corporeis auribus loquitur, et velut interposito corporalium locorum intervallo: multum enim similia sunt talia visa corporalibus. Sed loquitur ipsâ veritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore. Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine caeteris, quibus homo constat, est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior.\*

‘Nam etiam sol iste, et videntis faciem illustrat et cæci; ambobus sol præsens est, sed præsentē sole unus absens est. Sic et sapientia Dei DOMINUS JESUS CHRISTUS ubique præsens est, quia ubique est veritas, ubique sapientia.’ †

‘Illi in vos sæviant, qui nesciunt cum quo labore verum inveniatur, et quam difficilē caveantur errores. Illi in vos sæviant, qui nesciunt, quā rarum et arduum sit carnalia phantasmata piæ mentis serenitate superare. Illi in vos sæviant, qui nesciunt cum quanta difficultate sanetur oculus interioris hominis, ut possit intueri SOLEM SUUM; non istud, quem vos videtis coelesti corpore, oculis carneis et hominum et pecorum fulgentem ac radiantem; sed illum de quo scriptum est per prophetam: *Ortus est mihi justitiæ SOL*; et de quo dictum est in Evangelio: *Erat lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*’ ‡

#### BOETHIUS.

Πᾶν' εἶφορ' καὶ πᾶν' ἐπακούει  
 Puro clarum lumine Phœbum  
 Melliflui canit oris Homerus;  
 Qui tamen intima viscera terræ  
 Non valet, aut pelagi, radiorum

\* S. August. *Philosophia*, pp. 194, 195.

† August. in *Joan. Tract.* 35.

‡ St. Augustine, *Lib. cont. Epist. fund.* c. 1.

Infirmâ perrumpere luce,  
*Haud sic magni conditor orbis,*  
 Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti  
 Nullâ terræ mole resistunt ;  
 Non nox atris nubibus obstat.  
 Quæ sint, quæ fuerint veniantque,  
 Uno mentis cernit in ictu ;  
 Quem, quia respicit omnia solus,  
 Verum possis dicere SOLEM."\*

## THOMAS AQUINAS.

Omnia dicimus in Deo videri, in quantum participatione sui luminis omnia cognoscimus ; nam et IPSUM NATURALE LUMEN RATIONIS EST QUÆDAM PARTICIPATIO DIVINI LUMINIS. Undè dicit Augustinus : 'Disciplinarum spectamina videri non possunt nisi aliquo velut suo SOLE illustrentur,' videlicet DEO.† . . .

## JOHN SMITH (The Cambridge Platonist).

'For indeed this enthusiastical spirit (*Ruach hakkodesh*, or Holy breathing) seated itself principally in the higher and purer faculties of the Soul which were *ὡς περ ἀνὰ ψυχὰς πρὸς διγυγῆν*, that I may allude to the ancient opinion of *Empedocles*, who held that there were two Suns, the one Archetypal which was always in the inconspicable hemisphere of the world, but the beams thereof shining upon this world's Sun were reflected to us, and so further enlightened us.' ‡

\* Boëthius, *De Consol. Phil.* Lib. 5.

† St. Thomas Aquinas, quoted in a brilliant and beautiful Essay on *Philosophy*, by the Bishop of Orleans (*Le Correspondant*, October, 1865, p. 274.)

‡ *Select Discourses*, p. 239. (Ed. Cambridge, 1859.)

## CUDWORTH.

. . . 'The first of these three (Platonic) hypostases, is that which is properly called by the Platonists *πηγή τῆς θεότητος*, the fountain of the Godhead, and by Plato himself *ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς*, *περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὁ αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν*. The King of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things.

'And this first Divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly *αὐτόθεος*, the original Deity—is largely insisted upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his *Politics*, under the name and title of *τ' ἀγαθόν*, the Good—but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also a heavenly god, and said to be the offspring of this highest Good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, *ὃ, τί περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ κοιτῷ τόπῳ, πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα*. This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For, as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it; nor is that light by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only *ἡλιοειδές*, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest Good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only *ἀγαθοειδές*, a boniform thing. Again: as the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest Good, not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings.—*Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος*, this highest Good being not itself properly essence, but above essence, transcending the same in dignity and power.\*

\* *Intellect. Syst.* Vol. II. pp. 301, 302. (Ed. London, 1820.)

## MALEBRANCHE.

‘ Il y a peut-être un SOLEIL (*Sap. v. 6*) pour les esprits comme tu en vois un pour les corps. Il y a peut-être une *lumière* (*Joan. i. 9.*) et une sagesse éternelle, une raison universelle, immuable, nécessaire, qui éclaire tous les hommes et qui les rend raisonnables. Si c’était une telle lumière qui t’éclairât, si celui qui renferme les idées de tous les êtres t’aimait tant que de se vouloir bien communiquer à toi à proportion de tes désirs, ne serais-tu pas bien misérable de tirer de sa bonté des raisons de ton ingratitude ? ’ \*

## BOSSUET.

“ Toute la lumière, toute la science philosophique, est renfermée dans ces admirable paroles de Bossuet, commentant le verset de saint Jean : *Erat lux vera quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*. ‘ La vraie lumière, la lumière éternelle qui illumine tout homme venant en ce monde, C’EST LE SOLEIL DES INTELLIGENCES ; tout œil, tout intelligence la voit, et ils ne verraient rien, s’ils ne la voyaient pas, puisque c’est par elle et à la faveur de ses purs rayons qu’ils voient toute chose ; comme le soleil sensible éclaire tous les corps, de même CE SOLEIL DES ESPRITS éclaire toute la raison. Toutes les vérités, tous les premiers principes, toutes les idées, toutes les lois éternelles sont des rayons communiqués, fractionnés, reflétés de ce DIVIN SOLEIL. ’ ” †

## FENELON.

‘ Comme le soleil sensible éclaire tous les corps, de même le SOLEIL D’INTELLIGENCE éclaire tous les esprits. La sub-

\* *Méd. Chrét. I. § 4.*

† *La Philosophie*, by the Bishop of Orleans.. (*Le Correspondant*, for 25th October, 1865.)

stance de l'œil de l'homme n'est point la lumière ; au contraire, l'œil emprunte à chaque moment la lumière des rayons du soleil. Tout de même mon esprit n'est point la raison primitive, la vérité universelle et immuable ; il est seulement *l'organe* par où passe cette lumière originelle et qui en est éclairé.'

' Il y a un SOLEIL DES ESPRITS, qui les éclaire tous, beaucoup mieux que le soleil visible n'éclaire les corps : ce soleil des esprits nous donne tout ensemble et sa lumière et l'amour de sa lumière pour la chercher. Ce soleil de vérité ne laisse aucune ombre, et il luit en même temps sur les deux hémisphères : il brille autant sur nous la nuit que le jour : ce n'est point au dehors qu'il répand ses rayons ; il habite en chacun de nous. Un homme ne peut jamais dérober ses rayons à un autre homme. Un homme n'a jamais besoin de dire à un autre : Retirez-vous, pour me laisser voir ce soleil ; vous me dérobez ses rayons : vous enlevez la portion qui m'est due. Ce soleil ne se couche jamais, et ne souffre aucun nuage que ceux qui sont formés par nos passions : c'est un jour sans ombre ; il éclaire les sauvages même dans les antres les plus profonds et les plus obscurs : il n'y a que les yeux malades qui se ferment à la lumière ; et même n'y a-t-il point d'homme si malade et si aveugle, qui ne marche encore à la lueur de quelque lumière sombre qui lui reste de ce SOLEIL INTERIEUR des consciences.' \*

DR. W. E. CHANNING.

'The great idea on which human cultivation especially depends, is that of God. This is the concentration of all that is beautiful, glorious, holy, blessed. It transcends immeasurably in worth and dignity all the science treasured up in cyclopaedias or libraries ; and this may be unfolded in

\* *Ibid.* pp. 316, 317.



the poor as truly as in the rich. It is not an idea to be elaborated by studies, which can be pursued only in leisure or by opulence. Its elements belong to every soul, and are especially to be found in our moral nature, in the idea of duty, in the feeling of reverence, in the approving sentence which we pass on virtue, in our disinterested affections, and in the wants and aspirations which carry us towards the Infinite. There is but one way of unfolding these germs of the idea of God, and that is faithfulness to the best convictions of duty and of the Divine will, which we have hitherto gained. God is to be known by obedience, by likeness, by sympathy ; that is, by moral means, which are open alike to rich and poor. Many a man of science has not known him. The pride of science, like a thick cloud, has hidden from the philosopher, the SPIRITUAL SUN, the only True Light ; and for want of this quickening ray, he has fallen in culture far, very far, below the poor.\*

## THE ABBÉ FABRE.

‘L’analyse de notre intelligence nous a donc démontré que Dieu, considéré en tant qu’Être, est pour toutes les intelligences, le stimulant d’action, l’objet propre, le Maître, la Lumière intelligible. Il résulte de notre étude que le SOLEIL DIVIN est présent, par ses rayons, à tous les esprits créés, et que tous les hommes en aperçoivent le reflet éclatant ou pâle dans les vérités absolues qu’ils connaissent.’

\* \* \* \* \*

‘O souverain Être, mon Créateur, mon Dieu, mon Maître, ma Lumière, SOLEIL DU MONDE SPIRITUEL, Foyer de *la pensée*, et de *l’amour*, Aliment vivifiant de mon intelligence, recevez l’hommage que ma raison se plaît à vous rendre ! Souvent, livré aux objets finis, je vous ai en quelque sort oublié ; mais tout servira désormais à me ramener aux idées,

\* Works, Vol. i. p. 234.

à me rappeler à vous. Je ferai en sorte que toutes les créatures m'annoncent le Père céleste qui offre à ma pensée son pain de chaque jour.' \*

SWEDENBORG.

*In the Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, published in 1740, three years before the opening of our author's spiritual sight, and his Divine call to his holy office, he thus writes on this subject of two Suns, one within the sphere of nature, the other above and before nature :—

“ *Whatever is in God, and whatever law God acts by, is God.* In vain do we endeavour to find, except from Revelation, how God acts, and how he communicates with our souls ; because the action of God is God himself. ‘The operation of God,’ says the Philosopher (Aristotle) . . . ‘is perpetual life.’

‘ *The only representation we can have of it, is in the way of comparison with light.* We are not forbidden to approach the Divine Sanctuary by the path of comparison. For since it is He for whom we exist, and whose we are to be, and with whom we are conjoined by love, so, in order that we may understand His attributes, He has willed that we should understand them through nature ; consequently, through signs, by the help of which the principles of our minds are formed. There is nothing more usual, even in the Holy Scriptures, than a comparison of the Deity with the sun ;’ . . . . . ‘The one sun is within the sphere of nature, the other is above and before it. The one is physical, the other purely moral. And the one falls under the philosophy of the mind, while the other lies withdrawn among the sacred mysteries of Theology ; between which two there are

\* *Cours de Philosophie*, tom. ii. pp. 562, 563.

boundaries that it is impossible for human faculties to transcend.’\*

It is, surely, far from unreasonable or ‘enthusiastic’ to believe that, when the proper time arrived, in the order of the eternal counsels, the sanctuaries of the Divine favour would be unveiled to lowly reverence, pure piety, and deep adoration of the Creator and Upholder of the universe, such as that which pervades our author’s writings throughout. And if there ever was a state of the Church in which a fresh outpouring of heavenly light was needed, and might with good reason have been looked for, it was that which prevailed throughout Christian Europe in the middle of the last century, and which showed itself with terrible distinctness, in that stupendous moral and spiritual earthquake, the first French Revolution.

Narrow and shallow minds may mock at this wonderful and unprecedented fact of Swedenborg’s spiritual enlightenment, in the very midst of that more than Cimmerian darkness in which the Christian Church of his time lay dying. The cold hard unbelief proper to naturalism may reject it, as being a mere hallucination, the offspring of dreamy reverie, mystical musing, or fanatical folly. The fact, nevertheless, remains. The marvellous and glorious body of spiritual truths revealed, through the instrumentality of this supernaturally enlightened servant of the Lord Jesus Christ, to a church and a world lying ‘in darkness and the shadow of death,’ are destined to endure through all and every kind of opposition, until the Divine purpose for which the new light was vouchsafed shall have been accomplished.

\* Vol. II. pp. 239, 240, 246.

## NOTE G., pp. 25, 26.

THAT SUN ITSELF IS NOT GOD ; BUT FROM GOD.

It is obvious that the subject of the present Note stands in intimate relation with that of the preceding. It involves, however, the consideration of a new and most profound question, which has been keenly controverted since the time of Malebranche in the Roman Catholic schools of philosophy—and, indeed, with extreme warmth during the last quarter of a century, under bitterly hostile banners, bearing respectively the names of Ontologism and Peripateticism.

A recent English writer \* on the subject ingenuously confesses that a satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is Ontologism ?' is by no means easy, and that the root of the matter has not yet been reached. He takes it to be 'a line of thought which pervades many, in other respects, very different systems.' He is also of opinion that thinkers of every school must regard it as 'one of the gravest speculations of the day.' In a brochure entitled *Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists* this liberal and candid writer thus approaches a principal point of the Ontologistic hypothesis:—"There is," he says, "a natural Light, wherewith God 'enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.' And what of it? What is its nature? Is it merely a power of the mind, or is it objective and independent of the mind? This is the problem which we have chiefly to deal with; and it is the problem, not only of the present controversy, but of all philosophy." †

After exposing, with much plainness of speech, the futile

\* The Rev. Charles Meynell, D.D., Professor of Philosophy and Literature at St. Mary's College, Oscott.

† *Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists*, p. 22.

attempt of Father Liberatore to reconcile St. Augustine with the 'angel of the schools,' Dr. Meynell proceeds to say:—

"Now, F. Liberatore's ruling idea seems to be this, that Deity must be strictly severed from immediate contact with the human intellect—else we are in Pantheism: while the aim of the Fathers seems to have been to establish the closest possible contact between Deity and the intellect. However, if we interpret SS. Augustine, Anselm, and Buonaventure by St. Thomas, and St. Thomas again by F. Liberatore, there is no closer union between God and the mind than this, that God has created man with the twofold faculty of perceiving sensible objects, and of arriving, by an abstractive process exercised upon these, at the higher intellectual notions . . . Now, let us suppose it [this doctrine] true; but what (once more) are we to think of the Platonic language of the Fathers? Was this, after all, only what they meant in saying that the human mind is 'immediately informed by,' 'conjoined to,' and 'lighted up' by '*the Incommutable Truth*,'—that God has given to it the power of abstraction! Why, if this be all, the same language might be applied to any system, short of Atheism."

'If, however, we must reconcile St. Augustine and St. Thomas, it can only be by supposing that when they speak of 'the light,' they are not really speaking of the same thing. For are there not *two lights*? The Fathers speak of the lamp of our mind as being enlightened by Another—by the Uncreated Light. Now, when St. Augustine or St. Anselm tells us that the Light is God Himself, they are speaking, surely, of the Uncreated Light, which is, as it were, the Sun of our intellect; and when, on the other hand, St. Thomas declares that the light is the Active intellect, that it is not one to all, but multiplied according to the number of individuals, he is speaking of the created light, which is a participation of God's Light. F. Liberatore himself helps us



to this distinction by a reference to the article of St. Thomas about the 'separated intellect.' St. Thomas denies that the *intellectus agens* is one to all men; but he adds, 'Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio derivetur.' And what this principle is, he tells us in the most unmistakable terms: 'Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati QUEM PLATO COMPARAT SOLI, non autem unitatem intellectus agentis QUEM ARISTOTELES COMPARAT LUMINI.' This is a most important passage; it aims at nothing less than a reconciliation, by mediation, between Plato and Aristotle, and is an additional testimony to the eclectic temper of St. Thomas. Plato rightly said that God is the Sun of our intellect, which is common to all men; and Aristotle also rightly said that its light is individually reflected by individual minds.\*

The Review concludes with 'one word as to the religious aspect of the question.' The reviewer wishes to be on the right side, and to think as the Church thinks. He is in doubt as to which is the right side. Surely here is an opportunity, if ever there was one, for the exercise of infallible authority. The problem is one which goes to the very foundations of theological and spiritual truth. But the *Ecclesia docens* remains in doubt. In reply to the question 'How does the Church think?' the writer of the Review has only to say:—'The proper ecclesiastical authority has, it is true, condemned what certain persons have called Ontologism; but the Ontologism it has condemned—what they called Ontologism—is the system, the fundamental doctrine of which ascribes to man a direct, immediate knowledge of God; and this doctrine was held only by an extreme party in the School. The rest still contend, as stoutly as ever, that the Faith is imperilled by psychologism (peripateticism); while the psychologists maintain, with equal earnestness, that it is rather imperilled

\* *Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists*, pp. 24, 25.

by Ontologism. On the side of Ontologism we are urged, in the name of religion, to reject the pernicious doctrine that the Light of Reason is a mere faculty of the mind ; while, on the side of psychologism, we are told that we open the door to Pantheism, unless we accept this doctrine.\*

The distinction taken by Swedenborg, between the Divine Being and the proximate Divine Sphere surrounding Him, and proceeding from Him, is one entirely new in the history of theological thought. It throws a flood of light on what has hitherto been regarded, by the most enlightened theologians, as one of the most obscure and perplexing subjects. It bears intimately on the greatest problems in philosophy, such as that of the Infinite and the Finite, the 'Vision of all things in God,' the character of the Platonic ideas, the nature and process of human Perception, and similar speculations. It will be found, after due examination, that a clear conception of the distinction above referred to, constitutes a most complete and effectual safeguard against Pantheism, however subtle and seducing the form it may assume.

In the theology which it was Swedenborg's special mission to publish to the world, this distinction is all important. In presence of the theological difficulties of the day its value cannot be over-estimated. It affords the key to a complete solution of the arduous questions involved in the thorny controversy now raging between the Schools of Ontologism and Peripateticism. In its light one is enabled to see the Jesuit partizans of Scholasticism, loving 'the darkness rather than the light,' and fatuously hugging the chains by which they have bound themselves. While, on the other hand, the students of St. Augustine, Malebranche, and Fénelon, appear as plants of a heavenly origin, struggling and straining after the pure and bright light of a sphere truly celestial. As will be

\* *Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists*, pp. 43, 44.

seen in what immediately follows, the hypothesis held by the Ontologists is, at not a few points, obscure, inadequate, and obnoxious to grave error. It contains, notwithstanding, the genuine truth, but only in germ. It is, as has been elsewhere remarked, *veritas in umbra*. But the faces of those who defend it seem steadfastly turned towards the shining walls of the Holy City, and to Him who is its sole and only light and glory.

Nevertheless, if it may be permitted to say so without offence, the Ontologists stand in need of the caution contained in our author's text. And it must, in fairness, be confessed that there exists some ground for the mistrust and uneasiness shown by their opponents, as to the pantheistic tendency which appears in some of the forms assumed by the Ontologistic hypothesis. To obviate all difficulty on this point, the disciples and expositors of the Bishop of Hippo, have only to take one step further towards the truth, and the spiritual horizon will suddenly become clear and bright, in the radiance of the Sun of Righteousness. They have but to elevate yet a little more the *acies mentis*, so as to be able to see, in what (after the great Doctor in whose teachings they rejoice) they term the Sun of spirits, of intelligences, the very abode peculiar and proper to the Lord Himself. In that Sun of heaven He dwells 'in the light which no man can approach unto.'\* With this infinite sphere of Divine light Jehovah covers himself 'as with a garment.'†

The following notable declaration of Bossuet, for example, if taken *au pied de la lettre*, may be made to bear a decidedly pantheistic sense.

'L'intelligence,' says the eagle of Meaux, after St. Augustine, 'a pour objet des vérités éternelles qui ne sont autre

\* 1 Tim. vi. 16.

† Ps. civ. 2.

chose que Dieu.' (*De la connaissance de Dieu*, etc., titre du § 5, du chapitre quatrième.) \*

But these striking words cease to have the slightest tinge of pantheism, or even 'mysticism,' when duly qualified and explained in the light of the distinction taken by Swedenborg as between Deity and the Divine Sphere proximately surrounding Him, and proceeding from Him.

But it may be asked, What, according to the Ontologists, is this Sun to which they so frequently refer, and whose beams are everywhere present throughout the universal realm of spirit?

A sufficiently clear and categorical answer is given by a distinguished writer of this illustrious, albeit far from numerous, school of Christian philosophers:—

'Si Aristote, disait Thomassin,† eût voulu se laisser persuader que Platon n'a mis les idées divines que dans l'intelligence de Dieu, il n'eût pas attaqué une doctrine qu'il ne peut désavouer lui-même, puisqu'il reconnaît que Dieu est un agent intellectuel, qui se formé toujours auparavant l'idée de son ouvrage. Et s'il eût fait réflexion sur sa propre métaphysique, où il *distingue les opinions des sciences, et ne donne à celles-ci que des objets éternels et immuables, il eût peut-être confessé avec Platon que ce ne sont pas nos idées faites par des abstractions arbitraires, qui sont ces objets éternels et*

\* Quoted by the Abbé Fabre in his *Cours de Philosophie*, tom. i. p. 454.

† *Méthode d'enseigner la Phil.*, p. 356, quoted by the Abbé Fabre, in his *Cours de Philosophie*, tom. i. p. 39. Cf. *Arcana Coelestia*, § 1809, where it is shown, by a beautiful illustration taken from the microscope, that the rays of internal vision are ideas; also (*Ibid.* § 3704) that light is not in the sun but from it. In these, and numberless other places in that treasure-house of spiritual cognitions, the germ of truth contained in the much disputed principle of 'the vision of all things in God' is clearly brought to view, and the difficulties which have hitherto surrounded the subject wholly removed.

immuables, mais les idées divines, qui sont outre cela les essences propres des choses et les vérités qui descendent comme les RAYONS DU SOLEIL INTELLIGIBLE, LE VERBE, jusqu'à nous, et nous éclairent dans tous nos raisonnements justes et solides.'

The concluding portion of the above remarkable passage appears to set forth, in almost express terms, a principal doctrine of the theological system taught by our author, namely, that THE WORD, that is, the Lord, is the Sun of the spiritual world, the unique source of light and love to angels and men.

It must, nevertheless, be admitted that the view taken by the Ontologists, respecting the spiritual Sun, labours under one most grave defect. It presents an aspect of thick darkness, where the purest and most intense light might reasonably have been looked for. This darkness, the most enlightened writers of the school confess their utter inability, during the present life, to penetrate; as, for example, in the following admission of the Abbé Fabre :—

'Quand nous disons que nous connaissons l'idée ou l'essence de Dieu, nous ne parlons que de l'idée et de l'essence abstraite. Par la vision de cette idée nous ne voyons pas le noyau de cette grande lumière qui est Dieu.'\*

Here an approach appears to have been unconsciously made to the very verge of what Swedenborg has shown to be one of the most universal of all truths. To see this truth 'full circle' only one step higher needs be taken. Let the gaze of the inner eye be only elevated yet a little more, and the dark cloud will suddenly become transformed into brightness and glory; and in the theological firmament, the light of

\* *Défense de l'Ontologisme*, p. 63. The parallel state of ignorance that obtains among men of science respecting the nucleus of the natural sun, while so much is professed to have been discovered concerning the phenomena presented by the photosphere, is not a little remarkable.



the moon will become the light of the sun, and the light of the sun sevenfold.\* For this apparently inaccessible *noyau* is verily and indeed no other than the Lord himself, in His glorified or Divine Humanity. It will be seen still more clearly in the sequel of these remarks, that the Lord Himself is not that Sun. It is his Divine Love and Wisdom, proceeding from Him and encompassing Him, which thus appears as a Sun to the angels. He Himself, in that Sun, is THE MAN, is OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, as to THE DIVINUM A QUO, and as to THE DIVINE HUMANITY.† As soon as this central truth of all truths is clearly recognised, the true Sun of Righteousness appears on the intellectual horizon of the tired and weary searcher after truth. The final goal is at last attained. Man sees and knows his Lord and his God. He finds rest and peace in the unclouded vision of Him who is the sole and only light and life of men.

When once the Christian Ontologist, the faithful disciple of the Bishop of Hippo, or rather of the Eternal Word Himself, comes to recognise this primary theological truth, his complete victory over his peripatetic opponents follows as a necessary consequence.

The means of attaining to clear rational cognitions on this most exalted and sacred of all subjects, have been furnished abundantly in the various works of our author, as well philosophical as theological. As a preliminary step to the acquisition of such cognitions, it may be useful to quote here a passage which places the point in question clearly before the reader, in a general form. It is taken from a posthumous *Explanation of the Historical Word of the Old Testament*, to which reference has been already made in these pages:—

‘*Ipsae veritates non conspiciuntur nisi in quadam Luce, quae vocatur Lux intellectualis, sicut figurae objectorum*

\* Isaiah xxx. 26.

† See *True Christian Religion*, § 25.

coram oculis, quae non apparent nisi interdiu in lumine solis, secundum ipsum gradum luminis. Lux illa, in qua conspiciuntur veritates supracoelestes, unice a veritatum SOLE, hoc est, a Jehovah Deo venit, inde Lux illa vocanda est *supracoelestis* ac *Divina*, ex hac ipsa anima humana illuminatur. Lux autem in qua conspiciuntur veritates coelestes seu vere spirituales, ex eodem SOLE venit, sed per totidem quasi fonticulos, qui sunt spiritus seu angeli coelestes; qui ideo comparantur siderulis, ac ipsum coelum ex his assimilatur coelo stellifero; hi per suam activitatem, lucem istam excitant, inde lux mentis intellectualis, quae vocanda est *lux coelestis* et *vere spiritualis*. Lumen autem in quo videntur objecta memoriae, etiam clausis oculis, venit a suis fonticulis, qui sunt spiritus variae indolis, in infracoelesti sphaera, qui immensa copia sunt, et per suas motiones eandem in mente naturali excitant. Lumen autem naturale, ex suis luminaribus, nempe a sole, tum a luna, sideribus, flammis et phosphoris.\*

In a small but wonderful treatise—wonderful for depth, comprehensiveness, and condensed thought, touching the deepest subjects of human investigation, our author treats *ex professo* of the spiritual Sun and the world proper to it. One short extract is here given in which he describes *where* the spiritual world is, and also its relation to man. He shows that even during his earthly sojourn, man is in a certain true and real sense, an inhabitant of that world:—

‘It has been hitherto unknown, that angels and spirits are in light and heat altogether different from that of men. Yea, it is even unknown that any other kind of heat and light is possible. For man, in the exercise of thought, has never penetrated deeper than into the inner and purer things of nature. Wherefore, also, many fancifully placed the habitations of angels and spirits in the æther, and some

\* *Adversaria*, § 940.

in the stars ; thus within the sphere of nature, and not above it or outside of it. When, nevertheless, angels and spirits are altogether above or outside of nature, and in a world of their own, which is situate under another and a different sun. And since in that world spaces are appearances, as has been shown above, therefore it cannot be said that angels and spirits are in the æther or in the stars. For they are, together with man, conjoined to the affection and thought of his spirit. For man is a spirit ; thence it is that he thinks and wills. Wherefore the spiritual world is where man is, and in no wise removed to a distance from him. In a word, every man, as to the interiors of his mind, is in that world in the midst of spirits and angels ; he also thinks from its light, and loves from its heat.\*

The extreme importance of the subject, in the present day, may, perhaps, in some measure excuse the addition to this note, already too far extended, of a few passages in which the doctrine under consideration is set forth, free from the shadows and fallacies which so often becloud mere human reasonings.

In view of the noble efforts which are being made in the sacred cause of intellectual philosophy by the enlightened and truth-loving school of Roman Catholic Ontologists, especially in France and Belgium, it is a source of sincere satis-

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 92. It is worthy of remark, in connexion with the Theophanies of Holy Scripture, that St. Paul sees only the Light, whereas the Apostle whose privilege it was to lean, at Supper, on the Lord's bosom, is admitted to a clearer and closer vision. To him, it was given to see the Holy One of Israel, as 'the sun shineth in his strength.' These two very different states of spiritual enlightenments are carefully to be distinguished by all who desire to comprehend the depth of meaning contained in the Divinely inspired Records. In like manner, the expressions 'children of light' (St. John xii. 36) and 'sons of God' (*Ibid.* i. 12) are not to be taken as equivalent expressions. Vid. *Arcana Coelestia*, § 51.

faction to be able to give the following extracts from the excellent French version of the late J. F. E. Le Boys des Guays.\*

Treating of the distinction between the Sun of Heaven and God, a distinction absolutely essential to the complete refutation of Pantheism in every form, Swedenborg lays down the following plain proposition :—

*‘ Ce soleil n’est point Dieu, mais il est le procédant du Divin Amour et de la Divine Sagesse de Dieu-Homme : il en est de même de la Chaleur et de la Lumière procédant de ce Soleil.’*

Upon this he proceeds to observe :—‘ Par ce Soleil visible pour les Anges, d’après lequel ils ont la Chaleur et la Lumière, il n’est pas entendu le Seigneur Lui-Même, mais il est entendu le premier procédant du Seigneur, c’est-à-dire, le plus haut degré (*summum*) de la chaleur spirituelle ; le plus haut (degré) de la chaleur spirituelle est le feu spirituel, qui est le Divin Amour et la Divine Sagesse dans leur première correspondance : c’est de là que ce Soleil apparaît igné, et qu’aussi il est igné pour les Anges, mais non pour les hommes ; le feu qui est feu pour les hommes n’est pas spirituel, mais il est naturel ; entre le feu spirituel et le feu naturel il y a la même différence qu’entre le vivant et le mort ; c’est pourquoi le Soleil spirituel par la chaleur vivifie les êtres spirituels et renouvelle les choses spirituelles ; le Soleil naturel agit de même, il est vrai, sur les êtres naturels et sur les choses naturelles, mais ce n’est pas d’après lui-même, c’est par l’influx de la chaleur spirituelle, à laquelle il porte un secours secondaire.

‘ Ce Feu spirituel, dans lequel est aussi la Lumière dans son origine, devient une chaleur et une lumière spirituelles, qui décroissent en procédant, et le décroissement se fait par des degrés,† dont il sera parlé dans la suite. C’est ce que les

\* St. Amand Cher, et Paris 1851.

† On Degrees, see Appendix, Note Y.

Anciens ont représenté par des Cercles brillants de feu et resplendissants de lumière autour de la Tête de Dieu ; cette représentation est encore commune aujourd'hui, quand dans des tableaux on présente Dieu comme Homme.\*

‘Qu'on se garde de penser que le Soleil du monde spirituel soit Dieu Lui-Même ; Dieu Lui-Même est Homme ; le premier procédant de son Amour et de sa Sagesse est l'Igné Spirituel qui apparaît devant les Anges comme Soleil : c'est pourquoi, lorsque le Seigneur se manifeste aux anges en Personne, il se manifeste comme Homme, et cela, parfois dans le Soleil, parfois hors du Soleil.’

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NOTE H., p. 26.

FROM LOVE BY MEANS OF WISDOM ALL THINGS WERE  
CREATED.

In connexion with several questionable opinions, and some that are positively erroneous, Sir William Hamilton makes the following notable approximation to the theory of creation as taught by Swedenborg, more especially in the Fourth Part of the small Treatise entitled *Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and Wisdom*. The view of the Scotch Professor is thus given :—

‘We are able to conceive, indeed, the creation of a world ; this in fact as easy as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation ? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of Deity.’†

\* *La Sagesse Angélique*, §§ 93, 94, 97.

† To this is appended the following footnote :—‘The creation d[icitur] ex *Nihilo* means only that the universe, when created, was not merely put



From these principles the following remarkable conclusion is drawn :—

‘ All that is now *actually* existent in the universe, this we think and must think, as having, prior to creation, *virtually* existed in the Creator ; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated, we can only conceive this as the retractation by the Deity of an overt energy into a latent power.’\*

The subject of this note demands a special treatise. A few passages are subjoined which will serve to give a general notion of the manner in which our author has approached the investigation of this arduous problem.

#### CREATION REPRESENTED IN THOUGHT.

‘ The act of creation is represented at every moment in our own minds. First we view and embrace some end abstractedly from means. Then we form and create means ; and thereby the end is advanced, and finally obtained, by physical effects as instrumental causes. Thus the end that was the first, and which is the all in the progressing means, becomes the last.’†

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF CREATION, AND THE HISTORICAL FACTS INVOLVED IN THE FIRST CHAPTERS OF GENESIS ARE IN ACCORD.

De Telluris ortu, Paradiso, Viridario, et Adami nativitate in Tractatu meo de Cultu et Amore Dei, Parte I<sup>ma</sup>, actum

into form, an original chaos, or complement of brute matter, having preceded a plastic energy of intelligence ; but, that the universe was called into actuality from potential existence, by the Divine fiat. The Divine fiat, therefore, was the proximate cause of the creation ; and the Deity containing the cause, contained, potentially, the effect.’

\* *Reid's Works*, Supplement. Dissert. Note H. pp. 936, 937.

† *Econ. An. King*. Vol. II. p. 356.

est, sed secundum ducem intellectum seu filum rationis ; verum quia Intelligentiæ Humanæ, nisi a Deo inspiratæ, nullatenus fidendum est, veritatis interest illa quæ in memorato Opusculo tradita sunt, cum revelatis in Sacro Codice, et heic cum historia creationis a Deo Mosi revelata conferre, et sic quomodo coincident, sub examen mittere ; quicquid enim cum revelatis non prorsus coincidit, omnino ut falsum seu ut delirium mentis nostræ rationalis pronuntiandum est. Ob hunc finem breviusculam commentationem capitum primorum Geneseos præmittere debui.

Quum ea jam sedulo contulerim, *miratus sum concordantiam, &c.* \*

#### BASIS OF A TRUE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION.

The following statement contains Swedenborg's view of the primal origin of vegetables and animals. A careful analysis of it will serve to show that it involves a thorough-going refutation of the modern naturalistic hypothesis of 'Evolution,' and also discloses a true theory of Creation :—

'These vegetable growths themselves, in imitation of the Great Mother, were primitively like so many seminaries or ovaries ; but of such a quality that they produced not only *after their own kind*, but also after a kind *different from themselves*. For one thing *lay so folded up* in another, that this other did not come forth until all such things were ready prepared, as should serve for the various exercises and necessities of its life. From the very series of origins itself, it may be evident whence came the souls of the lower creatures, which are said to have been created and implanted in the various natures of the seeds which belong to the vegetable kingdom. For just as the seeds of vegetables took their rise from the conjunction of the active forces of

\* See the Posthumous work called *Adversaria* (vol. i. p. 7, London, 1847), the true title of which, as already observed, is *Explicatio in Verbum Historicum Vel. Test.*

nature with the forces of the sluggish earth through the medium of the radiation of the sun of the world, so those seeds, which were animated, had their origin from that Form or Spiritual Essence which was infused into the forms or active forces of nature, through the medium of the radiation of the Sun of Life, which radiation is spiritual and living. Wherefore these various kinds of life went forth in the same subordinate series as those forces of nature which constitute the atmospheres, and consequently in the same series as the seeds of the vegetables themselves, from which they were finally hatched. And inasmuch as that Life, from its fountain-head, breathes forth nothing whatever but *uses*, and since nature is nothing else but an effect for the sake of uses, it is clear that it was so foreseen and provided that these very uses should unfold themselves as effects.

‘He is totally blind and in the grossest darkness who, in these things, does not clearly discern the Deity.’\*

‘That such things (as leaves, flowers, and fruits) exist in the vegetable kingdom is due to an influx from the spiritual world. Those who attribute all things to nature and nothing to the Deity can in no wise believe this. On the other hand, those who attribute all things to the Deity and nothing to nature, are enabled to see that each single thing is derived from this source, and not only that things are thence derived, but also that they are correspondent; and inasmuch as they are correspondent, that they are representative. Lastly, they are granted the power of seeing that all nature throughout is a theatre representative of the Lord’s Kingdom: thus that the Deity is in each single thing, and this even to such an extent that there is in it a representation of the Eternal and the Infinite: of what is Eternal from propagation even to eternity; of what is Infinite, from the multiplication of seeds to infinity. Such

\* *Worship and Love of God*, § 25, (note.)

efforts (*conatus*) could not possibly have existed in every individual of the vegetable kingdom, were there not a continual inflowing of the Deity. From this influx arises *effort*, from effort *force*, and from force the *effect*.

'They who attribute all things to nature say that such qualities were imparted to fruits and seeds on their first creation, and that owing to the force thence acquired, they are afterwards, of themselves, carried on into such modes of action. These persons, however, do not consider that subsistence is perpetual existence, or, what is similar, that propagation is perpetual creation. Nor do they consider that an effect is a certain continuous product of its cause ; and that when the cause ceases the effect ceases also ; and therefore that every effect, apart from the continuous influx of the cause, comes to nought in a moment. In the next place, they do not consider that what has no connexion with the First Cause of all, consequently with the Deity, falls to nothing in an instant. For the *prior* must be without interruption in the *posterior*, in order that what is posterior may have any being. . . .

'The reason why natural men do not consider such things is that they are unwilling to acknowledge them. . . . Does any one of them when he sees trees and other plants in bloom, consider that this is, as it were, their breaking forth into gladness because they are now producing fruits and seeds ? They see that the flowers go before, and that they are continued on till at length they have in their bosom the beginnings of fruits and seeds, into which they thus transfer their juice.

'If they knew anything of the re-birth or regeneration of man, or rather if they were willing to know it, they would, from the likeness, also see in those flowers a representative of man's state before regeneration, namely, that man in like manner is then blooming, that is to say, he is in a state of

interior delight and beauty, inasmuch as he is then in the effort of implanting those things in his life, to wit, the good things of intelligence and wisdom. In other words, he is striving to produce fruits. Nor can it be known that his state is such, because what that interior delight and interior beauty are, which they represent, is not in the least known to those who are in the delights of the love of the world, and in the joys which originate in the love of self. These delights and joys cause those above-mentioned to appear as wanting in delight and joy, even to such a degree, that such persons hold them in aversion. And when they thus hold them in aversion, they also reject them as trifling, or as a kind of nonentity. They consequently deny them; and at the same time deny that what is spiritual and celestial is anything.\*

‘Every one who thinks from clear reason, sees that the universe was not created out of nothing, because he sees that it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing. For nothing is nothing. To make anything out of nothing is a contradiction: and a contradiction is contrary to the light of truth, which is from Divine Wisdom: and whatsoever is not from Divine Wisdom is not from Divine Omnipotence.

‘Every one who thinks from clear reason, sees also that all things were created out of a substance which is substance in itself: for this is the real and very being from which all things that are, can have their existence: and inasmuch as God alone is substance in itself, and thence is real and very being itself, it is evident that the existence of all things is from no other source. Many have seen this, because reason gives the power of seeing it; but they did not venture upon a confirmation of this truth, fearing that by doing so they might come to think that the created universe is God,

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 5116.



because it is from God ; or that nature exists from itself, and thus that the inmost principle of nature is what is called God. Hence it has come to pass, that although many have seen that the existence of all things is from no other source than from God and His real and very being, nevertheless they had not the courage to proceed beyond the first thought on the subject, fearing lest they should involve their understanding in a Gordian knot, as it is called, whence they should not afterwards be able to free it. . . . In what follows it will be seen, that although God created the universe and all things therein from Himself, still there is not any the least thing in the created universe which is God. Other things will also be shown, which will place this subject in its just light.' \*

'Creation itself (that is, an idea of the creative act,) cannot be formally taught so that it may be grasped by the mind, unless space and time be removed from the thought. If, however, these be removed, creation can be comprehended. Remove these two notions, if you can, or at least as far as you are able, and keep your mind in an idea withdrawn from space and time, and you will also perceive that the *maximum* of space and the *minimum* of space differ in no respect whatever ; and then you cannot but have an idea of the creation of the universe like that of the creation of each single thing in the universe ; also, an idea that the diversity which obtains in created things owes its existence to the fact that there are infinite things in God-Man, and thence indefinite things in the Sun, which is the first principle proceeding from Himself ; and these indefinite things exist, as in an image, in the created universe. Hence it is that there can nowhere exist any one thing which is the same as another : hence, also, is that variety of all things which is presented before our eyes, together with space, in the natural world,

\* *On Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 283.

and in an appearance of space, in the spiritual world. Hence, moreover, is the variety which obtains both among things in general and things in particular.\*

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NOTE I., p. 36.

THERE IS AN INFLOWING OF THE SIGHT OF THE MIND  
INTO THE SIGHT OF THE EYE.

‘If,’ says Bishop Butler, ‘we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by anything here said to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by any other of our senses, can be traced, through all its steps, quite up to the living power of seeing, or perceiving†: but that so far as it can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of appearance that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and, what would otherwise be, an *unimagined unknown power* of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them.‡

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 155.

† What this profound and cautious thinker has not ventured to affirm as possible, Swedenborg has actually accomplished. And the marvellous achievement constitutes only one of his many claims to be regarded as *par excellence*, the Psychologist.

‡ Vol. i. pp. 22, 23. *Of a future Life*. (Oxford Ed.)

HELMHOLTZ.

'Autrefois, tant qu'on manquait de connaissances positives à ce sujet, l'étude des sensations visuelles appartenait en entier au domaine de la philosophie. Il était d'abord nécessaire de comprendre que les sensations ne sont que les actions des objets extérieurs sur notre corps et que ce n'est que par l'intermédiaire d'actes psychiques que les sensations donnent lieu à des perceptions. C'est dans le cercle de ces idées que se débat la philosophie grecque. Au commencement, nous lui voyons faire de naïves hypothèses pour expliquer comment des images en rapport avec les objets peuvent arriver à l'âme. DÉMOCRITE et ÉPICURE veulent que ces images se détachent des objets et viennent pénétrer dans l'œil. EMPÉDOCLE fait arriver simultanément, aux objets, des rayons provenant de la lumière et d'autres provenant de l'œil, et il fait servir ces derniers à tâter, pour ainsi dire, les objets. PLATON paraît hésiter. Dans le *Timée*, il suit l'idée d'EMPÉDOCLE : les rayons partis de l'œil sont semblables à la lumière, mais ne brûlent pas ; la vision ne peut avoir lieu que lorsque la lumière interne, en se dirigeant sur les objets, rencontre la lumière externe, qui est d'une nature analogue. Dans *Theætet*, au contraire, par des recherches sur l'influence de l'intelligence sur les perceptions, il se rapproche déjà du point de vue plus avancé d'ARISTOTE.

'Chez ARISTOTE, on trouve une fine analyse psychologique du rôle de l'esprit dans les perceptions des sens ; ici, point de confusion entre ce qui est physique et ce qui est physiologique ; la sensation est nettement distinguée d'un acte psychique ; la perception des objets extérieurs n'est plus attribuée à une sorte de fines antennes, si l'on peut nommer ainsi les rayons visuels d'EMPÉDOCLE, mais repose sur un jugement. Quant à la partie physique, les idées d'ARISTOTE

sont assurément très-peu développées ; cependant on pourrait y trouver des traces de la théorie des ondulations. En effet, pour lui, la lumière n'est rien de matériel, mais un état d'activité (*ἐνέργεια*) de la partie transparente, interposée entre les corps, et qui, à l'état de repos, constitue l'obscurité. Cependant, il ne s'élève pas encore à cette idée que l'action de la lumière sur l'œil ne doit pas nécessairement être de même nature que la lumière qui la produit. Il cherche, au contraire, à expliquer cette identité de nature en disant que l'œil contient aussi des parties transparentes, qui peuvent affecter le même état d'activité que les parties transparentes extérieures.\*

#### SWEDENBORG.

In the case of sight and hearing, Swedenborg observes that their organs 'are accommodated to the modifications of the auras, and therefore do not receive the impulses of inert forces, but the forms of active forces, and having received them, conduct them by the nerves to the supreme chamber of the sensoria, that is, to the cerebrum. For the ear is constructed—on the principle of modified air, or of air acting from modification—of tympana, fenestrae, tubes, cochleae : the eye is constructed—on the pattern of modified aether—of tunics, as the cornea, albuginea, and sclerotica ;

\* Helmholtz, *Optique Physiologique*, pp. 281, 282. (Ed. Paris, 1867.) See the remainder of this most instructive note, in which the illustrious physicist has traced the progress of investigation into the phenomena of visual sensations, up to the present time.

"There is," says Dr. Acland, "a most elaborate literature on the Eye, for which see Helmholtz, *Physiologische Optik*, in 'Karsten's Encyclopaedie,' and Kolliker, 'Microscopic Anatomy,' p. 583. Notwithstanding this, I cannot but think that it would be a fit work for some wealthy person or society to prepare an elaborately illustrated Monograph on this organ of organs, treated psychologically [physiologically] and anatomically through the animal series, adding from time to time such knowledge as is obtained of its refinements, even now not completely understood." *Hervæian Oration* for 1865. Note on pp. 30, 31. (Macmillan & Co.)

and of humours, as the aqueous, vitreous, and crystalline. Thus everything is modelled to the forces acting upon it; and thereby the organ itself declares the character of its acting principle, and *vice versa*, the acting principle, the character of its organ; for the one receives the impression, the other gives it; so that it is impossible that the seeing mind should not be instructed by the one respecting the other.\*

‘The eye is the most noble organ of the face, and communicates more immediately with the understanding than the rest of man’s organs of sense. It is also modified by a more subtle atmosphere than that of the ear, wherefore also the sight penetrates to the internal sensory, which is in the brain, by a shorter and more interior way than speech that is perceived by the ear. Hence also it is, that certain animals, inasmuch as they are devoid of intellect, have two as it were succenturiate cerebra within the orbits of their eyes. For their (analogous) intellectual principle depends on their sight. With man, on the other hand, such is not the case. On the contrary, he is distinguished by having a brain of ample size, to the end that his intellectual principle may not depend upon his sight, but his sight upon his intellectual principle. That the sight of man depends upon his intellectual principle, is manifestly clear from the fact that his natural affections exhibit themselves in the face, representatively, in effigy; whereas the interior affections, which pertain to thought, appear in the eyes from a certain flame of life, and a consequent flashing forth of light, which sparkles according to the affection in which the thought is.’†

‘Unless there were interior vision the eye could never see. The sight of the eye exists from an inner sight, and therefore a man also sees equally well after the life of the body, nay,

\* *Animal Kingdom*, vol. ii. pp. 449, 450.

† *Arcana Coelestia*, § 4407.



much better than while he lived in the body ; not indeed worldly and corporeal objects, but those which are in the other life. They who were blind in the life of the body, see in the other life equally well as those that were quick-sighted. For the same reason also a man sees while he sleeps, and in his dreams, as well as when he is awake. By the internal sight it has been granted me to see the things that are in the other life, more clearly than I see those that are in the world.

‘ From these considerations it is evident that external vision exists from interior vision, and this from a vision still more interior, and so on.’\*

‘ That there is a correspondence between the sight of the eye and the sight of the intellect, appears manifestly to those who reflect. For the objects of the world, which all derive something from the light of the sun, enter in by the eye, and store themselves up in the memory ; and this evidently under a like visual appearance. For the things which are thence reproduced, are seen within. Hence comes the imagination of man, the ideas of which are called by philosophers material ideas.

‘ When these objects appear still more interiorly, they constitute thought, and this also under some visual appearance, but more pure ; and the ideas of this latter kind are called non-material and intellectual.

‘ That there is an interior light, in which is life, consequently intelligence and wisdom, which illuminates the interior sight, and meets those things which have entered by the external sight, is clearly manifest ; also that the interior light operates according to the arrangement of the things which are there from the light of the world.

‘ The things which enter by hearing, are also changed

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, vol. i. § 994. (Ed. of 1872.)

within into appearances like those of the visual objects from the light of the world.\*

‘What is internal is led forth, when one contemplates the starry heaven with the eyes of the body, and is thence led to think of the Lord’s kingdom. As often as a man sees with his eyes, and those things which he sees, so to say, does not see, but from and by them sees and thinks of what pertains to the Church or Heaven, then the interior sight or spirit, in other words, what belongs to his soul, is brought forth abroad.

‘The eye itself, properly regarded, is nothing else but the man’s very spirit brought forth abroad ; and chiefly, indeed, to this end, that from things external he may see things internal ; in other words, that from the objects which are in the world he may continually reflect upon those which are in the other life : for the latter is that life for the sake of which he lives in the world.’ †

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NOTE K., p. 37.

ALL THINGS WITHOUT EXCEPTION MAY BE TRACED TO THE  
GOOD AND THE TRUE.

‘It is proved that God is the Creator of the universe ; that is to say, that God is self-sufficing, and that the universe, which is the work of His will, has nothing *necessary* about it. But if so, why has God, who is thus self-sufficing, gone forth out of Himself ? why has he called this contingent universe into existence, rather than any other possible universe ?

“The answer of Leibnitz is that of Plato : ‘Let us state the cause which has led the Supreme Ordainer to produce

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 4408.

† *Arcana Coelestia*, § 1806.

and to compose this universe. He was good, and He who is good has no kind of envy. Exempt from envy, He willed that all things should, as far as possible, be like Him. Whoever, instructed by wise men, shall admit this, as the principal reason of the origin and formation of the world, will be right."

"So speaks the author of the *Timæus*; and from the principle of the Divine goodness he deduces the consequence, that the universe is not only very good, but the best possible. 'He who is the Best could not, and cannot, produce anything which is not the fairest. He found that of all visible works nothing without mind could be more beautiful than that which is intelligent, and that in no created being could there be intelligence without soul. Consequently, the Orderer of all lodged intelligence in the soul, and the soul in the body, and so organised the universe that, by its very constitution, it was the most beautiful and perfect work.'"<sup>\*</sup>

## ARISTOTLE.

"Ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὁ κινεῖ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινεῖν, καὶ μέσον τοίνυν ἐστὶ τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἰετὸν, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσα. Κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε, τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. Τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά†

## SWEDENBORG.

"Only one mode of influx follows of necessity from a necessary Being. Our philosopher (Aristotle) has thought the same. 'The first cause,' says he, 'exists in all things according to one disposition' (*De Mundo*, cap. vi.) 'The first cause induces its goodness upon all things, by one in-

<sup>\*</sup> *Essay on Religious Philosophy*, by M. Emile Saisset. Anonymously translated. Vol. i. pp. 229, 230 (Edinburgh, 1863), where the passage is given in the original, from the *Timæus*, the depth and force of which no translation can adequately convey.

† Aristotle, *Metaph.* L. xi. c. vii. § 2.

fluxion.' (*Ibid.*) The first cause, whatever may pertain to it,—and our philosopher acknowledges it as the veriest *esse*, and declares that 'in things eternal *esse* and *posse* mean the same,' (*Natur. Auscult.* lib. iii. cap. 5),—the first cause, I say, to us who are better instructed, cannot be any other than the Supreme Being.\*

"'In eternal natures,' says our philosopher (Aristotle) 'there is no evil.' (*Metaph.* lib. ix. cap. 9.) 'God is a law in us, equably infused, and admitting of neither correction nor mutation.' (*De Mundo*, cap. 6.)"†

'All things, observes our illustrious philosopher, (Aristotle) receive the goodness of the first cause according to the capacity of their nature.' (*De Mundo*, cap. 6.)‡

#### BOËTHIUS.

Atqui Deus ipsum esse bonum monstratus est. Memini, inquam. Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit; si quidem per se regit omnia quem bonum esse concessimus: et hic est veluti quidam clavus atque gubernaculum quo mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta servatur. §

For further illustration of this subject, the reader is referred to a remarkable passage in *Arcana Coelestia* (§ 8944), in which it is shown that the knowledge the ancient Gentiles had of a Divine Being and the duty of worshipping Him with supreme adoration, also their belief in the immortality of the human soul, were not derived from the light of their own nature, but from a primeval Divine Revelation. The Church of the Lord had been in the land of Canaan from the most ancient times. From this unique source went forth, in the lapse of ages, to the surrounding nations, such things as pertained to the worship of the Deity. A knowledge of

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. p. 241.

† *Ibid.* p. 242.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 244.

§ Boëthius, *De Consol. Phil.* L. iii. p. 65. (Ed. Parisii, 1783.)

these was diffused among the neighbouring Greeks, and passed from Greece to the Italians, or Romans.

In the *True Christian Religion*, also (§ 336), there is a similar allusion to the primal source of the wisdom which existed among the men of the old time :—‘ From the wisdom of the ancients has flowed this dogma, that the universe, and indeed all and each of its parts, bear in them a resemblance to the Good and the True.’

If these things be so, the authentic records of the past, wherever they exist, and therefore the writings of Plato and Aristotle, become henceforth invested with a new and undying interest in the eyes of all who devote themselves to a study of the history of the rise and development of the human race. The highest and noblest thoughts and speculations of the wise ancients, that have descended to our day, are to be regarded as so many gleams and scintillations of a light derived, by various ways, from a Divine Revelation made to primeval Man.

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#### NOTE L. p. 39.

##### IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE INFLUX.

... ‘The Lord by truth proceeding from himself, rules all things even to the veriest individual thing, not as a king in the world, but as God in heaven and in the universe. A king in the world exercises only universal care, and his princes and officers exercise particular care. It is otherwise with God. For God sees all things and knows all things from eternity, and provides for all things to eternity, and of Himself keeps all things in their order. Hence it is evident that the Lord hath not only universal, but also particular and individual care of all things, otherwise than as a king in the world. His arrangement is *immediate* by means of Divine Truth from Himself, and also *mediate* by means of heaven.



This mediate arrangement, however, is also as if it were immediate from Himself : for what comes from heaven comes also from Himself through the medium of heaven. That it is so, the angels in heaven not only know, but also perceive in themselves.\*

‘How the case is with the influx of both kinds of life (which are in man), to wit, the influx of the life which pertains to his thought, and that of the life which belongs to his will, and both from the Lord, has been granted me to know through the medium of a revelation. It is in this way the Lord flows in after a two-fold manner, namely, by the way of heaven mediately, and from Himself immediately ; and from Himself He flows in equally into the rational principles pertaining to man, which are his interiors, as into his natural principles which are the exteriors. What flows in from the Lord is the goodness of love and the truth of faith ; for what proceeds from the Lord is Divine Truth in which is Divine Goodness. These, however, are received in various ways by man, according to his quality.

‘The Lord does not compel man to the reception of what flows in from Himself ; but He leads him in freedom ; and in so far as man permits, He leads him by means of freedom to goodness. Thus the Lord leads man according to his delights, and also even according to his fallacies and the principles he has taken from these fallacies. But He leads him gently and gradually out of them. And this appears to the man as if it were done by himself. Accordingly the Lord does not break these principles in man, for this would be to violate his freedom, which, however, is a thing which must of necessity be preserved, that man may be capable of reformation.

‘That the Lord thus flows in with man, that is to say, not only mediately by way of heaven, but also immediately from

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 8717.

Himself, into the interior as well as into the exterior principles that are in man, is a mystery which up to the present time (*circa* 1750) has remained unknown.\*

... 'From the Lord proceeds Divine truth, immediately and mediately. That which proceeds immediately, is above every angelic intellect. On the other hand, that which proceeds mediately, the same is on a level with the capacity of angels in heaven, and also of men; for it passes by means of heaven, and in its transit puts on an angelic quality, and a human quality. But into this latter truth the Lord also flows in immediately; and thus he leads angels and men, as well mediately as immediately. For all and everything is from the First Being; and the order has been so instituted† that the First Being is present, both mediately and immediately, in the things derived from it; thus present, alike in the ultimate principle of order as well as in its first principle. For the Divine truth itself is the sole and only substantial Being. Beings that are derivative, are nothing but successive forms from this source. Hence also it is clear that what is divine flows in immediately into all and everything, for by Divine truth all things were created. Divine truth, indeed, is the sole and only essential Being: and thus it is that from which all things have their being. It is Divine truth which is called the Word in St. John:—'In the beginning was the

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 6472.

† Cf. the beautiful Collect of the Church, for the Feast of *St. Michael and All Angels*:—'O Everlasting God, who hast ordained and constituted the services of Angels and men in a wonderful order; Mercifully grant, that as thy Holy Angels alway do thee service in heaven, so by thy appointment they may succour and defend us on earth; &c.' In the bright light of our author's revelations on the subject, it is impossible not to be struck with the extremely accurate language in which the prayer is expressed. The words 'by thy appointment' essentially involve the principle above described as *immediate influx*, and serve to show the unlawfulness as well as the folly of offering prayers to saints or angels, or any other being but God alone.

Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . All things were made by him ; and without him was not anything made that was made.' (i. 1, 3.) Through the medium of such influx the Lord leads man by a Providence which is not only in what is universal, but also in what is individual, yea, in what is the most individual of all things. . . . That there is an immediate influx of the Lord where there is mediate influx, thus in the last of order, alike as in the first of order, was told me from heaven ; and a living perception of the thing itself was granted to me : also that what takes place by means of mediate influx, that is to say, through the medium of heaven and also the angels there, is respectively very little ; and further, that the Lord by the way of immediate influx leads heaven, and at the same time by means of it holds all and everything there in its connexion and order.' \*

The doctrine of immediate and mediate Divine influx, of which the preceding extracts may serve to give a general notion, presents to the reader one of those transcendent analyses of spiritual truth peculiarly characteristic of our author's writings. The subject, indeed, is one that involves the consideration of questions far exceeding the capacity of the generality of readers. It is altogether new and foreign to current habits of thinking even amongst theologians. No one could be more fully aware than was Swedenborg himself, of the immense difficulties which stood in the way of the comprehension, not to say acceptance, of his wonderful expositions of the deepest and most difficult spiritual truths. This is evident from a passage in the *Arcana Coelestia* (§ 3563), which treats of the present subject as it bears on the process of man's regeneration, where the author observes that the subject is of such a character that it is capable of being brought on a level with the comprehension of few, owing to

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 7004. Cf. *ibid.* § 7270.

a want of the necessary cognitions respecting it. 'I am well aware,' he adds, 'that these particulars, albeit they have been clearly stated, and consequently may be clearly perceived by those who are in the cognition of such things, are nevertheless obscure in the presence of those who know nothing of Influx, and more so to those who are not aware of the fact that what is rational is distinct from what is natural, and still more so to those who have no distinct idea concerning the good and the true.'

Glimpses of truth touching kindred subjects, mingled indeed with much that is obscure or altogether erroneous, have been seen, from time to time, by the most illustrious masters in the domain of metaphysical and theological thought. Consult, for example, on the subject of a Divine *concursus*—involving the still keenly disputed questions of Grace, Freewill, Physical Premotion, and the like—the *Institutiones Logicae, Metaphysicae, et Ethicae* of Cardinal Gerdil;\* or the Père Malebranche's *Réflexions sur la prémotion physique*,† with the friendly criticisms of the Abbé Blampignon.‡

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NOTE M., p. 44.

GOD IS LIFE IN HIMSELF.

This is a primary principle of the perfect system of Theology taught by Swedenborg. A clear and adequate comprehension of it is absolutely necessary to enable the reader to see a multitude of intellectual and spiritual truths which must otherwise remain shrouded in impenetrable mystery.

Our author thus demonstrates the truth of the proposi-

\* *De Deo concurrente*, tom. ii. c. 2.

† *Œuvres*, tom. ii.

‡ *Étude sur Malebranche*.

tion 'that God, inasmuch as He is Love itself, and Wisdom itself, is also Life itself, which is Life in itself : '—

'It is written in the Gospel according to St. John, *The Word was with God, and the Word was God. In Him was Life, and the Life was the light of men.* (C. i. 1, 4.) God signifies there, the Divine Love ; and by the Word is meant the Divine Wisdom. Moreover, Divine Wisdom is properly Life ; and Life is properly the Light which proceeds from the Sun of the spiritual world, in whose midst is Jehovah God. Divine love forms life as fire forms light.

'There are two things in fire. There is a burning quality, and also brightness. From its burning quality proceeds heat ; and from its brightness, light. In like manner, there are two things in love : one, to which the burning quality of fire corresponds, and which is a certain principle affecting inmosty the will of man ; another, to which the brightness of fire corresponds, and which is a something affecting inmosty the intellect of man. Thence it is that man has love and intelligence. For, as stated above several times, from the sun of the spiritual world proceeds heat, which in its essence is love ; and light, which in its essence is wisdom. These two principles flow-in into all and everything in the universe, and affect them inmosty. And in the case of men, they flow-in into their will and intellect, both of which were created to be receptacles of this influx : the will, to be the receptacle of love, the intellect to be the receptacle of wisdom. It thence clearly appears that the life of man has its habitation in the intellect, and that its quality is such as is his wisdom ; also that the love belonging to his will exercises a modifying influence on that life.

'It is also written in the Gospel according to St. John, *As the Father hath life in himself ; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself* (ch. v. 26) : by which is meant, that just as the Divinity which was from eternity, lives in itself,



so also the Humanity which was assumed in time, lives in itself. Life in itself is the very and one only life, from which all angels and men live. Human reason may see this from reflecting on the light which proceeds from the sun of the natural world, in that it is not capable of being created; whereas, the forms recipient of that life are created. For the eyes are its recipient forms, and the light flowing in from the sun causes them to see. The case is similar with Life—which, as already stated, is the light proceeding from the Sun of the spiritual world—in that it is not creatable, but flows in without ceasing; and just as it enlightens, so it gives life to the intellect of man. It follows as a consequence that inasmuch as light, life, and wisdom are one, wisdom is not capable of being created. In like manner neither is faith, nor truth, nor love, nor charity, nor goodness. Whereas, the forms that are the recipients of these things are created. The minds of men and angels are these forms.

‘Let everyone, therefore, take good heed that he do not allow himself to fall into the persuasion that he lives of himself, then that he is wise, believes, loves, and perceives truth of himself; and that he wills and does what is good. For in so far as he gives himself up to these persuasions, to the same extent he casts his mind down from heaven to earth, and from being spiritual, he becomes natural, sensual, and corporeal. By acting thus he closes up the higher regions of his mind, and the result is that with respect to all that pertains to God, Heaven, and the Church, he becomes blind; and then all that he chances to think, reason, or speak, concerning them, is done in a state of sheer infatuation, because it is done in deep darkness. In addition to this, he at the same time contracts a confident assurance that these things have their source in wisdom. For when the higher regions of the mind are closed, in which the true light of life has

its abode, that region of the mind which is beneath them opens itself, and into this the natural light (*lumen*) of the world only is admitted ; and this light, when separated from the light of the higher regions, is the light of infatuation, in which the false appears as true, and the true as false ; and also reasoning from what is false appears as wisdom, and reasoning from truths, as insanity. Then it is that this reasoner believes himself to be mighty as possessing the clear steady gaze of the eagle, although with respect to those things which pertain to the domain of wisdom, he sees no more than does a bat in the light of day.\*

Again he states with even still greater distinctness this cardinal doctrine of a true Christian Theology :—

‘It is manifestly clear, from angelic ideas which have in them nothing whatever of space, that in the created universe nothing *lives* but the God-Man alone, that is to say, the Lord ; and that nothing is put in motion unless by means of life from Himself ; and, again, that nothing *is* except through the medium of the Sun which is from Himself : thus, that it is a truth, that in God we live, and move, and have our being.’†

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NOTE N., p. 50.

WHAT HAS BEEN WRITTEN CONCERNING THE MANNER IN  
WHICH OUR EARTH HAS BEEN PEOPLED.

The exemplary Anglican priest whose privilege it was to be the first to present the public with the little work on *Influx*, in an English dress, manifestly mistook the meaning of the original in this place. For the words, *ex scriptis de*

\* *True Christian Religion*, §§ 39, 40.

† *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 301. See in *Arcana Coelestia*, (§ 6467) a remarkable passage, at the close of which it is stated that this Life from the Lord is the life of love towards the whole human race.

*habitatione ejus*, he has given the loose and maimed rendering, 'from the writings of natural philosophers.\*' Swedenborg makes no mention of 'natural philosophers.' To what *writings*, then, does he refer? Clearly, not to the numberless guesses, hypotheses, and fantastic traditions which existed previous to his own time, nor to the learned and sometimes ingenious speculations of contemporary men of science.†

It is obviously impossible, in this place, to do more than remark on the note below, that (dismissing the quadrature of the circle) Swedenborg has given a perfect solution of the other two problems, Paradise and Prophecy.

With his characteristic modesty, Swedenborg manifestly refers to his own writings, which contain his own peculiar and distinctive teaching on the subject of Creation; and more especially to the treatise entitled *De Cultu et Amore*

\* See, *A Theosophic Lucubration on the nature of Influ*, p. 16. (Ed. London 1770), by the Rev. Thomas Hartley, Rector of Winwick, Northamptonshire; but published anonymously. This estimable clergyman, although a cordial receiver of the New Light, nevertheless remained a faithful member of the Church of his country, while deeply deploring her then ruinous state.

† For an interesting summary of imaginary notions put forth, from time to time on this point, see Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, (Art. EDEN.) 'It would be difficult,' says the writer, 'in the whole history of opinion, to find any subject which has so invited, and at the same time, so completely baffled, conjecture, as the Garden of Eden.' He then concludes his brief account of various views which have been hazarded on the subject:—'In the midst of this diversity of opinions, what is the true conclusion at which we arrive? Theory after theory has been advanced, with no lack of confidence, but none has been found which satisfies the required conditions. All share the inevitable fate of conclusions which are based upon inadequate premises. The problem may be indeterminate because the data are insufficient. It would scarcely, on any other hypothesis, have admitted of so many apparent solutions. Still it is one not easy to be abandoned, and the site of Eden will ever rank, with the quadrature of the circle and the interpretation of unfulfilled prophecy, among those unsolved, and perhaps insoluble, problems, which possess so strange a fascination.' (p. 486.)

*Dei.*\* The manner in which the reference is made, is in keeping with that remarkable reticence uniformly observed by the author with respect to his purely philosophical works, without, at the same time, ignoring them, or revoking a single truth contained in them. Moreover, no writer except himself can with the slightest show of reason be adduced as having given information as to the origin of the human race on this earth. To make evident that the view here taken of the reference in the text is the correct one, it may abundantly suffice to direct the reader's attention to a single passage in the *True Christian Religion* (§ 33), in which an altogether similar allusion is made. In proof of the proposition that *everything created is finite; and that the Infinite is in things finite, as in its receptacles, and in men as in its images*, a most distinct and significant reference is made to the author's works, without restriction. His words are : —Quæ in OPERIBUS MEIS † de Creatione tradita sunt.

By the words 'MY WORKS' are meant all his works, without exception, which treat of Creation.

A catena of passages might be adduced from his writings, beginning with the Treatise on The Infinite, &c., published in 1734, and ending with the *True Christian Religion*, which appeared in 1771, to prove that the origin of mankind from

\* The character, design, and scope of this altogether unique specimen of philosophical speculation, from a purely Christian point of view, seem from the first to have been imperfectly understood even by those who professed to have made the author's writings a special study.

† The 'capitals' are the author's own, as given in the *Editio princeps* of 1771. They have been scrupulously retained in Dr. J. P. Im. Tafel's accurate edition of 1857. They have also been preserved in the earlier and more carefully edited copies of Mr. Clowes' translation. In the more recent reprints, however, they cease to appear. Those who of late have been charged with the duty of seeing this work through the press, had evidently no notion whatever of Swedenborg's special purpose in thus giving emphasis to this general reference to all his works on the subject of Creation.

one primeval pair, created in a state of perfect integrity, is a constant doctrine of Swedenborg's, both as a philosopher and as a theologian. He has nowhere called this doctrine in question. On the contrary, he reiterates it in various forms throughout his entire writings.

#### ST. AUGUSTINE ON THE FIRST MAN.

St. Augustine, as in so many other instances, struggles courageously with the arduous problem of the *first man*. He thus argues with the Theist.

Nemini dubium est, (he says), omnes homines aut stultos aut sapientes esse. Si autem stultus factus est primus homo, quomodo non est Deus auctor vitiorum, cum sit stultitia maximum vitium? Nullo certè modo stultum dicere possumus qui sine vitio factus est, cum sit stultitia magnum vitium. Sapiens igitur primus homo factus est, et in sublimitate sapientiae collocatus, cum credamus hominem perfectè conditum à Deo, et in beatâ vitâ constitutum.\*

#### SWEDENBORG ON THE FIRST MAN.

In precisely the same spirit, but on the basis of an incomparably broader, deeper, and richer experience, the philosopher of Stockholm thus writes on the same subject:—

'No man seems to have been capable of arriving at true philosophy, since the age of that first of mortals who is said to have been in a state of the most perfect integrity, that is to say, who was formed and made according to all the art, image, and connexion of the world, before the existence of vice. All who are governed by a right mind, aspire after, nay, are intensely desirous of arriving at the same degree of wisdom, as at a something which we have lost: but how far it is possible to succeed, none but the true philosopher

\* St. Aug. *Philosophia*, p. 253.



can see ; he who is only in part a philosopher, or who wishes to be reputed one, may suppose himself to have arrived at the goal, and even to have proceeded beyond it ; while his fancied wisdom is after all mere hallucination. The reason why man, in a state of integrity, was made a complete philosopher, was, that he might the better know how to venerate the Deity—the Origin of all things,—that Being who is all in all. For without the utmost devotion to the Supreme Being, no one can be a complete and truly learned philosopher. True philosophy and contempt of the Deity are two opposites. Veneration for the Infinite Being can never be separated from philosophy ; for he who fancies himself wise, whilst his wisdom does not teach him to acknowledge a Divine and Infinite Being, that is, he who thinks he can possess any wisdom without a knowledge and veneration of the Deity, has not even a particle of wisdom.’\*

*‘There is nothing in the whole mundane system more perfect than man, and yet nothing more imperfect if he abuses the faculties designed to be employed in making him perfect.*

‘In general we may observe that man is an animal machine possessing a structure worthy of our highest admiration ; he is a most marvellous complement to the whole mundane system ; so marvellous, indeed, that all nature appears to have unfolded herself in him. . .

‘But, *fuimus Troes* ! The time was when we were men ; now, alas, how are we fallen ! How are we daily continuing to fall ! The dignity of the soul we have degraded to the dust. We have set menials over her as her lords and masters. We have abandoned ourselves to the tyranny of the body, the blood, the world, or externally inciting causes ; for

\* *Principia*, vol. i. pp. 34, 35. Cf. *ibid.* pp. 43–45, for a truly marvellous description and contrast of man in his primeval state of integrity, and in his subsequent fallen condition.

we are under the arbitrary control of pleasures and desires, by which we are hurried away to ends which are often contrary to the more universal, and to Him who is of all ends the most universal. In the whole world, therefore, there is nothing more imperfect than man in such a state ; as may be seen by comparing him with brutes ; for animals, when excited by external causes, are incapable of acting except in a manner suitable to the nature according to which they have been organized. Whilst man frequently both intends to act, and also does act, in a manner little suitable to his organization, and this, by the aid of a perverted reason.\*

‘ It is evident, from our general definition of the soul, that the soul of every offspring is derived from its parent, and the souls of all from Adam, who received his soul immediately from the Creator of the universe.’ †

#### SWEDENBORG ON CREATION AND GEOLOGIC PERIODS.

‘ Since the sun thus executes all the functions of parental duty, it follows from the connexion and tenour of causes, that if we desire to unfold the history of the earth from her earliest infancy, and to examine her from her origin, we must have recourse to the sun himself. For every effect is a continuity of causes from the first cause ; and the cause by which anything subsists is continued to the cause by which it exists, since subsistence is a kind of perpetual existence.’ ‡

‘ From what we have already stated, it is evident that the earth has already travelled a considerable distance from the sun ; that as soon as it commenced its course freely through

\* *Æcon. An. King.* vol. i. pp. 199, 200.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 278.

‡ *Worship and Love of God*, § 7.

the vortical region, it began to rotate on its axis, and revolve round the sun ; that at first it described only small circles, then gradually larger according as it reached a greater distance from the sun. At first, the times it measured were only years of short duration ; nay, it could comprise a whole century within the limits of our present year ; in the course of time, the duration of its years was gradually extended until they finally reached their present limit, beyond which they are unable farther to proceed, so long as the state of the solar vortex and axillary gyration of the earth continue as they are.\*

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NOTE O., p. 54.

THE SUN OF THE NATURAL WORLD IS NOTHING BUT MERE  
FIRE.

To assert that the sun is pure fire is doubtless to excite immediately, in the minds of most readers, sentiments of astonishment or pity, if not of ridicule and contempt. Such a notion, in presence of modern modes of speculation on the subject, cannot but appear a wild fancy. Those who are at the pains to *think* will not regard it in this light. Thus much, however, may be fairly alleged in its defence. It bears on its face, to an unsophisticated mind, quite as much *vraisemblance* as any guess or hypothesis hitherto made. It may even be affirmed that no modern discovery is in the least opposed to it. Moreover, it will be found to fall in, at every point with known *facts*. All the solar phenomena, when rationally considered in their true order and connexion, conspire to prove its truth. It may also be observed, in passing, that it is unphilosophical to expect that rational

\* *Principia*, vol. ii. p. 344.

views, on this or any other scientific question can be arrived at, as long as physicists are content to remain on the low level of mere science.

#### NUCLEUS OF THE SUN UNKNOWN TO MODERN PHYSICISTS.

The sun of our world is so constantly appealed to in illustration of intellectual and spiritual truth, in both classes of our author's writings, that some further consideration of the subject seems called for in this place. Few, comparatively, take the trouble to acquire even a most general notion of what is involved in the apparently simple expression—*sun of our world*.

What is a sun? To this question, strange to say, no satisfactory answer has yet been given by modern physicists or philosophers. Something seems to be known of the surface phenomena and proximate surroundings of the orb of day itself, but as to its body, or kernel, observers are as yet entirely in the dark. Numerous proofs of this ignorance might be given. The following may suffice:—

• What are the solar spots, and what constitution of the Sun is implied by them? Of tentative answers to this question there is first Wilson's, adopted by Sir William Herschel, that the visible surface of the Sun is a luminous envelope, within which there are cloudy envelopes covering a dark central body; and that when, by some disturbance, the luminous envelope is broken through, portions of the cloudy envelope and of the dark central body, become visible as the penumbra and umbra respectively. This hypothesis, at one time received with favour, mainly because it seemed to permit that teleological interpretation which required that the Sun should be habitable, accounted tolerably well for certain of the appearances—more especially the appearance of concavity which the spots have when near the

limb of the Sun. But though Sir John Herschel supported his father's hypothesis, pointing out that cyclonic action would account for local dispersions of the photosphere, there has of late years become more and more manifest the fatal objection that the genesis of light and heat remain unexplained, and that no supposition of auroral discharges did more than remove the difficulty a step back ; since, unless light and heat could be perpetually generated out of nothing, there must be a store of force perpetually being expended in producing them. A counter-hypothesis, following naturally from the hypothesis of nebular origin, is that the mass of the Sun must be incandescent ; that its incandescence has been produced, and is maintained, by progressing aggregation of its once widely diffused matter ; and that surrounding its molten surface there is an atmosphere of metallic gases continually rising, condensing to form the visible photosphere, and thence precipitating. What in this case are the solar spots ? Kirchoff, proceeding upon the hypothesis just indicated, which had been set forth before he made his discoveries by the aid of the spectroscope, contended that the solar spots are simply clouds, formed of these condensed metallic gases, so large as to be relatively opaque ; and he endeavoured to account for their changing forms as the Sun's rotation carries them away, in correspondence with this view. But the appearances as known to astronomers, are quite irreconcilable with the belief that the spots are simply drifting clouds. Do these appearances, then, conform to the supposition of M. Faye, that the photosphere encloses matter which is wholly gaseous and non-luminous ; and that the spots are produced when occasional up-rushes from the interior burst through the photosphere ? This supposition, while it may be held to account for certain traits of the spots, and to be justified by the observed fact that there are up-rushes of gas, presents difficulties not



readily disposed of. It does not explain the manifest rotation of many spots; nor, indeed, does it seem really to account for that darkness which constitutes them spots; since a non-luminous gaseous nucleus would be permeable by light from the remoter side of the photosphere, and hence holes through the near side of the photosphere would not look dark. There is, however, another hypothesis which more nearly reconciles the facts. Assuming the incandescent molten surface, the ascending metallic gases, and the formation of a photosphere at that outer limit where the gases condense; accepting the suggestion of Sir John Herschel, so amply supported by evidence, that zones north and south of the Sun's equator are subject to violent cyclones; this hypothesis is, that if a cyclone occurs within the atmosphere of metallic gases between the molten surface and the photosphere, its vortex will become a region of rarefaction, of refrigeration, and therefore of precipitation. There will be formed in it a dense cloud extending far down towards the body of the Sun, and obstructing the greater part of the light radiating from below. Here we have an adequate cause for the formation of an opaque vaporous mass—a cause which also accounts for the frequently observed vortical motion; for the greater blackness of the central part of the umbra; for the formation of a penumbra by the drawing in of the adjacent photosphere; for the elongation of the luminous masses forming the photosphere, and the turning of their longer axes towards the centre of the spot; and for the occasional drifting of them over the spot towards its centre. Still, there is the difficulty that vortical motion is by no means always observable; and it remains to be considered whether its non-visibility in many cases is reconcilable with the hypothesis. At present none of the interpretations can be regarded as established.\*

\* *The Study of Sociology*, by Herbert Spencer, 2nd Ed., pp. 7—9.

## ALLEGED ORIGIN OF SOLAR HEAT.

Again : as to the origin of the sun's heat, a modern writer presents his readers with what he deems to be 'the most plausible theory' on the subject. On examination it will be found to contain scarcely a single intelligible statement. Every principal term employed is as much an occult quality as any ever excogitated by the most imaginative of mediæval metaphysicians. It runs thus :—

'The most plausible theory of the origin of the sun's heat is that which supposes that the primeval potential energy of gravitation has been converted into heat for the sun's particles.

'The rudiments of such an idea seem to have occurred to Mayer and to Waterston ; but Professor W. Thomson has worked it out in such a manner as almost to prove that there is no other known power capable of producing such a stupendous result.

'According to this theory we may imagine the particles of matter when originally created to have been at a distance from each other, but endued with the power of gravitation, forming, in fact, a chaotic mass.\*

'As these particles rushed together heat would be produced, just as when a stone is hurled from the top of a precipice heat is the ultimate form into which the potential energy of the stone is converted.

'It is probable that this cause, by storing up an amount of heat in the sun, is sufficient to account for his wonderful outpouring of light and heat during a long series of ages.†

\* See *True Christian Religion*, § 35, where this opinion is shown to be in the highest degree absurd.

† Dr. Balfour Stewart, *Elementary Treatise on Heat*, pp. 361, 362.

## THE SUN AND NATURE.

'There seems to be great molecular delicacy of construction in the sun, and probably also, to an inferior extent, in the various planets; and the bond between the sun and the various members of our system appears to be a more intimate one than has hitherto been imagined. *The result of all this will be that a disturbance from without is very easily communicated to our luminary, and that when it takes place it communicates a thrill to the very extremities of the system.*'\*

With the fact here indicated, Swedenborg was already well acquainted; and with many others in addition, not yet dreamed of by natural philosophers, but which are destined to be fully acknowledged in due time, as the views of scientific men widen and deepen.

'The sun of this world,' he says, 'does itself consist of created substances the *activity* of which produces fire.'† This is the only intelligible theory of the sun's nature, and of the origin of cosmic force. It will be found adequate to account for all the known solar phenomena. The 'delicacy of construction in the sun,' spoken of above, is indeed a stupendous fact. The 'mechanism' involved in it is of a transcendent character. The glorious orb of day was so constructed by the Divine Architect of the universe as to receive, in a certain measure, the heat and light of the Sun of heaven, which is the Lord's Divine love and wisdom.

The Christian philosopher, who has firmly grasped this great truth, rejoices in the advance of genuine physical science. He labours under no 'disquieting circumstances.' On the contrary, he cordially welcomes newly discovered facts, from whatever quarter they may come. These will be

\* Dr. Balfour Stewart and Mr. Lockyer, on *The Sun as a Type of the Material Universe*. (Macmillan's Magazine, for July 1868, p. 257.)

† *True Christian Religion*, § 472.

found to fall easily and almost of themselves into their fitting places, while the crude materialistic speculations which, in the present day, so often accompany their discovery will be rejected as the hallucinations of a disordered imagination. In the light of this theory, it is possible for the human mind to perceive with more or less of clearness how it is that nature is separate from God ; and that, nevertheless God is omnipresent in nature.\* It is also possible to speak of nature, and not use mere empty terms emulous of the darkest formulas of Scholasticism.

‘The mechanical world of nature,’ says Swedenborg, speaking from the stand-point of natural philosophy, ‘is not unlike a spider’s web, and natural philosophy may be compared to the spider herself. The spider chooses a situation which will permit her to fasten her threads to the various parts of the surrounding objects: the radii which she draws she then makes to meet in a certain centre, and these she ties and connects together, at various distances, by circles and polygons ; her design in which is, to render all the parts of the sphere which she occupies contiguous one to another. . . . Now Nature herself closely resembles this spider’s web ; for she consists, as it were, of infinite radii proceeding from a certain centre, and connected together, in like manner, by infinite circles and polygons ; so that nothing can happen in one of them which does not immediately extend itself to the centre, from whence it is reflected and dispersed through a great portion of the fabric. By means of such a contiguity and connexion it is that Nature is able to perform her operations, and in this her very essence consists ; for wherever this contiguity is interrupted, wherever a thread of the web is broken, so as to dissolve the connexion between the centre and its circumferences, there Nature herself ceases and terminates.’†

\* Cf. *True Christian Religion*, § 30. † *Principia*, vol. i. pp. 32, 33.

## SIZE AND DISTANCE OF THE SUN.

Something certain and definite, however, is known, for example, about the vast size and enormous distance of the sun. Knowledge such as this is calculated to make any reader of ordinary intelligence pause, and contemplate with wonder and delight the beautiful and precious truths conveyed in those repeated references of Swedenborg to the glorious image of His own Divine love and wisdom which the Deity has vouchsafed to place in the natural order. *In them hath he set a tabernacle for the sun.\**

The passages given below, in the clear and accurate language of a master in this kind of knowledge, may serve to add new force and vividness to the obscure and inadequate idea too commonly entertained of that stupendous orb for which, in the sublime language of the Psalmist, the starry heavens form a tent :—

‘Now suppose the sun and the earth connected by a steel bar. A blow struck at one end of the bar, or a pull applied to it, would not be delivered—would not begin to be felt—at the sun till after a lapse of 313 days. Even light, the speed of which is such that it would travel round the globe in less time than any bird takes to make a single stroke of his wing, requires seven minutes and a half to reach us from the sun.’

‘The illustration of the distance of the sun which I have just mentioned, by supposing it connected with the earth by a steel bar, will serve to give us some notion of the wonderful connexion which that mystery of mysteries, gravitation, establishes between them. The sun *draws* or pulls the earth towards it. We know of no material way of communicating a pull to a distant object more immediate, more intimate, than grappling it with bonds of steel ; and how such a bond

\* Ps. xix. 4.



would suffice we have just seen. But the *pull* on the earth which the sun makes is instantaneous, or at all events incomparably more rapid in its transmission across the interval than any solid connexion would produce, and even demonstrably far more rapid than the propagation of light itself.\*

‘From the distance of the sun, and from its apparent size, . . . measured very nicely by delicate instruments called micrometers, the real diameter of the sun has been calculated at 882,000 miles, which I suppose may be taken as exact to a few odd thousands.

‘Now, only let us pause a little, and consider among what sort of magnitudes we are landed. It runs glibly over the tongue to talk of a distance of 95,000,000 of miles, and a globe of 880,000 miles in diameter, but such numbers hardly convey any distinct notion to the mind. Let us see what kind of conception we can get of them in other ways. And first, then, as to the distance. By railway, at an average rate of 40 miles an hour, one might travel round the world in 26 days and nights. At the same rate it would take 270 years and more to get to the sun. The ball of an Armstrong 100-pounder leaves the gun with a speed of about 400 yards per second. Well, at the same rate of transit it would be more than thirteen years and a quarter in its journey to reach the sun; and the sound of the explosion (supposing it conveyed through the interval with the same speed that sound travels in our air), would not arrive till half a year later. The velocity of sound, or of any other impulse conveyed along a steel bar, is about sixteen times greater than in air.

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‘Let me now try to convey some sort of palpable notion of the *size* of the sun itself. On a circle six feet in diameter, representing a section of it through the centre, a similar

\* Sir John Herschel, *Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, p. 57.

section of the earth would be about represented by a four-penny-piece, and a distance of a thousand miles by a line of less than one-twelfth of an inch in length. A circle concentric with it, representing on the same scale the size of the moon's orbit about the earth, would have for its diameter only thirty-nine inches and a quarter, or very little more than half the sun's. Imagine now, if you can, a globe concentric with this earth on which we stand; large enough not only to fill the whole orbit of the moon, but to project beyond it on all sides into space almost as far again on the outside! A spangle representing the moon, placed on the circumference of its orbit so represented, would require to be only a sixth part of an inch in diameter.

\*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*

'Giant size and giant strength are ugly qualities without beneficence. But the sun is the almoner of the Almighty, the delegated dispenser to us of light and warmth, as well as the centre of attraction; and as such, the immediate source of all our comforts, and indeed of the very possibility of our existence on earth.'\*

#### THE REALITY OF THE ELEMENT CALLED ÆTHER.

The fine mind of Malebranche divined, by that rapid and penetrating intuition which characterises true genius, fundamental truths in physical philosophy, which men of science arrive at only after long and repeated pondering on the phenomena, and some never reach at all.

'Dans l'instant,' says he, 'qu'on allume un flambeau, ou que le soleil se lève, il répand la lumière de tous côtés, ou plutôt il presse de tous côtés la matière qui l'environne. Les surfaces des corps étant diversement disposées, elles réfléchissent diversement la lumière, ou plutôt elles modifient

\* *Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, by Sir John F. W. Herschel, pp. 56—58, 62.

diversement *la pression que cause le soleil.*' Aether is a reality. Its pressure is gravity. The manner in which the point intended to be taught is here gradually approached, presents an admirable example of true teaching power. The good Père, however, feels instinctively that he has, perhaps, exceeded his hearer's power of apperception, and hastens to add in a parenthesis :—('Imaginez cela comme il vous plaira, il n'importe maintenant. Je crois, pour moi, que ces modifications de pression ne consistent que dans des vibrations ou des secousses que reçoit la *matière subtile* par celle qui la frise en glissant incessamment sur la surface des corps entre elle et ces mêmes corps.) Toutes ces vibrations ou modifications de pression, alternativement plus et moins fort, s'étendent ou se communiquent en rond de tous côtés et en un instant, à cause que tout est plein.'\*

*Dr. Tyndall on Heat, Light, Motion, and Aether.*

"Thomas Young never saw with his eyes the waves of sound ; but he had the force of imagination to picture them and the intellect to investigate them. And he rose from the investigation of the unseen waves of air to that of the unseen waves of ether ; his belief in the one being little, if at all, inferior to his belief in the other. One expression of his will illustrate the perfect definiteness of his ideas. To account for the aberration of light he thought it necessary to assume that the ether which encompasses the earth does not partake of the motion of our planet through space. His words are :—'The ether passes through the solid mass of the earth as the wind passes through a grove of trees.' This bold assumption has been shown to be unnecessary by Prof. Stokes, who proves that, by ascribing to the ether properties analogous to those of an elastic solid, aberration would be

\* *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique*, Douzième Ent. § i. Cf. *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, Seizième éclaircissement, § xiv.

accounted for, without supposing the earth to be thus permeable." \*

'The Emission Theory was first opposed by the celebrated astronomer Huygens, and the no less celebrated mathematician Euler, both of whom held that light, like sound, was a product of *wave motion*. Laplace, Malus, Biot, and Brewster supported Newton; and the emission theory maintained its ground until it was finally overthrown by the labours of Thomas Young and Augustin Fresnel.

'These two eminent philosophers, while adducing whole classes of facts inexplicable by the emission theory, succeeded in establishing the most complete parallelism between optical phenomena and those of wave motion. The justification of a theory consists in its exclusive competence to account for phenomena. On such a basis the *Wave Theory*, or the *Undulatory Theory* of light, now rests, and every day's experience only makes its foundations more secure.' †

'I have endeavoured to make as clear to you as possible that bold theory according to which space is filled with an elastic substance capable of transmitting the motions of light and heat. And consider how impossible it is to escape from this, or some similar theory,—to avoid ascribing to light, in space, a *material basis*. Solar light and heat require about eight minutes to travel from the sun to the earth. During this time the light and heat are detached from both. Enclose, in idea, a portion of the intervening space—say a cubic mile of it—occupied for a moment by light and heat. Ask yourselves what they are. The first inquiry towards a solution is, *What can they do?* We only know things by their *effects*. What, then, are the effects which this cubic mile of light and heat can produce? At the earth, where we can operate upon them, we find them capable of producing

\* Dr. Tyndall's *Notes on Light*, Conclusion, p. 72.

† *Ibid.* §§ 215, 216.

*motion.* We can lift weights with them ; we can turn wheels with them ; we can urge locomotives with them ; we can fire projectiles with them. What other conclusion can you come to than that the light and heat which thus produce motion *are themselves motions ?*

‘Our cubic mile of space, then, is for a measurable time the vehicle of motion. But is it in the human mind to imagine motion without at the same time imagining something moved ? Certainly not. The very conception of motion necessarily includes that of a moving body. What, then, is the thing moved in the case of our cubic mile of sunlight ? The undulatory theory replies that it is a substance of determinate mechanical properties, a body which may or may not be a form of ordinary matter, but to which, whether it is or not, we give the name of *ether*. Let us tolerate no vagueness here ; for the greatest disservice that could be done to science—the surest way to give error a long lease of life—is to enshroud scientific theories in vagueness. The motion of the ether communicated to material substances throws them into motion.’\*

After stating the chief reasons ‘why the foremost men of the age accept the ether not as a vague dream, but as a real entity,’ the accomplished experimental physicist goes on to say, that ‘if there is one conception more firmly fixed in modern scientific thought than another, it is that heat is a mode of motion.’†

*Professor Challis on Aether and Light.*

‘Having long since perceived that the science of Hydrodynamics was in an incomplete and unsatisfactory state, and being at the same time convinced that the progress of Theo.

\* *Op. cit.* Conclusion, p. 71.

† *Ibid.* p. 72.



retical Physics, especially the theoretical explanation of the Phenomena of Light, absolutely demanded a more exact and advanced knowledge of this department of applied mathematics, I have during a long course of years made efforts to overcome the difficulties that beset it.\*

‘The following theory rests on the hypothesis that the phenomena of Light are *visible* effects of the motions and pressures of a continuous elastic fluid, the pressure of which is proportional to its density, the effects being such only as are cognisable by the sense of sight. This hypothesis brings the facts and laws to be accounted for into immediate connection with hydrodynamical theorems demonstrated in the preceding part of this work . . . It is to be understood that since the hydrodynamical theorems rest on principles and reasoning altogether independent of this application of them, the success with which they explain phenomena is to be taken as evidence of the *actuality* of the hypothetical medium and of its assumed properties . . . This medium will be called *the Æther*.’ †

Referring to facts which the above theory has accounted for, Professor Challis observes :—

‘It should also be remembered that these facts, so various and so peculiar, are known to us only through the medium of the sense of sight, and that *primâ facie* there would seem to be no probability of any relation between such a sensation and the movements of an elastic fluid. The case is, however, precisely the same with the sensation of sound, which is something utterly diverse from movements of the air ; and yet we know, as matter of experience, that sound is generated by such movements. This experience, without which it is scarcely possible that the undulatory theory of light could

\* *Principles of Mathematics and Physics*, p. 319.

† *Ibid.* pp. 320, 321.

have been imagined, suggested that as vibrations of the air acting dynamically on the parts of the ear produce sound, so the vibrations of a most subtle elastic medium, acting on the constituent parts of the eye, might produce the sensation of light. Hence the hypothesis of an æther was adopted, and the necessity arose of determining its movements by mathematical calculation, in order to compare them with the observed phenomena of light. The requisite mathematical reasoning having been gone through . . ., the points of analogy between the light sensations and the laws of the movements of the æther are found to be so many and of such particularity, that scarcely less than positive proof is obtained of the *actual existence* of an elastic fluid, such as the æther was assumed to be. It is inconceivable that the analogies can be accounted for in any other way. Resting, therefore, on the argument, I shall, in subsequent physical researches, regard the æther as a *reality*.\*

*Swedenborg on the doctrine of an ætherial element.*

‘The doctrine of the ether, or the phenomena caused by ether, may be reduced to the following compendious statement:—Motion diffused from a given centre through a contiguous medium (*per contiguum*) or volume of particles of ether, produces light; for in consequence of this motion the ether is reflected from every entity it meets, and thus an idea of the object is presented to the eye. The central motion of the particles of the ether causes not only a rigid expansion of every particle, but also heat; and if this motion be urged from the centre to the circumferences, it causes light together with heat. If, however, it be urged from centres towards circumferences so as to become a local motion, but without the

\* *Op. cit.* pp. 355, 356.

central circumvolution of every particle, it occasions light in a cold state.

‘There are corpuscles which resemble a species of effluvia, and which are so small as to be enabled to move only a volume of ether, but not a volume of air; and these, if spontaneously moved, excite light to a certain distance. If they are not spontaneously moved, but are put in motion by means of the tremulation of the parts in any hard body in which they reside, in this case also light is excited, and in like manner electricity, so long as the tremulation continues.’\*

From this passage it is manifestly clear that Swedenborg, in a work published in the year 1734, proves that he was perfectly aware of the fact that heat is nothing but a *mode of motion of the aether*. But he also reveals specifically what that *mode* actually is. Much of what he has stated above must of necessity appear utterly unintelligible to an ordinary reader; but a time will surely come, perhaps it is not far distant, when its full import will be seen and acknowledged.

At the close of a series of paragraphs quite marvellous for the power of keen observation and subtle analysis which they display, and in which he explains the threefold nature of motion under the terms *undulation*, *modulation*, and *modification*, as applied respectively to water, air, and aether; and after having remarked ‘that no other doctrine comprehends such a multitude of scientific laws, as this of undulatory motion; for to this doctrine belong the laws of incidence, reflection, refraction, optics, music, physics, physiology, &c., with others that might be mentioned,’ Swedenborg makes the following statement:—

‘In one word, there is nothing in all nature more wonderful than undulation; nothing which includes a greater

\* *Principia*, vol. ii. p. 296. Cf. Professor Challis's *Principles*, &c. p. 512 (note).

multiplicity of laws ; nothing which is more worthy our consideration, or of more importance in physical and physiological studies. It is in fact the one great subject which demands our attention in the science of the animal economy ; so that to expound this science without any knowledge of this *mode of motion*, is like attempting to explain geometry without lines and figures, or the art of navigation without the use of the rudder and the compass. For nature, which is an active force, has transcribed its life into the three above mentioned species of motion, and particularly into that of undulatory or modificatory motion.\*

That the Emission Hypothesis should have found the least favour with any philosopher, seems to have excited in our author the greatest surprise :—‘I scarcely know,’ he says, ‘how to mark the condition of those who maintain that light in itself is an afflux of material atoms, when nature in all her phenomena demonstrates the contrary.’†

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NOTE P., p. 57.

NATURE, FROM AN INNER SPHERE, CONSTRAINING LIFE  
TO ACT.

‘All things that live in the body are formed with a power of acting, or of living in action ; and do not enter upon their tasks and functions, until objects present themselves, knock at the door, or flow in. But it is not enough that the fabrics be thus determined by their fibres, and that these fibres be mutually connected with each other, and correspond in common and in particular to the objects : in addition to this, *there must constantly be involved, or con-*

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. i. §§ 171, 172.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 244.

tinually be influent, a power from above or within, and at the same time from below or without, in order that the organ may be in a state for receiving, and applying to itself, that which is offered and represented. Let us take the eye as an example. Unless the power of receiving images flow into all its fibres, and into all the minutest stamina of the retina, from the innermost; and unless at the same time a light that enlightens the whole, flow into its common fabric from the outermost, the images that present themselves by variation of light and shade, cannot possibly be received, discriminated, and at length perceived. And a similar influx is requisite from within and from without into our organic principles, where the rational sight exists. These principles remain in mere potency, until a certain rational light, or life, flows in from the soul, or from the innermost; and a certain fire of life, passion, or love, (which are the stimulants of corporeal life,) from the body, or from without: in this case the objects that insinuate themselves either by ocular sight, or by the memory, fall distinctly into the understanding.\*

(1) '*A man who is rational owing to interior enlightenment from the Lord, at once perceives whether several things are true or not, as soon as he hears them.* . . .

(2) '*Exterior enlightenment* is enlightenment of the thought, due to the above interior enlightenment, &c. . . . Thought, from this exterior enlightenment, sees a thing from both points of view; from one side it sees the reasons which give strength, from the other, it sees the appearances which weaken; the latter it scatters, the former it gathers.

(3) 'On the other hand, *interior enlightenment coming from man*, is of a totally different kind. By this, man sees a thing from the one point of view and not from the other;

\* *An. King.* vol. ii. pp. 559, 560.



and when he confirms it, he sees it in a light similar as to appearance to the above-mentioned light. It is, however, a wintry light . . .

(4) 'Lastly, the *exterior enlightenment which is from man* is in those who think and speak from the bare knowledge of a thing. These possess very little power, of themselves, to establish anything.'\*

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NOTE Q., p. 60.

LIVING FORCE AND DEAD FORCE.

These two kinds of Forces, although entirely distinct and different, have nevertheless been confounded, especially in the present day, by a certain class of physicists and physiologists. The direct and necessary results arising from the prevalence of such an error, are the more or less open denial of the existence of a spiritual order of being, and a daily increasing avowal of materialism and atheism.

Confusion of thought on such a matter is of most mischievous consequence, not merely to true and sound science itself, but also to what concerns humanity, in its highest and most sacred relations. The subject, then, is one which merits the most conscientious consideration of all who have a real regard for the true welfare of their fellowmen.

The following excerpts, albeit merely *disjecta membra*, may prove useful in the way of indicating to the reader the existence of a very treasure-house of truths relating to this deeply interesting question.

\* *Divine Providence*, § 168.

## I.—ON GRAVITY AS DUE TO PRESSURE.

PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

*On the fundamental idea of Force.*

‘The fundamental and only admissible idea of force is that of pressure, exerted either actively by the æther against the surfaces of the atoms, or as reaction of the atoms on the æther by resistance to that pressure. The principle of deriving fundamental physical conceptions from the indications of the senses, does not admit of regarding *gravity*, or any other force varying with distance, as an essential quality of matter, because, according to that principle, we must, in seeking for the simplest idea of physical force, have regard to the sense of *touch*. Now by this sense we obtain a perception of force as pressure, distinct and unique, and not involving the variable element of distance which enters into the perception of force as derived from the sense of sight alone. Thus on the ground of simplicity, as well as of distinct perceptibility, the fundamental idea of force is pressure. . .

\* \* \* \* \*

‘All the different kinds of physical force being by hypothesis modes of action of the pressure of the æther, it follows that the æther itself must be supposed to be incapable of being acted upon by them.’\*

SWEDENBORG.

*On active and living Force, Gravity, and Matter.*

. . . ‘All materiality, as being inert and a terrestrial phenomenon, must be abstracted from force as the first principle of weight, consequently from the first (or most

\* *Principles of Pure and Applied Calculation, &c.*, pp. 358, 359.

subtle) aura (of the universe) and from its most noble determinate (the animal spirit). Thus active and living force answers to gravity, as its analogue, or fellow by way of eminence.'\*

PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

(a)—*On Force as proximately due to the motion and pressure of an ætherial medium.*

'The general physical theory I am propounding does not admit the existence of the action of force through space without the intervention of a medium.'†

'There are the same reasons for theoretical investigations respecting the quality and laws of gravity, as for theories of light and heat, all three being physical agencies known to us by their effects, and alike capable of transmission from distant bodies; and so far as evidence has been given that light and heat are transmitted by an intervening medium, a presumption is established that gravity is transmitted by the same medium.' The author refers the action of gravity to the motion and pressure of the ætherial medium. . . . †

(β)—*Doctrine of Pressure a desideratum in physical science.*

'What has since (the time of Newton) been required for the advancement of Natural Philosophy is the farther discovery of the processes of reasoning proper for ascertaining the motions and pressures of a congeries of particles in juxtaposition forming an elastic fluid.'‡

'It was too obvious to be overlooked that the different kinds of phenomena above-mentioned (viz. electricity, galvanism, electro-magnetism, magnetism, and diamagnetism) had

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. p. 38.

† *Principles of Pure and Applied Calculation, &c.*, pp. 436, 486.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 319.

*something* in common. The existence, as matter of experience, of this common quality, or point of relation, was expressed in the (extended) use thus made of the term electricity; but those who employed the word in this comprehensive sense did not profess to explain the exact *modus* of the correlation, or to indicate any common fact by which the various phenomena are connected. As far as I am aware no general conception of this kind had been published, when I first proposed the theory which I still advocate, namely, that these physical forces (as well as light, heat, and gravity), all result from motions and pressures of the ætherial medium, differing in their effects under different circumstances, according to laws ascertainable by the application of hydrodynamical theorems.\*

(γ)—*On the pressure of æther as being proportional to its density.*

‘The first part of the preceding theory of light may be considered to have established with a very high degree of probability the existence of an æther, which, so far as regards phenomena of light, may be treated as a continuous medium pressing proportionally to its density.’†

‘The theories that will come under consideration are those of Light, Heat, and Molecular Attraction, Force of Gravity, Electricity, Galvanism, and Magnetism, respecting which I make the general hypothesis that *their phenomena all result from modes of action of an elastic fluid the pressure of which is proportional to its density.*’‡

\* *Op. cit.* p. 506. Swedenborg, in his philosophical works, had already announced the principle from a point of view which for breadth, depth, and minuteness of detail, has yet been reached by no other writer. See, for example, *Æcon. An. King.* vol. i. pp. 130–137, on Undulation, and vol. ii. §§ 586, 590.

† *Ibid.* p. 436.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 318.

## SWEDENBORG.

*On the law of pressure of the ærial and ætherial atmospheres.*

In the *Animal Kingdom*,\* when treating of the movements of the lungs during the act of inspiration, Swedenborg refers to the experiments of Pascal and others respecting the phenomenon of atmospheric pressure, and sketches in brief outline the foundations of a true system of what is known in the present day as Hydrodynamics, wherein is incidentally revealed the true cause of gravity.

‘The experiments of Pascal especially,’ he observes, ‘as well as of many later writers, have satisfactorily demonstrated, that air, like water, presses upon a given area with a force proportioned to the height of its column : hence that it is found to press with different degrees of force upon the mercury of the barometer, according as the experiment is made upon lofty mountains and in high buildings, in deep mines, or under the exhausted receiver of an air-pump : and the same remark applies to water and other fluids. But in measuring the gravity of the air, one difference necessarily occurs, namely, that the air itself may be of varying density or rarity, consequently, of varying gravity or levity ; for being elastic, it will allow of being compressed considerably, as well as of being expanded considerably, with respect to volume or space : and thus the same height of column may produce a different result of gravity ; as in the different regions and climates of the globe. These differences are likewise observed between northern countries, and places lying under the meridian sun. But the breadth of the column is measured by the area upon which it presses, which, multiplied by the altitude, (that is to say, by the mean altitude, which corresponds to the levity of the expanded air in the higher region,

\* Vol. ii. pp. 141, 142.



and to the density of the compressed air in the lower region,) gives the real amount of *active force*, in a word, the *gravity*, with which the air acts upon the given object.'

The remainder of the note is taken up with showing that the aërial atmosphere has another known property—that of pressing with equal force in all directions. From these properties, the author infers, 'that the air not only operates by virtue of its elasticity, but also presses by its gravity; which shows that it is a partly terrestrial and partly celestial atmosphere: (that is to say, if the term celestial be applied to the higher and more perfect atmospheres, according to the usual mode of speaking adopted in the Holy Scriptures.)'

Want of space here forbids any attempt to indicate the deep significance of this allusion to the Sacred Writings, and its special bearing on the peculiar terminology of our author.

In the *Principia*, the law of aetherial pressure is thus enounced in express terms:—

'That the ethereal particles mutually press upon\* each other according to the altitude or weight of the superincumbent volume. That they press in like manner most equally in all directions, upwards, downwards, and obliquely. That their pressure is also proportioned to the side or area opposed to them at any given angle. That the elastic force of the particle tends also in every direction. That they exercise likewise a similar pressure upon the interior parts of any hard body, whose pores and the interstices of whose texture they are capable of entering and permeating; and that thus it is they keep the smaller parts in connexion one with the other.'\*

\* Vol. ii. p. 289.

## II.—ON COSMICAL FORCE.

MALEBRANCHE.

*On Vortical Force and Motion.*

‘La supposition que j’ai faite que la matière subtile ou éthérée n’est composée que d’une infinité de petits tourbillons qui tournent sur leur centre avec une extrême rapidité, et qui se contrebalancent les uns les autres, comme les grands tourbillons que M. Descartes a expliqués dans ses *Principes de Philosophie*, cette supposition, dis-je, n’est point arbitraire. Et comme je suis persuadé que c’est le vrai principe de la physique générale dont dépendent les effets particuliers, je crois la devoir prouver et en déduire l’explication de quelques vérités de conséquence.’ \*

After adducing the phenomena presented by thunder and gunpowder, in proof of the extreme rapidity of the *matière subtile*, or the æther, Malebranche proceeds to say :—

‘Il me paraît donc certain . . . que tout le mouvement qu’a la matière éthérée n’est pas employé dans le cours à peu près circulaire ou elliptique des grands tourbillons qui entraînent les planètes principales autour du soleil, et leurs satellites autour du soleil et de la planète à l’entour de laquelle ils circulent. Toutes les petites parties de cette matière ont encore des mouvements très-rapides. Et parce que l’univers est comprimé par une force infinie ou comme infinie, et qu’il n’y a point de vide, ces parties de la matière subtile se résistent réciproquement par leurs mouvements divers et particuliers, il est nécessaire qu’elles se divisent sans cesse et forment de petits tourbillons, et dans ceux-ci d’autres encore plus petits, et même encore d’autres moins durables dans les intervalles concaves que laissent entre eux les tourbillons qui se touchent.’ †

\* Malebranche, *Œuvres*, vol. i. p. 368.

† *Ibid.* p. 369.

## SWEDENBORG.

*On the fourfold order of the active Forces in nature ; and on Forces regarded as Fluids.*

In answer to the question, 'What is air, and what is ether,' our author replies :—

'The air and the ether, from what I have been led to conclude from the various experimental sciences, are auras or atmospheres of the mundane system, whose parts, (into which they are most distinctly divided,) are most perfect forms, receiving their determination according to the gravity and acting force of their dimension ; they are expansile, compressible, contiguous ; hence susceptible of modifications ; experiencing the least possible loss of any impressed forces ; most exactly representing the images or differences and proportions of impressions received in one place, at another, however remote ; having a tendency equally to every direction according to their force or gravity ; that is, from a centre to the circumferences belonging to it, or from these circumferences to the centre ; so that one and the same part can be in the centre, in the radius, in any circumference belonging to the centre, or in a thousand of each at the same time. Of these auras, such as are the parts such are the volumes, and such as are the volumes, such is the entire atmosphere ; so that a part of any atmosphere is its smallest volume. They are, moreover, as it were, the forces of nature in their forms, and to act as these they have a constant tendency. Such is the manner in which they constitute the circumfluous regions of the mundane system. But a question again arises, What is the origin of the air and the ether, and what is the difference between them ?

'When the rational mind, from the effects presented to its notice, institutes an analytical inquiry into their causes, it

nowhere finds them, except in a subordination of things, and a coördination of things subordinate. We must, therefore, travel through the orders and degrees of things, would we from the sphere of effects reach the sphere of causes, or ascend beyond it. To stop short on the road as often as anything occurs we do not comprehend, and to employ ourselves in supposing things simple and uncompounded as antecedents to other things of which we have only the same idea, is but prescribing so many ultimate boundaries to the human intellect, and destroying all chain of connection between consequents and their antecedents.

‘The forces of nature and the substances of the mundane system possess, not one, but many distinct spheres of activity, one under the other, each of which terminates in its own proper unity. Should any one of the inferior spheres be dissolved or perish, the superior spheres, nevertheless, outlive the dissolution; for whenever the effect perishes, still the cause survives; thus whenever air ceases its existence, the ether survives; when the red blood ceases its existence, the spirituous substance survives; and when the body dies, the soul survives. What is superior may exist and subsist without what is inferior, as the parent without its offspring, the substance without the subject in which it resides. The converse, however, cannot obtain.

‘Would we know, therefore, what is the air and what the ether, we must distribute the auras into their several degrees; for example, into degrees, superior and inferior, or prior and posterior. Those which are superior and prior are also more universal, less compounded, and more perfect, and are as it were the analogues of such as are inferior and posterior. Hence the air is one thing distinctly, and the ether another, in the same manner as hearing is one thing distinctly, and seeing another; nor is it possible for us to arrive from air at ether by any process of attenuation. . . .

‘Experience shews that the atmospheres or auras of the mundane system are of a fourfold order, namely, air, ether, and two others still less compounded. That there is such an atmosphere as *air* is proved by the phenomena of the air-pump ; by the respiration of the lungs ; by sound ; by the organ of hearing, and an infinite variety of other things. That there is such an atmosphere as *ether* is proved by the science of optics ; by the organ of sight ; by colour, light, and shade ; by the exhaustion of the receiver of an air-pump ; by the vast tide of insensible effluvia surrounding us, and penetrating vitreous and metallic bodies ; by the forms and connections of the minutest atoms, &c. That there exist *atmospheres still less compounded* is proved by physiology ; by the organization of the internal senses, by the mutual relation existing between the internal and external senses and their dependence one upon the other ; by the magnetic properties of things ; by the fluxions and orbits of the celestial bodies ; by vortices ; by physico-astronomical science ; by the correspondence between the gravities of bodies and their forces ; by the causality of effects ; and by the use of analogues as adopted by Ontologists.

‘Without, however, that experimental knowledge to which I have before adverted, we cannot venture to explain the quality of each aura except in some such general terms as the following ; as that the ether, for instance, is prior to the air, more universal, less compounded, and more perfect ; that the aura is of an order superior to the ether, and so forth.’ \*

Elsewhere, in connexion with the above, when treating of the inflow of superior into inferior substances, our author observes :—

‘For the forces and modes themselves (i.e. of substance) may be compared with fluids, since *fluids resemble the forces of active nature*. Whence also the forces are said to be modified.

\* *Econ. An. King*, vol. i. pp. 50—52.



Wherefore, forces viewed abstractedly from substances, may be said *to flow*, and *to be influent*; or *influx* may be predicated of them; just as substances may be said *to be connected*, and, by connection, to act mutually on each other.\*

In the light of the principle here enunciated, namely, that the forces and modes of substances may be compared to fluids, the following paradoxical statement is at once explained:—

‘If, for example, a cube or sphere of copper suspended from a twisted string be caused to spin, by untwisting, between the poles of an unexcited electro-magnet, it experiences the retardation due to air friction only; but on the supervention of the magnetic force the rotation is suddenly arrested. Faraday also showed that in passing a plate of copper rapidly to and fro between the magnetic poles you seem to be cutting cheese, though nothing is visible. It is as if pure space were a kind of solid.’†

### III.—THE MAGNETIC ELEMENT AS A COSMICAL SUBSTANCE AND FORCE.

DR. TYNDALL.

#### *On the Theory of Magnetism.*

“What then is the thing that causes magnetic attraction? The human mind has long striven to realize it. Thales (600 B.C.) thought that the magnet possessed a soul. Cornelius Gemma in 1535 supposed invisible lines to stretch from the magnet to the attracted body, a conception which reminds us of Faraday’s Lines of Force. Others thought the iron the natural nutriment of the magnet. Descartes embraced magnetic phenomena in his celebrated theory of vortices, and in our day Clerk Maxwell has worked in this

\* *Op. cit.* vol. ii. p. 29.

† Dr. Tyndall’s *Notes on Electrical Phenomena and Theories*, § 301.

direction. *Æpinus* assumed the existence of a magnetic fluid. *Coulomb* assumed the existence of two fluids, each self-repellant, but mutually attractive. *Ampère* deemed a magnet an assemblage of minute electric currents, which circulated round the atoms of the magnetized body. These conceptions are sometimes exceedingly useful as a means of connexion and classification, even when we do not believe them true. *William Thompson* deduces magnetic phenomena from 'imaginary magnetic matter,' thus giving the mind the conception, while distinctly releasing it from belief. The real origin of magnetism is yet to be revealed."\*

PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

*On the Theory of Magnetism.*

'In the preceding theories of Electricity, Galvanism, and Thermo-electricity, the generation of secondary aetherial currents from the primary ones. . . . has been ascribed to a gradation of interior density produced by external agency. In electricity the agent is friction; in galvanism, the mutual molecular actions of dissimilar substances in contact; and in thermo-electricity, the application of heat. In the Theory of Magnetism . . . the fundamental hypothesis is, that in certain substances a gradation of interior density exists independently of any such agency; that it exists, for instance, in iron found in nature in a magnetized state, and without being accompanied by an *electric* state of the superficial atoms. It is assumed, in short, in this theory that the gradation of density is maintained solely by interior atomic repulsions and first-order molecular attractions, the particular atomic constitution of the substance allowing to a limited extent these forces to be in equilibrium in its interior consistently with the gradual variation of density.'†

\* *Notes on Electrical Phenomena and Theories*, § 51.

† *Principles, &c.* p. 604, 605.

SWEDENBORG.

(a.)—*On the Sun as the fountain of motion in the Cosmos.*

*'According to the tenor of the foregoing principles, the large active solar space could primitively have consisted only of the active principles of the first finite principle.*

*'That the solar ocean existing in the middle of the vortex is the fountain of all the motions which take place between the parts constituent of the world, is, I imagine, perfectly clear; as also that it is, as it were, the soul of its immense body and system, and a perfectly active centre, around which the smaller and larger parts are whirled in a perpetual current.'* \*

*'In the state of the formation of the vortex, among the elementary particles, as they are growing by accretion into an immense sphere or volume, no other force was needed than a certain active centre . . .*

*'Elementary nature is similar to herself both in the greatest and least things; in the macrocosm and in the microcosm; in a heaven, and in a small volume; in a world and in a particle . . . Nature is a motive force diversely modified; a motive force diversely modified is mechanism; mechanism is geometry acting, since it cannot be otherwise than geometrical; geometry is an attribute of every entity endowed with figure and space; it is consequently inseparable from every individual and compound, whether at rest or in motion; it is inseparable also from motion itself. Hence throughout the world geometry follows nature from its first origin, seed, and egg; from the least dimension to the greatest. And inasmuch as geometry is the same in the greatest things as in the least, hence also nature, in so far as it is a motive force and modified, in so far as it is mechanical*

\* *Principia*, vol. i. p. 203.

and geometrical in either extreme (the indefinitely large or indefinitely little) is perfectly similar to itself. Hence we may contemplate the whole world in a volume ; a volume in a particle ; a particle in an individual ; an individual in a simple : and, reciprocally, a simple in a compound ; a compound in a volume ; a volume in a world ; a world in a heaven ; proceeding thus from the indefinitely small to the indefinitely great. Nature therefore is largest in what is least, and least in what is largest. And inasmuch as the world is not visible except in things large and compound, we may hence draw conclusions from the large, to the lesser, and the least ; as also from the large, to the larger, and the largest. The same parts and elements are in the least things as in the largest ; in a small volume as in the great heaven. If the causes are like, there will result like causates. Such as are the principles, such are the principiates. They cannot be varied as to effects, unless they are first varied as to causes. If the same causes remain, the same effects will present themselves. If  $a$  be a cause and  $b$  an effect, then if there be a thousand times  $a$  there will be a thousand times  $b$  ; and a thousand times  $a$  to a thousand times  $b$  is the same ratio between the causes and effects as that of  $a$  to  $b$ . Thus from the particles we have above described, or from a minute volume of these particles, we may learn the nature of the starry heavens, and of the large solar vortex ; from the lowly hovel we may ascend to the palaces of the skies, with all their sublime and magnificent courts ; from the dust, to the stupendous arch of heaven studded with so many, and such mighty stars, and enriched with such beautiful ornaturne.\* \*

\* *Op. cit.* pp. 206—208.

(β.)—On the universal Element of the Cosmos ; also, on the second or Magnetic Element.

There is an element which is ‘the most subtile, the first and most universal, of our mundane system, and of the universe in general . . . In every system, both the greatest and least spaces are occupied by this element ; and this element is of all others the most perfectly contiguous . . . In virtue of this universal element all things in the starry system appear as it were present. Whenever they do not appear so, it is only in consequence of our being accustomed to measure distances by comparing the angles made by distant objects with those immediately proximate to the eye. It is in virtue therefore of this element, that we can contemplate the remotest stars ; as also the planets by their reflected light.

. . . ‘I entreat the indulgent reader to pardon me for venturing to speak so positively of the elements and entities of the *natura prima*, which are so unknown and occult ; and as if they were objects well known and familiar to the senses. It would indeed be rash in me so confidently to lead him through such an unexplored region, a region of so many clouds and shadows, were I not aiming, through the medium of the principles propounded, to arrive at an element in which we are enabled to make experiments, and which, by help of these and geometry, may be subjected to the most accurate examination. When we have arrived at this station, if it shall appear that there is a geometrical harmony between the experiments and our principles, if a connexion be pointed out between the first ens or simple and the before-mentioned element, I then flatter myself that I shall have won the assent of my reader ; more particularly as, in the present age, there is no other way left for us to open the secrets of nature.’ \*

\* *Principia*, vol. i. pp. 168, 169.



There is also a 'second or magnetic element of the world . . . This element, together with the former, constitutes the solar vortex, and is the one which principally contributes to the phenomena of the magnet.

. . . 'Unless there were elements crowding round the sun, there would be nothing on which it could exercise its action ; and through which it could extend its sway into the remotest and most widely scattered regions. Without elements the active space (of the sun) would be as nothing. It would be a centre without circumferences, an active without passives, a soul without a body, a space without place. The eye would have no quarter towards which to look. There would be no upwards, downwards, or sideways. In fine, without a termination in elementaries there would exist nothing ; but everything would relapse into its pristine inanity. For this reason, the solar ocean is surrounded with new and additional elements, by means of which Titan can elongate his rays, and extend his arms and sceptre into the remotest regions.'\*

(γ.)—*On the form and flow of the Magnetic Sphere.*

'The magnet with the play of its forces we both see and do not see ; hence our wonder at the phenomena it presents. In the magnet and in its sphere there is, however, a type and effigy of the heaven ; a mundane system in miniature presented to our senses, and brought within the limits of our comprehension. In the sphere of the magnet are *spiral* gyrations or vortices ; in like manner in the sidereal heavens there are *spiral* gyrations and vortices. In every vortex round the magnet there is an active centre ; in every vortex in the heaven there is also an active centre. In every vortex round the magnet the motion is quicker near the centre than it is at a distance from it ; the same is the case in every

\* *Op. cit.* p. 195.

vortex in the heaven. In every vorticle round the magnet the spiral gyration is of greater curvature in proportion to its nearness to the centre ; the same is the case with every vortex in the heaven. In every vorticle round the magnet there are, in all probability, corpuscles fluent round the centre and revolving round an axis ; such also is the case with every vortex in the heaven. The vorticles round the magnet mutually colligate themselves by means of their spiral motions, and thus colligated, form a larger sphere ; the same is the case in the sidereal heaven ;—not to mention other points of agreement of which we shall speak in the sequel.\*

‘Since . . . there is no doubt that there is a vortical and spiral motion of particles in the vortex of our earth, and that hence are formed ecliptics and poles ; it follows that the element which tacitly flows in at one pole and flows out at the other, has two poles ; one on the south side of the earth, the other on its north side ; and that *from the south* it pursues its course *to the north* and so tends back again into its vortex, and repeats the course it before pursued. Thus there are two poles ; one in the southern, and the other in the northern region.’†

‘In the Milky Way,’ he adds, ‘lies the chain and magnetic course of the whole of our sidereal heaven.’‡

PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

*On the spiral motion of the Magnetic Element.*

‘The preceding reasoning has proved the possibility of the flowing of a steady stream symmetrical with respect to a rectilinear or curvilinear axis, and has indicated that such motion must be compounded of uniform rectilinear motion

\* *Principia*, vol. ii. pp. 230, 231.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 146.      ‡ *Ibid.* p. 237.

parallel to the axis, and uniform circular motion about the same. The resulting motion is therefore *spiral*, as appears also from the foregoing equation of the surfaces of displacement.\*

SWEDENBORG.

*On the spiral and vortical motion of the Magnetic Element.*

Treating specifically of the causes and mechanism of the magnetic forces, he observes:—

‘Inasmuch as the diffusion and emanation of motion from the centre, is of one kind according to the plane or parallelism of the poles, and of another and different according to the plane and parallelism of the equators of the parts; it follows, that the motion cannot be diffused into circumferences equidistant from the centre, or similarly circular, but only into such as are *spiral*. . . A motion of this kind in a volume of parts is truly *vortical*, inasmuch as it propagates itself by spires to various distances, and thus spreads itself in every direction.’†

PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

*On the direction of the flow of the Magnetic Element into the earth.*

‘I proceed, in the next place, to make certain applications of the theory (of magnetic force), which will serve to determine in *what direction the æthærial currents pass through the dipping needle*.’ After stating certain results of experiments, the author goes on to say that as these results agree with observation, ‘they confirm the hypothesis that the magnetic stream enters the north end of the needle, passing, consequently, *out of the earth*. Similarly, it may be argued, that

\* *Principles*, &c. p. 566.

† *Principia*, vol. i. p. 215.

on the south side of the magnetic equator the terrestrial magnetic current enters into the earth.' \*

SWEDENBORG.

*On the mode of the Magnetic Influx from pole to pole of the earth.*

. . . 'The influx of the particles of this (i.e. the magnetic) element is *at the south pole*, and that hence it tends to the north; not like a stream and torrent, but like a tranquil and tacit current (*alvei*), which gradually and without any sensible motion, pursues its course from one haven to another . . . this stream tends from the south pole to the north in a spiral manner; for it does not flow directly from one pole to the other, because it flows in spirally by polar cones, and embraces the surface of the earth by preserving the motion and pressure of a spire, until it comes to the other pole, or cone of emergence.' †

#### IV.—CORRELATION OF NATURAL AND SPIRITUAL FORCES.

PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

*On the character of the Cosmos, and the purpose of Man's Creation.*

"It is . . . conceivable that the law of pressure of the æther may be caused by *a like æther of another order*, ‡ similarly acting by means of vibratory motions; and so on *ad libitum*. For here Newton's dictum, 'Nature knows no

\* *Principles*, pp. 614, 615.

† *Principia*, p. 146.

‡ The italics are those of the present writer. Cf. the second, or magnetic element, in Swedenborg's system, described above, p. 396.

limit,' (neque novit natura limitem, *Principia*, Lib. I. Scholium to *Lemma XI.*), may be applied with as good reason as to the abstract relations of space. In accounting for physical force in this way, we seem to reach the farthest conception we can form of it, resolving it, in fact, into *volition*, such as that we are conscious of when we exert *power*. This inference accords well with an opinion expressed by Newton in Query 28, attached to his *Optics*, where he says that the part of philosophy is 'to deduce causes from effects, till we come to the very First Cause, which certainly is not mechanical.' In short, force dissociated from *personality* and *will*, must be for ever incomprehensible by us, because it would be something contradictory to our consciousness. It is also worthy of remark that the ultimate conception of physical force to which the above argument conducted is analogous to the idea which . . . we have of the extensibility *ad libitum* of time, space, and the æther; an analogy which seems to show that all these entities exist by antecedent *will*." \*

'The different physical theories discussed in this volume . . . wholly consist of calculations of the effects of force acting as pressure under intelligible conditions. The theory of Light comes under this description, because it regards the phenomena of light as *sensible* effects of vibrations of the æther acting dynamically. So also Heat and Molecular Attraction, Gravity, Electricity, Galvanism, and Magnetism, are all *modes of force* of the ætherial medium. Now, imperfect as these theories may be in the condition to which my endeavours have brought them, it may yet be possible to state the character of the scheme of the Universe—the *Systema Mundi*—which they tend to unfold. It may, I think, be asserted that the completion of these theories will demonstrate the existence of a vast and wonderful *mechanism*,

\* *Principles*, p. 681.



of which not the least wonderful quality is, its being so constructed that we can understand it.' \*

"Through all this scheme *law reigns*, in order that we may thereby be educated morally as well as intellectually, and be taught the end of our creation. In proof of this conclusion, it need only be said that when the Eternal Word, *ὁ Λόγος*, through whom the worlds were made, visited His creation, by assuming a body like ours, and submitting to its laws, He shewed us how we must act and suffer, that our spirits, through faith and patience, may 'partake of the divine nature,' and be *formed* for immortality." †

PROFESSOR HELMHOLTZ.

*An apparently idealistic († Kantian) view of laws, forces, and causes.*

'En présence des phénomènes de la nature, la tendance de notre esprit est de chercher des *notions générales*, et des *lois naturelles*. Les lois naturelles ne sont que des notions générales qui comprennent les variations naturelles. Mais comme il nous faut considérer les lois naturelles comme valables et actives indépendamment de notre observation et de notre pensée, tandis que les notions générales ne seraient qu'une manière de mettre de l'ordre dans notre pensée, nous exprimons cela en appliquant à ces lois les dénominations de *causes* et de *forces*. Lors donc que nous ne pouvons pas ramener des phénomènes naturels à une loi, et que, par conséquent, nous ne pouvons pas poser la loi comme valable objectivement et comme étant la cause des phénomènes, nous cessons de pouvoir concevoir ces phénomènes.' ‡

\* *Op. cit.* p. 684.

† *Ibid.* pp. 686, 687.

‡ *Optique Physiologique*, p. 592.

DR. TYNDALL.

*Naturalistic (apparently materialistic and atheistic) view of the Cosmos.*

‘The origin, growth, and energies of living things are subjects which have always engaged the attention of thinking men. To account for them it was usual to assume a special agent, to a great extent free from the limitations observed among the powers of inorganic nature. This agent was called the *vital force*; and, under its influence, plants and animals were supposed to collect their materials and to assume determinate forms. Within the last twenty years, however, our ideas of vital processes have undergone profound modifications; and the interest, and even disquietude, which the change has excited in some minds are amply evidenced by the discussions and protests which are now common regarding the phenomena of vitality. In tracing out these phenomena through all their modifications the most advanced philosophers of the present day declare that they ultimately arrive at a single source of power, from which all vital energy is derived; and the disquieting circumstance is that this source is not the direct fiat of a supernatural agent, but a reservoir of what, if we do not accept the creed of Zoroaster, must be regarded as *inorganic* force. In short, it is considered as proved that all the energy which we derive from plants and animals is drawn from the sun.

‘A few years ago, when the sun was affirmed to be the source of life, nine out of ten of those who are alarmed by the form which this assertion has latterly assumed would have assented, in a general way, to its correctness. Their assent, however, was more poetical than scientific, and they were by no means prepared to see a rigid mechanical signification attached to their words. This, however, is the pecu-

liarity of modern conclusions :—that there is no *creative* energy whatever in the vegetable or animal organism, but that all the power which we obtain from the muscles of men and animals, as much as that which we develop by the combustion of wood or coal, has been produced at the sun's expense.'\*

SWEDENBORG.

(a)—*On the auras of the Cosmos.*

'The auras are the forces of the world, because they are the forms of the forces of the universe. . . The phenomena of the world plainly declare that these auras are four in number, perfectly distinct from each other, and one prior and superior to the other, and more universal and more perfect than the other. Thus that there is an air by which we are surrounded, is incontestibly proved by hearing, respiration, the air-pump, and the whole range of experimental physics. That there is an ether, or subtler air, is proved by the sight, as well as by the air-pump, for light and shade are still distinct, and colours survive, although the air be exhausted from the receiver. That this ether is a real but higher atmosphere, is demonstrated in its own light by the organism of the eye, and by the whole of optical experience; for the matter of the organ is seen to be exactly determined to the form of its modifications; in order that it may be suitably touched, modified, and affected: for a vacuum admits of no affection, and has no organic forms corresponding to it.

That this aura is prior to the air, is also evident from the fact, that it can subsist without the air: that it is higher and more perfect than the air, is clear from the fact, than the sounds of the ear correspond to the images of the eye or of the natural mind (*animus*). Modified forms are also

\* *Fragments of Science for Unscientific People*, pp. 436, 437.

similarly reflected, infracted, are resilient at the angle of incidence, possess the highest elasticity, contain crowds of effluvia, carry about and agitate them, giving rise to phosphoric appearances, wandering meteors, and many other phenomena, which, from their mysterious nature, carry away the rational sight into a sort of ignorant astonishment, and occasion perpetual discordance in accounting for their origin, so long as we deny the existence of such an aura : &c.

‘That a still purer ether or higher aura exists, distinct from the ether just spoken of, is evident from the magnetic force (see my *Principia*), also from the vortex of our earth, within whose sphere the moon is carried round, and which great vortex has lesser vortices circumgyrating exactly in the same manner as itself; for from the form, nature, and mode of acting of aggregates, are discoverable the form, nature, and mode of acting of their parts; each part being a type of its universe.

‘The existence of this aura is proved also by the instincts of brute animals, whose purest fluids owe their origin to it, and are affected by it; for they know how to turn accurately to the various zones (of the ethereal region), and by the sole guidance of a natural force to return to their homes many miles distant, by ways they have never before smelled or tried; they know how to extricate themselves at once from labyrinthine mazes, and so they act as living magnets; not to mention innumerable other circumstances.

‘That a yet purer aura exists, which is in fact the first, the highest, the most universal, and the most perfect,—this position is the consequent of the antecedent positions, because the aura itself is the antecedent of the consequent auras. Now if the aura just mentioned describes vortices around the earth and the planets, there must be a vortex, or corresponding universe, embracing and directing all other vortices or universes, and this grand vortex, and that pre-

vously spoken of, must mutually correspond with each other in the relation of superior and inferior. So too if the magnetic aura above indicated affects the fluids of brute animals, there must be a superior aura that affects the higher human fluid, for without the medium of such an aura, no light from the sun, much less from the stars, would ever reach the eyes of the inhabitants of our earth; for, as we before observed, a vacuum, or what is the same, nothing, admits of no affection.

‘And without this supreme aura the minutest forms could not be held together in connexion, nor could effects flow from their first causes according to the order of nature. But perhaps I am telling tales to the deaf: should such be the case, my audience is well described by an Englishman of fine genius.’\*

In presence of the above marvellous *élan* of the rational faculty, the brilliant experiments of mere physicists are little more than the toys and trifles of schoolboys, while their imaginary lucubrations based upon a very superficial view of natural phenomena, well deserve to be called *the procacious prattle of the scientific imagination*.

(β)—*Spiritual Forces in Nature.*

. . . ‘In all and each of these things that are in nature and her three kingdoms, there is, intrinsically, that which acts from the spiritual world; unless there were inherent in

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 250, 251. The author here quotes a long and strikingly characteristic extract from Locke’s *Essay on the Human Understanding*, (B. IV. ch. xx. §§ 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 17,) which deserves to be read and deeply pondered by imaginative physicists and their followers. In hearkening ‘diligently with much heed’ to the sound advice and wholesome rebuke there given, they may, perhaps, be led to feel in some degree the benign influence of that ‘kind power’ so pathetically appealed to on a special occasion, by the Scottish poet, and thus be enabled, if they are so disposed, to *see themselves as others see them*.



them such an agent thence originating, nothing whatever would act, in the natural world, as cause and effect, and consequently nothing would be produced. That which inheres in natural things, from the spiritual world, is called the *vis insita* from the first creation. On the contrary, it is an *endeavour*, on the ceasing of which, action or motion ceases. Hence it is that the entire visible world is a theatre representative of the spiritual world. The case herein is similar to that of the motion of the muscles, whence comes action. Unless there inhered in that motion an endeavour arising from man's thought and will, it would cease in a moment. For it is according to rules known in the learned world, that when the endeavour ceases, the motion also ceases; likewise, that in the endeavour is everything pertaining to the determination; as also, that in motion nothing real exists but the endeavour. That this force, or this endeavour, in the action or motion is the spiritual in what is natural, is clear; for to think and to will is spiritual, but to act and to be moved is natural. Those who do not think beyond nature, in fact do not even comprehend this; still, however, they cannot deny it.\*

(γ)—*The threefold character of Force in the spiritual order.*

*'There are three forces in everything spiritual; a force of acting, a force of creating, and a force of forming.*

'1. There is A FORCE OF ACTING; inasmuch as what is spiritual proceeds from the Primal Fountain of all forces, which is the Sun of heaven; and this Sun is the Divine Love of the Lord, and love is the very active principle, itself: thence also proceeds the living force, which is LIFE.

'2. THE FORCE OF CREATING is a force of producing causes and effects from beginning to end; and also proceeds from

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 5173.

the First, through the instrumentality of intermediates, to the last. The First is the Sun itself of heaven, that is to say, the Lord; intermediates are things spiritual; next in order natural things; then terrestrial things; from which, in the last place, are productions. And since, in the creating of the universe, that force proceeded from the First to the last, therefore, after creation it still proceeds in a similar manner, in order that productions may be continual; otherwise they would come to an end. For what is First continually regards the last as an end; and did not the First, continually from Itself, behold the last with provident care, through intermediates, according to the order of creation, all things would perish. Wherefore, productions, which are principally animals and vegetables, are continuations of creation. It matters not that continuations are made by means of seeds; it is nevertheless the same creative force which *produces*. It is in accordance with the experience of some, that certain kinds of seeds are still being produced.

‘3. THE FORCE OF FORMING is the ultimate force, derived from ultimate things; for it is the force of producing animals and vegetables from the ultimate materials of nature which are amassed together in the earth.

The forces which are inherent in nature from its origin, which is the sun of this world, are not living forces, but dead forces; and these latter are no other than such as are the forces of heat in man and in animals, which preserve the body in that state in which the will, by means of affection, and the understanding, by means of thought,—and these are both spiritual—can flow in and perform their own acts in it. Nor are they other than such as are the forces of light in the eye, which merely acts so that the mind, which is spiritual, sees by means of that its own organ. The light of this world sees nothing. It is the mind that sees by means of the light of heaven. The case is similar with vegetables.

He who believes that the heat and light of the sun of this world produce any other effect beyond opening and disposing those things which are proper to nature, for the reception of influx from the spiritual world, is greatly deceived.”\*

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NOTE R., p. 73.

ORGANIZED FORMS, SPIRITUAL AND NATURAL.

Some definite notion of Swedenborg’s marvellous and altogether original doctrine of Forms, is absolutely necessary to obtain even the most general conception of his philosophical system. As an example of subtle analysis this doctrine stands alone in the history of human speculation. Nor is it possible, without its aid, for the human mind *rationaly* to investigate truth, whether of the natural or the spiritual order, as may be gathered from a study of what follows :—

“Both ancient and modern philosophers subscribe to the axiom, that everything derives from its form its peculiar and distinctive character or quality. ‘Each thing,’ says the Philosopher (Aristotle), ‘is called a thing in virtue of its form.’ ‘By means of the form of an entity,’ says Wolff, ‘we understand why that entity is of one particular genus or species, or of one quality rather than another; and why it is adapted to act in one particular manner: consequently the law of these predicates is contained in the form. The form, therefore, is the principle of the entity, upon which its peculiar existence depends; consequently, it is the cause of the entity.’ (*Ontologia*, § 947.)

“But what is form? This, as well as other terms, is distinctly explained by the doctrine of Order, which as it ascends through degrees, so it arrives at higher abstractions.

\* *Apocalypse Explained*, § 1209.

In the lowest degree, form means the structure of a body, both internal and external. 'The form of everything,' says the Philosopher (Aristotle), 'is perceived by the sense of sight.' There is also the form of other things. Thus we speak of forms of government, forms of motions, forms of words or of speech, &c. In a higher degree form means image; for such as it is successively represented to the ear or to the eye, such is it simultaneously represented to the natural mind, abstractly from matter. In a still higher degree it is a bare and naked form, or according to some, idea; for figure, magnitude, situation, motion, or the limit of these, are abstracted from it. In a still higher degree it means the universe, as including within its embrace all and everything; and in this respect it is also the form of natural forms. To ascend beyond this to forms still higher would be to climb both above and beyond the universe, where the mind's intuitive power perishes, and language with it; so that to discourse of such forms would be to utter empty terms." \*

A compendious statement of the doctrine of Forms is thus given in the *Animal Kingdom*:—†

'I intend,' he says, 'to explain the nature of the spiral form in an especial doctrine of forms. Meanwhile . . . I will here state, that forms ascend from the lowest to the highest, in order, and by degrees, as do also the essences and substances of all things.

(1) 'The lowest form is the *angular*; which is also called the *terrestrial* and the merely *corporeal* form, inasmuch as it is peculiar to bodies having rectilinear angles and planes; the measurement of which is the primary object of the present geometry.

(2) 'The second and next higher form is the *circular*, or

\* *Æcon. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 231, 232.

† Vol. i. pp. 125, 126 (note f).

*spherical* form ; which may also be called the *perpetually angular*, since the circumference of the circle involves neither angle nor rectilinear plane, because it is a perpetual angle and a perpetual plane : this form is at once the parent and measure of angular forms ; for it is the means of shewing the properties of angles and figures, as trigonometry teaches.

(3) 'The form above this is the *spiral*, which is the parent and the measure of circular forms, as the circular form is the parent and the measure of angular forms. . . .

• 'There are other still higher forms, as the *perpetual-spiral*, properly the *vortical* : the *perpetual-vortical*, properly the *celestial* : and a highest, the *perpetual-celestial*, which is *spiritual*, and has in it nothing but what is everlasting and infinite. But these remarks are only by the way.' . . .

The specific application of the principle of *organized forms*, referred to in the text, to the structure and mechanism of the brain regarded as the organ of mind, would require a special treatise, and a mastery of the stupendous subject to which the present writer makes no pretension.

It may be gathered from what follows, that notwithstanding the increased knowledge of facts respecting brain structure and function, our author's teachings on the subject, as to *principles* firmly based on the facts known in his own day, are still far in advance of the most recent and most rational physiologico-psychological speculations.

DR. BEALE.

*On the nervous mechanism, and the seat of the most exalted form of vital power.*

(a) 'Of all organic mechanism, the most perfect, the most exalted, and, as regards mere structure the most elaborate, is the nervous. Widely distributed, but connected so as to form one whole, intimately concerned in the actions going



on in various tissues, and co-extensive with most of these, it sends filaments to the very confines of the organism.\*

(β) 'There can be no doubt that the most important part of the mechanism engaged in mental action is situated in the grey matter of the cerebral convolutions; and the results of observations upon the structure, as well as experiments upon the action of the other nerve organs, justify us in the conclusion that *nerve-cells* consisting of germinal matter and formed material, and *nerve-fibres* composed of formed material only, are the active agents. These are so arranged as to constitute a mechanism (if this term may be properly applied to it) of marvellous perfection and complexity. The fibres, many being of extreme tenuity, are seen to interlace with one another, and run in every conceivable direction, so that when the observer realizes the actual arrangement as it exists in a very small portion of grey matter, and this is the utmost he can hope to do, he marvels how it has been brought about.†

(γ) 'The mechanism concerned in expressing thoughts consists of a nervo-muscular apparatus arranged with such consummate skill, and occupying so small a space, that it is possible for the mind to form but a most imperfect conception of the arrangement of even a very small part of it.‡

(δ) 'In man there seems to be evidence of the action of a higher and more wonderful vital power than exists in any other living form. This influences a very special and easily destructible living matter,§ situated in and limited to a particular part of man's nervous system. . . . It is in relation with the delicate living matter, seated near the

\* *Protoplasm*, p. 315 (2nd Ed.)

† *Ibid.*, pp. 130, 131 (1st Ed.)

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 146 (1st Ed.)

§ That is to say, matter so organised as to be receptive of and actuated by life. For matter, in itself, is dead. It is the mere clothing of what is spiritual. The latter alone can be said, properly, to be living.

surface of the grey matter of the convolutions of man's brain, which is alone concerned in mental action, that I conceive vital power attains its most exalted form.\*

DR. DELITZSCH.

*On the amazing multiplicity and complexity of the cerebral nerve fibres.*

'In order to give only a weak conception of the character of this marvellous mechanism, I will mention that here generally microscopic relations are treated of, and that the thickness of single nerve-fibres themselves being taken at 1-200th part of a line (and the central fibres of the brain are incomparably finer still), in a single square inch nearly six millions of such fibres are packed, and that the mass of a civilised man's brain may, perhaps, contain upwards of 60 cubic inches. Astonishment seizes us when we think upon the marvellous riches of such an organization; and, perhaps, we may doubt whether we shall ever attain to penetrate into its mysteries, and ever learn to know only the coarser relations of this disposition of filaments, and only the general relations of their activities entwining with one another.†

DR. BEALE.

*On Brain 'bioplasts.'*

Referring to a work in which he has described, what he terms 'bioplasts,' this eminently cautious and conscientious observer says:—'I believe that the bioplasts referred to are directly concerned in mental action. Movement affecting the matter of many thousands of these minute bioplasts, probably at the same moment, is required for the initiation of the simplest idea. . . .

\* *Protoplasm*, pp. 318, 319 (2nd Ed.)

† Delitzsch, quoting from a modern writer, in his curious *Bib. Psychol.* p. 318.

'The number of nerve fibres, like that of the bioplasts, is altogether beyond calculation. A portion of grey matter upon the surface of a convolution, not larger than the head of a very small pin, will contain portions of many thousands of nerve fibres, the distal ramifications of which may be in very distant and different parts of the body.'\*

SWEDENBORG.

*On the same subject.*

(a) 'I have said that the cortical substance is the principal mover of all the other substances in the body.' . . .

(β) 'Truly marvels present themselves when we consider how animal nature has distributed, distinguished, multiplied, and by perpetual communications conjoined, these pulsific and vital substances (the cerebral nerve-cells) . . . How they are *multiplied* will be evident if we consider the abundance of them in the circumference of the brain, and in the penetralia of the cerebellum and of the two medullae: *they are a number ineffable and unassignable.*† . . .

(γ) Elsewhere he observes that in the inmost parts of the brain there are 'subtle *organic forms* called the cortical substances, from which and by means of which the operations of the soul proceed.'‡

(δ) Again: 'Organic forms are not only those which appear to the eye, and which can be discovered by microscopes. On the contrary, there are organic forms still purer, which can never be discovered by any eye whether naked or aided by art. These latter forms are of an interior kind; such as are the forms which pertain to the internal sight, and those which finally belong to the intellect. These forms are inscrutable. But still they are *forms*, that is to say, *substances*. For no sight,

\* *Protoplasm*, p. 321 (2nd Ed.)

† *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 163, 164.

‡ *Arcana Coelestia*, § 501.

not even that which is intellectual, can exist, otherwise than from *something*. This is also known in the learned world, to wit, that apart from a substance, which is a subject (of inherence), there is no *mode*, in other words, no *modification*, or in still other terms, there is no *quality* that actively manifests itself. These purer or interior forms, which are inscrutable, are those which are present to the internal senses, and also produce the interior affections.\*

(c) Once more, in a truly wonderful passage :—

*'There are two general Forms—a spiritual and a natural ; the spiritual is such as pertains to animals, and the natural such as pertains to vegetables. Hence it is that all things belonging to Nature, besides the sun, moon, and atmospheres, make three kingdoms, the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral : and that the mineral kingdom is only a storehouse in which are contained, and whence are taken, those things which compose the forms of the two other kingdoms, the animal and the vegetable.*

*'The forms of the animal kingdom, which in one word are called animals, are all according to the fluxion of spiritual substances and forces, which fluxion, owing to the endeavour (conatus) which inheres in them, tends to the human form, and into all and everything belonging to it, from head to heel ; thus it is an endeavour, in general, towards producing organs of sense and organs of motion, likewise organs of nutrition, and also of proliferation. Hence it is that the entire heaven is in such a form, and that all angels and spirits are in such a form, and that men on earth are in such a form ; and also all beasts, birds, and fishes : for all these have similar organs. This animal form derives an endeavour*

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 4224. Cf. *True Christian Religion*, § 38, where it is shown, on the author's principles, that 'the human mind is an organised form, consisting of spiritual substances within, and of natural substances without, and lastly of material substances.'

towards such things from the First, from Whom are all things, who is God, and this because he is A MAN.

‘Such endeavour, and the consequent determination of all spiritual forces, could not otherwise have being and existence ; for it is to be found in things greatest and least, in things first and last in order which are in the spiritual world ; thence it is in the natural world—but with a difference of perfection according to degrees.

‘The second form, however, which is the natural form, and in which are all vegetables, derives its origin from the endeavour and consequent fluxion of natural forces, which are atmospheres, and are called æthers, in which that endeavour is inherent owing to the determination of spiritual forces, and this endeavour tends to the animal form : and from the continual operation of these spiritual forces into natural forces, which are æthers, and thereby into the earthy materials of which vegetables are composed. That hence is the origin of this natural form is evident from what has been said above, namely, that a certain likeness of the animal form appears in them.

‘That all things of nature struggle towards the attainment of that form, and that the æthers have an effort which has been impressed by a spiritual principle, and thus implanted in them, for producing that form, is evident from many considerations. As, for example, from the entire vegetation which is on the surface of the whole earth, also from the growth of minerals into such forms in mines, where openings exist ; and from the growth of cretaceous matters into corals at the bottom of seas, and even from the forms of the particles of snow, which are emulous of those of vegetables.’\*

Had such writers as Mr. Darwin undertaken even the most rudimentary investigation into the essence and nature of Forms, from the point of view of a truly Rational Philo-

\* *Apocalypse Explained*, § 1208.



sophy, the scientific and religious worlds would not have been troubled with the fruitless controversies that have arisen, respecting the singular phantasms which this consummate naturalist has chosen to designate 'primordial forms;' and as to the nature of which neither himself nor his readers are able apparently to make the remotest approach to an intelligible conception.

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NOTE S., p. 74.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING AND EXISTING.

It might seem, at first sight, as if the subject of the present note were of no practical importance, in a theological and spiritual-moral point of view. This opinion will, perhaps, not be entertained by an intelligent reader after duly pondering the extracts given below, and comparing the insane ravings of Hegelianism respecting the profoundest and most sacred of all subjects, with *the truth* as seen in its own light, free from a shadow of fallacy.

'Voici,' says a late ardent lover of the true and good, one of whom neither his country nor the religious communion to which he belonged were worthy, 'un secret qui n'a pas encore été mis au jour; j'ai appris la chose en Allemagne: c'est l'usage que ces sophistes athées font des deux mots *être* et *exister*. Vous les croyez peut-être synonymes! Bien au contraire. *L'être*, c'est l'abstraction, et *l'existence*, c'est la réalité. *Dieu est, mais il n'existe pas*. Les individus seuls existent. L'homme et le monde existent: mais non pas Dieu. L'Être proprement dit, c'est l'être pur, l'être qui est simplement, qui est, sans plus: c'est-à-dire qui n'est ni telle chose ni telle autre, c'est-à-dire qui n'a nulle qualité, nulle propriété; qui n'a par conséquent nulle existence. *L'être*, en lui-même, est un point géométrique sans dimensions, et un

principe sans conséquences. *L'existence* seule a qualités, propriétés, dimensions, conséquences, réalité. L'Être est un germe qui n'est pas sorti de lui-même, qui n'a rien produit, absolument rien, ni en soi ni hors de soi. Rien à saisir, rien à voir, rien à dire, c'est le néant pur.

'Dieu est cet être pur, ce néant pur.' \*

'States are of two kinds,' says Swedenborg, 'to wit, a state which corresponds to space, and a state which corresponds to time. The state which corresponds to space is a state as to Being (*Esse*), and the state which corresponds to time is a state as to existing (*Existere*). For there are two things which constitute man; namely, Being (*Esse*) and Existing (*Existere*). The Being of man is nothing else but the recipient of the eternal principle which proceeds from the Lord; for men, spirits, and angels, are nothing else but recipients; in other words, forms that are recipients of life from the Lord. The reception of life is that of which Existing is predicated. Man believes that he is, and, indeed, that he is of himself (*ex se*); when nevertheless, he is not of himself, but he *exists* in the manner that has just been stated. BEING is solely in the Lord, and this BEING is called JEHOVAH. From the BEING which is JEHOVAH are all things which appear as they are. But the Being of the Lord, in other words Jehovah, can never be communicated to any one, save only to the Lord's Humanity. This Humanity became THE DIVINE BEING, that is, JEHOVAH.' † . . .

'Nothing exists in nature except from a spiritual principle, and by means of it. The reason of this is, that nothing can exist unless from something else, and so at last from Him who, in Himself, is and exists. This Being is God. There-

\* Le Père Gratry, *La Sophistique Contemporaine*, pp. 220—221.

† *Arcana Cœlestia*, § 3988.

fore God is called Being and Existing (*Esse et Existere*), JAH from *Esse*, and JEHOVAH from *Esse* and *Existere* in Himself\* . . .

‘There are two universals employed to express what is DIVINE, namely, Infinite and Eternal. The Infinite is the Divine as to its Being (*Esse*) ; and the Eternal is the Divine as to its Existing (*Existere*). Both terms are to be understood in a supereminent sense, that is to say, apart from space and apart from time. He who thinks from space and time concerning what is infinite and eternal falls into errors. For space and time are proper to nature, and man, as to his ideas, is in these two properties of nature as long as he lives in the natural world. He is no longer in them, however, when he leaves the world and comes into heaven. Spaces and times, indeed, appear in heaven in a manner precisely similar to that in which they present themselves in the world ; but they are only the appearances of states which are in the angels. For the states of their affection, and of their thought thence arising, are presented to view, in appearance, before their external senses, as spaces and as times, but still they are not spaces and times such as are in the natural world.’ †

The rigorously concise and studiously accurate terminology used by our author when treating of a topic so exalted, loses not a little by translation. A passage is here appended, in the original, and as an illustration :—

QUOD DIVINUM ESSE SIT ESSE IN SE, ET SIMUL EXISTERE  
IN SE.

Quod Jehovah Deus sit Esse in Se, est quia est Sum,  
Ipsum, Unicum et Primum, ab aeterno in aeternum, a quo

\* *Apocalypse Explained*, § 1206.

† *Ibid.*, § 870.

omne est quod est, ut sit aliquid ; ita et non aliter est Principium et Finis, Primus et Ultimus, et Alphah et Omegah : non potest dici, quod sit suum Esse a se, quia hoc ex se ponit prius et sic tempus, quod non cadit in Infinitum, quod vocatur AB AETERNO ; et quoque ponit alium Deum, qui Est Deus in se, ita Deum a Deo, aut quod Deus se Ipsum formaverit, et sic non foret Increatus, nec Infinitus, quia sic se a se vel ex altero finivit. Ex eo, quod Deus sit Esse in se, sequitur quod sit Amor in se, Sapientia in se, ac Vita in se, et quod sit Ipsum a Quo omnia sunt, et ad quod omnia se referunt ut sint aliquid ; quod *Deus sit Vita in se*, et sic Deus, constat ex Domini Verbis apud Johannem, Cap. V. 26. Et apud Esajam, *Ego Jehovah facio omnia, expando Coelos Solus, et extendo Terram, a Me Ipso*. Caput XLIV. 24. Et quod *sit Solus Deus, et praeter Ipsum non Deus*, Esaj. XLV. 14, 15, 20, 21. Hosch. XIII. 4. Quod Deus non modo sit Esse in se, sed etiam Existere in se, est quia Esse nisi Existat, non est aliquid ; pariter Existere nisi sit ex Esse ; quare dato uno dabitur alterum : similiter nisi substantia etiam sit forma ; de Substantia nisi sit forma, non est aliquid praedicabile, et hoc, quia non habet quale, est in se nihil. Quod hic dicantur Esse et Existere, et non Essentia et Existentia, est quia distinguendum est inter Esse et Essentiam, et inde inter Existere et Existentiam, sicut inter prius et posterius ; ac prius est universalius quam posterius ; ad Divinum Esse se applicat Infinitas et Aeternitas, at vero ad Divinam Essentiam et Existentiam se applicat Divinus Amor et Divina Sapientia, et per haec duo Omnipotentia et Omnipraesentia.\*

\* *Vera Christiana Religio*, § 21. (Ed. Amstelod. 1771.) Cf. the series of §§ 18-33, in which the point in question is laid open with transcendent accuracy and depth of thought.

## NOTE T., p. 79.

## ORIGIN OF COLOURS.

As in the case of the internal constitution of the sun, so in the present case, Swedenborg's theory of colours differs from the views commonly entertained by the most eminent philosophers, as, for example, by Sir John Herschell. 'By the union,' says that enlightened physicist, 'of all the coloured prismatic rays . . . white light is reproduced. And hence we conclude that colour is not *superinduced* but an *inherent quality* of the luminous rays.' \*

The account given by Swedenborg is similar to that of the ancients; but his idea of the whole subject differs from that ordinarily taught by modern physicists, as a conclusion derived from a combination of experience, mathematics, and the use of reason, differs from a sagacious guess or a divination.

By way of obviating objections it may be observed that the subject is one which is confessedly not yet thoroughly understood. Objections to the modern notions can be made, and have been made. 'In the words of a great authority on this subject, who has himself pointed out imperfections in the Newtonian hypothesis, and the perplexity in which the mind of Newton was involved by the difficulties of the subject, and who has also proposed a view of his own:—

'Whatever answer may be given to these objections, we think it will be admitted by those who have studied the subject most profoundly, that a satisfactory theory of the colours of natural bodies is still a *desideratum* in science.' †

\* *Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, p. 254.

† Brewster's *Life of Newton*, p. 89.



## PROFESSOR HELMHOLTZ.

In an admirable historical summary of the various opinions advocated by eminent thinkers ancient and modern, as to the origin and nature of colours, given by Professor Helmholtz in his great work, the opinion of Aristotle is thus stated. Considering the circumstances under which that opinion was formed, it affords a signal proof of the amazing intellectual insight of the Greek philosopher :—

‘Avant l’époque de Newton, la théorie des couleurs ne se composait guère d’hypothèses mal définies. Comme la lumière colorée, extraite de la lumière blanche totale, possède nécessairement, comme partie, une intensité toujours moindre que le tout, on considérait anciennement cette diminution de l’intensité lumineuse comme la condition essentielle de la couleur, et l’opinion d’ARISTOTE, d’après laquelle la couleur proviendrait d’un mélange de blanc et de noir, comptait un grand nombre d’adhérents. ARISTOTE lui-même se demande s’il doit considérer ce mélange comme une véritable combinaison ou plutôt comme une superposition ou une juxtaposition atomique. L’obscur, d’après lui, doit provenir de la réflexion de la lumière par les corps, puisque toute réflexion affaiblit la lumière. Ce fut là l’opinion généralement admise jusqu’au commencement de l’époque moderne. On la retrouve chez MAUROLICUS, JOH. FLEISCHER, DE DOMINIS, FUNK, NUGUET (voyez l’histoire de la théorie des couleurs de Göthe), et, dans ces derniers temps, Göthe a encore cherché à la défendre, dans sa théorie des couleurs.’ \*

## SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

‘*Physically speaking,*’ says Sir William Hamilton, ‘Colour is co-extensive with Light. As a genus containing under it,

\* *Optique Physiologique*, p. 353.

as species, the various modifications of light, it excludes, of course, the privation of light. The black or dark is not therefore, physically considered, a colour. But *psychologically* speaking. . . and in common language, this is not the case. For *colour* is used as a word equivalent with *visual state*, and as a genus (or, perhaps, more properly as an equivocal term) contains under it every mode of our visual organism, whether one of excitement (a positive affection or colour, as the white, blue, red, yellow, &c.), or one of non-excitement (a negative affection or colour, as the black or dark). In this relation, colour thus comprises two contradictory or repugnant opposites.\*

The same acute thinker also asserts that psychologically speaking colour contains within itself contradictory qualities which cannot both be abstracted, in thought, from any material object; and that light and darkness, white and black, are in this relation, all equally colours.†

SWEDENBORG.

‘In order that colour may exist at all, there must be a something dark and bright, or a something black and white, upon which, when rays of light from the sun fall, colours exist, according to the various combinations (*temperatura*) of the dark and bright, or of the white and black, arising from the modification which the rays of inflowing light undergo. And of these colours certain derive more or less from the dark and black, while certain others take more or less from the bright or white. Thence arises their diversity.‡

. . . ‘That which properly pertains to man (*proprium*) may be compared to black and white, which being variously

\* Sir W. Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, Appendix, Note E, pp. 917, 918.

† *Ibid.*, p. 839.

‡ *Arcana Cælestia*, § 1042.

modified by the rays of light are changed into beautiful colours, as blue, yellow, purple, etc., by which, according to their arrangement, as in flowers, for example, divers forms of beauty and loveliness are presented to view, albeit the black and the white radically and fundamentally remain.\*

‘Colour, as we learn from phenomena, is a certain discrimination of light and shade, and a certain determinate ratio and analogy thence arising in those extremely minute objects which do not come distinctly within the circle of sight. For, in objects of this kind, the eye cannot discern between luminous and shady rays; wherefore it takes in only the general image of the discriminations and differences, as represented under the beautiful appearance of colours. White and black are two opposites, as light and shade, the modifications of which are the intermediate colours. This is confirmed by the passage of the solar beam through spheres of glass, bubbles, and watery vapours; also by its inflection and resilience; by prisms placed in different positions; by the manifestation of colours in extensive spaces where shade begins notably to distinguish itself from light; by various chemical mixtures and precipitations; by the beautifully coloured objects of the vegetable kingdom in general; and by numberless other phenomena. From all which particulars, severally illustrated, it may be clearly shown that in colour there is nothing whatever real, but that it is solely an illumination produced by the sun, by candle-light, fire-light; variegated, under this appearance, according to the diverse constitution of the bodies interposed, particularly such as are transparent.’†

\* *Arcana Cœlestia*, § 731.

† *Econ. An. King.*, vol. i. p. 59.

## GOETHE.

With the view taken by Swedenborg may be compared the opinion of Goethe. 'Goethe,' according to Wagner, 'explains all chromatic phenomena on the sole ground of modifications in the light and the dark—light and shade. In the light seen through dull media, when the dimming is moderate, we perceive yellow, then red, pale blue, blue, violet, black-blue, finally, black.'\*

Swedenborg's theory of colours is an evident corollary from the principle first held and taught by him, that, in light there is nothing *real*. Light is merely an *activity* of the æther. This view is at variance with no law or property of light yet discovered. It will be found to be in full accord with all the phenomena at present known.

## NOTE U., p. 85.

## GOD ALONE ACTS.

The affirmation of this principle presents another important point of contact between the clear and definite teaching of Swedenborg, and the dim divinations of spiritual truth which characterise much of the Cartesian philosophy.

'Among the opinions,' says Mr. Stewart, 'which chiefly characterise the system of Malebranche, the leading one is, that the *causes* which it is the aim of philosophy to investigate are only *occasional causes*; and that the Deity is himself the *efficient* and *immediate cause* of every effect in the universe.

\* *Elements of Physiology*, translated by Willis, pp. 588, 589.

From this single principle, the greater part of his distinguishing doctrines may be easily deduced, as obvious corollaries.\*

## DESCARTES.

The germ of the Malebranchian view is to be found in the following statement of Descartes respecting the Divine *concursum* :—

‘*Motus natura sic animadversa, considerare oportet ejus causam, eamque duplicem. Primo scilicet universalem et primariam, quæ est causa generalis omnium motuum qui sunt in mundo; ac deinde particularem, à qua fit, ut singulæ materiæ partes motus, quos prius non habuerunt, acquirant. Et generalem quod attinet, manifestum mihi videtur illam non aliam esse, quam Deum ipsum, qui materiam simul cum motu et quiete in principio creavit, jamque per solum suum concursum ordinarium tantundem motus et quietis in ea tota quantum tunc posuit conservat.*’†

## MALEBRANCHE.

According to Malebranche, matter possesses no *proper* efficacy. ‘*La matière,*’ he observes, ‘*n’est capable ni de se remuer elle-même, ni de se donner aucune modalité; toute sa propriété est de recevoir diverses figures et divers mouvements. Elle ne peut non plus agir sur l’esprit; une épine semble, il est vrai, ébranler les nerfs et agiter le cerveau; mais le cerveau et les nerfs ne sont que la matière. Comment donc pourrait-elle se faire sentir à l’esprit? Quel rapport entre une épine et une substance immatérielle? Qu’on ne prétende pas que de l’union étroite de l’âme et du corps découlent une action relative et une dépendance commune: cette idée n’est pas claire; ou plutôt*

\* Prelim. Dissert. to *Encyc. Britan.* pp. 77, 78.

† *Principia*, Part. II. Art. xxvi.



ce sont des mots qui n'éveillent nulle notion réelle ; tandis qu'il est très-aisé de comprendre qu'à l'occasion de l'épine, Dieu fasse éprouver à l'âme tel sentiment déterminé.'

To the above, which serves to show how clearly Malebranche had grasped the conditions of the problem, the Abbé Blampignon adds, in the way of comment :—"Comme il n'y a dans le monde qu'une seule source d'idées, ou plutôt qu'une seule idée, il n'y a de même qu'un seul centre d'action, ou plutôt qu'une seule action. Voir dans l'infini, c'est ne voir que l'infini ; ainsi, agir par l'infini, c'est ne reconnaître qu'une seule force, une seule cause, un seul principe libre. Être cause occasionnelle ou n'être pas cause, est identique. C'est l'erreur commune, enseigne Malebranche, d'*humaniser* les corps et de *diviniser* les esprits."\*

' La force mouvante des corps est l'action toute puissante de Dieu, qui les conserve successivement en différents lieux ; nul esprit n'est le maître de l'action de Dieu, nulle puissance ne peut la changer, il n'y a donc que *Dieu seul* qui puisse remuer les corps . . . Or, la force mouvante n'est point dans les corps mus, mais *uniquement en Dieu*, puisque ce n'est que l'action de Dieu qui les crée ou qui les conserve successivement en différents lieux,' &c. †

' Afin qu'on ne puisse plus douter de la fausseté de cette misérable philosophie, ‡ . . . il est nécessaire de prouver en peu des mots qu'il n'y a qu'une vraie cause, parce qu'il n'y a qu'un vrai Dieu ; que la nature ou la force de chaque chose n'est que la volonté de Dieu : que toutes les causes naturelles ne sont point de *véritables* causes, mais seulement des causes *occasionnelles*. §

\* *Étude sur Malebranche*, pp. 163, 164.

† *Méditations Chrétiennes*, V. § viii.

‡ Scholasticism.

§ *Recherche de la Vérité*, Lib. VI. Par. ii. c. 3.

## THE PÈRE KLEUTGEN.

The great truth thus distinctly enounced by Malebranche, in connexion (it must be admitted) with much that is obscure, and mingled with not a little error of mischievous consequence, has ever been bitterly opposed by the thorough-going partizans of Peripateticism.

Among its most determined impugnors, in modern times, is the Père Kleutgen, in his elaborate work in defence of the Scholastic Philosophy. He thus formally states the view adopted by his school, touching the spontaneity of corporeal substances:—

‘Selon la théorie des scolastiques, le principe de l'être, c'est-à-dire, l'essence, est aussi, en chaque chose, le principe de l'activité, et sous ce rapport l'essence s'appelle *nature*. Quoique ce ne soit pas la forme, mais le corps, composé de matière et de forme, qui opère, et quoique ce ne soit pas la matière, mais bien le corps tout entier qui subisse l'impression, néanmoins le corps possède la puissance de souffrir en vertu de la matière, et la puissance d'agir en vertu de la forme.’\*

Again, he observes:—‘En une autre occasion, nous avons déjà parlé de l'erreur soutenue par certains philosophes qui, non contents de rejeter la manière dont la scolastique expliquait l'activité des substances naturelles, *refusaient à la nature toute activité propre*.† Il nous faut ici revenir sur cette question, aussi bien parce qu'elle est par elle-même assez importante pour mériter un examen sérieux, que parce que cette étude jettera de vives lumières sur les vrais rapports entre la philosophie naturelle qu'enseignaient les

\* *La Philosophie Scolastique*, tom. iii. pp. 424, 425.

† The italics are those of the present writer.

scolastiques et celle des écoles modernes, particulièrement de l'école cartésienne.' . . . \*

Once more :— . . . ' La première erreur, qui attribue à Dieu seul toute l'activité de la nature, ne fut patronnée que par le nominaliste Biel. Cependant l'école cartésienne a ressuscité cette erreur surannée, et jusqu'à nos jours elle a trouvé des partisans, surtout en France.' †

The controversy, the main point of which has been indicated in the above extracts, involves issues of the gravest kind, both philosophical and theological. One fact, however, is patent to all unbiassed judgments, namely, that no ingenuity can reconcile the philosophy of St. Augustine with the Scholastic system. The latter is doomed to disappear, sooner or later, before the advance of a truly intellectual and Christian Philosophy.

#### ST. AUGUSTINE.

The doctrine of Malebranche, so fiercely opposed by his enemies, is an evident corollary from the following sublime passage on the Divine Omnipresence, by the brightest theological light of the Primitive Church:—

'Est etiam Deus per cuncta diffusus. Ipse quippe ait per Prophetam: *Cælum et terram ego impleo; eique dicitur in quodam Psalmo: Quod abibo a spiritu tuo, et a facie tua quod fugiam? si ascendero in cælum, tu ibi es: si descendero in infernum, ades: quia substantialiter Deus ubique diffusus, Quanquam in eo ipso, quod dicitur Deus ubique diffusus carnali resistendum est cogitationi, et mens à corporis sensibus avocanda, ne quasi spatiosa magnitudine opinemur Deum per cuncta diffundi, sicut humus, aut humor, aut aer, aut lux ista diffunditur; omnis enim hujuscemodi magnitudo*

\* *La Philosophie Scolastique*, tom. iii. p. 426.

† *Ibid.*, p. 427.

minor est in sui parte, quam in toto. Non sic est Deus per cuncta diffusus, per spatia locorum, quasi mole diffusa : ita ut in dimidio mundi corpore sit dimidius, et in alio dimidius, atque ita per totum totus : sed in solo cœlo totus, et in sola terra totus, et in cœlo et in terra totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in seipso ubique totus. Nullo loco est, et ubique est. Neque enim est in ejus substantia, qua Deus est, quod brevius sit in parte quam in toto, sicut necesse est esse de iis quæ in locis sunt. Non itaque sic Deus dicitur implere mundum velut aqua, velut aer, velut ipsa lux, ut minore sui parte minorem mundi impleat partem et majore majorem. Novit ubique totus esse et nullo contineri loco.\*

In another place, the same wonderful thinker has enounced, in almost express terms, the truth in question :—

‘Voluntas Dei omnium quæ sunt, ipsa est causa, id est, causa omnium, quæ facit, voluntas ejus est. Ac per hoc voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium corporalium specierum atque motionum. Nihil enim fit visibiliter et sensibiliter quod non de interiore, invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris aut jubeatur aut permittatur.’†

#### PROFESSOR CHALLIS.

In the following, Professor Challis appears to approach closely to the Malebranchian view :—

‘The author is of opinion . . . that metaphysical inquiry, coming, as it ought, *after* the establishment of physical truth, will eventually lead to the conclusion that external to ourselves there exist *personality, intelligence, will* ; but that sensations and perceptions, inclusive even of the perception of space and time, are *subjective*, and such as they are by the sole will of our Creator, operating thus immediately and constantly

\* St. August. *Philosophia*, p. 314.

† *Ibid.*, p. 348.

for the purpose of bringing us into intellectual and moral relations towards Himself and our fellow-creatures.'

... 'The æther and the atoms are entities to *us* of the same class as our sensations and perceptions, that is (as was before intimated) our conceptions of them may be determined by the immediate volition of the Creator, while as external realities they are simple manifestations of His presence and power.'\*

#### SWEDENBORG.

Intimately connected with the subject of this note is the doctrine taught by Swedenborg, touching *the reciprocal principle of conjunction* as between the Lord and man. This is one of those profound yet pre-eminently practical theological doctrines with which our author's writings abound. In treating of it he deploras that notwithstanding the clearness with which it is stated in Holy Scripture it is unknown in the Christian Church, owing to the character and influence of the hypothetical tenets generally held, in relation to faith and free-will.

Leibnitz, after his accustomed manner, endeavoured to adjust the disputes which arose out of the discussion of such questions, in the age which preceded his own. He arrived at the conclusion that 'a sinful action is contingent, and the act of eliciting good motions is free. And although the impulse under which we act, and the aid which we receive are from God, yet there is always *some co-operation* on man's part, else he could not be said to have acted.' Upon this opinion a friendly commentator observes:—'There is evidently in all this little else than the bare statement of the fact admitted by every truly rational Christian, that the will of man and the grace of God are both *free*.' †

\* *Principles*, pp. 682, 685.

† Leibnitz, *Posthumous System of Theology*, translated by Dr. Russell,



In the hands of Swedenborg such a subject is unfolded in all its deep spiritual relations, with a wealth and power of illustration not previously attempted by any theologian, while at the same time it is at once elevated into the sacred domain of the practical religious life.

'There are,' he observes, 'two modes of reciprocation by means of which conjunction takes place. The one is *alternate*, the other *mutual*.' Alternate reciprocation is illustrated by the act of respiration, by the conjunction of the heart and the lungs, by the circulation of the blood, and lastly by embryonic life. Such however,' he proceeds to say, 'is not the reciprocal conjunction which exists between the Lord and man. On the contrary, there is a *mutual* conjunction, which does not take place by means of action and reaction, but through various modes of *co-operation*. For the Lord acts, and man is a recipient of the action which is from the Lord, and works as if *from* himself, yea, as it were, of himself, from the Lord. This *working* on the part of man is imputed to him as if it were his, inasmuch as he is continually kept in a state of free determination by the Lord. The free choice thence resulting is this : that he is able to will, and he is able to think from the Lord, that is to say, out of the Word ; and also that he is able to will and to think from the devil, in other terms, against the Lord and the Word. This freedom the Lord bestows upon man, to the end that it may be in the power of man to effect this reciprocal conjunction, and through the medium of such conjunction be endowed with life and bliss eternal. For the latter state, without reciprocal conjunction, is not possible.' \*

Again :—' In the created universe nothing lives but the

pp. 20, 21. See the arguments of Cardinal Gerdil characterised by his wonted acuteness, depth, and fairness, *Institutiones Log. Met. et Ethic.* (Tom. i. p. 360—365), *De vi activa causæ efficientis*.

\* *True Christian Religion*, § 371. Cf. *Arcana Cælestia*, § 1735.

GOD MAN alone, that is to say, the LORD ; nothing is put in motion except by means of life from Him : and nothing is but by means of the Sun which is from Him. Thus it is the truth, that in God we live, and move, and have our being.\*

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NOTE V., p. 87.

ANALOGUE OF WILL AND UNDERSTANDING IN ANIMALS.

DR. HARTLEY.

The ingenious and amiable author of the *Observations on Man*, who was a contemporary of Swedenborg, gives the following comprehensive description of the term *analogy*, in which a reader of the latter's writings will at once perceive dim traces of the science of Correspondences :—

‘Analogy is that resemblance, and, in some cases, sameness, of the parts, properties, functions, uses, &c., any or all of *A* to *B*, whereby our knowledge, concerning *A*, and the language expressing this knowledge, may be applied in the whole, or in part, to *B*, without any sensible, or, at least, any important practical error. Now analogies, in this sense of the word, some more exact and extensive, some less so, present themselves to us every where in natural and artificial things ; . . . .

‘Animals are also analogous to vegetables in many things, and vegetables to minerals : so that there seems to be a perpetual thread of analogy continued from the most perfect animal to the most imperfect mineral, even till we come to elementary bodies themselves.’

\* \* \* \* \*

‘The body politic, the body natural, the world natural, the

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 301.

universe:—The human mind, the mind of brutes, on the one hand, and of superior beings on the other, and even the Infinite Mind himself;—the appellations of father, governor, judge, king, architect, &c., referred to God;—the ages of man, the ages of the world, the seasons of the year, the times of the day;—the offices, professions, and trades of different persons, statesmen, generals, divines, lawyers, physicians, merchants;—the terms night, sleep, death, chaos, darkness, &c., also light, life, happiness, &c., compared with each other respectively; life and death, as applied in different senses to animals, vegetables, liquors, &c.,—earthquakes, storms, battles, tumults, fermentations of liquors, law-suits, games, &c., families, bodies politic lesser and greater, their laws, natural religion, revealed religion, &c., &c., afford endless instances of analogies, natural and artificial.\*

## CHRISTIAN WOLF.

*Bruta, says Wolf, habent analogum rationis.* After proving the truth of this proposition in his usual formal and prolix manner, he proceeds to state in a note:—Qui ad actiones brutorum animum sedulo advertit, abunde convincetur, eadem circumstantias casus presentis percipientia beneficio imaginationis atque memoriae recordari eorum, quae in eo alias accidunt, et quod eventurum idem sit expectare, ut adeo dubitari non possit expectationem casuum similium esse brutis loco rationis in actionibus dirigendis.†

## BURMEISTER.

‘Man is free, that is to say, he has the faculty of in so far subjecting his natural instincts to other relations, either

\* See Hartley's *Observations on Man*, pp. 184—186 (ed. 1834).

† *Psychol. Ras.* § 765.

voluntary on his part, or introduced by social life, as the law of self-preservation will admit, and may satisfy them at his own discretion; whereas the animal is not free, it exercises all, both corporeal and intellectual functions, from a determinate necessity, from which it has not the power of emancipating itself. Thence the entire greatness of man consists in his freedom, and in it consists the faculty of his progressive development or perfection, as well as the possibility of his degeneration, and which would place him beneath the animal. The animal is equally perfect in all its individuals; men are distinguished from each other as perfect or imperfect, according to the exercise of their freedom towards good or evil.

'The phenomena thus characterised bear in animals the general name of instinctive impulses, and that which urges their exercise we call instinct; in man we call them intellectual phenomena, and their stimulant mind or soul. Instinct in animals, therefore, is the *analogue* of the soul in man, a soul differing only from the human soul by the necessity with which it does everything, whereas the human soul is independent of necessity, and freely resolves upon its actions.'\*

#### ADDISON.

'Several brute creatures,' says Addison, 'discover in their actions something *like* a faint glimmering of reason.' This is a most felicitous paraphrase of the term *analogue* as used by Swedenborg.

#### DE BONALD.

'L'animal n'a que des cris, expression de sensations irré-

\* Burmeister's *Manual of Entomology*, pp. 498, 499 (Ed. London, 1836).

fléchies, et des mouvements involontaires, expressions ou plutôt impulsions d'une faculté de percevoir des images, sans jugement et sans raison ; il n'a aucune expression de pensée ou de raisonnement, parce qu'il n'a ni la faculté de penser ni celle de raisonner ; et même dans la parole que l'homme lui adresse il n'entend que le son.\*

## SWEDENBORG.

. . . 'There is no freedom of will in things inanimate ;† a certain analogon of free will in brute animals ; a shadow of it in maniacs and idiots ; a small share in the lowest grades of mankind : in all, a larger measure, according to their degree of intelligence : in Adam, a faculty of the kind absolutely perfect.'‡

"Grotius speaks as follows of brute animals :—'That they do not,' says he, 'possess the power of discovery, or of judging between different things, appears from the fact, that they always act in one and the same manner : wherefore it follows that these actions proceed from an extrinsic reason, either directing them, or impressing its efficacy upon them. And this reason is no other than God.'"

. . . 'The result, then, is that such animate beings can have no intellectual mind ; they cannot think, judge, conclude or rationally will, at all ; in other words, they cannot act from foresight or prudence ; they cannot regard ends freely or exercise choice ; they cannot express themselves in

\* Quoted in *Précis de Psychologie*, by Prof. Ubaghs, p. 135.

† Strange to say, it has become quite necessary, in the interests of common sense, to re-assert this most evident of axiomatic propositions, owing to the character of recent speculations in what may be called *imaginary physics*.

‡ *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. p. 311.



articulate sounds or words; they cannot get a higher sense or understanding out of the forms of words: and they cannot bring forth actions as perpetual acts of the will formed out of the subjects of thought.\* It is as impossible to instruct their faculties in these and the like respects, as to infuse life into a stone, to turn water into ether, or to rise to the sun on the waxen wings of Daedalus. Still as animals possess a soul, whose organism answers to that of the human mind, and as they are ignorant of the operation of our soul within the fibres, just as we are ignorant of the operations of the soul within its fibres, so they possess some *analogon* of a mind, or of reason and will. Yet only in such wise, that the actual determinations of their forces—we mean, their actions—put on this analogous appearance, when they are regarded by the human mind:† and indeed these actions not unfrequently seem better ordered (than ours), inasmuch as they take effect in correspondence with the order of nature.

‘But if they have no mind, or no centre of operations higher and lower, and yet their soul is accommodated to the beginning of motion and to the reception of life, they must possess a natural mind (*animus*), to serve as the centre of their operations, and into which force and light flow in from the soul *à priori*, and from the body and the bodily senses *à posteriori*. Hence they must have a perception of the

\* See Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, bk. II. ch. xi. Lect. x. §§ 10, 11, ‘*Brutes abstract not.*’

† This apparently simple remark affords the key to many puzzling speculations at present current respecting a supposed mutual communication of their ideas on the part of bees, ants, and the like. It contains, as in a nut-shell, the only rational explanation of whole volumes of ingenious paradoxes with which certain writers of more subtlety than real intelligence have recently amused or disgusted their readers. These indescribably absurd, if not profane, hypotheses, elaborated with such perverse skill, and apparently supported by a superabundance of rare, curious, and in themselves invaluable facts, seem to possess a singular power of fascination alike over their inventors and their dupes.

things that flow in from the senses; and also an imagination, with its allied cupidities. Now particular experience here conducts us to the same result. For animals, in common with ourselves, possess the affections of anger, envy, fear, hatred, friendship, &c., also appetites of various kinds; in a word, all the peculiar attributes of the natural mind (*animus*), which indeed furnish them with the incentives and fires of life.

'It would be wrong, therefore, to liken animals to automations or inanimate machines.'\*

The following remarkable passage, taken from a posthumous work of our author, signally displays that peculiar vigour and perspicacity which characterised the faculty of analysis with which he was pre-eminently endowed. The principles set forth in it so lucidly, are recommended to the serious and conscientious study of those who, unhappily, have abused and degraded their intellect, by favouring the indescribably absurd 'Ape' hypothesis, in support of which so much ingenious nonsense has been written under the assumed name of science:—

*Quod mens rationalis sit proprie id quod homo dicitur.*

Forma externa non facit hominem, nam simia etiam humana est facie, usque est simia, cera etiam efformari forma humana potest, sed usque est cera, et simulachrum hominis. Forma externa corporis nec constituit hominem, similibus membris et visceribus, et simili fere structura gaudent animalia bruta, imo etiam imperfectiora, ut insecta. Loquela non facit hominem, psittacus enim loquitur, nec tamen est homo. Animus non est homo, nam simili animo gaudent etiam bruta, suique corporis, et sui mundi amoribus similiter ac homo afficiuntur.

Sed quod mente rationali gaudeat, scilicet quod cogitare,

\* *Econ. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 338, 339.

judicare, libere arbitrari, et velle possit, id est homo; talis etiam ab omnibus aestimatur homo, qualis est ejus mens rationalis, si solum animo et genio indulgeat, sique stupidus sit et hebes, dicitur brutus, animal, nec agnoscitur homo, nisi ut aliquid insit adhuc humanum, quod cogitare possit. Quo itaque major intellectus seu sublimior mens rationalis, eo major homo; si excellit caeteris, dicitur id supra-humanum et divinum, et aliquid quod supra hominem est.

Ipsi etiam in nobis agnoscimus id solum tanquam nostrum proprium quod mente possidemus, omne enim in toto systemate qualificatur a mente; quare omnes amores tam superiores quam inferiores in mentem rationalem ut in suum centrum influunt et confluunt, aequae illo effluunt, sic principium omnium actionum et finis omnium sensationum, seu concentratio totius est in mente: quare caetera omnia quae extra mentem sunt, respiciuntur tanquam instrumenta et organa mentis; quae mens nescit qualia sunt, nec curat scire, modo ei tanquam famulitia inserviant; et videtur Deus tanquam ipsa haec naturalia ita contempserit, et tantum in numerum instrumentorum reposuerit, quia nobis non revelavit, qualia sint, et quomodo mens per illa agit, sed quod solum illa dederit, et illis circumscripserit mentem, ut obsequiosa et paratissima stent ad omnem effectum, per quem mens promovere finem vult. Id solum amamus quod ipsi huic menti rationali tanquam proprio nobis adblanditur, nam quisque vult videri qualis est per mentem, si per corporis ornamenta, est ut ostendat qualis sit ejus mens. Ita etiam odimus id quod mentem istam infringit, et saepe ruimus in iram; quod corpori timeamus, est ut mens suis instrumentis et agendi potentiis non privetur.

In mente rationali est vultus animae, sicuti in corpore est vultus et effigies animi, ita mens rationalis potest dici corpus animae, quia ad ejus operationum imaginem est formata.

Haec mens indicat qualis est anima; si anima non sit

spiritualis, ac immortalis, nequicquam potest talis mens formari, in qua spirituale et naturale sit conjunctum ; quare quia spirituale inest menti et simul naturale, possidet mens ista, ut in quodam centro confluum, quicquid homo possidet ; quare est mens rationalis id quod dicitur homo. Hac mente destructa, perit homo : tunc est spiritus, quia sola anima vivit.

Haec est ratio quod homo dicatur internus et externus ; spirituale id quod in mentem rationalem influit, est homo interior et superior, naturale vero, quod ab animo influit, est homo externus ; mens est quae in se percipit, quid suadeat homo externus et internus. Ergo homo externus est idem ac animal ; internus vero idem ac angelus.\*

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NOTE W., p. 88.

IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD, AT A DISTANCE, THEY APPEAR AS  
BEASTS.

On a calm and dispassionate consideration of the actual character and tendency of the wild and sometimes insane phantasies lately put forth as 'scientific' speculations, on such questions as the origin of man and his place in nature, it cannot but appear to any truly rational mind that, perhaps, in no age of the world has the human intellect so deplorably perverted and degraded its heaven-derived powers as in this present nineteenth century.

The following extracts will show, that from a genuine philosophical stand-point, there are two sides to the 'ape question ;' and, moreover, that in certain relations, of a most grave character, there is much truth in the alleged *identity of*

\* Posthumous Work, *De Anima*, pp. 165, 166.

*nature* between a certain class of men and the 'beast that wants discourse of reason,' especially that of the ape type.

The self-confident advocates of the 'brute' view of man's nature and origin cannot reasonably be offended, if they are taken more or less at their word in this matter, albeit in a sense widely different from that intended by some who indulge their humour for writing 'Lay Sermons' for the enlightenment and edification of benighted British working men.

ADDISON.

*On Man's place in the scale of animated beings.*

'As nature (i.e., the God of Nature) has framed the several species of beings as it were in a chain, so man seems to be placed as the middle link between angels and brutes. Hence he partakes both of flesh and spirit by an admirable tie, which in him occasions perpetual war of passions; and as a man inclines to the angelic or brute part of his constitution, he is then denominated good or bad, virtuous or wicked: if love, goodness, and mercy prevail, they speak him of the angel; if hatred, cruelty, and envy predominate, they declare his kindred to the brute. Hence it was that some of the ancients imagined, that as men in this life inclined more to the angel or brute, so after their death they should transmigrate into one or the other: and it would be no displeasing notion, to consider the several species of brutes, into which we may imagine that tyrants, misers, the proud, malicious, and ill-natured might be changed.'\*

\* *Spectator*, No. 408.



## SWEDENBORG.

(a)—*On the apparent resemblance and absolute difference between the brain of man and that of brute animals.*

‘ In the most general respects, the brains of animals of all kinds are so like human brains, that unless we view the difference of the two by a rational intuition, we may easily be led by the apparent similitude to presume an absolute similitude in first causes, and to think that the form is the sole ground of distinction. Thus in both cases we have a cerebellum distinct from the cerebrum ; a medulla oblongata and a medulla spinalis ; almost similar investing membranes or meninges ; and almost similar folds and septa connected with the meninges, and forming partitions and separations : in both cases again we find a corpus callosum, fornix, septum lucidum, ventricles, choroid plexuses, corpora striata, thalami nervorum opticorum, lesser protuberances, nates, testes, pineal gland, infundibulum, pituitary gland, rete mirabile, receptacula cavernosa, tuber annulare, corpora olivaria and pyramidalia : then, again, similar subdivisions of the brain into congeries, large and small, bounded by winding channels, furrows, and chinks ; and convoluted into serpentine gyres ; also similar cortical and medullary substances : all of which are penetrated, united, and irrigated by similar arteries, namely, the carotids and vertebrales. There are sinuses, too, superior as well as inferior, placed in nearly the same situation in both animals and man ; and in the brains of both, every part enjoys its own animation ; not to mention still more numerous similarities that present themselves in the members. In animals, the organs of the external senses are for the most part more excellent than in man ; to the end that animals, which possess no reasoning power to infer the whole cause of their instincts, and to

apply it to themselves and their own nature, may enlarge their capacity of sensation to the utmost, and supply their wants from present objects. From a careful comparison, however, it is very clear, that everything in the human brain, which is the common sensory of all, is wonderfully disposed with a view to enable man, otherwise than brute animals, to live a rational life under the auspices of a higher sense, or of the intellect in the sense ; that is, of a soul raised to a sublimer faculty ; and to be directed to his ends by internal and not by external motives. . . .

But the great similitude between man and animals in regard to the brain, the organs of the senses, the viscera of the body, and even the respective actions of each, proves absolutely nothing. It only shows what we do in common with brute animals ; for instance, from the ground of the animus and the several operations of the animus, which consist in the various appetites for those things that pertain to life ; and in the various changes we undergo when we cannot obtain them, as indignation, anger, consternation, envy, and the like ; these being the passions and affections of the animus. But in order to know in what we are distinguished from the common herd of the creation, we must climb to the very origin and prime cause of all, which is to be found far beyond the eye, and will never be seen so long as we persist in fixing our regard upon the most external and the lowest sphere alone. In fact, we must ascend from the visible forms of animals to their purest fluid ; that is to say, to the soul that is their universal formative substance. Now we have shown above that the animal soul is as different from the human, as air is different from æther, or hearing from sight ; in a word, as a lower degree from a higher, or a whole number from the units of its unit. But in order again to represent this difference, let us compare hearing with sight. The former scarcely extends its sphere of perception farther

than a few yards, before it begins to grow indistinct and dull; the latter extends its sphere, almost without degrees and moments, beyond the vortex to the sun and stars. And we are convinced, by a careful examination and comparison of the operations of both, that even such is the difference in point of perfection between the souls of brutes and the human soul.\*

(β)—*On the essential distinction between man and brutes.*

In the following passage the author states briefly the difference between the life of a natural man and the life of a beast:—‘The difference is that man is endowed with three degrees of mind, or three degrees of understanding and will, and that these three degrees can be opened successively. These degrees are, moreover, transparent: man is able, therefore, as to his understanding, to be raised to the light of heaven, and see truths, not only of the civil and moral, but also of the spiritual order. From what he thus sees he is able to form conclusions consisting of truths *in order*, and thus to perfect his understanding to eternity.

‘Beasts, on the contrary, do not possess the two superior degrees, but only the natural degrees, and these, without the superior degrees, possess no faculty of thought concerning anything of a civil, moral, or spiritual kind. Forasmuch, also, as their natural degrees are not capable of being opened, and thereby elevated into superior light, they cannot think in successive order—but only in simultaneous order. This, however, is strictly speaking not to *think*, but merely to *act from a knowledge corresponding with their love*: and inasmuch as they cannot think analytically, nor see their lower thought from a certain higher thought, they are therefore unable to speak, and merely utter sounds in a manner agreeable to the knowledge which belongs to their love.

\* *Æon. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 334—336.

‘Nevertheless the sensual man, who is lowest in the natural scale, does not differ from a beast except in this, that he is able to store his memory with matters of science, and to think and speak from them. This power he derives from a faculty proper to every man, by virtue of which he can understand truth if he will. This is, indeed, his characteristic faculty. But many, notwithstanding, by the abuse of this faculty, have made themselves lower than the beasts.’\*

‘The soul of beasts, considered in itself, is spiritual; for affection, whatever may be its quality, whether good or evil is spiritual; for it is a derivation of some love, and owes its origin to the heat and light which proceed from the Lord as a Sun. Whatsoever proceeds thence is spiritual. That evil affections, called concupiscences, have the same origin, is evident from what has been said above concerning the evil loves and insane cupidities of genii and infernal spirits. Those brute creatures and wild animals, whose souls are similar evil affections, were not created from the beginning; such as mice, poisonous serpents, crocodiles, basilisks, vipers, and the like, as well as various kinds of noxious insects. On the contrary, they have had their origin, together with hell, in stagnant lakes, marshes, putrid and fetid waters, and wherever there are cadaverous, stercoraceous, and urinous effluvia. With these the malign loves of the infernal societies communicate. That such a communication exists, has been granted me to know from much experience.

‘There is also in every thing of the spiritual order a plastic force, where homogeneous exhalations are present in nature; and there is also in every thing spiritual a force of propagation: for it not only forms organs of sense and motion, but also organs of proliferation, by wombs and by eggs. But from the beginning, useful and clean animals only were created, whose souls are good affections.

\* *On Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 255.

‘ Let it be known, however, that the souls of beasts are not spiritual in the same degree in which the souls of men are. They are, on the contrary, spiritual in a lower degree. For there exist different degrees of things spiritual : and those affections which are of a lower degree, although regarded as to their *origin*, are spiritual ; they ought, nevertheless, to be called natural. They ought so to be called because they are similar to the affections of the natural man.’\*

‘ The difference between men and beasts is like that between waking and dreaming, or like that between light and shade. Man is spiritual and at the same time natural : a beast, on the contrary, is not spiritual but natural. Man possesses will and understanding. His will, moreover, is the receptacle of the heat of heaven, which is love ; and his understanding is the receptacle of the light of heaven, which is wisdom. A beast, on the contrary, has neither will nor understanding ; but instead of will it has affection, and instead of understanding, knowledge.

‘ In man, the will and the understanding can act as one, or they can act not as one. For man can think from his understanding what does not belong to his will ; for he can think what he does not will, and also *vice versa*. In a beast, on the other hand, affection and knowledge make one, and cannot be separated. For a beast knows what belongs to its affection, and it is affected by what belongs to its knowledge. Now since these two faculties, knowledge and affection, cannot, in a beast, be separated, therefore it could not destroy the order of its life ; and hence it is that it is born into every kind of knowledge pertaining to its own affection. The case is different with man. The two faculties of his life, called will and understanding, are capable of being separated, as already stated : therefore it was in his power to destroy the order of

\* *Apocalypse Explained*, § 1201.



his life, by thinking contrary to his will, and by willing contrary to his understanding. By this means he also has destroyed it. Hence it is that he is born into mere ignorance, that from such a state he may be introduced into order through the instrumentality of the sciences, the understanding serving as a medium.

‘The order into which man was created, is to love God above all things and his neighbour as himself: and the state into which man came after having destroyed that order, was to love himself above all things and the world as himself.

‘Now inasmuch as man possesses a spiritual mind, and this mind is above his natural mind, and his spiritual mind is able to take an interior view of such things as belong to Heaven and the Church, as also of what relates to the usages and laws of the State—and these have reference to forms of truth and goodness, which are called spiritual, moral, and civil—besides the natural things pertaining to science, as well as to their opposites, which are falsities and evils; since the spiritual mind is capable of doing all this, therefore man is able not only to think analytically, and then draw conclusions, but also to receive an influx by means of Heaven from the Lord, and to become intelligent and wise. No beast can do this. What it knows, is not from any understanding, but from a knowledge originating in the affection which is its soul.

‘The knowledge arising from affection exists in every thing spiritual, inasmuch as the spiritual principle proceeding from the Lord as a Sun is light united to heat, or wisdom united to love; and knowledge is derived from wisdom, also affection from love, in that degree which is called natural.

‘Inasmuch as man has a spiritual mind, and at the same time a natural mind, and his spiritual mind is above his natural mind, and also his spiritual mind is such that it is able to have an interior view and love of the true and the

good in every degree, conjointly with the natural mind and abstractly apart from it ; it follows, that the interior things of man, as pertaining to each mind, can be elevated to the Lord, by the Lord, and be conjoined to Him. Hence it is that every man lives for ever.

*' It is not so with a beast.* A beast does not rejoice in the possession of any spiritual mind, but only in that which is natural. Hence its interior principles, which have their source only in knowledge and affection, cannot be elevated by the Lord and conjoined to Him : wherefore a beast cannot live after death. A beast is led, indeed, by means of a certain spiritual influx, which falls into its soul ; but inasmuch as its spiritual principle cannot be elevated, that principle must needs be determined in a downward direction, and thus to regard such things as belong to its affection which have reference merely to what ministers to nutrition, habitation, and propagation ; and from the knowledge arising from its own affection to have cognizance of those things through the medium of sight, smell, and taste.

*' Now since man, by virtue of the spiritual mind pertaining to him, is able to think in a rational manner, therefore he is also able to speak. For to speak belongs to thought arising from the understanding, which is capable of seeing truths in spiritual light. A beast, on the contrary, which possesses no thought from understanding, but only knowledge from affection, can do no more than utter sounds, and, according to its appetites, vary the sound which expresses its affection.'* \*

. . . *' All beasts are organs created for the reception of light and heat from the natural world, and at the same time from the spiritual world. Every species is the form of some natural love, and receives light and heat from the spiritual*

\* *Apocalypse Explained*, § 1202.

world *mediately* through the instrumentality of heaven and hell; gentle and harmless beasts, by means of heaven, the fierce and noxious kinds through the medium of hell. Man alone receives light and heat, that is to say, love and wisdom, *immediately* from the Lord. In this lies the difference between man and beast.' \*

'Every man educated in a right and proper manner, is rational and moral. But there are two ways leading to the state of rationality, one from the world, the other from heaven. He that has been made rational and moral, from the world, and not from heaven also, is not rational and moral except merely in the matter of speech and outward conduct; and, moreover, he is inwardly a beast, yea, a wild beast, inasmuch as he acts as one with those who are in hell, who are all of such a quality. On the other hand, he who is rational and moral from heaven, the same is truly rational and moral, because he is such at the same time in his spirit, as well as in his speech and body; for inwardly in both, there is a spiritual principle which is as a soul that actuates what is sensual, natural, and corporeal. He also acts as one with those who are in heaven.' †

(γ)—*On the ferine character of naturalistic atheists.*

'This great System which is called the Universe is a work which is coherent as one thing from first to last, inasmuch as God, in creating it, had in view one single end, which was an Angelic Heaven from the human race; and all things from which the world has its being are means to that end. For he who desires the end desires also the means. . . . Those who do not contemplate the universe as the workmanship of

\* *True Christian Religion*, § 473.

† *Ibid.*, § 564.

God, and also as the dwelling-place of His Love and Wisdom, but as merely the work of nature, and the habitation of the sun's heat and light, close the superior regions of their mind with respect to God, and open the inferior parts of their mind with respect to the devil, and thence put off what is human, and assume a ferine character, and not only believe that they are like the beasts, but also become such. For they become foxes in cunning, wolves in fierceness, leopards in treachery, tigers in cruelty, and crocodiles, serpents, owls, and bats, as regards the nature of these creatures. Those who are of such a nature also appear like these wild animals, when seen at a distance in the spiritual world. The love of evil which belongs to them thus presents itself in a figure.\*

(d)—*On ape-like men.*

'Who does not know that man is not man owing to his having a human face and a human body, but from the wisdom of his intellect and from the goodness of his will. These two faculties as they ascend in quality cause him to be still more a man. When a man is born he is more a brute creature than any animal. But he becomes a man through the medium of instructions which, just as they are received, form his mind (*mens*), from which, and according to which, man is man. There are in existence some brute creatures whose faces are similar to those of men, but they do not enjoy any faculty of understanding or of acting in any respect from intellect. On the contrary, they act under the impulse of an instinct which their natural love excites. There is a difference too in this respect, that a beast gives expression to the affections of its love in sounds, whereas

\* *True Christian Religion*, § 13.

man gives utterance, in speech, to those affections, when brought to the sphere of thought. Again: a beast with its countenance bent downwards looks towards the earth; man, on the contrary, with face erect beholds heaven, whichever way he turns. And from all this it may be concluded that man is man only in so far as he speaks from sound reason, and regards his dwelling-place as being in heaven; and that he is not a man in so far as he speaks from reason turned the wrong way, and regards his dwelling-place as being in the world only. Nevertheless these latter are men: not in act, however, but in potency. For every man enjoys the power of understanding what is true, and willing what is good; but in so far as he is not willing to do what is good and understand what is true, he is only able to pretend to be a man, and to act as his ape.\*

(e)—*Men seen as apes in the world of spirits.*

‘It has been granted me to see whole communities of persons, born in islands, who were rational in what relates to civil affairs, and yet they had not the least knowledge of God. They appear in the spiritual world like *apes*, and are in a like kind of life with them; but inasmuch as they were born men, and consequently in the faculty of receiving spiritual life, they are instructed by angels, and through the medium of cognitions concerning the Lord, as a Man, they are endowed with (spiritual) life. What kind of creature man is, of himself, manifestly appears from those who are in hell—among whom there are some who had been prelates and men of learning—who are not even willing to hear of God, and on this account cannot utter the name of God. I have seen them and spoken with them: also with those who

\* *True Christian Religion*, § 417. Cf. *Divine Providence*, § 298, Sect. iii.



came into the fire of anger and wrath when they heard any one speaking concerning God. Ponder well, therefore, the following point:—What kind of creature man would be, were he to hear nothing of God, when there are certain persons such as are here described, who have heard of God, written of God, and preached of God. There are many such from among the Jesuits.\*

(C)—*Men seen as apes in Hell.*

Concerning certain persons who, while in the world, had been monsters of impurity in their lives, Swedenborg makes the following inexpressibly dismal disclosure:—

Datum etiam est videre illos in Inferno illo, ac mihi dictum est, quod ibi sint multi ex nobili stemmate, et ex opulentioribus; sed quia tales fuerant in Mundo, aufertur illis omnis recordatio stemmatis ac dignitatis ex opulentia, ac inducitur persuasio, quod fuerint vilia mancipia, et inde omni honore indigni. Inter se quidem apparent sicut homines, sed ab aliis, quibus licet illuc intueri, sicut *Simiae*.† . . .

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NOTE X. p. 89.

ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAN AND BRUTE  
CREATURES.

No philosopher except Swedenborg has succeeded in drawing an absolutely distinctive and intelligible line of demar-

\* *Doctrine concerning the Sacred Scripture*, § 116.

† *De Amore Conjugiali*, § 505.

cation between the instinct of animals and the reason of man. Impatient, superficial, and biased thinkers have, as usual, pronounced the problem impossible of solution, merely because they found that it transcended the reach of their own faculties.

The following graphic description of the state of opinion on this subject, in the last century, seems as if written for the present age, so accurately do its specific statements apply to recent speculations, in which the old and famous problem *De anima Brutorum*, has assumed a prominence so remarkable, and raised issues so momentous, in the domain of psychology :—

‘I have several times spoken with spirits concerning the learned of the present (eighteenth) century, as to the fact that they are acquainted with nothing beyond distinguishing man into an internal and external ; and this distinction they possess, not from reflection upon the interiors of thoughts and affections within themselves, but from the Word of the Lord : and that, notwithstanding, they are ignorant of what the internal man is. And more than this, several entertain doubts whether there be such a thing, and also deny the existence thereof, because they do not live the life of the internal, but only of the external man. I stated that they were greatly led astray by the circumstance that brute animals appear similar to man as to their organs, viscera, senses, appetites, and affections. It was said that the learned know less of such subjects than the simple-minded ; and that, notwithstanding, the former seem to themselves to know much more. For they dispute about the commerce of the soul and the body, yea of the soul itself as to what kind of thing it is, when, nevertheless, the simpler sort of people are aware that the soul is the inner man, and that it is the spirit of the man which is to live after the death of the body ; as also, that it is the very man himself who is in the body.

Moreover, it was said that the learned more than the simple-minded liken themselves to the brutes, and ascribe all things to the agency of nature, and hardly anything to the Deity : besides, that they do not reflect upon the fact that man, otherwise than the brute animals, can think of heaven, and of God, and thus can be elevated above himself, and consequently can be conjoined, by means of love, to the Lord : and so that men, after death, cannot but live to all eternity. It was said that these learned men were, in a special manner, ignorant of the fact that all and each of the things that are in man are dependent on the Lord, through the medium of heaven ; and that heaven is Man in the greatest form (*Maximus Homo*), to which corresponds all and each of those things that are in man, and also each single thing in nature ; and that perchance when they come to hear and read these things, they will consider them such paradoxes, that unless experience should confirm them, they will reject them as something fantastical.\* . . .

The above animadversions on the false philosophy of the last century, are obviously applicable to much that passes under the name of Physical Science at the present day.

One example, in illustration, may suffice to make this clear. It is taken from a work professedly written in a popular style, by a very distinguished man of science. The very title of the book—'Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature'—exhibits a confusion of thought quite characteristic of this writer's extra-scientific speculations. This confusion is all the more discreditable to his powers of discrimination, as it appears in a connexion, in which it especially behoved him to use clear and unambiguous terms of art.

The facts to be adduced prove that the pretentious title adopted, is a mere misnomer. It means, in reality, nothing more than—'Evidence as to the position which the human

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 3747.

organism appears to hold, in a more or less empirical and artificial classification of external animal forms.' Read in the light of this manifestly necessary correction, the book in question will be found to contain much interesting matter pertaining to Natural History and Physiology, ingeniously but perversely interwoven with a number of dogmatic assertions, destitute alike of scientific value, common sense, and refined feeling.

The author, who is a clever artist in word-painting for his own purposes, observes :—

' There is not much apparent resemblance between a barn-door Fowl and the Dog who protects the farm-yard. Nevertheless the student of development finds, not only that the chick commences its existence as an egg, primarily identical, in all essential respects, with that of the Dog, but that the yolk of this egg undergoes division—that the primitive groove arises, and that the contiguous parts of the germ are fashioned, by precisely similar methods, into a young chick, which, at one stage of its existence, is so like the nascent Dog, that ordinary inspection would hardly distinguish the two.'\*

. . . 'The study of development affords a clear test of closeness of structural affinity, and one turns with impatience to inquire what results are yielded by the study of the development of Man. Is he something apart? Does he originate in a totally different way from Dog, Bird, Frog, and Fish, thus justifying those who assert him to have no place in nature and no real affinity with the lower world of animal life? Or does he originate in a similar germ, pass through the same slow and gradually progressive modifications,—depend on the same contrivances for protection and nutrition, and finally enter the world by the help of the

\* *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, p. 64.

same mechanism? The reply is not doubtful for a moment, and has not been doubtful any time these thirty years. Without question, the mode of origin and the early stages of the development of man are identical with those of the animals immediately below him in the scale:—without a doubt, in these respects, he is far nearer the Apes, than the Apes are to the Dog.\*

. . . 'Exactly in those respects in which the developing Man differs from the Dog, he resembles the ape, which, like man, has a spheroidal yolk-sac and a discoidal—sometimes partially lobed-placenta.

'So that it is only quite in the later stages of development that the young human being presents marked differences from the young ape, while the latter departs as much from the dog in its development, as the man does.

'Startling as the last assertion may appear to be, it is demonstrably true, and it alone appears to me sufficient to place beyond all doubt the structural unity of man with the rest of the animal world, and more particularly and closely with the apes.†

Professor Huxley is desirous that his views respecting 'Man's Place in Nature' should pass beyond the enlightened circle in which science is specially cultivated, and be shared by that of the intelligent public. He hears on all sides the cry—'We are men and women, not a better sort of apes.' To this he replies:—'I have endeavoured to show that no absolute structural line of demarcation, wider than that between the animals which immediately succeed us in the scale, can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves; and I may add the expression of my belief that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally futile, and that

\* *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, p. 65.

† *Ibid.* p. 67.



even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life.\*

. . . 'The whole analogy of natural operations furnishes so complete and crushing an argument against the intervention of any but what are termed secondary causes, in the production of all the phenomena of the universe; that, in view of the intimate relations between Man and the rest of the living world; and between the forces exerted by the latter and all other forces, I can see no excuse for doubting that all are co-ordinated terms of Nature's great progression, from the formless to the formed—from the inorganic to the organic—from blind force to conscious intellect and will.'†

By gross and palpable naturalistic fallacies such as these, attempts are made, under the specious plea of 'Science,' and in the interests of materialistic 'philosophy' to confound MAN, made in the image of God, with the Divinely constructed physical organism by the medium of which he is brought into relation with the material universe wherein for a time, he has been placed by the Creator and Upholder of all things. An endeavour is made, in defiance of the dictates of sober reason, to degrade man to the level of the brute creation, and even to regard him as an integral part of the material world; and this outrage on common sense is imagined by those who have become the unhappy dupes of their own false reasonings, to be a mean of throwing light on 'the question of questions for mankind . . . the ascertainment of the place which man occupies in nature, and of his relations to the universe of things.' After the manner of the most astute sophist, the truth of the very point at issue is adroitly assumed. The term *Man* is employed in a sense equivalent to *human organism*. Under the influence of blind zeal for a favourite naturalistic hypothesis, a series of asser-

\* *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, p. 109. † *Ibid.* p. 108.

tions is confidently advanced, at variance with sound reason and the most certain facts.

The comparisons above made between a fowl and a dog, a man and an ape, are nothing but a tissue of blunders.

It is a mistake which a man of science ought to feel ashamed of having made, to assert *secundum simpliciter* that the chick commences its existence 'as an egg.' Strictly speaking it begins to exist in an egg. It is still more absurdly erroneous to say that the egg is '*primarily identical*, in all essential respects, with that of the dog.' The simple fact, apart from all sophistication, is that the two *ova* in question merely present a few points of *outward similarity*.

In like manner, when it is said that 'the study of development affords a clear test of structural *affinity*,' the very common-place truth is concealed from the unwary reader, that the study of external organic development, shows merely that a certain amount of *resemblance* exists between the external organisms of different animals. And so on of the whole cunningly constructed net-work of what Locke would term *insignificant* propositions, on which the mass of modern naturalism is built up.

Writers of this school have yet to learn the rudimentary psychological truth that 'the body of man is a tegument and, so to say, a crust, which (in due time) is dissolved, in order that MAN may truly live, and that things pertaining to him may come into a state of still higher excellence.'\*

The 'crushing argument' so boastfully referred to above, has been answered by anticipation for a full century and a half, in the following magnificent passage, in which one finds an intellect of the grandest order regarding, with magnanimous commiseration, the wild conceits of a race of scientific pigmies:—

\* See *Arcana Coelestia*, § 1718.

“It is especially to be remarked, that all the wills and actions of animals, we mean, all the instincts, are excited simply by external motives or moving causes,—by those things that strike their senses, or that affect their blood in a general manner. The changes and conditions of the air and æther, recurring with the four seasons, send heat into their fluids, which burn and boil accordingly; and with the fluids, as determinants, a corresponding change is wrought in the organic forms of the body and brain. In this way the principle of motion is at once excited, and animals are carried, agreeably to nature's order, into rational-seeming effects involving ends. Hence their loves, and hence the periods those loves obey. Hence the wonders they display in building their nests, incubating their eggs, and hatching their young. Hence their amazing parental care. Hence their public consultations as to the manner of providing for themselves and their progeny in the coming winter; and a number of other effects, which proceed from a soul like theirs, accommodated to the reception of life, according to its own peculiar character; whenever it is excited (by appropriate circumstances). Experience attests the truth of these remarks. For we know that the same effects are produced on animals by the warmth or heat of a room as by the heat of the sun, and when the season is neither spring nor summer. We may therefore say that the soul of animals resides in their blood, because it is always actuated by a cause extrinsic to itself. Not so the soul of man. He indeed is likewise moved, yet he is not governed, by external causes. The affections of the external world pass *à posteriori* in some measure into the sphere of intelligence; yet in the man himself they are determined into act by a foregone will arising from an appropriate principle and cause. Thus we men are stirred to action by a fire kindled, in the very sphere of the (intellectual) mind, even in mid-winter. As the philo-

sopher (Aristotle) says :—‘ Whatever a secondary cause can do, a prior cause can also do in a higher and more noble manner. The first cause assists the second in its operations ; and secondary causes are illuminated by the light of the first.’ ”

‘ Oh ! then how obscured—how deeply buried in the grave of the body are the minds of those, who judge of themselves by the brutes, and of their own souls by the souls of brutes, reasoning from likeness of actions, likeness of senses, and likeness of brain, so far as the eye alone discloses the brain ; and do not see beyond the likeness, nor how far we stand apart from them : fit subjects, indeed, for ridicule, did they not rather deserve our pity.’ \*

#### ST. AUGUSTINE.

##### *On the difference between men and beasts.*

Age nunc, videamus ubi sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Quicquid enim habemus in animo commune cum pecore, rectè adhuc dicitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinere. . . . Ascendentibus introrsus quibusdam GRADIBUS considerationis per animæ partes, unde incipit aliud occurrere, quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio, ubi homo interior jam possit agnosci. Nam et corpus nos habere manifestum est, et vitam quamdam, qua ipsum corpus animatur atque vegetatur (quæ duo etiam in bestiis agnoscimus), et tertium quiddam quasi animæ nostræ caput aut oculum, aut si quid congruentius de ratione atque intelligentia dici potest, quam non habet natura bestiarum. . .

Est enim quædam lux hominum ; unde distant homines à pecoribus videamus, et tunc intelligemus quid sit lux

\* *Æcon. An. King.*, vol. ii. pp. 340, 341.

hominum. . . . Lux hominum est lux mentium. Lux mentium supra mentes est, et excedit omnes mentes. *Hæc est vita illa, per quam facta sunt omnia. Et vita erat lux hominum.*

Ex ipsa vita homines illuminantur; pecora non illuminantur, quia pecora non habent rationales mentes, quæ possint videre sapientiam. Homo factus ad imaginem Dei habet rationalem mentem, per quam possit percipere sapientiam. Ergo illa vita per quam facta sunt omnia, ipsa vita lux est: et non quorumcumque animalium, sed lux hominum. . . . *Erat lumen rerum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*

. . . Ergo intelligamus habere nos aliquid ubi imago Dei est, mentem scilicet atque rationem. Ipsa mens invocat lucem Dei et veritatem Dei. Ipsa est, qua capimus justum et injustum. Ipsa est, qua discernimus verum à falso. Ipsa est, quæ vocatur intellectus; quo intellectu carent bestię; quem intellectum quisquis in se negligit, et postponit cæteris, et ita abjicit quasi non habeat, audit ex Psalmo: *Nolite esse sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus.\**

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#### NOTE Y., p. 91.

##### THE DOCTRINE OF DEGREES.

Among the most remarkable of the numerous discoveries, made by Swedenborg in the domain of pure intellectual philosophy, must be reckoned his Doctrine of Degrees. Its discovery marks a new and wholly original starting-point in the history of human thought. As yet it is almost unknown in the learned world. It has not escaped the fate of almost

\* *Philosoph.* pp. 523—527.



all new ideas—to be despised or violently opposed for a more or less protracted period. Its recognition, though ultimately certain, must be a work of time. It is destined to modify profoundly the philosophy of the future. A clear and full comprehension of it would prove eminently useful to the cause of intellectual and Christian philosophy in these days of rapidly increasing naturalism and worldliness.

From an intelligent and careful study of the extracts adduced below, taken from the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, may be obtained a general view of this most profound and beautiful doctrine. They present the subject in a point of view purely philosophical. They furnish the first step of that intellectual ladder by means of which the mind may reach the sphere of *true causes*. They will prepare the reader for entering upon a study of the perfect and complete exposition of the entire subject given in the Third Part of the author's treatise, entitled *Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom*.

(a).—*Introduction to a Rational Psychology.*

‘Psychology is the science which treats of the essence and nature of the soul, and of the mode in which she flows into the actions of her body; consequently it is the first and last of those sciences which lead to the knowledge of the animal economy.

‘But whereas the soul has her residence in a place so sublime and eminent, that we cannot ascend to her, and attain to the knowledge of her, except by a particular and general investigation of the lower and accessible things of her kingdom; or, whereas, she lives withdrawn so far within that she cannot be exposed to view until the coverings under which she is hidden are unfolded and removed in order: it hence becomes necessary that we ascend to her by the same

steps or degrees, and the same ladder, by which her nature, in the formation of the things of her kingdom, descends into her body.

‘By way, therefore, of an Introduction to Rational Psychology, I will premise THE DOCTRINE OF SERIES AND DEGREES, . . . the design of which is, to teach the nature of Order and its rules as observed and prescribed in the succession of things: for the rational mind in its analytical inquiry into causes from effects, nowhere discovers them, except in the subordination of things, and in the co-ordination of things subordinate; wherefore, if we would advance from the sphere of effects to that of causes, we must proceed by Orders and Degrees; agreeably to what rational analysis itself both approves and advises.’\*

(β.)—*A science of sciences possible.*

“On this subject (a mathematical philosophy of universals) Wolff observes;” ‘Among the desiderata of learning, is a science which should deliver the general principles of the knowledge of finite things; a science from which the geometer might draw his measures, when desirous usefully to exercise his calculations in the mathematical knowledge of nature. . . . And this science would have a better title to the name of *universal mathematics*, than the science of quantities in general, or of indeterminate numbers, since it would deliver the first principles of the mathematical knowledge of all things. . . . Thus we might at last obtain the true mathematical principles of natural philosophy and psychology, which might be of use to philosophers in guiding their further discoveries, and in general to all, for accurate practice. I wish the learned would turn their attention to it.’ (*Ontol.* § 755.) “It was for this end that I was here disposed, as a prepara-

\* *Æcon. An. King.* vol. ii. pp. 1, 2.

tory step, to offer the doctrine of series and degrees, since without a previous knowledge of the general and particular form of nature's government, in vain should we exert the powers and labours of the mind in composing such a philosophy, since it is no other than that of the soul itself. It is that philosophy alone which can put an end to the contest between truths and assumptions, and pave the way to the palace of reason. *For such a philosophy, if well digested, will be, in a manner, the one science of all the natural sciences, because it is the complex of all.*"\*

'In Part I. I endeavoured, by way of introduction to a knowledge of the soul, to expound a doctrine which I have called the Doctrine of Series and Degrees. This I did, inasmuch as for a long time I had been led to consider, and with many to doubt, whether the Human Soul was accessible to any reach of mind, that is to say, whether it was capable of being thoroughly investigated; for certain it is that the soul is far removed from the external senses, and lies in the depths of knowledge; being the highest and last in order of those things that successively reveal themselves to our inquiries.

'On a slight consideration of the subject, I could not but think with mankind in general, that all our knowledge of it was to be attempted either by a bare reasoning philosophy, or more immediately by the anatomy of the human body. But upon making the attempt, I found myself as far from my object as ever; for no sooner did I seem to have mastered the subject, than I found it again eluding my grasp, though it never absolutely disappeared from my view. Thus my hopes were not destroyed, but deferred; and I frequently reproached myself with stupidity in being ignorant of that which was yet everywhere most really present to me; since by reason of the soul it is that we hear, see, feel, perceive, remember, imagine, think, desire, will; or, that we are, move,

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. p. 55.

and live. The soul it is because of which, by which, and out of which, the visible corporeal kingdom principally exists. To the soul it is that we are to ascribe whatever excites our admiration and astonishment in the anatomy of the body. The body being constructed according to the image of the soul's nature, or according to the form of its operations.

'Thus did I seem to see, and yet not to see, the very object, with the desire of knowing which I was never at rest. But at length I awoke as from a deep sleep, when I discovered, that nothing is farther removed from the human understanding than what at the same time is really present to it; and that nothing is more present to it than what is universal, prior, and superior; since this enters into every particular, and into everything posterior and inferior.

'What is more omnipresent than the Deity—in Him we live, and are, and move—and yet what is more remote from the sphere of the understanding? In vain does the mind stretch its powers to attain to any degree of knowledge of the essentials and attributes of this Supreme and Omnipotent Being, beyond what it has pleased Him to reveal in proportion to each man's individual exertions.'\*

... 'The more any one is perfected in judgment, and the better he discerns the distinctions of things, the more clearly will he perceive, that there is an order in things, that there are degrees of order, and that it is by these alone he can progress, and this, step by step, from the lowest sphere to the highest, or from the outermost to the innermost. For as often as nature ascends away from external phenomena, or betakes herself inwards, she seems to have separated from us and to have left us altogether in the dark as to what direction she has taken. We have need, therefore, of some science to serve as our guide in tracing out her steps—to arrange all things into series—to distinguish these series into

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. pp. 201, 202.

degrees, and to contemplate the order of each thing in the order of the whole.

"The science which does this I call **THE DOCTRINE OF SERIES AND DEGREES, OR THE DOCTRINE OF ORDER**; a science which it was necessary to premise to enable us to follow closely in the steps of nature; since to attempt without it to approach and visit her in her sublime abode, would be to attempt to climb heaven by the tower of Babel; for the highest step must be approached by the intermediate.

"They who know nothing of this ladder of nature, when they have made their leap, and think they are standing on the summit, are little aware that they are lying flat upon the earth, and will be found at last by their friends, after they have searched the globe for them, in some obscure cavern; for instance, in some occult position, of the nature of which they themselves, and the wisest of men, are equally ignorant.

"The doctrine of Series and Degrees, however, only teaches the distinction and relation between things superior and inferior, or prior and posterior. It is unable to express by any adequate terms of its own, those things that transcend the sphere of familiar things. If, therefore, we would ascend to a higher altitude, we must use terms which are still more abstract, universal, and eminent, lest we confound with the corporeal senses, things of which we ought not only to have distinct perceptions, but which, in reality, are distinct.

"Hence it is necessary to have recourse to a **MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY OF UNIVERSALS**, by which we shall be enabled not only to signify higher ideas by letters proceeding in simple order, but also to reduce them to a certain philosophical calculus, in its form and in some of its rules not unlike the analysis of infinites. For in higher ideas,



much more in the highest, things occur too ineffable to be represented by common (or general) ideas." . . .

"That such a science of sciences may be found, many of the learned have already suspected; nay, they have beheld it as it were afar off. The illustrious Locke, in his golden *Essay on the Human Understanding*, near the close of the work, after his profound investigation of the powers of the mind, discovers at last, as if by divination, that there is yet another and profounder science. 'Perhaps,' says he, speaking of *συνεπιστημη*, "if they (viz. ideas and words) were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.' (Book iv. chap. xxi. s. iv.) And in another place he observes: 'The ideas that ethics are conversant about, being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement with one another; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general truths; and I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have been demonstrated to him.' (Book iv. chap. xii. s. viii.)

"That to such a science, seen so obscurely, yet so desirable, any other way can lead than the doctrine of the order, or of the series and degrees existing in the world and nature, I cannot be induced to believe; for all the other sciences, like derivative streams, regard this as their fountain-head. . . . This is the science which I just now called the Mathematical Doctrine of Universals. . . .

"But even were it granted that the Doctrine of Order and the Science of Universals were carried by the human

mind to the acme of perfection ; nevertheless it does not follow that we should, by these means alone, be brought into a knowledge of all that can be known. For these sciences are but subsidiary, serving only, by a compendious method and mathematical certainty, to lead us, by continued abstractions and elevations of thought, from the posterior to the prior sphere ; or from the world of effects, which is the visible, to the world of causes and principles, which is the invisible.

“Hence in order that these sciences may be available, we must have recourse to experiment, and to the phenomena of the senses ; without which they would remain in a state of bare theory and bare capability of aiding us. Algebraical analysis, for example, without lines, figures, and numbers, applied to the objects of natural philosophy and general economy, would be only a beautiful calculus, destitute of any practical application to the uses of life. The foregoing sciences, consequently, show their real value only in proportion to the abundance of our experience. They imitate the very order of animal nature, which is, that the rational mind shall receive instruction successively from phenomena, through the medium of the five-fold organism of the external senses ; but when it has matured its principles, it may begin to look round and enlarge the sphere of its rational vision, so as, from a few causes slightly modified, to be enabled to extend its view to an infinity of effects.

“For these reasons, I am strongly persuaded that the essence and nature of the soul, its influx into the body, and the reciprocal action of the body, can never come to demonstration, without these doctrines, combined with a knowledge of anatomy, pathology, and psychology ; nay, even of physica, and especially of the auras of the world ; and that unless our labours take this direction, and mount from phenomena thus, we shall in every new age have to build new

systems, which in their turn will tumble to the ground, without the possibility of being rebuilt.

"This, and no other, is the reason that, with diligent study and intense application, I have investigated the anatomy of the body, and principally the human, so far as it is known from experience ; and that I have followed the anatomy of all its parts, in the same manner as I have here investigated the cortical substance.

"In doing this, I may perhaps have gone beyond the ordinary limits of enquiry, so that but few of my readers may be able distinctly to understand me. But thus far I have felt bound to venture ; for I have resolved, cost what it may, to trace out the nature of the human soul." \*

#### DIM GLIMPSES OF THE DOCTRINE OF DISCRETE DEGREES.

CHRISTIAN WOLF.

*Gradum* appellamus id, quo qualitates eadem salva identitate differre possunt, scilicet vel tempore eodem in diversis subjectis, vel tempore diverso in eodem subjecto. Brevius : *Gradus* est discrimen internum qualitatum earundem, scilicet quod solum salva identitate in easdem cadit.

*Gradus sunt quantitates qualitatum.* †

MAINE DE BIRAN.

'Dans le point de vue psychologique, dit Maine de Biran, ou sous le rapport de la connaissance, l'âme tire tout d'elle-même ou du *moi* par la réflexion ; mais dans le point de vue moral, ou sous le rapport de la perfection à atteindre, du bonheur à obtenir, ou du but de la vie à espérer, l'âme tire tout du dehors ; non de ce dehors du monde des sensations, mais du *dehors supérieur* d'un monde spirituel, dont Dieu

\* *Econ. An. King.* vol. ii. pp. 201—207.

† *Ontologia.* §§ 746, 747.

est le centre ; car l'âme ne trouve en elle qu'imperfection, bassesse, misères, vices, légèreté. Comment donc l'idée ou le sentiment qu'elle a du parfait, du grand, du beau, de l'éternel pourrait-il naître de son propre fonds ? . . . Il faut reconnaître que les vérités morales et religieuses qui ont le bien pour objet et la perfection pour fin, ont *une autre source* que les vérités psychologiques, limitées à l'homme sensible et intelligent.\*

## ST. AUGUSTINE.

Utamur ergo gradibus, quos nobis divina providentia fabricare dignata est. Videamus quatenus ratio possit progredi à visibilibus ad invisibilia, et à temporalibus ad æterna conscendere. Non enim frustra et inaniter.intucri oportet pulchritudinem cœli, ordinem siderum, candorem lucis, dierum et noctium vicissitudines, lunæ menstrua curricula, anni quadripertitam temperationem, quadripertitis elementis congruentem, tantam vim seminum species numerosque gignentium, et omnia in suo genere modum proprium naturamque servantia. In quorum consideratione non vana et peritura curiositas exercenda est, sed gradus ad immortalia et semper permanentia faciendus.

Sed inanes sunt hominum cogitationes, quibus cogitant extra mundum infinita spatia locorum, ubi per interminabilem immensitatem locorum extra mundum circumquaque patentium sit Deus ; cum locus nullus sit præter mundum. Quo etiam modo inaniter homines spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant : cum nullum sit tempus ante mundum. Mundo tamen sic totus est præsens, ut eum non ex toto mundus capiat æterna stabilitate in seipso manentem (ex quo nimirum habet quod, ut supra jam diximus, totus adesse

\* Quoted in *L'Art de Croire*, par Auguste Nicolas, tom. i. pp. 43, 44.

rebus omnibus potest, et singulis totus) nullo claudatur loco : cum sit ipse, nullo locorum vel intervallo, vel spatio, incommutabili eternitate excellentique potentia, et INTERIOR omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et EXTERIOR omni re, quia ipse est super omnia : sicut nullo temporum vel intervallo, vel spatio incommutabili eternitate et ANTIQUIOR est omnibus ; quia ipse est ante omnia, et NOVIOR omnibus ; quia idem ipse post omnia.\*

#### MALEBRANCHE.

‘ Afin que tu conçoives maintenant comment je suis l’ordre, la règle, la loi immuable et nécessaire de Dieu mon père et de tous les esprits créés, tu dois savoir qu’entre les idées intelligibles que je renferme, il y a des rapports de grandeur et des rapports de perfection. Les rapports de grandeur sont entre les idées des êtres de même nature, comme entre l’idée d’une toise et l’idée d’un pied ; et les idées des nombres mesurent ou expriment exactement ces rapports, s’ils ne sont incommensurables. Les rapports de perfection sont entre les idées des êtres ou des manières d’êtres de différente nature, comme entre le corps et l’esprit, entre la rondeur et le plaisir. Mais tu ne peux mesurer exactement ces rapports. Il suffit seulement que tu comprennes que l’esprit, par exemple, est plus parfait ou plus noble que le corps, sans savoir exactement de combien ; et tu n’en douteras pas, si tu sais bien distinguer l’âme du corps, et si tu compares ce qui arrive à ton corps avec les propriétés admirables de ton esprit.

‘ Or, il y a cette différence entre les rapports de grandeur et les rapports de perfection, que les rapports de grandeur sont des vérités toutes pures, abstraites, métaphysiques, et que les rapports de perfection sont des vérités et en même temps des

\* *Philosophia*, pp. 265, 317, 318.



lois immuables et nécessaires : ces sont les règles inviolables de tous les mouvements de l'esprit. Ainsi ces vérités font l'ordre, que Dieu même consulte dans toutes ses opérations ; car, aimant toujours toutes choses à proportion qu'elles sont aimables, les différents degrés de perfection régulent les différents degrés de son amour et la subordination qu'il établit entre ses créatures.'\*

#### L'ABBÉ FABRE.

'D'ailleurs la manifestation surnaturelle de Dieu renferme en grand partie la manifestation naturelle ; et de cette manière, la foi embrasse la philosophie, et va au delà. La raison connaît UN DEGRÉ du monde intelligible, la foi en connaît UN AUTRE, qui contient le précédent implicitement, et quelquefois d'une manière formelle. Le chrétien les connaît tous les deux, et en saisissant le Verbe incarné, il a pour objet la Raison totale, souveraine, absolue, saisie dans ses manifestations extrinsèques et dans ses actes internes. De sorte que, si toutes les intelligences participent au même aliment, à la Sagesse de Dieu, les philosophes néanmoins n'y participent qu'imparfaitement, tandis que les chrétiens y participent pleinement. Le simple pâtre et le petit enfant possèdent ainsi implicitement, dans la foi qu'ils ont en Jésus Christ, toutes les vues sublimes du théologien et du philosophe ; et tous enfin trouvent vie en Dieu, si leur humilité permet à cette divine substance de communiquer à leur âme les affirmations de sa science immanente.'†

\* Tom. II. *Méd. Chrét.*, iv. §§ 7, 8.

† *Cours de Philosophie*, tom. i. p. 186.

## NOTE Z., p. 94.

## THERE ARE THREE ANGELIC HEAVENS.

A knowledge of the doctrine of Degrees, referred to in the preceding note, is absolutely essential to any clear and distinct thought on a subject of which it may be said that it pertains pre-eminently to those things that are 'of the Spirit of God,' and must be 'spiritually discerned.'\* Accordingly our author observes :—

'He who does not procure for himself a perception of these degrees can in no wise become acquainted with the distinctions which exist between the heavens, and also between the interior and exterior faculties of man ; nor with the distinction between the spiritual world and the natural, nor with that between the spirit of man and his body. Hence he cannot understand what and whence correspondences and representations are, nor what is the quality of influx.

'Sensual men do not comprehend these distinctions ; for they make increases and decreases to be *continuous*, even according to these degrees. Hence they are unable to conceive of what is spiritual, otherwise than as being like something more purely natural. Wherefore they also stand out of doors, and afar off from intelligence.' †

ST. PAUL

*On the Three Heavens, and on Paradise.*

'It is not expedient for me doubtless to glory. I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord.

'I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell ; or whether out of the

\* 1 Cor. ii. 14.

† *Heaven and Hell*, § 38.

body, I cannot tell : God knoweth ;) such an one caught up to the THIRD HEAVEN.

‘And I knew such a man, (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell : God knoweth ;)’

‘How that he was caught up into PARADISE, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.’\*

ST. AUGUSTINE.

(a.)—*On the Three Heavens, the Ecstasis of St. Peter, and the Heavenly Rapture of St. Paul.*

Si ergo cœlum primum recte accipimus hoc omne corporeum generali nomine quidquid est super aquas et terram ; secundum autem, in similitudine corporali quod spiritu cernitur, sicut illud unde animalibus plenus in ecstasi Petro discus ille submissus est ; tertium vero, quod mente conspicitur in secretâ et remotâ et omnino abruptâ a sensibus carnis atque mundatâ, ut ea quæ in illo cœlo sunt, et ipsam Dei substantiam, Verbumque Deum per quod facta sunt omnia, in caritate Spiritus-sancti ineffabiliter valeat videre et audire: non incongruenter arbitramur, et illuc esse Apostolum raptum, et ibi fortassis esse paradysum omnibus meliorem, et si dici oportet, paradysum paradisorum. Si enim animæ bonæ lætitia in rebus bonis est in omni creatura, quid est lætitiâ præstantius quæ in Verbo Dei est per quod facta sunt omnia ? †

(β.)—*On the Heaven of Heaven.*

Confitetur altitudini tuæ humilitas linguæ meæ, quoniam tu fecisti cœlum et terram ; hoc cœlum quod video, terramque quam calco, unde est hæc terra quam porto, tu fecisti. Sed ubi est cœlum cœli, Domine, de quo audivimus in voce

\* 2 Cor. xii. 1—4.

† *Ep. de Gen. ad Lit.*, L. XII. c. xxiv. § 67 (Ed. Bened.)

Psalmi, *Cælum cæli Domino, terram autem dedit filiis hominum*? Ubi est cælum quod non cernimus, cui terra est hoc omne quod cernimus? Hoc enim totum corporeum, non ubique totum, ita accepit speciem pulcræ in novissimis, cujus fundus est terra nostra. SED AD ILLUD CÆLUM CÆLI, ETIAM TERRÆ NOSTRÆ CÆLUM TERRA EST. Et hoc utrumque magnum corpus non absurde terra est, ad illud nescio quale cælum quod Domino est, non filiis hominum.\*

(γ.)—*On Heaven as our true Home.*

Sane, Fratres, exceptis illis cælis superioribus, ignotis nobis in terra laborantibus, et per humanas conjecturas utcumque ista quærentibus; exceptis ergo illis cælia, qui quomodo sint super invicem vel quot sint, vel quibus modis distincti sint, quibus incolis impleti sint, quâ dispositione regantur, quomodo ibi unus quidam hymnus indeficiens concinens ab omnibus prædicet Deum, *multum est ad nos invenire, satagimus tamen pervenire*. Ibi est enim patria nostra, quam longa fortasse peregrinatione obliti sumus. Vox enim nostra est in illo Psalmo, *Heu me, quoniam peregrinatio mea longinqua facta est*. Ergo de illis cælis et mihi difficile est disputare (si tamen non impossibile), et vobis intelligere. *Certe qui me in rebus intellectu prævenit, fruatur quo præcessit et oret pro me ut sequar ego.*†

CARDINAL GERDIL,

*On the Order and Offices of Good Angels.*

Perspicuum est sapientissimum atque optimum Numen quam maxime decuisse ut inter creaturas ordinem quemdam constitueret, qui ordo in Angelis, maxime postquam in bono confirmati sunt, procul dubio nitidior elucere debuit ac

\* *Confess.*, L. XII. c. ii.

† In Psalm. xxxi. Enarrat. II. § 6.

perfectior. Hunc ordinem a Sacris Scripturis, quibus hac in re mirifice consentit platoniorum doctrina, ut videre est apud Eugubinum, qui conqueritur a Proclo hanc depravatam fuisse, eruere conati sunt inter caeteros sancti Dionysius, Bernardus et Thomas, qui ulterius munera declarant apposite ad hunc ordinem Angelis convenientia. Verum cum illud fatendum sit, in iis plerumque conjectura nos niti, nec omnes in assignandis hisce muneribus plane consentiant, rem istam prout communius exponi breviter disseremus.

Et primo quidem Angeli distribuuntur in TRES HIERARCHIAS, quarum singulas Deum ternis ordinibus distinxisse volunt. Prima assistentes Angelos complectitur, *Seraphinos* nempe, *Cherubinos* ac *Thronos* : \* in duabus aliis ministrantes Angeli comprehenduntur ; in secunda *Dominaciones*, *Potestates* et *Virtutes* ; in tertia *Principatus*, *Angeli* et *Archangeli*, quorum omnium in Scripturis distincta fit mentio.†

BISHOP PEARSON.

*On the Three Heavens.*

‘This house of God,’ observes this profoundly learned Prelate, ‘though uniform, yet is not all of the same materials, the footstool and the throne are not of the same mould ; there is a vast difference between the heavenly expansions. This first ærial heaven, where God setteth up his pavilion, where *he maketh the clouds his chariot, and walketh upon the wings of the wind*,‡ is not so far inferior in place as it is in glory to the next, the seat of the sun and

\* Cf. the third and fourth verses of the *Te Deum*, the daily hymn of praise in the Anglican Church, where this first ternion of these three heavenly hierarchies into which the angelic host is divided, according to the above view, seems to be not indistinctly shadowed forth, but in the ascending order, as (1) the *Powers* of heaven, (2) the *Cherubin*, (3) the *Seraphim*.

† *Institutiones Log. Metaph. et Ethic.* tom. ii. pp. 139, 140.

‡ Psal. civ. 3.



moon, the two great lights, and stars innumerable, far greater than the one of them. And yet, that second heaven is not so far above the first as beneath the third, into which St. Paul was caught. The brightness of the sun doth not so far surpass the blackness of a wandering cloud, as the glory of that Heaven of presence surmounts the fading beauty of the starry firmament. For in this great Temple of the World, in which the Son of God is the High Priest, the Heaven which we see is but the Veil, and that which is above, the Holy of Holies. This Veil indeed is rich and glorious, but one day to be rent, and then to admit us into a far greater glory, even to the Mercy-seat and Cherubim. For this third Heaven is the *proper habitation*\* of the blessed Angels, which constantly attend upon the Throne.†

#### LOCKE.

*On the Intelligence possessed by the several degrees of Angels.*

‘There is another defect which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with some superior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty may so far excel man, that they may have constantly in view the whole *sense* of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may slip out of their sight. The omniscience of God, who knows all things, past, present, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men’s hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to those glorious spirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections in what proportion he pleases, as far as created finite beings can be capable?’ Referring to the wonderful memory of Pascal, the great English philosopher proceeds to state, that in the

\* *ἱεῖον αἰωνόησιον*. St. Jude, ver. 6.

† *Exposition of the Creed*, vol. i. p. 80. (Ed. Oxon, 1816.)

case of that 'prodigy of parts,' the peculiar endowment in question 'was still with the narrowness that human minds are confined to here,—of having great variety of ideas only by succession, and not all at once : whereas *the several degrees of angels*, may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together and constantly set before them *as in one picture*, all their past knowledge at once.' He concludes with the remark, that probably this is 'one of those ways wherein the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.'\*

SWEDENBORG. .

(a.)—*On Elevation of the Mind to Heavenly Things.*

'With respect to man, he is said to be elevated when he makes a nearer approach to things heavenly. The reason of this is, that heaven is believed to be elevated or on high. It is so said owing to the appearance. For heaven, and accordingly those things which pertain to heaven—to wit, things celestial and spiritual—are not on high, but in what is internal. . . . Wherefore man is in heaven, as to his interiors, when in a state of spiritual love and faith.

'As regards the elevation of truths and their respective affections, as also their orderly arrangement in general principles, the case stands thus:—Truths and affections are elevated, when a preference is given to those things which belong to life eternal and the Lord's kingdom, above those things which pertain to a life in the body and the kingdom of this world. When a man acknowledges the former to be principal and primary, and the latter to be instrumental and secondary, then truths and their respective affections are

\* *Human Understanding*, B. II. Ch. x. § 9. The student of Swedenborg's writings will at once recognise in the above remarkable speculation a strikingly close approximation to the doctrines taught by the Swedish theologian respecting angelic ideas and the inner memory of man.

elevated in him. For in so far as he is translated into the light of heaven, in which is intelligence and wisdom, to the same extent those things which pertain to the light of the world are to him images, and, as it were, mirrors, in which he sees the former. The contrary happens when he prefers those things which belong to the life of the body and the kingdom of this world, above those which are of eternal life and the Lord's kingdom. As in the case where he believes that the two latter have no being, because he does not see them, and because no one has come from that other world and declared their existence. As also in the case where he believes that, if there be such things, he will not fare worse than others, and confirms himself in these principles, and lives a worldly life, and entirely despises charity and faith. In such a man truths and their affections are not elevated, but are either suffocated, or rejected, or perverted. For he is in natural light, into which nothing of heavenly light flows. Hence it is clear what is meant by the elevation of truths and their respective affections.\*

(B.)—*On Angelic Speech and its Ineffable Character.*

'It has been made known to me by experience, that there is such a difference between the affections and thoughts, and consequently the speech, of the angels of the superior and inferior heavens, that they have nothing in common, and that communication is effected only by correspondences, which exist by immediate influx of the Lord into all the heavens, and by mediate influx by means of the supreme into the lowest heaven. These differences, being of such a nature, cannot be expressed or described by natural language, for the thoughts of angels being spiritual do not fall into natural ideas. They can only be expressed and described by the

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, §§ 4103, 4104.

angels themselves in their own language, words, and writings, and not by those that are human. On this account it is declared that the things heard and seen in heaven are ineffable.\*

(γ.)—*On the Three Heavens, and Man's Relation to them.*

'Such an order has been instituted by the Lord, that things superior flow into those that are inferior, and in the latter present an image of themselves in general; consequently they are together therein in a certain general form, and thus they are in order from the Supreme Being, that is, from the Lord. Hence it is that the proximate image of the Lord is in the inmost heaven, which is the heaven of innocence and peace, where dwell those that are celestial. This heaven, as being nearest the Lord, is called His likeness. The second heaven, namely that which succeeds this, and is also in an inferior degree, is an image of the Lord; because in this heaven, as in a certain general manner, are presented together those things that are in the superior heaven. The last heaven, which again follows upon the second, stands related to it in like manner. For the particular and individual things of the proximately superior heaven flow into this last heaven, and are therein presented to view in a correspondent form.

'The case is similar in man; for he was created and formed to the effigy of the three heavens. What is inmost in him flows in like manner into what is inferior to it, and this again in like manner into what is lowest or last. Of such influx and concourse in those things that are beneath, and at length in those that are last or lowest, the natural and corporeal order consists. Hence is the bond, which connects those things which are last in order, with that which is First: and without this bond, what is last in order could not subsist for the smallest part of a moment.'†

\* *On the Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 202.

† *Arcana Coelestia*, § 3739.

## NOTE A A., p. 95.

## NATURALISM.

The subject of *Naturalism* is one to which Swedenborg makes constant and pointed reference. The extreme severity of the language he employs in characterizing that peculiar class of persons whom he names *atheistic naturalists*, is more than justified by the facts of the case as they existed at the period in which he wrote. His forcible epithets, unhappily, have lost none of their appropriateness and point at the present day. This depraved and perverted state of the human mind, so subtle in spirit and so manifold in form, that it might say—‘My name is Legion, for we are many,’—is thus specifically traced to its source :—

‘There are two things that are proper to Nature, SPACE and TIME. From these two things, man, while he is in the natural world, forms the ideas of his thought, and from thence forms his intellect. If he remain in these ideas, and do not raise his mind above them, he can in no wise perceive anything spiritual and Divine; these, in fact, he envelopes in ideas which take (their form and quality) from space and time, and in so far as he does this, to the same extent the light of his intellect becomes merely natural. To think from such light, while reasoning on things spiritual and Divine, is as if one thought from the deep gloom of night concerning those things which appear only in the light of day. This is the source of naturalism.

‘On the other hand, he who knows how to raise his mind above the ideas of thought which take (their form and quality) from space and time, the same passes from thick darkness into light (*lux*), and comes to have a relish for spiritual and Divine things, and at length sees those things that are in them and proceed from them: then, also, by



virtue of that light, he dispels the gross darkness of natural light (*lumen*), and banishes its fallacies from the midst to the sides.

'Every man who has intellect, is able to think in a sphere above those things that are proper to nature, and also actually does so think. He then affirms and sees that what is Divine, inasmuch as it is Omnipresent, is not in space. . . . If, on the contrary, he denies the Divine Omnipresence, and ascribes all things to nature, in this case, although he is able, yet he does not wish to be elevated (above the natural order).'\*

Again he observes :—

. . . 'How sensually, that is, how much from the bodily senses and the darkness thereof, they think, in things spiritual, who say that nature is by and from herself! They think from the eye, and are unable to think from the intellect. Thought from the eye closes the intellect; but thought that comes from the intellect opens the eye. They cannot think anything of that which is and **EXISTS** in itself, and that it is Eternal, Uncreate, and Infinite. Nor can they think anything of **LIFE**, but as of something volatile, that vanishes into nothing. Nor can they think otherwise of **LOVE** and **WISDOM**. That from the two latter all things pertaining to nature are derived, they can in no wise conceive. That such is the origin of all that pertains to nature cannot be seen, unless nature be regarded from the point of view of uses in their own series and order, and not from certain of her forms which are objects of sight alone. For *uses* are nothing but *life*. Moreover the series and order of uses are derived from wisdom and love: but the forms are what contain the uses. Wherefore if forms only be regarded, nothing pertaining to life can be seen in nature; still less anything that has rela-

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 89.

tion to love and wisdom, consequently nothing whatever of God.'\*

DR. MAUDESLEY.

*On the Cerebral Hemispheres.*

As a marked type of the naturalism thus accurately and powerfully depicted, reference may be made to the lucubrations contained in a pretentious work sophistically entitled *The Physiology and Pathology of Mind*. As will be seen from the specimens adduced, the author has deliberately closed the way against the entrance of even a single ray of genuine intellectual light, respecting the essence and quality of Mind properly so called.

If this boastful dogmatizer had allowed himself to think rationally, instead of merely maundering on the profound questions involved in a methodical and thorough-going study of purely mental phenomena, whether normal or abnormal, he could scarcely have failed to see that the very title of his book exhibits a most egregious blunder. This title contains, indeed, the one fundamental falsity which, like a black thread, permeates the entire tissue of his speculations, bearing with it, in the language of Swedenborg, the 'poison of the serpent of the tree of knowledge of good and evil,'† and destroying by its pestiferous influence every truth of fact or reason with which it happens to come in contact.

Superficial sciolists in philosophy have need to learn, as a

\* *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 46.

† 'Reasonings concerning the mysteries of faith, derived from things pertaining to the senses, were spoken of by them (i.e. the most ancient people) as the *poison of a serpent*: and the reasoners themselves as *serpents*; and because such reasoners argue much from sensual or visible things, which are terrestrial, corporeal, mundane, and natural, it was said that the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field.' (*Arcana Coelestia*, § 195.) He adds, that they were called serpents who had more faith in the things of sense than in what was given by Revelation. (*Ibid*, § 196.)

first lesson, that the physiologist and pathologist, as such, can have nothing to do with what transcends the sphere of the mere corporeal organism. It is the proper province of the psychologist to investigate the phenomena and essence of the soul and its mind. The most consummate physiologist is not necessarily a psychologist in any sense. A rational psychology, on the other hand, is impossible apart from a methodical and thorough-going analysis of the fundamental facts of physics, anatomy, and physiology.

The day is probably not far distant when the puerile fantasies of the sensationalist philosophists, so rife at present, will be consigned, by common consent of all sober-minded men, to that 'mere oblivion' which, in any case, is their certain ultimate doom.

The writings of Dr. Maudesley, in particular, furnish a flagrant example of an audacious and mischievous attempt to describe purely mental phenomena as if they were nothing but higher activities of brute matter. The perverted ingenuity displayed in this absolutely hopeless (one might be justified in saying *insane*) attempt, is quite deplorable. The noxious principles he advocates, with all the ardour and virulence of the most relentless religious fanatic, are, indeed, essentially identical with the 'psychological' teachings of Professors Bain and Carpenter, and of Mr. Herbert Spencer. He disdains, however, to adopt the sophistical comparison of the 'two-sided shield,' and unblushingly presents, for the acceptance of his readers, mere, naked, gross naturalism.

In the following passage, taken almost at random from Dr. Maudesley's book, this avowedly practical student of insanity,\* writing apparently under the influence of what Swedenborg would call an *imaginatio fanatica*, thus describes the cerebral hemispheres.

\* See his Preface, p. vi.

‘The cerebral hemispheres . . . are superadded in man and the higher animals for the further fashioning of impressions, or of sensory perceptions, into ideas or conceptions. . . . This important step in the evolution of the human mind . . . is strictly an *idealisation* of the sensory impressions, and represents, so to speak, an epigenetic development of nature. . . . Looking not at the individual man and his work as the end . . . it is sufficiently evident that the history of mankind is the history of the latest and highest organic development—that in the evolution of the human mind nature is undergoing its consummate development through man. . . . So exquisitely delicate, however, are the organic processes of mental development which take place in the minute cells of the cortical layers, that they are certainly, so far as our present means of investigation reach, quite impenetrable to the senses; the mysteries of their secret operations cannot be unravelled; they are like nebulae which no telescope can yet resolve.’\*

Out of ‘Laputa or the Empire,’ or even, perhaps, those doleful abodes with the inmates of which this writer has made himself too exclusively acquainted, it would not be easy to find so much absurdity condensed into the same small space, as the above extract displays. By those who are acquainted with even the rudiments of the subject it will be pronounced to be destitute of a single genuine conception or a single coherent sentence.

SWEDENBORG.

*On the Human Cerebrum.*

With the above remarkable specimen of ‘scientific’ rhapsodising, let the following account of the cerebrum given by our author, be honestly and intelligently compared, and then let

\* Maudezley, *Physiol. and Pathol. of Mind*, pp. 123, 124.

the candid reader decide for himself who is to be pronounced the sound rational psychologist, and who the insane dreamer.

'Here (in the cerebrum) is laid our common sensorium, as well as that inmost sensorium, or intellectorium, which *perceives* from its senses, *thinks* from perceptions, *judges* from thoughts, *chooses* from judgments, *desires* from the objects chosen, and finally from the objects desired, *determines* those that it wills, and thus brings forth by the motoria or muscles, the things that it has conceived by the sensoria.' He proceeds:— . . . These cortical substances or glands are the complements of the sensoria of the body, or taken collectively, they are the common sensorium of all; for when these substances are affected, the whole appendage of fibres, that is to say, the cerebrum and the body, are affected and suffer at the same time: indeed, exactly according to the degree and mode in which they are affected, the forces of the imagination are blunted, those of thought languish, the memory fails, the determinations of the will are embarrassed, the desires vacillate, and the sensations are benumbed.\*

DR. MAUDESLEY.

*On what he is pleased to term 'Mind.'*

One other specimen of Dr. Maudesley's 'psychological' flights of fancy may suffice to illustrate here the crass naturalism which marks the speculations of this extravagantly self-opinionated writer:—

'Mind, viewed in its scientific sense as a natural force, cannot be observed and handled and dealt with as a palpable object; like electricity, or gravity, or any other of the natural forces, it is appreciable only in the changes of matter which are the conditions of its manifestation. Few, if any, will now be found to deny that with each display of mental

\* *An. King.*, vol. ii. § 528.



power there are correlative changes in the material substratum ; that every phenomenon of mind is the result, as manifest energy, of some change, molecular, chemical, or vital, in the nervous elements of the brain.'\*

'Instead of mind being, as assumed, a wondrous entity, the independent source of power and self-sufficient cause of causes, an honest observation proves incontestibly that it is the most dependent of all the natural forces. It is the highest development of force, and to its existence all the lower natural forces are indispensably prerequisite.'†

'Without doubt the will is the highest force in Nature, the last consummate blossom of all her marvellous efforts. The natural product of the highest and completest reflection, it represents the exquisitely and subtly adapted reaction of man to the best insight into the relations in which he moves . . .

'The highest action of the will is . . . truly creative, for in it is initiated a new development of nature ; . . . If we ask whence comes the impulse that displays itself in this upward *nisus*, we can only answer lamely that it comes from the same unfathomable source as the impulse that inspires or moves organic growth throughout nature.'‡

It would be worse than waste of time to hold a disputation with persons who are capable of writing thus wildly and recklessly. Dr. Maudesley appears to belong to that class who, to use the language of Swedenborg, in the text, 'take their stand in the bodily senses ;' who, 'owing to ignorance, which is intellectual darkness, are incapable of being elevated into that spiritual light which is above the senses.' When he touches upon topics which relate to the soul or to the

\* Dr. Maudesley, *Physiol. and Pathol. of Mind*, pp. 41, 42.

† *Ibid.*, p. 67.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 188, 189.

mind, naturalism rushes in upon his thoughts, like a flood. Thus it is that in his dogmatic deliverances on subjects which transcend the region of the merely physical, he plays the part of an itinerant astrologer rather than that of an enlightened astronomer, of a butcher rather than of an anatomist, of a dealer in trivial pseudo-scientific gossip, rather than of a systematic investigator of scientific truth, that has its basis on facts solidly established, and duly colligated, in the light of clear and manifest principles.

He requires to be reminded, that of the vice of inveterate *confirmed* naturalism it may be as truly said as of any other form of vice—

When seen too oft, familiar with her face,  
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

It may charitably be supposed that the fallacies of which the writer has allowed himself to become the victim, have arisen chiefly from the circumstance that the intellectual and *spiritual-moral* tone of his mind has become gradually blunted and hardened (unconsciously to himself) owing to constant contact with the mysterious phenomena of lunacy in its more gross and appalling forms. Too much brooding, perhaps, over these melancholy manifestations of poor disordered fallen humanity, unaided by the benign influence of any purely and properly spiritual principles and motives (no allusion to which any where appears in his writings), may have been heedlessly permitted to raise an impassable barrier between his natural reason and that higher light, in which alone the intellect of man truly lives.

To all such, who have thus suffered themselves to be spoiled 'through philosophy and vain deceit,' may fitly be addressed the ardent exclamation of St. Augustin :—

Væ qui se avertunt a lumine tuo, et obscuritati suæ dulciter inhaerent, ô suavissima lux purgatæ mentis sapientia !

Tanquam enim dorsum ad te ponentes in carnali opere valut in umbra sua defiguntur, et tamen etiam ibi quod eos delectat, adhuc habent de circumfulgentia lucis tuse.

By way of contrast to the debasing Neo-Lucretianism of writers like Dr. Maudesley, and as indicating the real conditions of true freedom of thought, it may not be without advantage to conclude this note with a passage in which Swedenborg describes the ascent of man towards God, and draws the distinction between those who live the life of true men, and those who are but human cattle :—

‘Sensations,’ he says, ‘ascend from the body to the mind ; the soul descends with its light and virtue into the mind also : thus the mind is a centre, to which there is an ascent from the lowest sphere and a descent from the highest. Its activities, and the executive acts of the will, perpetually descend, for in order that any determination may take place, there must be a descent into the ultimate region of the world. But the end for which this ascent and descent is made, is in itself one or single ; for life or wisdom, that is, God, is the end of ends, or the first and the last.

‘Descent is said to be made *from Him*, when we descend, when we descend into the cupidities of the natural mind (*animus*) and the pleasures of the body, as ends ; while on the other hand ascent is said to be made *to Him*, when we ascend from these cupidities and pleasures, or even when we descend to them, regarding them but as means to the end of ends. Now when we thus ascend we necessarily ascend to truths, consequently to the very sciences themselves, or to the soul, which is order, truth, science, art, rule, and law ; and from these the ascent is then easy to life itself, which is wisdom, or above the truths and sciences of nature ; for then (wisdom) itself conspires as with a subject accommodated to the reception of life.

‘To ascend in this manner is to ascend above ourselves ;

for then the love of self stands far below ; and above it stands the love of country, and above this the love of God. They who thus ascend are they that live as true men, others are but human cattle ; the former are heroes among mortals ; the latter are the lowest of all mortals, however they may be accounted heroes.\*

Again, in contemplating that awful endowment of humanity, the power of rejecting the good and choosing the evil, he pathetically exclaims :—

‘Oh ! how does the mind degrade itself, when dimly illumined by a few scanty rays of life, it thinks from blind nature, and contemplates the order of nature as not order ! (Part II. §. 237.) If the intelligent mind governs nature suitably to its ends, how much more suitably to the ultimate end, or to the end of ends, must the infinitely wise God govern the universe and all things in the universe. It is a necessary consequence of a necessary Being, that all things whatever that have been, that are, and that will be, follow in a constant order as means to the perfection of the whole ; however it may appear to be otherwise, from the fact that things are not rightly viewed according to their circumstances, and that (we think that) at every moment God attempts by some new impulse to rule the universal world, just as we ourselves, to rule our own little world. But God sees and embraces all series of means and ends in the universe from the first to the last, simultaneously, in the present, from the highest point of view, in himself, most distinctly. We, on the other hand, see and embrace only some, and indeed few, series of means and ends ; in fact, the last immensely distant from the first : we do this successively, before doing so simultaneously ; from the past in order to be in the present ; from below, from contingent causes, and

\* *Econ. An. King.*, Part II. § 237.

withal most obscurely. For this reason a vast number of things appear to our most limited minds to be repugnant (to the laws of a Divine Providence). But I believe and trust that even we, despite our present feeling of their contrariety, will yet be led to confess, if not in this life, yet in the life to come, that nothing could possibly be more just, that nothing could be more wise.\*

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NOTE B B., p. 99.

COMMON NOTIONS CONCERNING THE SOUL.

(a)—*The atoms of Epicurus.*

'Epicurus renewed the theory of Democritus. Admitting nothing in mind but sensations, and nothing in nature but bodies, he inquired after the components of these compounds, and came thus to the idea of indivisible, eternal, and indestructible atoms, which are the principles of all things. Democritus had supposed that atoms were put in motion in a right line in the infinite void. Epicurus observed that this hypothesis was not sufficient to explain the universe even in a purely mechanical way; for it could not be conceived how the atoms could meet so as to form bodies. He endowed them, consequently, with a second motion in an oblique line, by which, carried in every direction, they would come, by their successive contacts and separations, to produce the different phenomena which compose the universe. Among these phenomena *he included the soul*, which is of a more refined matter than the body, but so united to it that the

\* *Econ. An. King.*, Part II., § 337.



dissolution of the one involves the dissolution of the other.\*

(b)—*The monads of Leibniz.*

'Toute la théorie des monades,' says Nourisson, 'dans sa plénitude, se trouve esquissée à grands traits, dans le passage suivant d'une lettre de Leibnitz à Bierlingius (1711).' (*Dutens*, t. V. p. 375.)

'Vous demandez des définitions de la matière, du corps, de l'esprit. La *matière* est ce qui consiste dans l'antitypie, ou ce qui résiste à la pénétration; et c'est pourquoi la matière nue est purement passive. Au contraire le *corps*, outre la matière, a aussi une force active. Le *corps* est ou une substance corporelle, ou une masse composée de substances corporelles. J'appelle *substance corporelle*, la substance qui consiste dans une substance simple ou monade (c'est-à-dire dans une âme ou un analogue de l'âme), et dans le corps organique qui lui est uni. La *masse* est un agrégat de substances corporelles. La *monade* ou la substance simple par sa nature, contient la perception et l'appétit; elle est ou primitive, c'est-à-dire *Dieu*, en qui se rencontre la dernière raison des choses; ou dérivée, c'est-à-dire monade créée; dérivée, la monade est ou bien douée de raison, et alors elle est *esprit*; ou bien douée de sentiment, et alors elle est *âme*; ou bien douée d'un degré inférieur de perception et d'appétit, et alors elle est un *analogue de l'âme*, qui se contente du simple nom de monade; car nous n'en connaissons pas les divers degrés. Toute monade d'ailleurs est inextinguible; car les substances simples ne peuvent naître ou finir que par

\* *Epitome of the History of Philosophy*, pp. 128, 129. (Aberdeen, 1849.) Cf. Note A, of this Appendix, where the materialistic opinions of Dr. Priestley are stated; and also the apparently similar views of Dr. Carpenter, as indicated in his comparison of the mind and body to a shield with two sides. The principles taught by both these writers seem, in substance, identical with those of Epicurus on the point in question.

création ou annihilation, c'est-à-dire miraculeusement. En outre, toute monade créée est douée de quelque corps organique, suivant lequel elle perçoit et appète ; quoique par les naissances et les morts ce corps soit diversement modifié, replié, transformé, soumis à un flux perpétuel. Les monades contiennent donc en elles l'entéléchie ou force primitive, de telle sorte que sans elles la matière serait purement passive, et une masse quelconque contient des monades innombrables. Quoique en effet tout corps organique de la nature ait sa monade qui lui réponde, il contient cependant dans ses parties d'autres monades, douées de même de leurs corps organiques, rudiments dont elles disposent, et la nature tout entière n'est pas autre chose. Car il est nécessaire que tous les agrégats résultent de substances simples, comme de leurs vrais éléments. Quant aux atomes, ou corps étendus et pourtant infrangibles, ce sont des choses imaginaires qui ne peuvent s'expliquer que par un miracle. Ils manquent de raison d'être ; on ne pourrait par eux rendre compte des forces et des mouvements, et alors même qu'on le pourrait, ils ne seraient pas des substances vraiment simples, par cela même qu'ils sont étendus et doués de parties.\*

(c)—*Simple substances of Wolf.*

*Ens simplex dicitur, quod partibus caret.*

*Ens simplex est indivisibile.* Ens simplex nullas prorsus habet partes, adeoque in ea non dantur plura a se invicem diversa, quorum unum extra alterum existit. Quoniam adeo in simplici ne fingere quidem licet talia, quorum uno annihilato subsistere posset alterum ; ens simplex divisibile non est. †

\* Nourisson, *La Philosophie de Leibnitz*, pp. 225, 226.

† *Ontologia*, §§ 673, 676.

SWEDENBORG.

*On forms and substances recipient of life.*

'That there are forms or substances which are recipients of life may be manifest from every single thing that appears in living creatures ; as also that the recipient forms or substances are disposed in a manner the most suitable to the inflowing of life. Apart from a reception of life in substances, which are forms, there could not possibly be a living thing either in the natural world or in the spiritual world. There are series of most pure primitive fibrils, in the similitude of fascicles, which constitute these forms. The case is similar with the forms which become modified therein to an eminent degree. For modifications receive their form from forms that are substances, in which they are, and from which they flow ; for substances or forms are determinant subjects. The learned have a perception of what belongs to man's life — those things for example that are of his thought and will — as being without substances or recipient forms. The reason is this. They entertain a belief that life or soul is a something of the nature of flame or æther, and, consequently, that it is such as to become dissipated after death. Hence arises the insane notion that there is no life after death.'\*

The deep darkness in which the common notions on the essence, form, and future life of the human soul are involved, is curiously illustrated in the poet Prior's 'Lines to his Soul,' which he thus addresses :—

' Poor little, pretty, fluttering thing,  
Must we no longer live together !  
And dost thou prune thy trembling wing,  
To take thy flight thou know'st not whither !

\* *Arcana Coelestia*, § 7408.

Thy humorous view, thy pleasing folly,  
 Lie all neglected, all forgot :  
 And pensive, wavering, melancholy.  
 Thou dread'st and hop'st thou know'st not what.'

The notion of the soul as being a mere breath is strikingly exemplified in the habits and usages of the ancient Gentiles :—

'Non seulement,' says a modern writer, 'les anciens recueilloient avec un respect religieux les dernières paroles des mourans, mais encore ils recueilloient avec le même soin leur dernier soupir, en appliquant leur bouche sur celle des personnes chéries. C'est ainsi que s'exprime Anne, la sœur de l'infortunée Didon (*Æneid* iv. 684) ;

. . . Extremus si quis super halitus errat,  
 Ore legam. . . .

Cicero dit les Siciliennes dont Verrès avoir fait mourir les fils (Verr. v. 45) :—*Matres miserae pernoctabant ad ostium carceris, ab extremo complexu liberorum exclusæ, quæ nihil aliud orabant nisi ut filiorum extremum spiritum accipere sibi liceret.*\*

There are cheering signs, however, showing themselves here and there, in unexpected quarters, which indicate that the light of a true intelligence is breaking on the darkness in which this subject has been hitherto shrouded. The following remarks on the formation and essential character of the *spiritual body* and its relation to the *soul* are taken from a well known religious periodical. They bear a close resemblance to the teachings of Swedenborg on a similar topic :—

"Your 'spiritual body' will be built by your soul. And therefore—here is a solemn fact—it will bear, stamped upon its whole being, the impress of your own individual character—of that one indestructible, unmistakable spiritual and

\* See *Encyc. Méthodique, (Antiquité)*, p. 282 ; also in Plate 373, where this curious characteristic of Pagan piety is portrayed to the life.

moral likeness into which you will have allowed yourself to grow, and which will belong to you, and to no other creature that does or that ever will exist! Thus it will indeed be *your body*; and through its features therefore will shine your 'expression.'"<sup>\*</sup>

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NOTE C C., p. 101.

THE RULING LOVE REVEALS ITSELF IN THE OUTER MAN.

The remarkable, and at first sight unintelligible and paradoxical statement contained in the text, cannot in any wise be clearly understood without some knowledge of what our author has taught, in various parts of his writings, concerning *forms*, the *ruling affection of man*, and *spheres of spiritual influence*.

As an introduction to the whole subject see *Arcana Coelestia* :—

*On Forms*, §§ 3821, 4223, 4224, 4985, 8603, 3484.

*On the Ruling Love*, §§ 1317, 6159, 6571, 6626, 6872, 10153.

*On the Divine Sphere*, §§ 9489-9492, 9499, 9534, 9874.

*On Speech*, § 4292; *on the Face*, § 9306; *on Gesture*, §§ 1388, 2153, 3393.

The accomplished author of *Philosophical Arrangements* thus admirably discourses, after the manner of the ancient philosophers, as to the intimate connexion between *figure* and *form* :—

'The form or essence of every natural substance (that is to say, in other words, its system of internal qualities) extends itself outwardly every way from within; and, as it

---

<sup>\*</sup> *Sunday Magazine*, for Nov. 1873, p. 92. A paper by the Hon. and Rev. Canon Lyttelton.



must necessarily stop somewhere (every individual being finite), so according to the different points at which it stops in its evolution, it communicates to each substance a different and peculiar figure. And hence the true character of every natural and specific figure, which ought not to be considered merely as a surface, but as a bound ; the bound to which the internal essence or form every way extends itself, and at which, when it is arrived, it finally terminates.

‘For this reason it is, that of all the external qualities there is none so capital, so characteristic, as *figure*. It is a kind of universal signature, by which nature makes known to us the several species of her productions ; the primary and obvious test, by which we pronounce this a vegetable, and that an animal, this an oak, and that a lion : so that if we neither suspect fraud, nor the gullibility of our own organs, we commonly rest here and inquire no further.’\*

Malebranche arrived at a similar notion, which he describes and illustrates in his characteristically clear and simple way :—

‘L’étendue est capable de recevoir de deux sortes de figures. Les unes sont seulement extérieures, comme a rondeur à un morceau de cire : les autres sont intérieures, et ce sont celles qui sont propres à toutes les petites parties dont la cire est composée : car il est indubitable que toutes les petites parties qui composent un morceau de cire ont des figures fort différentes de celles qui composent un morceau de fer. J’appelle donc simplement *figure* celle qui est extérieure, et j’appelle *configuration* la figure qui est intérieure et qui est nécessaire à toutes les parties dont la cire est composée, afin qu’elle soit ce qu’elle est.’†

\* Harris's *Works*, pp. 297, 298. (Oxford Ed. 1841.) See the interesting note from Simplicius on the relation between *εἶδος* and *μέγεθος*, a point so well understood by Aristotle.

† *Recherchs de la Vérité*, Liv. i. c. 1.

What intellects of the highest order were able to discern only dimly, and, as it were, *de longinquo* and in a haze, Swedenborg saw with the utmost clearness and distinctness : and in philosophic language, altogether without a rival in its perspicuity, force, and precision, he presented his idea before the mind's eye of his reader, in the pure white light of genuine truth. His philosophy of Forms alone would suffice to place him far above all philosophers ancient or modern.

He thus distinguishes figure and form :—

‘FORM is essential determination, or determinate fluxion, of parts, points, substances, forces ; in this sense we have the form of motion, the form of modifications, the form of substances, these forms being coincident. FIGURE, on the other hand, is the boundary of a particular extension, or the termination of the fluxions of form ; that is, the terminus of essential determinations ; and may be called external form.’\*

Dr. Reid, in an instructive disquisition into the nature of First Principles, conducted with his usual sagacity and deep penetration, lays it down as a first principle, ‘*That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind.*’

In explanation of this principle, he proceeds to say :— ‘That many operations of the mind have their natural signs in the countenance, voice, and gesture, I suppose every man will admit. *Omnis enim motus animi, says Cicero, suum quemdam habet a natura vultum, et vocem, et gestum.* The only question is, whether we understand the signification of those signs, by the constitution of our nature, by a kind of natural perception similar to the perceptions of sense ; or whether we gradually learn the signification of such signs

\* *Æcon. An. King.*, Part. iii. § 262.

from experience, as we learn that smoke is a sign of fire, or that the freezing of water is a sign of cold ! I take the first to be the truth.'

He thus admits that such knowledge has an internal, supersensual, that is, a spiritual origin. That it should be derived from external experience seems to him incredible. After adducing a number of reasons in support of his opinion, he concludes by saying:—'For these reasons, I conceive, it must be granted, not only that there is a connexion established by Nature\* between certain signs in the countenance, voice, and gesture, and the thoughts and passions of the mind ; but also, that, by our constitution, we understand the meaning of those signs, and from the sign conclude the existence of the thing signified.'†

Lord Bacon had already observed :—

'The lineaments of the body do disclose the dispositions and inclinations of the mind in general ; but the motions and gestures of the countenance and parts do not only so, but disclose likewise the seasons of access, and present humour and state of the mind and will.'‡

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#### NOTE D D., p. 113.

##### SWEDENBORG A SPIRITUAL FISHERMAN.

THE foregoing Tractate on Influx is professedly an Essay written in the interests of a true Christian Psychology. Not until the concluding paragraph is the subject of Theology formally introduced. The author has, nevertheless, assumed everywhere throughout his exposition, that between philosophy and theology there exists a most intimate connexion.

\* By which Dr. Reid means, of course, the Divine Author of Nature.

† Sir W. Hamilton's *Reid's Works*, pp. 449, 450.

‡ Bacon's Works, Vol. iv. p. 376 (Ed. by Spedding, &c.)

The essential character of that connexion is clearly indicated in the short dialogue with which the little work is brought to a close.

It is deeply interesting to the systematic student of Swedenborg's writings, to note the unassuming and apparently incidental manner in which the venerable philosopher and theologian, then arrived at a ripe and full old age, 'like as a shock of corn cometh in his season,' and in entire and complete possession of the most powerful and cultivated intellect as yet vouchsafed to any human being, brings before his readers, in one clear view, and in a spirit of child-like simplicity, the chief characteristics of his wonderful literary labours, and the one special purpose of his sacred and exalted mission to the Church at large.

He describes, in his own characteristic way, how from being a philosopher he became a theologian. In doing so he makes, as usual, a direct reference to Holy Scripture, with the view of notifying to the reader, that his preparation for the office to which he was called, had a specifically supernatural and Divine source. He proceeds to draw a significant comparison between the vast change which, at an advanced period of his active life, had taken place in the character of his ordinary vocation and pursuits, and that which occurred in the case of the first disciples of our Lord, who from being simple fishermen, had been, after due preparation, divinely called to be 'fishers of men.'

Up to a certain definite date (*anno* 1743),\* the carefully

\* See Swedenborg's letter to the Rev. Thomas Hartley, dated London, 1769, translated and appended by the latter to his translation of the Tractate on Influx, published in 1770. Also, another letter to the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, printed in Dr. J. F. J. Tafel's Vindication of Swedenborg. (London, 1852.) In both these communications it is solemnly declared, in language free from the slightest trace of enthusiasm, that the Lord *manifested Himself in Person*, to our author, in the year 1743. These facts alone, when duly considered in themselves, in their

educated son of the Swedish Lutheran Bishop had been, unconsciously, in a high and peculiar sense, a *spiritual fisherman from his earliest youth*.<sup>\*</sup> He proceeds to explain to his reverend and intelligent interlocutor,<sup>†</sup> a form of speech which, on a first view, must necessarily have appeared to him altogether new and strange. This he does in language which leaves no doubt whatever as to the truth intended to be taught.

The explanation given of the term 'spiritual fisherman' is specially worthy of notice, as affording a thoroughly typical example of the method according to which Swedenborg (contrary to the vulgar impression concerning his mode of interpretation) invariably derives spiritual doctrine from the literal sense of the Word, and confirms it by the same. In the present instance a passage is quoted from the Old Testament in which, by the expression *fishers of men*, the doctrine in question is openly taught, in the *ipsisima verba* of Holy Scripture. It is next shown, in accordance with this doctrine, that a spiritual fisherman means one who teaches spiritual truths so as to enable them to be understood in the light of sound reason.<sup>‡</sup> Herein lies the peculiar character-

profound relations, serve to expose the diabolical character of the attempt to impose on the public the abominable forgery entitled *Swedenborg's Drömmar*, 1744, &c. (Stockholm, 1859.)

<sup>\*</sup> The bearing of this remarkable statement upon Swedenborg's general claim to be regarded as the herald of a New Dispensation, and also upon the character of the estimate which is to be formed of his purely philosophical works in connexion with this claim, has not yet received that careful scrutiny to which it is entitled, in any attempt to form a just and adequate notion of the intrinsic character of his labours and mission.

<sup>†</sup> It is noteworthy that in the dialogue in question, it is a Lutheran Bishop (Dr. Ettinger, of Würtemberg) to whom the information it contains is addressed. This is strictly in keeping with the uniform spirit and manner of our author's writings. They are specially and peculiarly addressed to the Clergy.

<sup>‡</sup> Cf. *Apocalypse Explained*, § 820. 'The reason why these three



istic of the New Theology which Swedenborg was commissioned, in a supernatural manner, to make known to the Church. Hence the ignorance and folly of those who accuse Swedenborg of 'mysticism' or 'enthusiasm.' In the genuine doctrinal sense of the term here given, he claims to have been a *fisherman* from his earliest youth. His works will be found, by all who study them *consecutively* with the requisite intelligence and candour, to furnish the most complete and convincing evidence of the validity of this high claim. Such a study will also serve to impart a more or less adequate notion of the fulness and depth of meaning contained in the apparently simple declaration that 'spiritual truth has for its foundation natural truth.' These words contain the key to a true conception of the express design and scope of Swedenborg's writings. They anticipate, by more than a century, the cavils of an irreverent and ignorant anti-Christian scepticism, as well as the unworthy suspicions and fears of a decaying theology. They point the way to a complete 'reconciliation of theology and science.' They imply that these two vast spheres of mental activity and research ought to be regarded as being, in themselves, mutually harmonious and correspondent; that they occupy, so to say, two entirely different levels; that one lies on a plane *distinctly above* the other; that each must be studied in the order and degree proper to it; and that, when thus studied, it will be seen that they cannot possibly be confounded or amalgamated, any more than parallel lines can be made to meet.

apostles (Peter, James, and John) were fishermen, and why the Lord said unto them, Follow Me, and I will make you fishers of men, was because to fish signifies to instruct the natural man; for there were at that time, as well within as without the Church, natural men, who, as they received the Lord and truths from Him, became spiritual.' Elsewhere he observes that in the light of the New Truths the intellect is allowed to enter into and penetrate all the hidden things of the Word. (*True Christian Religion*, § 503.)

The noble and sacred use of Science, according to Swedenborg, is to serve as a fixed and unmoveable *basis* for spiritual truths. If this be so, then it follows that the thorough comprehension of a true and reasoned philosophy forms the necessary propaedeutick to an adequate understanding of the New Theology.

The honest and intelligent student of Swedenborg's writings, therefore, is under no necessity either to ignore or fear the advance of true science. On the contrary, he hails with delight every newly-discovered fact, law, or principle, in every department of scientific research, as soon as it has been solidly and impregnably established on reasonable evidence, within its own proper sphere. He, of all others, feels intimately convinced that one of the many and admirable final causes of the rapidly increasing discoveries of modern science, is to extend indefinitely the horizon of man's rational faculties; and, especially, to enable the Churchman to strengthen and enlarge his *intellectual* vision of things spiritual and eternal. Thus as the domain of science proper widens and deepens, and as the human intellect becomes more and more purified from fallacies and falsities, the man of the Church will become more and more prepared to receive, under rational and intelligible forms, those wonderful radiations of spiritual light proceeding from the Holy Word, thus opened in this day of doubt, disbelief, and denial, for the edification and use of that glorious Church of the Future, represented under the Divine symbol of the Holy City New Jerusalem,\* and of whose Advent various significant indications are now discernible over the universal Christian world.

\* Rev. c. xxi. 2.

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